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This volume presents a collection of papers touching on various issues concerning the syntax 
and semantics of predicative constructions. 
A hot topic in the study of predicative copula constructions, with direct implications for the 
treatment of he (how many he's do we need?), and wider implications for the theories of 
predication, event-based semantics and aspect, is the nature and source of the situation 
argument. Closer examination of copula-less predications is becoming increasingly relevant to 
all these issues, as is clearly illustrated by the present collection. Five main classes of copula- 
less predication figure in the research reported here: 
(i)  primary predications lacking an overt copula, such as occur in Russian or Chinese 
(cf. Tang's paper), and also child English (cf. Becker's paper) 
(ii)  depictives (e.g. she met him &&) 
(ii)  resultatives (e.g. she shot him deam 
(iii)  complement small clauses (governed by e.g. epistemic, causative or perception verbs), 
(v)  predication internal to complex VPs of the dative shift or spraylload types 
(cf. Brandt's paper) 
A related hot topic is the stage level 1 individual level distinction. The linguistic importance of 
the SWIL distinction is due to the role identified for it (a) as a defining factor in various 
constructions -  e.g. in  'epistemic' small clauses like consider+NP+Pred, Pred is IL only, 
while in resultatives and depictives (V+NP+Pred) and there+be+NP+Pred constructions, it is 
SL  only; (b) in determining morphological form of the predicate -  e.g. the variation between 
the Instrumental Case and 'Agreeing Case' forms of Russian secondary adjectival predicates; 
and (c) in accounting for restrictions on the interpretation of the subject of the predication 
('subject specificity' effects, cf. Diesing's Mapping Hypothesis). 
Three contributions (Bailyn, Demjjanow & Strigin, and Hinterholzl) are directly 
concerned with the syntactic and semantic factors governing the Case alternation in 
adjectival predicates in Russian. 
Two papers deal with other issues concerning the lLPISLP distinction: 
Becker discusses evidence that the ILPISLP distinction plays a role in patterns of copula 
omission in child English. 
Percus reflects on semantic and pragmatic constraints on temporal adverbial modification, 
an issue crucial in determining the nature of the ILPJSLP distinction. 
Three of the papers deal with different aspects of predication and specificity in Chinese: 
Zhang presents an analysis of the syntactic properties of, and differences between two 
main types of secondary predication (depictive and resultative constructions) in Chinese. 
Tang investigates copula-less primary predications in Chinese and pragmatic principles 
that govern their distribution 
Tsai explores a Mapping Hypothesis approach to the distribution of specificity effects in 
object position in Chinese clauses. The remaining two papers are concerned with the nature and role of events and 'internal 
predication' in complex verb phrases. 
Rothstein examines the concept 'incremental theme' from the point of view of the 
semantic structure of accomplishment predicates, both lexical (build a house) and derived 
(i.e. resultatives such as sing the baby asleep). 
Brandt explores syntactic and semantic links between simple predications (especially 
there-constructions) and complex verb-phrase types involving 'argument shift' (especially 
'dative shift' and spraylload verbs). 
All of the papers except those by Demjjanow & Strigin and Zhang are based on presentations 
at the workshop 'Predicative Constructions' held in ZAS in October 2000. 
The uncommon amount of ink devoted here to Russian and Chinese reflects the fact that these 
two languages figure prominently in the editors' current research. 
The editors The Syntax of Slavic Predicate Case 
John Frederick Bailyn 
State University of New York at Stony Brook 
jhailvn@notes.cc.sunvsb.edu 
In  this  article  I  provide  a  syntactic  framework for  case  patterns  found  in  Slavic 
secondary predicates, such as those shown in (1). 
1)  a.  Ja  nagel  ego  pjanym  RUSSIAN 
Ii-Nom  found  himk-Acc  drunkk-Instr 
"I  found him drunk." 
b.  ?Ja  naSel  ego  p4janogo 
Ii-Nom  found  himk-Acc  dmnkk-Acc 
"I  found him drunk." 
Descriptively,  the paradigm  can  be characterized  as the  alternation  between  the predicate 
instrumental (la) and what I will call "Sameness of case" (lb), but which is commonly known 
as "agreeing case".  "Sameness" or "agreeing case" means the appearance on the predicate of 
the same case that marks an argument in the sentence, such as the Accusative on drunk in (lb) 
mathcing the Accusative of the direct object him.  The purpose of this article is to show that 
this  variation  reduces  to the festure makeup of  a functional  category.  In  this  sense I am 
supporting a claim made by Rothstein (1992), namely that predication is at its core a syntactic 
relation,  and  that  thematic  and  interpretative  aspects  of  it  are in  a  sense  secondary,  not 
defining (which is certainly not to say that they do not exist). 
Clearly, this  view  is  not  shared  by  all  linguists  working  on  predication  --  indeed 
Hinterhoelzl  (2000) starts with quite a quite different claim, which 1 will call the "semantic 
approach to predicate case choice", given in (2): 
2)  The semantic approach to predicate case choice (Hinterhoelzl 2000, emphasis mine): 
The factors  that determine which of the two [predicate case].forms,  the agreeing 
or the  invariant ,form, is auarooriate in a given  sentence  are  all  semantic in 
nature. 
A  similar view  is put  forth in  Kennedy & Filip (this volume).  I will  present  a particular 
approach to the syntax of case on predicates which, if it is at all on the right track, will throw 
the statement  in (2) into doubt, at least in its strongest form.  Instead, I would like to put forth 
a different kind of claim, on that could be named "the syntactic approach to predicate case", 
as given in (3): 
3) The syntactic approach to predicate case (this article): 
a.  The factors  that  determine  which  of  the  two predicate  case forms,  the 
agreeing  or  the  invariant form,  is possible  in  a  given  sentence  are  all 
syntactic in nature. 
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b.  Semantic distinctions are relevant only in those cases where the syntax allows 
both  forms. 
(3b) indicates that  the  two  views  are  not  necessarily  incompatible, but  that  (3a) provides 
possible  configurations  for  the  two  case  patterns,  and  only  in  cases  where  both  are 
syntactically available, does (2) kick in, as stated in (3b).  Essentially, I show that there is no 
more  direct connection  between  the  interpretation  and the morphology  of  predicates  than 
there is between the interpretation and morphology of arguments. 
The  article  is  structured  as  follows.  In  Section  1,  I  present  the  Structural  Case 
Hypothesis  for  predicates,  showing  that  given  a  few  simple  assumptions, predicate  case 
should turn  out to be a simple analog of  argument case, a desired result  in  an economical 
theory of  language.  In  section 2, I present the Slavic data, pointing out along the way cases 
that  appear  intractable for semantic approaches  such  as  (2).  In  section  3, I provide the 
particular  syntactic  framework I am assuming,  independently  motivated  for predication  in 
non-Slavic languages.  In  section 4, I show how this framework provides an elegant account 
of the two kinds of  Slavic predicate case.  Further, I show that only this syntax of predicate 
case allows a close parallel between argument case and predicate case.  In section 5, I address 
some  important  additional  questions  the  account  raises.  In  section  6,  I conclude  with 
discussion of the compatibility between semantic and syntactic accounts. 
1  The Structural Case Hypothesis for Predicates 
In supporting (3), I will argue for a form of Maling & Sprouse's (1995) Structural Case 
Hypothesis for predicates, presented in (4). 
4) The Structural Case Hypothesis for Predicates (Maling & Sprouse 1995)' 
a. Predicate NPs always receive case str~~cturally 
b.  Predicate NPs are assigned structural case in the same way as argument NPs 
c.  Case "agreement" is epiphenomena1 
4)  d. Predicate NPs get case via the same mechanism as verbal arguments (this  article) 
Any  theory  that  requires  independent  case mechanisms,  such  as  "case  by  agreement"  for 
handling predicate NPs, in addition to those needed for argument case, is less economical, and 
should be dispreferred, all else being equal.  Such a theory moves morphology and syntax 
closer together; this possibility serves as the theoretical core of this article.  (4d) differs from 
the 3 specific proposals of Maling & Sprouse (1995) only in adding the possibility of  a kind 
of  Lexical  Case  for  predicates.  By  showing how  predicate  NPs  get  case  via  the  same 
mechanisms  as argument case, we  eliminate the necessity for distinct case "strategies" for 
predicates.  With  respect  to  predicates,  this  obviates  the  need  for  thinking  of  them  as 
"caseless", or not subject to "visibility" in the Government and Binding sense.  (Chomsky and 
Lasnik  (1991), den Dikken & Naess  (1993)).~ Rather, it allows us to maintain the strong 
versions of the early GB Case Filter, provided in (5): 
5) The Case Filter  (Early Government & Binding (GB) Theory) 
--> a. Every phonetically realized NP must be assigned (abstract) case  (original version) 
-->  b.  *NP if NP has phonetic form and no case  (standard version) The Syntax of Slavic Predicate Case 
(5) covers all NPs, including predicates, and under Minimalist  assumptions, the distinction 
between arguments and predicates, in terms of case theory, should also not be relevant.  As 
nominals,  predicates  have particular  formal features,  associated  with  the morphology  with 
which they are selected into the Numeration, which must be checked off during the course of 
a convergent derivation, as discussed in Chomsky (1995): 
6)  "Generalizing the checking theory, let us  assume that,  like verbs, nouns are drawn 
from  the  lexicon  with  all  of  their  morphological  features,  including  Case  and  @- 
features, and these too must be checked in  the appropriate position ...  This checking 
too can take place at any stage in a derivation to LF."  (Chomsky 1995: 196.197) 
I will show that (6) is true in the same way for predicates just as it is true for arguments, that 
is, that there are instances of  structural case on predicates, and there is "Lexical" case -- that 
is, morphological  marking determined by  features of  a particular lexical  item mediated the 
same way as with argument NPs.  Under the system that emerges, "agreement" will indeed 
turn  out to be epiphenomena], as Maling & Sprouse claim, and "Sameness" will be  seen to 
result from true structural identity.  Thus predicate NPs will indeed turn out to get case via the 
same mechanisms  as  verbal  arguments,  a  welcome  and  probably unavoidable  result  if  the 
Minimalist case theory is at all on the right track.  In the spirit of Maling & Sprouse, I propose 
a theory that eliminates recourse to special treatment of predicate case such as "default" case, 
"case by  agreement", or Babby's (1989) "Semantic case"  whereby ser?za~ztic  case includes any 
direct  link  between  the  semantics  and  the  morphology,  without  any  syntactic  mediation. 
Indeed, in  the course of  the discussion we will also see instances in which one or the other 
pattern  is  absent  for purely  structural  reasons,  where  a  purely  semantic  approach  would 
predict them both to be possible.  Only in cases where both patterns are possible syntactically 
do semantic distinctions come in. 
2  Slavic Predicate Case 
In  the  Slavic  languages,  there  are  only  two  case  patterns  possible  on  secondary 
predicates  (see Nichols  1973,  1981, Franks  1995, among many  others).  One pattern  is 
known as the "predicate instrumental", the other I will call "Sameness of case".'  The two are 
exemplified in (la-b), repeated as (7) below: 
7)  Ja  nagel  ego  p'janym  /  p'janogo 
Ii-Nom  found  himk-hcc  drunkk-Instr  drunkk-Acc 
"I  found him drunk." 
In this section, I provide the relevant patterns for arguments and adjuncts from various Slavic 
languages.  (The distinctions are given in terms of  syntactic context -- the reader should see 
that a purely  semantic distinction is probably not directly derivable from the configurational 
generalizations given here.). 
In Russian, primary predicates are marked with "Sameness", whereas all argument 
secondary predicates and NP adjuncts show Instrumental.  Only AP adjuncts allow both. 
Examples are given in (8), (9-  lo), (1 1-12), and (13-14) respectively: 
Russian Primary Predicates:  Only "Sameness". 
8)  a.Ivan  --  durak.  *b. Ivan  --  durakomlduraka ... 
Ivan-NOM  fool-Nom  Ivan-NOM  fool-InstrIGen etc. John Frederick Bailvn 
"Ivan is a fool" 
c.  Ivan  --  ~~UP(YJ)  *d. Ivan  --  glupym/glupogo  ... 
Ivan-NOM  stupid-Nom  Ivan-NOM  stupid-InstdGen etc. 
"Ivan is stupid" 
Russian Secondary Predicate arguments:  Only Instrumental. 
9)  a.  Ivan  kaietsja  glupym.  I  *glup I *glupyj. 
Ivan-Nom  seems  stupid-Instr  stupid-Nom (short or long) 
"Ivan seems (to be) stupid." 
b.  Ivan  kaietsja  durakom  1  *durak 
Ivan,-Nom  seems  fool,-Instr  fooli-Nom 
"Ivan seems (to be) a fool." 
10)  a.  Ja  sEitaju  Ivana  glupym.  /  *g  lupogo  ... 
I  consider  Ivan-Acc  stupid-Instr  stupid-Acc 
"I consider Ivan stupid." 
b.  Ja  sCitaju  Ivana  durakom  /  *duraka.. 
I-Nomconsider  Ivani-Acc  fooli-Instr  fooli-Acc 
"I consider Ivan a fool." 
Russian Secondarv Predicate NP adiuncts  Only Instrumental. 
I 1) Oni  nazvali ego  direktorom  I  *direktora 
theyi-Nom  named himk-hcc  directork-Instr  directork-Acc 
"They named him director." 
12) On  rabotaet  vraEom  /  *vraE 
hei-Nom  works  doctor,-Instr  doctori-Nom 
"He works as a doctor." 
Russian Secondary Predicate AP adiuncts  Both, but "Sameness" restricted. 
13) Ja  nagel  ego  p'janym  /  ?p'janogo  [both possible] 
I;-Nom  found  himk-hcc  drunkk-Instr  drunkk-hcc 
"I found him drunk." 
14) MY  tancevali  golymi  /  ?golye  [both possible] 
we;-Nom  danced  nude,-Instr  nudei-Nom 
"We danced nude." 
In  Polish, lexical category is relevant for primary predicates, where we find Instrumental on 
NPs and "Sameness" on APs, as shown in (15.16): 
Polish Primarv Predicates  APs = "Sameness", NP = Instrumental 
15) a.  Jan-Nom  jest  glodny-Nom  *b.  Jan-Nom  jest  glodnym-Instr 
Jan  is  hungry  Jan  is  hungry The Syntax of Slavic Predicate Case 
16) *a. Jan-Nom  jest  student.-Nom b.  Jan-Nom  jest  studentem.-Instr 
Jan  is  a student  Jan  is  a student 
Polish Secondarv Predicates  "Sameness" 
17)  a.  Znalazlem  go  pijanego  /  "pijanym 
(POL) 
I-found  him-Acc  drunk-Acc  drunk-Instr 
"I found him drunk." 
b.  Uwazam  go  za  glupca  I  *glupcem 
I-consider  him-Acc  as  fool-Acc  fool-Instr 
In  Serbo-Croatian,  the argumendadjunct distinction appears more relevant.  Instrumental  is 
lexically  selected  by  verbs  such  as  smatrati  ('to  consider'),  whereas  adjuncts  show 
"Sameness". This is shown in (18-19): 
Serbo-Croatian Secondary Predicate arguments:  Instrumental  (when  selected  by  the 
verb) 
18)  a.  (Ja)  smatram  ga  budalom  I  * budala  (sc) 
I-Nom consider  him-Acc  a fool-Instr  a fool-Acc 
"I consider him a fool." 
Serbo-Croatian Secondary Predicate adiuncts:  "Sameness" 
19) a.  (Ja)  pleSem  go  *b. (Ja)  pleSem  golim. 
I-Nom dance-  I sg nude-Nom  I-Nom dance- 1  sg nude-Instr 
"1  dance nude." 
c.  NaSao  sam  ga  pijanog  *d.  NaSao  sam  ga  pijanim 
found  aux- 1 sg  him-Acc  drunk-Acc  found  aux-lsg  him-Acc  drunk-Instr 
"I found him drunk." 
Thus we find that there is morphological parametrized variation with respect to the AP vs. NP 
distinction and the argumendadjunct distinction.  Both these patterns of variation alone serve 
as an initial argument against the Semantic Approach to Predicate Case, in that the meaning 
of the verb or predicate in question is not directly relevant in determining the case variation. 
Further, it is clear that identical  sentences in  different but closely related languages can be 
marked with distinct morphology, despite having presumably identical semantics.  In the next 
section, I provide the particular theory of predicational syntax that I assume and that provides 
a configurational framework for predicate case checking. 
3  The Syntax of Predication 
There are two major directions  in the syntax of  predication within the generative tradition, 
summarized in (20): 
20)  a.  The Specifier Hypothesis  (Stowell 1981, Kooprnan and Sportiche 1991) 
i) The surface subject in MC predication originates universally in [Spec, V]  (and raises) 
ii) The surface subject in SC  predication originates universally in  [Spec, L]  (L=Lex Cat) John Frederick Builyn 
b.  The Functional Category Hvpothesis (Chomsky 1995, Bowers 1993,  Laurenqot 1995, Stowell 1995) 
i)  In MC predication, the surface subject originates in a functional category outside minimal 
VP 
ii)  In SC predication, the surface subject originates in a functional category outside minimal 
LP 
In  this  article,  I  will  argue  for  a  particular  version  of  (20b),  The  Functional  Category 
Hypothesis, namely that in which predication is directly represented by a functional category 
Pred(ication)P, as argued for extensively in Bowers  1993, 1997.  Major characteristics of this 
theory are provided in (2 I): 
21)  a.  There exists a functional category PredP (PrP) for every instance of "predication" 
b.  Every  10  selects  PredP (primary  predication),  some V's  select  PredP (secondary 
predication). 
c.  Predo  selects any  lexical  category  as  its  complement;  structurally,  the traditional 
"predicate" is the Predo complement. 
d. Small clauses are PredP's, either selected (arguments) or adjoined (adjuncts). 
e. Argument small clauses are raising structures. 
r.  Adjunct small clauses are control structures. 
Examples of primary and secondary instances of PredP are given in (22): 
22) a. I saw John in the kitchen.  Pro 1 selects VP,  Pro 2 selects PP 
b.  I consider John a fool.  Pro 1 selects VP,  Pro 2 selects NP 
c.  I saw John singing the blues.  Pro  1 selects VP,  Pro 2 selects VP 
d.  I consider John crazy.  Pro  1 selects VP,  pro 2 selects AP 
The structure of I  consider John crazy is given in (23): 
23)  a.  [p  I consider [p,p  John [p,'  [pr e  ][~p  crazy] ] ] ]  (Bowers 1993: 595) = (9d) 
b.  Structure of (23a)" 
TP 
NPnomA 




It is beyond the scope of this article to provide a full justification for this approach to 
predication.  However, a short discussion of its principle advantages other than those 
concerning Slavic predicate case are in order.  To begin with, the PredP approach, first 
presented in Chomsky (1957), provides a particular syntactic configuration for the semantic The S)~ntwc  of Slavic Predicate Cave 
notion of predication.  Second, it maintains both crucial aspects of the VP Internal Subject 
Hypothesis and a uniform X'-theory.  Third, it allows for complex internal structure of 
predicates, as shown in (24): 
24)  I consider  [Predp Fred  [~p  a mensch] I [~p  the best  person  for the job]  1 [DpMary's worst 
enemy] 1. 
Fourth,  it  accounts  for  the  exceptional  ability  of  predicates  to  allow  conjunction  of 
(apparently) unlike categories, such as those shown in (25): 
25)  a.  I consider  Jim  [,,crazy]]  and  [,,a  fool] 
b. I consider  Jim  [AP  shrewd]  and  [pp  in the know] 
Under the PredP approach, (25) is represented as (26),  immediately providing a constituency 
solution  for  (25),  whereby  it  is  in  fact  two  PredPs  that  are  conjoined,  not  two  unlike 
categories: 
25)  a. I consider  Jim,  [,,,  ti  [,p  crazy]] and  [prp ti  [DP a fool]] 
b. I consider  Jimi  [,,,  ti  [Ap shrewd]  and  [,,,  t  [pp  in the know] 
Further,  the  PredP  approach  allows  unergatives  vs.  unaccusatives  to  be  distinguished 
structurally, provides the necessary number of  adverb positions and provides for a reasonable 
classification  for elements such as English as (see Bowers 1997 and Bailyn (forthcoming) for 
discussion).  For  our  purposes,  however,  the  most  important  advantage  of  the  Bowers 
hypothesis is one not discussed in  the original work at all, namely that it allows an elegant 
functional  category  account  of  case  checking  on  predicates  that  is  otherwise unavailable 
without additional stipulation. It is to that analysis that we now turn. 
4  The Syntax of Slavic Predicate Case 
The  essential  proposal  of  this  section  is  that  the  two  kinds  of  predicate  case, 
Instrumental and "Sameness", correspond to the two familiar kinds of argument case:  Lexical 
case and structural case respectively.  Given the structures provided above under the PredP 
theory, these two case mechanisms can be implemented without any additional stipulations, 
thus supporting the direction of Maling & Sprouse (1995). 
4.1  Lexically determined Predicate Case (Instrumental) 
Typically, Lexical case on arguments is taken to differ from structural case in  that it 
depends cmcially on  idiosyncratic case assignment properties of  a particular head, usually  a 
verb or preposition, whose exact case requirements must be stated in the lexicon (that is, they 
cannot be derived from the structure alone).  Examples of Lexical case on prepositional and 
verbal arguments from Russian are given in (26). Violations are shown in (27). 
26) Lexical case on arguments: 
Prepositions  ye& 
a.  k  Ivanu  b.  zavidovat'  Ivanu 
to  Ivan-Dat  to envy  Ivan-Dat 
c.  u  Ivana  d.  bojat'sja  Ivana Juhn Frederick Builvn 
at  Ivan-Gen  to fear  Ivan-Gen 
e.  c  Ivanom  f.  interesovat'sja  Ivanom 
with  Ivan-Instr  to be interested in  Ivan-Instr 
27)  Lexical case violations (cf. 26)): 
k  *Ivane  / *Ivana  / *Ivanom 
to  Ivan-Prep /  Ivan-Gen  /  Ivan-Instr 
My claim  is that the Instrumental case marking on Slavic predicates  is similar -- it results 
from particular  properties  of  the PredO  head itself, and cannot be directly derived from the 
configuration  in  which  the predicate  is  located.  Before turning to the exact mechanisms, 
however, it  is necessary to take  a look at how Lexical  case might  work under  minimalist 
assumptions.  Here I will maintain a view that is derived from its Government and Binding 
counterpart, and requires a minor revision of a basic assumption of  the minimalist checking 
theory, without which Lexical and structural case cannot be adequately distinguished. 
Recall that under GB theory, Lexical case involved direct case assignment under 
government to the complement of a theta-assigning head.  Such a situation is sketched in (28). 
28)  Lexical case assignment (under GB theory): 
\7'  P' 
A  6  fl NP  P  NP  (particular case assigned 
UA  -  depends on the V or P) 
** case assigned *- 
In  (29), I present the Predicate Instrumental Rule, based on work by Bailyn & Rubin (1991), 
which  assumed exactly  a Lexical  case assignment  ~tructure.~  The GB version  of  Lexical 
Predicate Case is given in (29), from Bailyn & Rubin (1991): 
29)  Predicate Instrumental Rule "Rule I"  (Russian) 
PredO assigns Instrumental Case to its complement 
30)  Schematic view of Instrumental case assignment under GB theory 
Pred'  (particular case assigned 
depends on specific 
preB  NP/AP  properties of Pred) 
3\  -- Slavic: Instrumental case assigned ** 
Within  Minimalism, Lexical  Case has not been  treated  in  a uniform fashion (although see 
Lasnik (1999) for relevant discussion.)  The usual view of (structural) case checking as being 
the result of a Spec-Head relation cannot account for Lexical case because it cannot allow for 
the association with theta-role assignment, and because there is little evidence of raising of 
lexically-marked  arguments into  a higher  specifier position.  Thus Bailyn  & Citko (1998) 
maintain the spirit of Bailyn & Rubin (1991) by introducing for such cases Check-on-Merge 
and the Complement Checking Domain as shown in (31a-b): 
3 1) Lexical case checking  (under Minimalism): 
8 The Syntax of  Slavic Predicate Case 
a.  Check-on-Merge (Bailyn & Citko 1998) 
Strong Inherent Case  features must be checked on Merge 
b.  The Complement Checking Domain: 
i.  General Schema  ii.  Argument Case 
A 
PP 1 VP 
/\ 
x0 
p/v0  NP 
YP 
[+F] a  [+F]  Feature 
(inherent)  checked 
(replaces lexical case assignment) 
Given (31), which I assume to be independently necessary to maintain the tight connection in 
argument case between Lexical case assignment and theta-role assignment, (30) can now be 
simply restated as (32): 
32)  Predicate Instrumental Case Checking (replaces (30)) 
~Gture 
checked 
Examples of the workings of (32) are found in sentences such as (33): 
33)  a.  SaSai  kaietsja  [predp ti  durakom] 
Sasha-Nom  seems  fool-Instr 
"Sasha seems to be a fool." 
b.  Ja  sEitaju  egoi   red^ ti  durakoml 
I  consider  him-Acc  fool-Instr 
"I consider him a fool" 
In (33a), the subject of the small clause PredP raises to main clause Nominative case position, 
where it gets (checks) Nominative case.  A tree structure, taken from Bailyn and Rubin 1991, 
is given in (34): John Frederick Bailyn 
Structure of Russian argument small clause in (33a): 
TP 




PredP f-- small clause  v- 
kaietsjak  Spec 
predo  YP INST 
N'  (checked by 
tk  k 
ti  durakom 
Sasha  seems  a fool 
(33b) shows another instance of  a selected PredP whose subject raises for case, this time to 
object  position.  I follow  Larson  (1988)  and  Bowers  (1993)  in  assuming that  Accusative 
objects  are generated  in  (or  raised to)  SpecV, whereas lexically-marked  objects  are in  the 
complement checking domain as shown above. 
Adjunct small clauses can also show Instrumental case, as shown in (35a-c). 
35)  a.  Myi  tancevali  [predp PRO,  golymi.] 
we-Nom  danced  nude-Instr 
"We danced nude." 
b.  Jel'cinai  vybrali  [predp PROi  prezidentoml 
Yeltsin-Acc  elected-3pl  president-Instr 
"They elected Yeltsin president" 
c.  Ja  nagel  egok   red^ PROk  pljanym 
Ii-Nom  found  himk-Acc  drunk-Instr 
"I found him drunk." 
In these cases, the subject of the PredP secondary predicate is large PRO, whose reference is 
determined by control, theory  in the standard fashion.  (35a) exemplifies an adjunct small 
clause  controlled  by  the  subject  and  (35b-c)  ones  controlled  by  the  direct  object.  The 
structure of (35c) is given in (36): The Syntax of Sluvic Predicate  Case 
36)  Structure of (35c) (=(lb)) 
TP 
T'  NPnom- 




~~ 'ZLL  PRO subject controlled by direct 
I  found  himk  PRO  drunkk 
Further, I assume a theory of control that meets the Minimal Distance Principle (MDP): 
37) Minimal Distance Principle: 
PRO is controlled by the nearest c-commanding potential antecedent 
I also assume, following Bowers (1993), that adjuncts are adjoined at the X'-level.  Secondary 
PredP adjuncts are therefore adjoined to V'.  Given the placement of  direct objects in SpecV 
and oblique objects in the complement position, this approach predicts the impossibility of 
Instrumental small clauses with oblique controllers, a prediction that is strongly borne out by 
the facts, as shown in (38): 
38)  a.  Boris  sovetoval  Sage  gol~m  (??golomu) 
Boris,-Nom  advised  Sashak-Dat  nudei I *k-Instr  nudek-Dat 
"Boris advised Sasha nude." (Boris = nude) 
b.  Boris  pozvonil  Sage  golym. 
Borisi-Nom  telephonedsashak-Dat  nudeil*k-Instr 
"Boris telephoned Sasha nude." (Boris = nude) 
c.  Boris  bojitsja  SaSi  golym. 
Boris,-Nom  fears  Sashak-Gen  nudei/*k-Instr 
"Boris fears Sasha nude." (Boris = nude) 
d.  Boris  posmotrel  na  SaSu  golym. 
Borisi-Nom  looked  at  Sashak-Acc  nudeil*k-Instr 
"Boris looked at Sasha nude." (Boris = nude) 
Comparing the tree in  (36) with (38a-d), we see that whereas in (36) the controller of PRO is 
the internal argument, in  (38a-d) it cannot be.  This falls out from the structures assumed 
because  (36) containsa direct object,  whereas the arguments  in  (38a-d), all being lexically 
case marked,  are never  in  high  enough  position  to  control  the PRO subject of  the PredP John Frederick Bailyn 
adjunct, adjoined at V'.  The problem is demonstrated in (39), in which the Dative argument 
does not c-command the PRO subject of the adjunct PredP. 
39)  Structure of (38a) 
TP 





Saga  k 
dat 
* Boris-Nom  advised  Sasha-Dat  nude-Instr 
Thus  (39)  demonstrates that  the  configurations  proposed  account  for the  lack  of  oblique 
controllers, something the semantic Approach to Predicate Case cannot do, at least in the form 
currently given.  Thus the account of Instrumental case on predicates as Lexical case provides 
further evidence for the Syntactic Approach to Predicate Case.  In the next section, we turn to 
the  "Sameness" cases, and  show  that  these correlate with  instances of  structural argument 
case, thus further strengthening the syntactic approach. 
4.2  Structurally determined Predicate Case 
Given the framework provided  above, we are now  in  a position to provide a useful 
account  of  the cases in  which  the predicate shows the same case as  a structurally marked 
argument  in the sentence.  First, recall  that  these occur in certain  languages in exactly the 
same sentences in which Russian shows Instrumental.  This is shown in (19), repeated as (40) 
below, from Serbo-Croatian 
40)  a.(Ja)  pleSem  go  *b. (Ja)  pleSem  golim. 
I-Nom  dance-  1 sg  nude-Nom  I-Nom dance- l sg  nude-Instr 
"I dance nude." 
c.NaSao  sam  g  a  pijanog  *d.  NaSao  Sam  ga  pijanim 
found  aux-1  sg  him-Acc  drunk-Acc  found  aux-lsg  him-Acc  drunk-Instr 
"I found him drunk." 
(40a)  and  (40c)  show  occurrences  of  "Sameness"  in  PredP  adjuncts,  controlled  by  the 
nominative  subject and the accusative direct object respectively.  The impossibility of (40b) 
and (40d) with Instrumental predicates demonstrates that the situation is quite different from 
Russian, in which Instrumental is preferred but "Sameness" is also possible (we return to this 
distinction  below).  Given Minimalist assumptions about language variation, we expect the 
distinction between the two languages to reduce to a difference in the feature makeup of the 
PredO  head  itself.  We have seen  that  in  Russian  the Pred head  is  marked  with  inherent 
[+Instr] feature that is checked against the Instrumentally-marked NP or AP predicate in  its The Syntax of Slavic Predicate Case 
complement  position.  Clearly,  the  same Pred  head  in  Serbo-Croatian  is  lacking  in  this 
Instrumental  feature, or  indeed  any  inherent case feature.  In  its  absence, the  actual  case 
occurrence depends on the structure.  Specifically, in  the absence of  a case-checking PredO 
head, the NP or AP predicate must raise  into a(n  already existing) case position to have its 
case checked.  Thus these nominals raise to get case.6  "Sameness" marking on predicates 
parallels structural case marking on arguments.  The general situation is summarized in (41) 
41)  The typology of non-Instrumental predicate case 
Structural Case results from  there being no case feature  on the relevant PredO 
The relevant mechanisms,based on Bailyn & Citko (1998), require no additional stipulations: 
If  PredO has no case feature, its complement has no source of  case in  its base position  and 
must  raise  to  structural  case  position  to  check  case.  Assuming  the  existence of  double 
layered  specifier (Chomsky  1995, Koizumi  1995), schematized  in  (42), we  can  see the 
source of the structural case marking in "Sameness" cases:7 
42)  Double layered specifiers (Koizumi 1995, p. 138) 
SPEC 
SPEC  x 
n 
xm'" Complement 
In (42), both the predicate NP and the argument NP check case against the relevant functional 
category.  This  is  exactly  what  we  find  in  "Sameness"  predicate  marking,  now  clearly 
analyzable as a form of structural case.  The general schema for such cases is shown in (43): 
43)  LF Configuration for Structural Case on Predicates: 
Sameness of Case 
small clause 
LF movement of the uncased Predicate occurs to the closest structural case checking position, 
producing the "Sameness" of Case effects, and limiting them to structural case.  The relevant 
portion of the LF structure of (40c) is given in (44): John Frederick Railyn 
44)  LF Structure of the Accusative checking domain of (40c): 
VP 
We can now reduce the morphological difference between Serbo-Croatian and Russian small 
clause predicates  to a typological  difference in  the feature make-up  in  the PredO  head.  A 
schematic version of the feature makeup of Pred is shown in (45): 
45) m0  features:  Russian Polish  Serbo-Croatian  Germanic 
[+Instr] [+Instr]  [-Instr]  [+Acc] 
5  Extensions 
As presented, the analysis here provides a syntactic framework under Minimalism for 
maintaining the spirit of the Maling & Sprouse 1995 approach to predicate case.  Under this 
approach, predicate case occurrences mirror argument case even more exactly than previously 
proposed, in that we have instances of  both Lexically and Structural case, just  as we do for 
arguments.  Furthermore, all Lexical case occurrence are checked in complement position of a 
Lexical  case  assignor.  All  Structural  case  occurrences  are  checked  in  a  Spec-Head 
configuration.  Thus the general picture of the syntax of case is simplified by its extension to 
predicates. 
We now have purely syntactic accounts of  the paradigms given above -- the presence 
or  absence  of  a  strong  inherent  case  feature  on  Predo  determinies  whether  an  invariant 
inherent case will be assigned, such as the Slavic Instrumental, or whether "Sameness" results 
from a structural case doubling process when PredO cannot check case.  The impossibility of 
"Sameness" in  Russian argument small clauses is accounted for by the selectional properties 
of  verbs  like  consider  which  select  PredP  complements  whose  heads  must  check 
Instrumental. 
However,  various  questions  are  raised  by  the  analysis  above that  warrant  further 
discussion. These questions are listed in (46): The Syntax of  Slavic Predicate Case 
46)  Questions about the PredP account of predicate case: 
I. Why do overt instances of Pred disallow Instrumental case? 
11.  Why does Russian primary predication not show Instrumental case? 
III. How do we account for the Polish AP/NP distinction in copular sentences? 
N. How do we account for "Sameness" on Russian small clause APs such as (I b)? 
In the next section, we present brief answers to these important questions.  (For more 
discussion, see Bailyn & Rubin (1991), Bailyn & Citko (1998), and Bailyn (forthcoming)). 
5.1  Overt predicators 
In  Bailyn  (forthcoming)  I use the same framework presented  here  in  analyzing the 
status  of  certain  pieces  of  morphology  in  Slavic as  overt  heads  of  the  PredP  functional 
category.  Standard examples of these elements, from Russian, are given in the (b) sentences 
of (47-48): 
47)  a.  On  vygljadit  0  durakom  I  *durak 
he-Nom  looks  fool-Instr 1  *-Nom 
"He looks (like) a fool." 
b.  On  vygljadit  kak  durak  I  "durakom 
he-Nom  looks  PRED  fool-Nom 1  *fool-Instr 
"He looks like a fool." 
48)  a.  My  sEitaem  ego  0  svoim  1  *svoego 
we  consider  him-Acc  self s-Instrl  *-  Acc 
"We consider him (as) one of us." 
b.  My  sEitaem  ego  -  kak  svoego  I  *svoim 
we  consider  him-Acc  PRED  selfs-Acc 1  *-Instr 
"We consider him (as) one of us." 
In  (47a),  we  see  an  NP predicate  marked  with  Instrumental  case, checked  in  a  standard 
Lexical case configuration with a Pred head that has Instrumental case features, as expected in 
Russian.  (47b), on the other hand, has the element kuk, analyzed in Bailyn  as the head of 
PredP.  Similarly, in  (48), when kak is present, Instrumental on the predicate  AP becomes 
impossible where it is otherwise required. Indeed, it is well-known that Instrumental is always 
impossible whenever an element such as kuk fills the PredO head.  I draw on ideas of Bowers 
(1993) for English and Bailyn & Citko (1998) in  showing that the presence of such elements 
precludes Instrumental case.  I adopt the Morphological Pred Rule of Bailyn & Citko (1998), 
given in (49): 
49)  Morphological Pred Rule (MPR):  (from Bailyn &L  Citko 1998) 
Overt morphology in  redo absorbs Instrumental Case 
(49) has the status of  a descriptive generalization, similar to the generalization that passive 
verbs cannot  assign Accusative  case.  When  an  NP  is generated  as the  direct  object  of  a 
passive  verb, it must move to get case, which is exactly what happens when an NP or AP 
predicate is generated as the complement of  a filled Pred.  The structure of  (4%)  would then 
be something like (50): John Frederick Bailyn 
50)  Structure of (48b) 
TP 
(kak absorbs case from Pr, 
object must raise for Case) 
we  consider  him  as  our own 
The  case  absorption  hypothesis  accounts  for  the  impossibility  of  overt  predicators  co- 
occurring with Instrumental predicates.  It is not clear how this regular alternation would be 
handled in other frameworks. 
5.2  Primary Predicates 
In primary predication in Slavic (Russian and Polish), we find a second occurrence of 
Nominative, rather than Instrumental on the NP or AP predicate.  This is shown in (51): 
51)  a.  Boris  by1  muzykant.  (R) 
Boris-Nom  was  musician-Nom 
"Boris was a musician (in his very nature). 
b.  Jan  jest  glodny  (p) 
Jan-Nomis  hungry-Nom 
"Jan is hungry" 
c.  Jan  to  student.  (p) 
Jan-Nom?  student-Nom 
"Jan is a student." 
These constructions are analyzed in Bailyn (1995) for Russian and in Bailyn & Citko (1998) 
for Polish as instantiating verbless structures where the 'to be' element occupies the head of 
(primary) PredP.  In these cases, therefore, to be also serves as an overt predicator.  These 
cases crucially do not involve secondary predication, and as a result have a highly equative 
meaning.8 The surface and LF structures of (5  I b) are given in (52): The Syntax ofSlavic Predicate Case 





In  rt-  Pr'  C  Spec - 
Jan  is  hungry-NOM 
b.  LF structure of (51 b) Janjest gtodny "Jan is hungry." 
j  tk 
We now can extend the analysis of Polish to to constructions like (51c) thus explaiing both its 
category and the required double Nominative case marking as another example of "Sameness" 
arising from the effect of an overt predicator. 
There remains the issue of Russian present tense double nominatives ('Ivan -- student') 
which have no overt form of to be. Following previous work (Bailyn & Rubin 1991, Bailyn 
1995, Bailyn & Citko 1998), I assume that these too are non-verbal sentences, similar in 
structure to (52), with an overt predicator (the verb to be)  whose present tense form happens 
to be (morphologically) null.  However, from the point of view of this article, this is still an 
overt predicator, simply one that is null on the surface.  In this sense, the head of primary 
PredO  is filled, simply the morphological form is zero.  This differs from secondary predicates 
where there is nothing in the head of Pred (except the strong Instrumental case features).  This 
appears at first glance to be something of a non-natural class (overt morphology like kak or 
null copular morphology).  However, in both cases we have material relevant to an interface, 
PF and LF respectively.  Only in cases where there are no interface-interpetable features (such 
as null secondary Predo), can the Instrumental case feature be ~arried.~    or more discussion 
see Bailyn & Citko (1998) and Bailyn (forthcoming). 
5.3  Polish copular sentences 
Recall that in  Polish present tense copular sentences with jest  ('is'), AP predicates and 
NP predicates show a morphological distinction, shown in (50). 
53)  a.Jan  jest  studentem  /  *-student  (NP) 
Jan -Nom is  student-Instr  I  *-Nom 
"Jan is hungry" 
b.  Jan  jest  gtodny  /  *glodnym 
Jan -Nom is  hungry-Nom  1  *-Instr 
"Jan is hungry" John Frederick Bailyn 
In (53a) we see that NP predicates must be marked Instrumental whereas (53b) shows that AP 
predicates must be marked Nominative ("Sameness"), as analyzed above. This restriction on 
Polish jest constructions can be reduced to a selectional restriction on the overt predicator: 
jest only takes AP complements. The other overt predicator in Polish, to, is the oppsoite:  it 
only takes NP complements."  Thus (53a) involves secondary predication, and an occurrence 
ofjest as a raising verb, and as such is essentially identical to the Russian raising verb 
schematized in (34) above. 
5.4  Russian "Sameness"  without overt predicators 
Finally, we are in a position to return to the alternation we began with in (I), repeated 
as (54) below, in which Russian adjunct small clauses appear to allow both Instrumental and 
"Sameness". 
54)  a.  Ja  naSel  ego  p'janym 
Ii-Nom  found  himk-Acc drunkk-Instr 
"I found him drunk." 
b.  ?Ja  naSel  ego  p'janogo 
Ii-Nom  found  himk-Acc drunkk-Acc 
"I found him drunk." 
Further,  these  are  the  cases  that  involve  a  semantic  distinction  between  the  two  case 
alternations,  discussed  in  Hinterhoelzl  (this  volume)  and Kennedy  & Filip  (this  volume). 
Given the analysis of Russian predicative case presented above, there are two possibilities that 
can account for (54b).  First, we could analyze (54b) as structurally identical with (54a), but 
with some kind of defective case assignor in the head of PredP (that is, a PredO head that for 
whatever reasons fails to have the strong inherent Instrumental case feature that characterizes 
all other Russian  secondary predicates.)  This is essentially the approach taken in Bailyn & 
Citko (1998).  For this to go through, however, we would need to ensure that PredP whose 
heads have this defective character could never be selected as the complement of raising verbs 
such as consider or seem, which in Russian only allow Instrumental complements, as we have 
seen.  Secondary  predicates  showing  "Sameness"  in  Russian  occur  only  with  overt 
morphology.  Since it would be difficult to claim that in (54b) Pred is "overt", when there is 
no morphology present, nor any LF-relevant features, it appears that an analysis with identical 
structures in  (54a) and (54b) is difficult to maintain.  This leads us to the other possibility, 
namely that in (54b) there is simply no PredP structure at all.  If we allow for the possibility 
of  true "appositive" adjuncts, we would predict that in the absence of  a Pred head, the only 
possible source of case for the predicate would involve LF raising into the specifier of a case 
checking head, and hence a "Sameness" effect.  Such a small clause would look much like the 
small  clauses proposed  by  Stowell, which  would  constitute  examples of  the Lexical  Case 
Hypothesis for small clauses, in  these cases only.  Thus the structure of  (54b) would  look 
something like (55): The Syntax of Slavic Predicate Case 
55)  Structure of (54b) (= (Ib)) 
PredP 
nael  el' 
appositive adjunct 
no source of instrumental case  .  adjective must raise to get  I  .  ,  structural case 
There are three arguments in  favor of  the appositive  approach taken  here over that of  the 
defective PredO head approach suggested in Bailyn & Citko (1998).  First, it explains why the 
alternation between Instrumental and "Sameness" in Russian is possible only in adjunct cases; 
in  argument small clauses the categorial  status of  the verbal  complement is determined by 
selectional  requirements  of  the  verb  (consider  requires  a  PredP  complement)  and  an 
appositive "Sameness" structure is impossible.  Second, it predicts the existence of a semantic 
distinction between a true secondary predicate, with a full PredP structure, and the appositive 
small clauses of  the type shown in  (55).  This provides a structural  basis for the distinction 
discussed under the  Semantic Approach  to Predicative Case.  Because this  only  occurs in 
adjunct  position,  it  allows  us  a  syntactic  characterization  of  the  situations  in  which  the 
semantic distinction discussed in  the other papers in this volume can operate, and provides for 
those accounts a structural correlation.  In  this  sense, the account suggested here  solves a 
potential  problem  for the  Semantic Approach  to Predicative  Case choice, namely  how  to 
explain why a distinction in the meanings between the Russian options (la) and (lb), holds 
here,  but  does  not  obtain  with  respect  to  the  cross-linguistic  distinction  in  cases such as 
Russian  (la)  and  its  Serbo-Croatian  equivalent  (36b)  which  have  exactly  the  same 
interpretation.  In fact, if  this article is on the right track, the semantic distinction does not 
depend on Instrumental vs. "Sameness" but  reduces to PredP structures vs. bare appositive- 
style small clauses.  Third, the appositive account predicts that "Sameness" should be possible 
in  cases where control theory disallows Instrumental case, namely in  cases where the small 
clause predicate refers  to an  obliquellexically  marked  argument of  the  main  verb.  Recall 
(38a), repeated  below, in  which Instrumental  secondary predication referring to  the Dative 
argument were impossible because of control theory. 
38) a. Boris  ~ovetoval  Sage  golym  (??go1  omu) 
Borisi-Nom  advised  Sashak-Dat  nudei 1 *k-Instr  nudek-Dat 
"Boris advised Sasha nude." 
Notice,  however,  that  a  Dative  "Samenessu-marked AP  is  marginally  possible  in  this 
structure.  This is expected  only  if  c-command  is not relevant  for the  structures  involved. 
golomu  is in  the Complement Checking Domain  of  sovetoval which is responsible for the 
Dative case marking.  Thus the appositive account can allow for such cases, whereas for the 
PredP account of "Sameness" in Russian, such cases constitute a serious problem.  For these 
three reasons, I maintain that (55) is the proper analysis for (Ib), and leave a characterization 
of the semantic distinction to the other papers in this volume. John Frederick Bailyn 
6  Conclusion 
In this article we have seen that a syntactic approach to the case alternations in Slavic 
predicates  is  fruitful  in  characterization  the configurations  that  the  different  case patterns 
occur in.  This approach is shown to have various advantages.  For one thing, cross-linguistic 
variation reduces to the feature makeup of functional categories, as expected given Minimalist 
assumptions.  Second, it  allows  us  to  eliminate any  recourse  to  special  case  assignment 
mechanisms for predicative case, as well as any need for semantic case as something distinct 
from Lexical  or structural  case.  In  particular,  predicative  Instrumental  requires  the  same 
mechanisms  as  other  instances  of  inherent  or  Lexical  case,  and  "Sameness" of  Case  on 
predicates  reduces  to structural case, given  the possibility of  a predicate  and an  argument 
sharing the specifier positions of  a single case checking head.  Further, we can maintain the 
usual view within generative grammar that the relation between semantics and morphology is 
mediated by configuration, and does not constitute a direct correlation.  At the same time, the 
configurations proposed  are rich  enough  to  allow  distinct  structures  to correlate  with  the 
semantic distinctions in  those instances where  both  forms can  occur.  Finally, the account 
moves  us  one step closer to a  strong theory  of  Case under  Minimalism, under  which  all 
nominals would fall under one unified Minimalist Case Filter (MCF), along the lines of that 
proposed by Bailyn & Citko (1998), given in (56). 
56) The Minimalist Case Filter (MCF): 
a. Every [+N] category must bear formal case features 
b.  Morphological case is a direct reflection of formal case features 
The conclusions of  this article allows us to extend the MCF neatly to predicates, not always 
covered by theta-theory driven versions of the Case Filter under GB Theory.  It remains now 
only to provide distinct configurational checking mechanisms for adjunct (bare) NP adverbs, 
and we can unite all nominals under a case filter such as (56), increasing the simplicity of the 
grammar of natural language. 
John  Frederick Bailyn 
Department of Linguistics 
SUNY at Stony Brook 
Stony Brook, NY 11794-4376 
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NOTES 
'Maling & Sprouse limit their discussion to Germanic, and do not make a distinction between two kinds of case 
patterns.  However their account is crucial in being the a strong proponent of treating case on predicates like case 
on arguments, a goal I share throughout. 
'Late GB Thcory derived the requirement thal argunicnt NPs, but not predicates, needed case from the "Visibility 
Condition" given in (i): 
(i)  The Visibilitv Condition:  A chain is visible only if  it has a Case position Arguments must hear Case, and 
predicates may not bear Case  .... 
A more exact description is given in den Dikken & Niess (1993): 
Arguments, bearers of thematic roles, must be made visible for the Theta Criterion through the assignment 
of a Case feature; predicates, on the other hand, do not impose this requirement, hence do not need Case. 
Economy considcrations then dictate that predicates are not allowed to bear Case.  (den Dikken & NZSS: 
303-304) 
I assume that elimination of such distinctions is a step forward in understanding the relation of ~norphology  to 
syntax. 
   his term is originally due to Wayles Browne, who related  it exactly to avoid saying "agreement", which has 
acquired a new meaning since the advent of Minimalism, and which is misleading in  its implication as to the 
right analysis of ccrtain phenomena. 
Note that (23b) and trees throughout this article show verb raising to pred0.  This assumption is taken  from 
Bowers, and parallels obligatory V raising to v  in Chomsky (1995).  However, nothing crucial in the account 
follows from this raising.  Not crucially that the verb does not raise as high as I in the ovcrt syntax, as argued in 
Bailyn (1995). 
'Here  "lexical" refers to the lexically  idiosyncratic nature of  the case in question, and not to the nature of the 
categor)?  of the case assignor, which in the case of predicates is a functional head. 
"t  first glance it appears that we then predict "Sameness" nominals to end up in an LF position distinct from 
Instrumental Nominals.  However, on the assumption that Agreement must also be checked on AP predicates, 
the Instrumentals presumably move at LF  also, for independent reasons.  Thus the LF positions of the different 
predicate types are not distinct. 
'Double-layered  specifiers are not generally  allowed (or we  would  expect  multiple occurrences of  the same 
structural case regularly in language).  I assume the general rcstriction against double-specifiers follows from the 
theta-criterion, stating that two theta-marked elements may not occupy the same structural position (at LF).  If 
this is indeed the nature of the restriction  on multiple specs, there appears to he no reason why the restriction 
should extend to predicates, which do not bear theta-roles. We would thus expect a predicate to be able to share 
specifierhood of a head with  an argument, acquiring all of the same morphological characteristics by virtue of 
being in the checking domain of the samc head. The Syntax of Slavic Predicate Case 
'The  alternative Instrumental forms found in Russian and with Polish NPs do not share this meaning, and as such 
can be analyzed  as small clause raising construction similar to what we have already seen, where the 'to be' 
element is indeed a verb taking a small clause complement. 
 nothe her  possihility  (or  reducing  this correlation to something morphological  involves treating ccrtain predO 
heads as "affixal".  All overt morphology in Pred would require [+affixall Pred to allow both the morphology 
and the formal features of Pred to occupy one head position.  Primary predO, because they always raise to T, 
would also be affixal; (see 5.2)  For now, I leave deeper explanation of the MPR to future rcsearch. 
"This inverts the usual description of these facts, namely that jest  licenses Instrumental on NPs and Nominative 
on APs, whereas to allows only Nominative.  Rather, I propose to is unambiguously a head of Pred, taking NP 
complement and jest  as Pred, takes only AP complements. jest  also occurs as a raising verb, taking Instrumental 
complements.  This predicts that Polish  should allow some AP-instrumentals  as well, which  Przepi6rkowski 
(2000) shows are possible, contra Bailyn & Citko (1998).  to, on the other hand, does not double as a verb, 
therefore to with Instrumental is always impossible -- it is always an overt predicator so it always absorbs case. Misha Becker 
Institute for Research in Cognitive Science 
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The Syntactic Structure of Predicatives: Clues from the Omission 
of the Copula in Child English 
Abstract 
This paper explores the syntax of main clause predicatives from the perspective of trying to account 
for an asymmetry  in  copular constructions in certain  languages.  One of the languages in which 
we find such an asymmetry  is child English (around age 2).  Specifically, new results show that 
children acquiring English tend to use an overt (and inflected) copula in individual-level predicatives, 
hut they tend to omit the copula in  stage-level predicatives.  The analysis adopted to account for 
this pattern draws on evidence from adult English, Russian, Spanish and Portuguese that stage-level 
predicates are Aspectual (they contain AspP) while individual-level predicates are not (they involve 
only a lexical Small Clause predicate). Children's omission of the copula in structures with AspP is 
linked to the fact that at this stage of development, children fail to require finiteness in main clauses. 
In particular, Asp0 is temporally anchored in child English, thereby obviating the need for a finite 
(temporally anchored) Infl, i.e. an inflected copula. 
1  Introduction 
Predicative expressions, which consist of a subject, a copula and a nominal, adjectival or locative 
(PP) predicate, can be categorized as stage-level or individual-level. 
(1)  Rodney is in the kitchenkired. (stage-level) 
(2)  Rodney is a catlfat. (individual-level) 
This semantic contrast is well known. It is characterized by Carlson (1977) in terms of a differ- 
ence in the sort of thing the predicate applies to. An individual-level predicate applies directly 
to an INDIVIDUAL (e.g.  an object or a person), denoted by the subject. A stage-level predicate 
applies to a STAGE of  the subject (i.e.  (I) means that the predicate [in the kitchen] or [tired] 
applies to a stage of Rodney, not to Rodney himself.)  A stage is defined as a spatio-temporal 
slice of an individual. 
One approach to capturing this contrast is to say that the predicate in a sentence like (2) denotes a 
"permanent"  property, while the predicate in a sentence like (1) denotes a "temporary"  property. 
While this sort of generalization is true in many cases, it is not quite accurate and gives the false 
impression that we might be able to tell (1)- and (2)-type predicates apart based on the length of 
time the property holds. Instead, the argument made here is that the semantic difference between 
stage- and individual-level predicates should be analyzed as a difference of grammatical Aspect. 
Grammatical Aspect encodes information about the imperfectivity or perfectivity of  an event 
or eventuality, and this information is encoded syntactically (i.e. by the projection of an Aspect 
ZAS Papers in Linguistics 22, 2001, 2542 Phrase, the head of which contains features for (im)perfectivity).'  More generally, Aspect asserts 
an eventuality of the predicate (e.g. in (1) it is asserted that an eventuality of Rodney's being in 
the kitchen or being tired is taking place). Since eventualities can be situated in time, predicates 
with Aspect can be said to be temporal in nature, as opposed to being atemporal. In clauses that 
lack Aspect no eventuality of the predicate is asserted; predicates in such clauses are atemporal. 
The relationship between Aspect and the stagelindividual distinction is  that stage-level predi- 
cates project AspP (they are TEMPORAL) but individual-level predicates do not (they are ATEM- 
PORAL).'  Support for this position is provided from English perception verb constructions and 
from main clause predicatives in Spanish, Portuguese and Russian. 
In addition to the proposal for a syntacticlaspectual analysis of the stage-lindividual-level dis- 
tinction, an independent proposal is made for the temporal  anchoring of  main clauses:  main 
clauses must be temporally anchored to the discourse in order to receive temporal reference. 
The manner in which clauses are anchored is made explicit in section 5. The main contribution 
of this paper is that the proposal for a syntactic asymmetry between stage- and individual-level 
predicatives, coupled with the analysis of the temporal anchoring of main clauses, allows us to 
account for the pattern of omission of the copula in main clause predicatives in child English. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 goes through the basic semantic and syn- 
tactic distinctions between stage- and individual-level predicates, and some traditional accounts 
of the distinction are summarized.  The syntactic distinctions in particular point to a difference 
of  Aspect between the two types of predicatives  (as mentioned above:  stage-level predicates 
are argued to be aspectual, while individual-level predicates are non-aspectual). The following 
section provides further support for this view from adult non-English languages. Syntactic alter- 
nations in main clause predicatives in Russian (involving the case of the predicate), and Spanish 
and Portuguese (involving the form of the copula) suggest an alternation based on Aspect. In ad- 
dition to adult grammars, we find an alternation in copular constructions in new data presented 
from child standard English.  Here the alternation is  in the overtness of the copula.  The data 
show that children omit the copula in stage-level predicatives (clauses with Aspect) but tend to 
produce an overt copula in individual-level predicative clauses (those without Aspect). 
In  section 5, an account is given of  the correlation between the presence of AspP in a clause 
and a null copula, and the absence of AspP and an overt copula in child English. The account is 
based on a requirement for temporal anchoring in main clause predicatives. In the final section, 
this account is shown to be extendable to cover the pattern of copula omission in adult Hebrew. 
2  A Syntactic Asymmetry 
At first blush, the sentences in  (1) and (2) above appear to have the same structure, modulo the 
different lexical categories of  the predicates. We might adopt, as a point of departure, the basic 
structure in (3), following Stowell (1981).3 
'I understand  'perfective'  aspect to indicate a completed situation, or to refer to a situation in  its entirety, 
while 'imperfective' aspect is understood to indicate an uncompleted situation, or to refer to the "internal temporal 
structure of a situation" (Comrie, 1976,  p. 24). Henceforth I use the term  'Aspect' to refer only to grammatical, not 
lexical, Aspect. 
'1t  is worth noting that Carlson also conceived of the stage/individual contrast as one involving a contrast in 
temnoralitv. Carlson (1 979) writes of the "hasicallv  atemaoral nature of individuals as opposed to their time-bound  r  . . 
stages."  (Carlson, 1979, p. 57). 
 h hat no VP is projected  in  this structure is due to the fact that I believe the inflected  copula is simply the 
spell-out of finiteness features in Infl, rather than a raised verb.  Arguments for this view are given in Becker (to 
appear) Predicatives in Child English 
A 
Spec  I' 
I  A 
DPt  Infl  SC 
However, there are a number of environments that distinguish stage- from individual-level pred- 
icates and thereby give us reason to think they might differ structurally. I will briefly go through 
the main diagnostics here. 
One difference between stage- and individual-level predicates is that only stage-level predicates 
can be modified by a spatial or temporal modifier, as shown in (4a-b). 
(4)  a.  Rodney is in the kitchen all the time. 
b.  ?? Rodney is a cat all the time. 
(While certainly true, it is semantically odd to say that Rodney is a cat all the time; it seems to 
imply that there might be times at which he's not a cat, which is not possible in our ~orld.~) 
In  addition to modification  by a temporal modifier, the ability to occur in  a when-clause  is a 
property of stage- but not individual-level predicates. This is shown in (5). 
(5)  a.  When Rodney is in the kitchen, he eats my parsley. 
b.  ?? When Rodney is a cat, he eats my parsley. 
According to Kratzer (1995), the reason (5b) is semantically ill-formed is that it lacks a semantic 
Event variable (Davidson, 1967): she argues that a when-clause contains an implicit ALWAYS 
operator that looks for a variable to bind in the restrictor clause.  This need is satisfied in the 
structure in (6a), corresponding to (Sa), but not in (6b), which corresponds to (5b). 
(6)  a.  ALWAYS, [in-kitchen(Rodney,  l)][eat(Rodney, my-parsley,  l)] 
b.  * ALWAYS  [a cat(Rodney)][eat(Rodney, my-parsley,  l)] 
Assuming the constraint against vacuous quantification  (it. that if  there is an operator in an 
expression, there must be a variable in the restrictor clause for the operator to bind), (6b) is 
ill-formed because there is no variable in the restrictor clause ([a cat(Rodney)]) for the ALWAYS 
operator to bind. (6a), on the other hand, satisfies the constraint and is well-formed. 
As for the fact that individual-level predicates resist modification by a temporal modifier, Kratzer 
claims that this is likewise captured by the fact that individual-level predicates do not contain 
an Event variable:  it is the presence of this variable in  stage-lwei  predicates that allows such 
modification (the event itself gets modified). 
A further semantic difference between stage- and individual-level predicates is that stage-level 
predicates admit an  existential (weak) reading of a bare plural subject, while with individual- 
level predicates the subject can have only a generic interpretation, as in (7a-b). 
4The  interesting issue of how predicates can be coerced into having a temporary or permanent meaning, contrary 
to their natural tendency, will not he taken up here. See Fernald (2000) for discussion. (7)  a.  Cats are in the kitchen.  (existential ok) 
b.  Cats are mammals. (generic only) 
Kratzer follows Diesing (1988, 1992) in  accounting for this contrast in terms of the syntactic 
position of  the Event argument.  Namely, the Event argument is in SpecIP, and the subject of 
a stage-level predicate is generated lower in the structure, i.e. in SpecVP. Since the Existential 
Operator, 3, is taken to be projected at the VP boundary and the Generic Operator, Gen, at the 
IP boundary, only elements within VP can receive an existential reading.  Elements outside of 
VP, i.e. in IP, must be interpreted in the scope of the Generic operator. 
These differences  between  stage- and  individual-level  predicates are semantic in  nature and 
therefore call for a semantic-based account, which is what Kratzer provides.  However, there 
are other contrasts that suggest a syntactic distinction between these two types of predicates. In 
particular, the unacceptability of individual-level predicates in perception verb complements is 
syntactic, not semantic in nature (i.e. (8b) is ungrammatical, not semantically ill-formed). 
(8)  a.  I saw Rodney in the kitchen 
b.  * I saw Rodney a cat. 
A similar contrast is found in the coda of existential constructions. 
(9)  a.  There are doctors in the corridor. 
b.  * There are doctors women. 
What is the syntax of these constructions such that they allow only stage-level predicates to occur 
in  them?  Felser (1999) argues that perception verb complements (henceforth PVCs) contain 
AspP as their highest projection.  Felser shows that  the reduced  clausal constituent under  a 
perception verb involves more structure than a VP (it can host expletive subjects, as in (10a)) 
but less than a TP (it cannot be tensed, as in (lob))? 
(10)  a.  I wouldn't like to see [there be so many mistakes] 
b.  * I saw John drawslto draw a circle 
Rather, she argues that the relevant level of projection is the functional projection between VP 
and TP, namely AspP (Travis, 1992). We might add that the head of this projection may be spec- 
ified either as [+per4 or as [-perfl  to capture the difference between (1  la) and (1 lb), respec- 
(I la) denotes a closed eventuality (hence perfective). while (I lb) denotes an ongoing 
(not closed) eventuality (hence imperfective) 
(1 1)  a.  I saw John draw a circle 
b.  I saw John drawing a circle. 
SThe  embedded clause under a perception verb can he infinitive if the main clause is passive: John was seen to 
draw a circle. I won't deal with these constructions here. 
"elser  uses [+progressive] as the feature of the Asp head. However, since we will apply the same structure to 
non-verbal predicates, which are not progressive, the [+perfective] feature seer~is  more appropriate, at least to the 
constructions under consideration here. I believe this is not more than a notational change. Predicatives in Child English 
Since (im)perfectivity is what gets expressed by grammatical Aspect, and since the PVCs in 
(I la) and (1 lb) express perfectivity and imperfectivity, respectively, these predicates project an 
AspP. 
(As a side note, Felser brings another argument for projecting AspP in PVCs:  it is that PVCs 
can host eventive but not stative verbal predicates, and she associates only eventive (not stative) 
predicates with the projection of an Event argument. Furthermore, Felser places the Event argu- 
ment in SpecAspP. Thus, sentences like (12b) are ruled out because they do not project an Event 
argument, and hence cannot occur with AspP: 
(12)  a.  I saw John draw a circle. 
b.  * I saw the book lie on the table.' 
While I do not adopt the view that only eventive predicates project an Event argument, the asym- 
metry between eventive and stative verbs in this environment is notable and must be accounted 
for. If there is an association between eventive verbs and Aspect that stative verbs do not share, 
the asymmetry in (12) is expected. Furthermore, an eventivelstative asymmetry arises in exis- 
tential codas, another environment in which only stage-level predicates can occur: see below.) 
We adopt Felser's view that PVCs involve AspP as the highest functional projection, and a non- 
verbal PVC, such as (8a) above has the structure in (13). 
I 
[+past]  v A  AspP 
'A  saw 
Spec  Asp' 
Asp  SC 
I 
[-perf]  spec  PP 
I  LcLIIhL 
Rodney  in the kitchen 
A sentence like (8b) is ruled out because individual-level  predicates do not project AspP, so 
the ungrammaticality of (8b) results from a selectional problem: individual-level predicates are 
non-aspectual and so are incompatible with AspP, yet AspP must be projected in a perception 
verb complement. The head of AspP in (13) is indicated as [-perfl  (i.e. imperfective) rather than 
[f  perf] as in the verbal PVC above because the predicate in (1 3)/(8a) does not denote a closed 
or completed eventuality. Instead, it is compatible with a continuation clause such as .  .  .and  he's 
'~tative  verbs may occur in progressive form in this environment (e.g. 1  saw  the hook lying on the table). How- 
ever, these cases can be shown to involve a reduced relative clause, rather than a true perception verb complement 
structure. See Felser (1999) for discussion. still there. An imperfective verbal PVC such as (1  lb) likewise can be continued with.. .and  he's 
still drawing it, but a perfective PVC such as (I  1 a) cannot be continued so: *I  saw John draw a 
circle, and he'k still drawing it." 
As for the exclusion of individual-level predicates in existential codas (cf. (9)), 1 will speculate 
that this can be argued to follow from the same restriction  on predicates in PVCs.  Namely, 
existential codas contain AspP. Notably, when the coda contains a verbal clause the verb must 
be eventive and must appear in progressive aspect. 
(14)  a.  There are children playing in the yard. 
b.  ?* There are children knowing that song. 
(15)  a.  * There are children play in the yard. 
b.  * There are children know that song. 
The contrast between (14a) and (14b) seems to suggest that existential codas, like PVCs contain 
AspP as the highest projection (if there is a connection between eventive predicates and Aspect, 
as suggested above).  The ungrammaticality  of  (15a-b) can be accounted for by limiting the 
feature of  AS^' to [-perf].  That the head of AspP in an existential must be [-perf]  receives some 
support from Giorgi and Pianesi's (I  996) claim that English bare verbs are inherently perfective. 
As perfective predicates, they cannot be predicated of  a "here and now" event. But according 
to GuCron (1995) existential there is a pronoun that denotes a time and place, i.e. it anchors the 
expression to the here and now. Thus, if existentials denote a here and now situation, then they 
should be incompatible with a perfective predicate, thus ruling out bare verbal predicates.' 
3  Further Evidence that S-level Predicates Contain AspP 
In addition to (certain) English embedded clauses, there is some evidence from other languages 
that stage-level predicates (or at least predicates that denote a more or less temporary property) 
should be associated with the projection of AspP. The languages I will discuss here are Russian, 
Spanish and Portuguese. 
3.1  Russian 
In  Russian past tense predicative constructions, the nominal or adjectival predicate may bear 
either Nominative or Instrumental case.1°  But the difference in case marking corresponds to a 
difference in meaning between the two predicates. A Nominative predicate has a permanent or 
inherent meaning, while an Instrumental predicate has a more temporary meaning, as shown in 
(I 6-1 7) (from Pereltsvaig (1999); see also Bailyn and Rubin (199  1); DCchaine (1 993)). 
(16)  a.  Oleg  by1  durakom. 
Oleg-Nom was fool-Instr 
'Oleg was a fool (sometimes he'd behave like a fool)' 
 he perfectivelimperfective contrast can be seen more clearly with the predicate drown. Compare: I saw Bill 
drowning, hut I rescued him vs. *I  saw Bill drown, but I  rescued him. See Felser (1999) for discussion. 
'I  thank Nina Hyams for this suggestion and for discussion on this point. 
'O~ussian  predicatives in present tense always contain a null copula (never an overt one), and the predicate 
always bears Nominative case. I will not discuss present tense constructions here; bul see Kondrashova (1996) for 
discussion. 
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b.  Oleg  by1  durak. 
Oleg-Nom was fool-Nom 
'Oleg was a fool (by nature, he was a foolish person)' 
(17)  a.  Pjatno  bylo krasnym. 
spot-Nom was  red-Instr 
'The spot was red (and then it changed color)' 
b.  Pjatno  bylo krasnoe. 
spot-Nom was  red-Nom 
'The spot was red (as long as there was a spot, it was red)' 
Matushansky (2000) argues that Instrumental case is checked in SpecAspP, and therefore that 
predicates marked with Instrumental case project AspP. Her claim is twofold: one part involves 
evidence for an extra projection in Instrumental predicatives that is absent in Nominative pred- 
icatives, and the second part involves evidence that the extra projection in Instrumentals is As- 
pect. Let us look at the two claims individually. 
Her evidence for the claim that Instrumental predicates involve an extra functional projection 
comes from extraction asymmetries between Nominative and Instrumental predicatives: in cases 
of Wh-extraction, scrambling and extraction from embedded clauses, extraction of the predicate 
is possible only when the predicate bears Instrumental case. An example of this asymmetry in 
scrambling is given below. 
(18)  a.  Velikim pobtom  by1  Pushkin. 
great  poet-Instr was Pushkin 
'Pushkin was a great poet.' 
b.  * Velikij p&t  by1  Pushkin. 
great  poet-Nom was Pushkin 
Thus, she argues, the structure of clauses containing Instrumental predicates must be such that 
there is a position through which the predicate can move as it raises in the structure (cf. (18a)). 
This position must be absent in clauses containing Nominative predicates, since these predicates 
are not able to raise (cf. (18b)). 
Matushansky's reason for invoking AspP in particular as the locus of Instrumental case checking 
(and the position through which the predicate may move) has to do with a more general asso- 
ciation between Instrumental case and (im)perfectivity. In the above examples, the past tense 
copula by1 'was'  is not marked for aspect. It may, however, occur in a form that bears an explicit 
morphological affix indicating (perfective or imperfective) Aspect.  In this case the predicate 
must bear Instrumental case; Nominative is ungrammatical. 
(19)  Ja pobyla/byvala zavedujuSEeh1"zaveduju~ia. 
I  was-perf/impf manager-Instr/*Nom 
'I waslhave been a manager' 
This datum illustrates the connection between Instrumental case and Aspect:  when  the cop- 
ula is explicitly marked for Aspect, the predicate can only have Instrumental case.  Following 
Matushansky, this connection between Instrumental and Aspect should extend to those clauses 
where the copula does not bear any explicit aspectual morphology. That is, in past tense main 
3 1 clause predicatives  such as (16a), if  the predicate is marked with Instmmental case AspP is 
projected in the clause. 
It is true that the semantic distinction found in Russian between Nominative and Instrumental 
predicates is not exactly the stagelindividual distinction.  At least, it is not the same distinc- 
tion that is drawn in English (since, according to Carlson (1977), all nominal predicates are 
individual-level). Nevertheless there is a semantic difference between the predicates in the (a) 
and (b) examples in (16-17), and this semantic difference, namely that the one sort of predicate 
denotes an atemporal property and the other sort denotes a temporal property, is quite similar in 
nature to the difference between individual-level (atemporal) and stage-level (temporal) predi- 
cates. What I am suggesting here is that both distinctions should be accounted for in terms of 
the presence vs. absence of AspP in the syntax. 
3.2  Spanish and Portuguese 
In Spanish and Portuguese there are two copulas that both translate in English as be: ser and es- 
tar. The general distribution of these copulas is that ser  occurs with individual-level predicates, 
and estar occurs with stage-level predicates, as in (20) from Spanish (see e.g. Sera, 1992; Lujin, 
1981; Bull, 1965; Roldan, 1974). 
(20)  a.  Juan esIYesta  un hombrelgrande. 
John is-ser/*estar a  manlbig 
'John is a manlbig' 
b.  Juan esta/*es  en la  casa/cansado 
John is-estar/*ser in  the houseltired 
'John is in the houseltired' 
Like their English counterparts, Spanish perception  verb complements are restricted to stage- 
level  If the above analysis of PVCs for English is correct, then the following datum 
suggests that estar-predicates, but not ser-predicates project AspP. 
(21)  Vi  a  Juan en la  casalcansadol*profesor. 
I saw A John in  the home/tired/*teacher 
'I saw John at home/tired/*a teacher' 
Consistent with the idea that estar predicatives contain AspP but ser  predicatives don't, Schmitt 
(1992) has argued independently that estar is an aspectual copula but ser is non-aspectual. That 
is, a predicate that occurs with estar carries temporal meaning: it relates to the temporal structure 
or constituency of an eventuality. As Schmitt argues, it denotes a result state. A predicate that 
occurs with ser is atemporal. A clear example of this difference can be seen in (22).12 
(22)  a.  Maria C  quase  bonita. 
Maria is almost pretty 
'Maria is sort of pretty' 
"It is not clear whether this is the case in Portuguese, i.e. individual-level predicates are permitted in this context 
according to the judgment of one speaker of Brazilian Portuguese. At present I do not have an account of this fact. 
I2See  also Lujdn (1 98 1)  for a similar argument that the serlestar distinction is an aspectual one. Predicatives in Child English 
h.  Maria estd quase  honita. 
Maria is  almost pretty 
'Maria is not pretty yet' 
(Portuguese; from (Schmitt, 1992, p. 422)) 
In (22b), the adverb quase 'almost'  modifies an event of becoming pretty, while in (22a), the 
adverb quase modifies the adjective itself. Since grammatical Aspect is something that relates 
to events, the structure for (22b) contains AspP, while the structure for (22a) does not. 
3.3  Summary 
Thus far I have made the argument that stage-level (or otherwise temporal) predicates project 
AspP, hut individual-level (or otherwise atemporal) predicates do not.  The evidence for this 
syntactic relationship came from English perception  verb constructions and existential codas 
(although the case made from existentials was admittedly weaker), Russian past  tense main 
clause predicatives and Spanish and Portuguese present tense predicatives. English PVCs were 
argued by Felser to contain AspP as the highest functional projection, and only stage-level pred- 
icates are admitted in this environment. Russian past tense predicatives with Instrumental case 
on the predicate have a temporal interpretation and are argued by Matushansky to contain an 
AspP. (Past tense predicatives with Nominative case, in contrast, are non-aspectual:  they have 
an atemporal meaning and do not project AspP.) 
The alternation between stage- and individual-level predicatives in  Spanish and Portuguese is 
an alternation in the lexical form of the copula: stage-level predicates occur with estar, while 
individual-level predicates occur with ser. The evidence for associating estar-predicates with 
AspP is much the same as in adult English: stage-level predicates have a temporal meaning and 
relate to the internal temporal structure of an eventuality, and thus encode Aspect.  Individual- 
level predicates are atemporal and therefore don't encode Aspect.  The main difference in this 
respect between Spanish or Portuguese and English is that Spanish and Portuguese indicate the 
aspectual difference in terms of the lexical form of the copula, whereas English does not. In the 
next section, we will see that child English, like Spanish and Portuguese, displays a difference 
between stage- and individual-level predicatives in form (overtness vs. omission ) of the copula. 
It will then be argued that the Aspect-based analysis of the stage-/individual distinction allows 
us to account for the pattern of copula omission we find in child English. 
4  Child English 
Many of  the facts discussed above for Russian, Spanish and Portuguese are well-known and 
widely discussed in the literature. Previously unknown, however, is the fact that child standard 
English displays a similar asymmetry between stage- and individual-level  predicates in main 
clause predicatives. Like Spanish and Portuguese, the asymmetry appears as a difference in the 
form of the copula: in child English, we find a null/overt alternation in stage- vs. individual-level 
predicatives. 
The data presented here come from the spontaneous speech utterances of four English-speaking 
children. taken from the CHILDES database (MacWhinney and Snow, 1985). In Table 1 I give  - 
the agesand average MLU (Mean Length of utterance) of the children whose data are discussed 
here."  The final column (Be Contexts) lists the number of utterances in the relevant files that 
IiMean  Length of  Utterance is the average numher of morphemes per utterance, measured  over the first 100 
utterances in a file (Brown, 1973). either contained an overt copula or lacked a copula (but would require an overt copula in adult 
English). 
Table 1: Children's Ages, MLU and Number of Predicatives 
Child (source)  1  Age Range I Avg. MLU I Be Contexts 
Nina (Suppes, 1973)  1  2;O-2;2  1  2.98  47 1 
All four of the children in this study are at a stage of development in which they omit functional 
elements in some, but not all of their utterances. For example, they sometimes omit determiners, 
verbal inflectional morphology and auxiliary verbs in addition to the copula. Nevertheless, when 
these functional elements are used they  are virtually error-free,  and the copula is (correctly) 
inflected (e.g. is, am, etc., not be) 99.25% of the time. The files were chosen on the basis of the 
children's production of predicatives and of the copula: the earliest file selected for each child 
was the earliest at which the child used all types of predicatives, and the last file selected was 
the last one in which the child's rate of  omitted be was significantly different in  locative and 
nominal predicatives. The reason for using this criterion for choosing the last file for inclusion 
in the analysis will become clear when we look at children's asymmetric rates of omission of 
the copula. 
Naomi (Sachs, 1983) 
Adam (Brown, 1973) 
First, let us examine children's omission of  the copula in nominal and locative predicatives; we 
will return to adjectival predicatives in section 6. 
As shown in Table 2, children showed a strong tendency to use an overt (inflected) copula in 
nominal predicatives but to omit the copula in locative predicatives.'4 
555  1  2;O-2;7 
2;7-3;4 
Table 2: Average Rate of Overt Be in Children's Predicatives 
3.09 
3.38  1  792 
Adam's  rates of overt he are noticeably lower than those of the other children, but his rates are 
lower in both categories. That is, he shows the same trend as the other children, but his rates of 
an overt copula are depressed overall. For comparison, the average rates of overt be excluding 
Adam's  data are 81.7% for nominal predicatives and 26.3% for locative predicatives.  Some 
examples of children's nominal and locative predicatives are given in (23) and (24) (the child's 
age at the time of utterance is given in years;months(.days)). 
I41n the table, the numhers in parentheses to the right of the percentages indicate the lotal number (N) of copula 
utterances or each type.  That is, Nina produced  143 nominal predicatives,  74.1% of which contained an overt 
copula. 
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(23)  a.  I'm big boy. (Adam 2;7) 
b.  he's a dog. (Nina 2;0.24) 
c.  Patsy's a girl. (Peter 2;  1.22) 
d.  she's a crocodile. (Naomi 2;3) 
(24)  a.  my pen down there. (Peter 2;O. 10) 
b.  I in the kitchen. (Nina 2; 1.15) 
c.  Eric at Cathy house. (Naomi 2;4.30) 
d.  he way up dere [there]. (Adam 3;O. 10) 
It is interesting to note that the nominal predicates children use denote exclusively permanent 
properties (often an object's name or label), and their locative predicates denote exclusively tem- 
porary locations. Thus, while there may be predicates that do not possess the canonical prop- 
erties of  stage- or individual-level predicates (NP predicates that denote temporary properties, 
e.g.  fugitive,  and locative predicates that denote permanent locations, e.g. Paris is  in France), 
children do not produce such predicates at this stage of development. The question of how these 
non-canonical predicates are analyzed in child English is an important one. Acknowledging that 
the correct analysis of these predicates in adult English is still not completely settled, it is an 
issue that I plan to pursue in future experimental work. 
5  Analysis 
To recapitulate briefly, the structure proposed for individual-level predicatives is that in (25a), 
and the structure proposed for stage-level predicatives is that in (25b). 
Spec  I' 
I  A 




Spec  I' 
1-  Subj  I  AspP 
A 
Spec  Asp' 
A 
Asp  SC 
LcEl.l 
SL predicate 
We  saw in the previous section that children acquiring English omit the copula when  AspP 
is projected  in the structure, and they produce an overt (and inflected) copula when AspP is 
not projected.  This result  may seem surprising. a priori,  since children appear to be adding 
something to the string when there is less stmcture, but leaving something out of  the string 
35 when there is more structure. So we should ask how it is that the syntactic asymmetry between 
stage- and individual-level predicates, argued for in sections 2 and 3, helps us account for the 
asymmetry in the overtness of  the copula in child English.  Put another way, why does AspP 
"block"  the occurrence of  an overt copula? To see how it does so, let us turn to the temporal 
anchoring of main clauses. 
Let us  assume that all main clauses must be anchored to the discourse in  order to receive a 
temporal interpretation,  and this is done via an abstract Tense Operator (TOP)  located in the 
C-domain."  Let us further suppose that all indicative main clauses must be anchored by this 
operator.  Temporal anchoring obtains when Top binds a functional head in the matrix clause 
that is associated with the temporal structure of the clause. The functional heads associated with 
temporal structure are Infl and  AS^.'^  The particular head that must be bound is determined by 
the particular grammar and may vary across languages, in a way to be made explicit directly. 
Let us define temporal anchoring in the following way. 
(26)  Dejinifion 
Temporal Anchoring: 
i.  A main clause is temporally anchored if  the Tense Operator (Top) binds an appro- 
priate functional head in  the structure, where an appropriate head is either Infl or 
Asp. 
ii.  In some languages Top binds only Infl; in other languages it binds Asp (when pro- 
jected). 
Further, let us define grammatical finiteness in terms of temporal anchoring, so that a main clause 
is finite when Top binds Infl, but not otherwise.  In other words, Infl is the sort of head that, if 
bound by To,,  results in morphosyntactic finiteness (provided the particular language contains 
morphology to express finiteness). Asp is not the sort of head that bears finiteness features, so 
a clause in which Top binds Asp is not finite (nor is it infinitive: Aspo simply does not relate to 
grammatical finiteness). 
In adult English, all indicative main clauses are finite (the main verb or auxiliary element, if 
present, carries tense or agreement features, which may or may not be realized overtly). There- 
fore, in adult English TOP  always binds Infl, whether or not AspP is projected in the structure. 
Thus, the structures of individual- and stage-level predicatives in adult English are then those in 
(27a) and (27b), respectively. 
Spec  I' 
I - 
[+fin]  IL predicate 
"~n~  (1987) and Guirorl and Hoekstra (1995) have both proposed such an operator; lor Enq the operator is in 
the head, c', while for Guiron and Hoekstra it is in SpecCP. I remain neutral on the issue of its precise location 
within the CP projection. 
''1  do not distinguish between the heads InH and Tns. Predicatives in Child English 
i 
Sub;  Ii A  AspP 
But in grammars in which the temporal anchoring requirement is satisfied through the binding of 
Asp0 (when projected), not all main clauses will be finite. In particular, stage-level predicatives 
involve a bound Asp instead of a bound Infl, and these expressions are not finite.  I argue here 
that child English is a grammar in  which Aspu is bound by Top when Asp is projected.  Thus, 
the structures for individual- and stage-level predicatives in child English are given in (28a-b). 
A 
TOP,  IP 
A 
Spec  I' 
i - 
[+fin]  IL predicate 
Subj  I  ASPP 
A 
Spec  Asp' 
/", 
Aspi  SC 
& 
SL predicate 
I should point out here that Infl in (28b) does not have a [-fin]  feature, rather it is just empty. 
In  spite of its being empty, we still want to project IP (as opposed to projecting only as far as 
AspP; e.g. one might propose this if  one believes children's clause structures are reduced-see 
Rizzi (1994)). IP must be projected even when Infl is not finite, because some of children's null- 
copula predicatives contain Nominative subjects (e.g. I in the kitchen). In such cases we would 
37 need to have a position for the subject to move to which is high enough to get Nominative case. 
I assume that the canonical subject position is the appropriate position. (See also arguments in 
Schiitze (1997) for the view that IP must be projected in children's main clauses.) 
The difference between  child and adult English, then, amounts to a difference in  the way in 
which the temporal anchoring requirement is satisfied. In adult English it is satisfied through the 
binding of Infl, regardless of whether Asp is projected in the structure or not.  In child English 
it is satisfied through the binding of  Infl  only if  Asp is not projected (i.e. in individual-level 
predicatives) (otherwise, the requirement is satisfied through the binding of  Asp).  Recall the 
claim made above that main clauses in  which Infl  is bound by  TOP  are finite, while clauses 
in which Infl is not bound (i.e. those in which Asp is bound) are non-finite.  In predicative 
constructions, finiteness is expressed via an inflected copula, and non-finiteness is indicated by 
the absence of an inflected copula. By defining finiteness in this way, we capture the association 
in child English between the projection of Asp and a null copula, and between the lack of Asp 
and an overt, inflected copula. 
6  Adjectival Predicatives 
Although the asymmetry in copula omission between nominal and locative predicatives is robust 
and clear, it is somewhat less robust among individual-level and stage-level adjectival predica- 
tives. Nevertheless, three of the four children do show an asymmetry in the expected direction 
(a higher rate of overt be with individual- than stage-level adjectival predicates), and I will argue 
that adjectives introduce independent difficulties. 
In Table 3 I give the children's average rate of overt be in adjectival predicatives. 
Table 3: Average Rate of  Overt Be in Children's Adjectival Predicatives 
Adam  1  44.4%  (35)  1  43.3%  (80) 
Avg.  /  68.3%  1  46.2% 
Some examples of children's adjectival predicatives are given in (29). 
(29)  a.  this empty. (Peter 2;3.3) 
b.  this is orange. (Peter 2;3.3) 
c.  her thirsty. (Nina 2;2.6) 
d.  Mommy's little. (Nina 2;1.22) 
e.  you warm enough. (Naomi 2;s) 
f.  and this is yellow. (Naomi 2;5) 
Once again, Adam's utterances pattern somewhat differently from those of the other children in 
that he does not show a difference in his rate of overt be between stage- and individual-level ad- 
jectives.  In fact, Adam's rate of overt be in adjectival predicatives is the same as his rate of overt 
38 Predicatives in Child English 
be in nominal predicatives, suggesting that if  there is a syntactic reason behind children's omit- 
ted copulas, Adam's grammar assigns the same (in relevant respects) structure to both adjectival 
and nominal predicatives, but a different one to locatives. According to the present analysis this 
would entail that Adam's adjectival predicates uniformly lack AspP. However, given Adam's 
overall low rate of overt be, I hesitate to take a strong position on this particular issue. For com- 
parison, the average rates of  overt be in adjectival predicatives excluding Adam are 76.2% and 
47.1%. The reasons for Adam's different rate of omitting the copula is not totally clear, but it is 
possible that Adam was exposed somewhat to African American English, in which null copula 
main clauses are grammatical. and perhaps this had an effect on his tendency to omit the copula. 
The overall weaker distinction between stage- and individual-level predicates in terms of chil- 
dren's copula omission may seen1 surprising if children indeed have grammatical knowledge of 
the stagelindividual distinction. However, there are a number of factors concerning adjectives 
that suggest that adjectives are not straightforwardly classified as stage- or individual-level, and 
therefore that they might not pattern exactly like nominal and locative predicates. 
There are certain adjectives that behave in some respects like stage-level predicates and in other 
respects like individual-level predicates.  For example, as discussed by  Jdger (1999), avuilable 
denotes a temporary property, it can be modified by temporal modifiers (e.g. John is available on 
Tuesdays), its bare plural subject can get a weak reading (e.g. Firemen are available: existential 
OK)  and it can occur in an existential coda (There are.firemen available),  but it cannot occur in 
a PVC (*I  saw John available). There are also a number of  adjectives that are individual-level 
in the unmarked case (e.g.  Jololzn  is mean), but which can be easily coerced into a stage-level 
meaning in different syntactic contexts. For example, these adjectives occur in the "active be" 
context (John is being mean) and in Stowell's (Stowell, 1991) "mental property" contexts (John 
was mean to hit Bill/lt was mean of John to hit Bill) (please see Fernald (2000) for a discussion 
of coercion). 
Moreover, since adjectives constitute a single lexical category, children cannot classify adjec- 
tives as stage- or individual-level simply on the basis of their lexical category, as they might, for 
example, with NP and PP predicates.  Rather, the stage- or individual-levelhood of each adjec- 
tive IPPUS~  be learned on an item-by-item basis. For this reason, and because of the existence of 
discrepancies between the temporarylpermanent meaning of an adjective and its behavior in the 
stagelindividual tests, I conclude that children's somewhat weaker stagelindividual distinction 
in  terms of their omission of the copula with  adjectival predicates does not constitute coun- 
terevidence to the general pattern. Therefore, I maintain the generalization that children tend to 
produce an overt copula with individual-level predicates, and they tend to omit the copula with 
stage-level predicates. 
7  Hebrew 
According to the present analysis, the omission of the copula in childEnglish predicatives results 
from the fact that Top binds  Asp%o  satisfy the temporal  anchoring.  If  this option is made 
available by UG and if child grammars are subject to the full range of UG principles that govern 
adult grammars (i.e. if this is not a property only of "pre-mature",  or non-adult grammars), then 
we would predict that there are adult grammars that display the same pattern of copula omission 
in main clauses as we find in child English. Here I would like to suggest that adult Hebrew is 
such a language. 
In Hebrew present tense predicatives the copula is not verbal, unlike its past and future tense 
counterpart (h.y.y)  (Doron, 1983; Rapoport, 1987; Rothstein, 1987; Greenberg, 1994; Rothstein, 1995, among others). Rather, it is the spellout of Agreement material in Infl (Rapoport, 1987). 
Also unlike the past and future tense verbal copula, the "pronominal"  copula, or Pron (hu in 
masculine singular), is omitted in some predicatives but overt in others (the verbal copula in past 
and future tenses is obligatorily overt in all main clause predicatives). 
Some examples are given in (30) (from Greenberg, 1994)). 
(30)  a.  ha-kli  ha-ze  *(hu) patiS 
the-tool the-this 3m.sg hammer 
"This tool is a hammer." 
b.  Dani ("hu)  me'od 'ayef ha-yom 
Dani 3m.sg very  tired  the-day 
"Dani is very tired today." 
c.  ha-Samyim (hem) kxulim 
the-sky  3m.pl blue 
"The sky is blue." 
The predicate in (30a) denotes an inherent, indeed, definitional property of the subject, and Pron 
must be overt.  The predicate in (30b) denotes a temporary, non-inherent property,  and Pron 
must be null.  In  (30c), Pron is optionally overt, but its overtness/covertness corresponds to a 
difference in the meaning of the predicate. When Pron is overt the sentence means "The sky is 
blue (as  opposed to some other color, e.g. red)";  when Pron is null the sentence means "The sky 
is blue (right now, as opposed to being overcast)". 
Greenberg (1994) shows that in predicatives with an overt pronominal copula the predicate de- 
notes an inherent or generic property (e.g. orvim *(hem)  Sxorim 'Ravens are black'), while in 
predicatives with a null copula the predicate denotes a non-inherent or non-definitional  prop- 
erty.  Thus, Hebrew appears to divide predicates into temporal and atemporal properties along 
somewhat different lines than a language like adult English.  For example, the predicate more 
'teacher' could be temporal or atemporal in Hebrew, but it is only atemporal (individual-level) 
in English. Nevertheless, the syntactic result that temporal predicates project AspP and atempo- 
ral predicates do not project AspP is the same in both languages. Moreover, the morphological 
reflex of this asymmetry is the same in Hebrew as in child English: in Hebrew, predicates that 
denote non-inherent properties project AspP, and in these cases Asp0 is bound by Top, hence 
there is no overt copula. Predicates that denote inherent properties do not project AspP; in these 
cases the only head available for binding by To,  is Infl.  When Infl is bound it is spelled out as 
the pronominal copula. 
8  Summary and Open Questions 
The main  argument made in  this paper  is that the semantic contrast we know  as the stage- 
level/individual-level distinction corresponds to a syntactic (aspectual) difference between pred- 
icative structures. Stage-level and otherwise temporal predicates project AspP above the lexical 
Small Clause.  Individual-level and otherwise atemporal predicates do not project AspP. Sup- 
port for the association between stage-level predicates and AspP (and between individual-level 
predicates and the lack of  AspP) was provided from English perception verb complements and 
existential codas (which admit only stage-level predicates and arguably contain AspP), Russian 
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past tense predicatives (Instrumental case-marked predicates have a temporal meaning, and In- 
strumental is checked in SpecAspP) and Spanish and Portuguese main clause (present tense) 
predicatives (the serlesrf~r  distinction was argued to be an aspectual one). 
The analysis of the stagelindividual contrast as a syntactic aspectual distinction provides a basis 
for accounting for the asymmetry in the overtness of the copula in child English. As shown in 
section 4, children acquiring English tend to omit the copula with stage-level predicates but use 
an overt, inflected copula with individual-level predicates, a pattern seen most clearly in nominal 
and locative predicatives.  The formal requirement of temporal anchoring defined in section 5 
allows us to capture this null-/overt-copula alternation. Stage-level predicates contain AspP, and 
in child English Aspo can be bound by TOP  to satisfy the temporal anchoring requirement. Main 
clauses containing these predicates are non-finite  in child English (realized as a null copula) 
because Infl is not bound by Top, rather, it is Asp that is bound.  Individual-level predicates, 
instead, lack AspP, so the only functional head available for binding by TOP  is Infl. When Infl 
is bound, the clause is finite, and in (non-verbal) predicatives finiteness is spelled out as an 
inflected copula.  Adult English, in contrast to child English, never allows ASP'  to satisfy the 
temporal anchoring requirement, and so in all main clauses in  adult English, Infl is bound by 
Top, and the copula is overt and inflected. 
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Presenting and Predicating Lower Events* 
Abstract 
The effects of different forms of  predication have been insightfully  (and almost exclusively) stud- 
ied for 'simple'  cases of predication, of which the 'presentational sentence' is maybe the paradigm 
instantiation.  It is the aim of this paper to show that thc same kind of effects as well as in fact the 
same kind of structures are present at embedded levels in thematically and otherwise more complex 
structures.  Beyond presentational sentences, 'unaccusative'  experiencing constructions involving a 
dative subject, 'double object constructions' and -  to a lesser extent -  spraylload constructions are 
discussed.  For all of these, it is argued that they comprise a predication encoding the ascription of 
a transient temporal property to a location.  On this basis, a proposal is made as to how the scope 
asymmetry between the two arguments involved in the colistructions can be explained. Furthermore, 
a proposal is made as to how what has been called 'argument shift' is motivated. 
1  Introduction 
In this section, the constructions under investigation are briefly introduced (1. I). Subsection 1.2 
comprises the proposal and gives an overview of the discussion. Some background assumptions 
the proposal depends on are spelled out in  1.3. 
1.1  Constructions 
The constructions to be dealt with are exemplified in (1) to (4).  Since the bulk of data to be 
discussed comes from German, I give an example in German verb-final order under (a).  (b) 
roughly indicates the assumed structure: 
(I)  Presentational Construction (PC): 'm  {was, appeared) a man (in the garden)' 
a.  Da ein Mann (im Garten) {war, erschien) 
b.  [There [[Dprnan-~~~  (PPgarden)l was/dppearedIl 
(2)  Dative Experiencer Construction (DEC): 'A gangster escaped the police' 
a.  Der Polizei ein Gangster entkam 
b.  [ DPpoiice-~,U  [DPg".ngster-NOM  escaped11 
*I  would like to thank Olga Borik, Alexis Dimitriadis, Helen de Hoop and Gerhard Jaeger for taking the trouble 
to read a draft version of this paper and commenting on it.  Thanks also to Rick Nouwen and Tanya Reinhart for 
discussion. For largely pragmatic reasons, some of the more fundamental critique didn't make it into this particular 
paper but will no doubt have an important impact on future work. The usual disclaimers apply. 
ZAS Papers in Linguistics 22, 2001.43-68 (3)  Double Object Construction(D0C): 'Otto sold a man a gun' 
a.  Otto einem Mann eine Pistole verkaufte 
b.  [DPottO-~ond  [DPman-~ar  [DP,~,-acc  sold111 
(4)  Shifted SprayILoad Construction (shifted SILC): 'Otto loaded a  with hay' 
a.  Otto einen Wagen mit Heu belud 
b.  [DPotto-~fl~  [DP ca7.t-ACC  [PPhay loaded111 
For ease of reference, I call the elements underlined 'shifted arguments'. This is however not to 
suggest that they have undergone movement. A detailed discussion of the (common) syntactic 
properties of these constructions is not the subject of this paper but can be found in Brandt (in 
progress).  In what follows, reference will be made also to what I call here the 'oblique object 
construction' and the 'unshifted spraylload construction', exemplified in (5)  and (6): 
(5)  Oblique Object Construction (OOC): 'Otto sold a gun to a man' 
a.  Otto eine Pistole an einen Mann verkaufte 
b.  [DP,t,to-~o~  [Dp,,,-~cc  [PP,,,  ~~ldllll 
(6)  Unshifted SprayILoad Construction (unshifted SILC): 'Otto loaded hay onto a cart' 
a.  Otto Heu auf einen Wagen lud 
b.  [DPott0-~onn  [DPhnl/-~cc  [PPzualon  loaded111 
1.2  Proposal and Overview 
The 'shifted arguments' restrict a spatiotemporal location that is ascribed a temporal property. 
This property is a change of state associated with the occurrence of an event. In rough syntactic 
terms, the claim is that (1) -  (4) share as part of their overall structure a structure as depicted in 
(7) that encodes this meaning: 
'shifted  tP 
argument' 
t  VP 
'A  PERF  VP 
& A 
theme  VL,,  lot 
Spelling this out in more detail, the paper seeks to derive in particular: 
(A)  The fact that a D/NP in the c-command domain of the 'shifted argument' is confined to a 
narrow scope interpretation 
(B) The reason behind what has been called 'argument shift' 
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After laying down more global background assumptions, the view here on presentational there 
sentences is sketched and motivated to some extent: Presentational there sentences are viewed 
as encoding the ascription of a transient temporal property to a location (section 2).  Section 3 
presents evidence in favor of the claim that the shifted ditransitive constructions under discussion 
are biclausal.  However, the lower clause is argued  to comprise an  event, the predication it 
encodes thus being different from a primitive possessive relation  HAVE. Building on Freeze 
(1 992), section 4 argues for the shifted ditransitive constructions that the possession-like relation 
between  the shifted argument and the theme argument really  stems from the lower clause's 
corresponding to a presentational sentence. Collecting (the relevant parts of]  the constructions 
into one, section 5 analyzes the building blocks of the predication in question and how they are 
put together, deriving (A) and (B) above: 
As to the 'scope freezing' property associated with the construction, it is argued that a D/NP 
that finds itself in the c-command domain of  the shifted argument codefines the property that 
is ascribed to the shifted argument.  It is in this sense 'incorporated'  into the predicate, which 
forces it to take narrow scope. 
As to the motivation for 'argument shift', it is argued that the DINP (including there) that finds 
itself in the position of the shifted argument acts as the logical subject of the predication encoded, 
restricting what is being quantified over. Not filling this position with an appropriate argument 
would leave the restriction too small for the predicate to be assessed, resulting in a semantically 
ill-formed structure. 
Section 6 sums up the results and aims them back at presentational sentences that do not seem 
to fit the picture. 
1.3  Core background assumptions 
The general view of 'narrow' syntax adopted here is this: Syntactic structures are not determinis- 
tically projected form contentful lexical categories (idiosyncratic soundlmeaning associations). 
Rather, (arrays of) functional categories selecting these lexical categories to a large extent de- 
termine the eventually projected syntactic structures and -  as a consequence -  how they  are 
interpreted.'  An example is the assumption made here of  a category 'light verb'  labelled 'v' 
that selects VP as projected by the lexical verb. For example, selection of (an instance of) 'little 
v'  determines whether an agent argument is projected or not.  As far as I can see, two conjec- 
tures crucial here are natural on, if not essential to, this view:  First, 'poorer'  structures (where 
for example an agent argument is not projected) correspond to parts of  full blown structures 
with higher layers missing (rather than being derived from these full blown structures). Second, 
since syntactic structures (LFs) feed interpretation, not all meaning is associated with contentful 
lexical categories. 
1.3.2 Spatiotemporal Location, states and events 
Following Galton (1984), I assume that states are logically distinct from events in the following 
way: States correspond to sets of times, namely those times where they are true. A proposition 
encoding a state can therefore be evaluated with respect to just  a time.  Events 'take time':  A 
proposition encoding an event can be evaluated only given an  event AND a particular time: 
'This view seems particularly prominent in recent work by  Borer, Marantr and Cinque among others and is 
solnetirnes called 'neoconstructional'. It will be true if  the event occurred in  that time and false otherwise.  To cite a passage from 
Galton (1998): "With an event, the natural question is When  did it happen?, answered by means 
of the function which maps event occurrences onto times, whereas with a fluent [% states and 
progressives], the natural  question is What is its value at time t?".  Events as well  as times 
are both primitive, then, with each event being associated with a certain time in the temporal 
framework. 
For the representation of time, I assume the following: The type T of times has the structure of an 
algebra, comprising atomic times and sums built from these atomic times, where these sums are 
again individuals 't'.  The Time Structure will be ordered with respect to (at least) inclusion ('5') 
as well as precedence ('<').' The crucial assumption pertaining to the statelevent distinction is 
that states can be evaluated with respect to an atomic time (= instant).  The occurrence of an 
event can be assessed only given a 'sum individual' time (% interval). 
Times are understood to 'locate' states in that they are the things that have states as properties. I 
use times for representation, but will speak in the text of 'spacetimes' or 'locations' rather. While 
all these concepts seem equally mysterious eventually, times seem to me to have the advantage 
of having a richer tradition in Linguistics with theories for representation in place. 
1.3.3 Events, perfection and target states 
Events are essentially determined by the change of state that is associated with them: We be- 
lieve that something must have happened if  something has changed.  With Dowty (1979) and 
Kratzer (1994), I assume that the meaning of  an eventive predicate (Vendler (1957)'s  accom- 
plishmentslachievements) derives from the state that the event 'brings about':  Events have as 
properties the states that result from them.  For example, an accomplished event of feeding  the 
cat has as a consequence a state where the cat is fed.  This is captured by Kratzer's  'f-target' 
function that takes an event argument and maps it onto its 'target state': 
(8)  FEED THE CAT --. Ae  At  [feeding(e) & (fed(the cat))(f-target(e)) (t)] 
For the meaning of the target state (the set of times at which it holds) to be determined, the event 
leading to it has to have happened or be 'perfected'.  The occurrence of an event is represented 
by binding the event argument, where this binding is accomplished by a perfect operator which 
is assumed to be situated in the extended verbal projection  (cf.  (7)).  Apart from existentially 
quantifying the event variable, the perfect operator does something else: It maps the times that 
make the target state true to a set of  'bigger'  times which comprise as parts at least one time 
where the target state holds and at least one (preceding) time where the target state does not 
(yet) hold. What the perfect operator does then is capture the event, understood essentially as a 
change of state occurring over time, 'as a whole'.  The denotation of the perfect operator is given 
in (9), its application to what we have above in (8) is given in  (10): 
(9)  PERFECT -.A  AP  At  Itl,  t2,  e [lP(f-target(e)) (t,) & P(f-target(e)) (tz) & tl, tz 5 t & tl + 
t2 1 
(10)  PERFECT(FEED THE CAT)  At  3tl, t2, e [feeding(e) & 7 (fed(the cat))(f-target(e)) 
(t,) & (fed(the cat))(f-target(e)) (t2) & tl, t2 5 t & tl <  t21 
2~he  Time Structure T can he represented thus: T = ( UT, &, 5,  4).  The sum operation '@' is an idempotent, 
commutative and associative function from UT x UT to UT. Cf. Link (1983), Krifka (1998) for definitions of part 
structures for the modelling of Mass Nouns/Plurals and the spatiotemporal domain respectively. Presenting and Predicating Lower Events 
1.3.4 Predication 
Predication is asymmetric:  Subject expressions are capable of referring and 'standing on their 
own'. Predicate expressions are essentially incomplete and dependent (Strawson, 1959, chap. 5 
& 6). 
In Semantic Theory, this asymmetry is expressed in terms of quantification. In  first order pred- 
icate logic, individual variables  are the only terms that lend themselves to quantification.  In 
second order generalized quantifier theory, predication is expressed as an  asymmetric relation 
between  sets. Following tradition, I assume that predication  proper entails a subject-predicate 
relation as well as what one might call 'temporal location'  (Aristotle: De Interpretatione,  55 2, 
3,s). 
The paradigm syntactic unit encoding predication in  this sense is the clause.  In  (generative) 
Syntactic Theory, the 'Extended Projection Principle'  states that 'Sentences must have syntac- 
tic Subjects' (Chomsky (1981), Rothstein (1983)) and it is assumed that the structural relation 
between subjects and predicates is asymmetric in that a subject must c-command its predicate 
(Williams (1980)). 
2  Presentational Sentences 
This section draws together some points suggesting that presentational sentences can be viewed 
as encoding the ascription of a transient state to a location denoted by there. It is proposed that 
the 'scope freezing' property of there is rooted in this. 
2.1  Presentation and Location 
The intuition that presentational sentences are locative in  some sense is unsurprising.  Across 
languages, an element similar to English there appears both as what is commonly taken to be a 
meaningless 'dummy'  subject expression and as a locative proform.  In general, a speaker will 
be the more ready to utter a presentational sentence the more specifically 'located' the concept 
that is asserted to be instantiated is. Thus (a) does not make a good presentational sentence, but 
(b) does: 
(1 1)  a. ??There is life 
b.  There is life {on Mars, after marriage) 
Presentational sentences are used to 'single out' certain states of affairs, they point to something 
that 'is the case'.  While lve alone does not seem to make an interesting case, ly'e on mars or 
ly'e afier marriage does. Inspired by Chierchia (l995), McNally (199%) argues specifically that 
'location  dependence'  is the crucial property a state must have to be encodable in  a presenta- 
tional sentence. What is ruled out are states that are 'location independent'  (% Carlson's (1978) 
indidual level predication), where in essence "the entities participating in these states will do so 
no matter what their location happens to be"  (McNally,  1998b, p.  298).  Thus there is a man 
bald does not make a good presentational sentence while there is water available does. Location 
does not matter for a man's baldness, but it does matter for the availability of water. 
47 2.2  Predication in Presentational Sentences 
An alternative to the view that presentational sentences lack a logical subject (and hence that 
there as it appears as subject in presentational sentences is a 'dummy'  expression) is expressed 
for example in Kratzer (1994), of which I cite a passage: 
(I) The White Mountains are visible 
... is most easily understood as answering a question about a contextually salient spatiotemporal 
location:  As for the time and place we are considering, what is going on there?  (I) says that 
what is going on there is that the white mountains are visible.  [Kratzer 1994: 65fl 
In effect, what Kratzer proposes is that (I) really expresses the ascription of  a property -  the 
holding of a particular situation -  to a location, which is consequently the subject of the predi- 
cation. Kratzer argues that the LF of (I) comprises a 'raising copula'  predicating a situation of 
a spatiotemporal pronoun corresponding to there but phonologically invisible. The white moun- 
tains raises past the copula and the invisible there and becomes the syntactic subject of (I). The 
logical subject of the presentational sentence is however the location denoted by (unpronounced) 
there. 
The 'scrambling language' German provides evidence suggesting that what appears as the sur- 
face subject of  (I) plausibly generates lower structurally than a locative proform.  In German, 
the proform  da, largely  corresponding to English  there, has  to  appear to the left of - and 
c-commanding on  standard assumptions -  stranded quantifiers  associated with the extracted 
phrase.  Similarly,  'was  fuer  split'  leaves  behind  the NP restriction  to  the right of  (and c- 
commanded by) this profom.' 
(1 2)  a.  [Weisse BergeIi  waren da  vielei  sichtbar. 
[White  mountainsli were  there manyi visible. 
b.  *[Weisse BergeIi  waren vielei  da  sichtbar. 
[White   mountain^]^ were  manyi there visible. 
(13)  a.  Wasi  waren da  [fuer BergeIi  sichtbar ? 
What, were  there [for   mountain^]^ visible  ? 
b.  *Wasi  waren [fuer BergeIi  da  sichtbar ? 
Whati were  [for  mountain~]~  there visible  ? 
In  the spirit of  Kratzer (1994), Kiss (1996) puts forward evidence that "There  constructions 
always predicate about a specific point in space and time:  about here and now or there and 
then".  If  there is the logical subject in a presentational sentence, then it is expected to behave 
like a definite or 'strong' DINP in principle, where I assume that the crucial property of a strong 
DINP is that it carries an existence presupposition (while a weak DINP does not).4 Evidence for 
there corresponding to a strong D/NP comes from patterns involving tag formation. While tag 
formation is bad with predicates that involve weak subjects, it is good with predicates involving 
strong subjects as well as with presentational there constructions:' 
3Stranded quantifiers have heen argued to mark the base position of the extracted NP complement (cf. Sportiche 
(1988)).  den Besten (1989) has argued that wasfuer split can take place only from deep objects before these 
undergo movement. 
4Kiss uses the terms 'non-specific'  versus 'specific', but I will use the tcrminology of Milsark (1977). 
5~resumably,  one would want to argue that the anaphor that is part of the tag nceds an antecedent the existence 
of which is established in the common ground. Presenting and Predicating Lower Events 
(14)  a. ?*A girl appeared, didn't shelone ? [weak subject] 
b.  A girl knew the answer, didn't shelone ? [strong subject] 
c.  There was a man at the door, wasn't there ? [+  strong subject] 
Another piece of evidence involves focussing adverbs which do not allow in their scope strong 
subjects.  While these can appear to the left of  and have in  their scope clauses involving weak 
subjects, they cannot appear to the left of and have in their scope clauses involving strong sub- 
jects.  There constructions again pattern with clauses involving strong  subject^:^ 
(15)  a.  [Only [A BABY WAS BORN]]; nothing else happened. [weak subject] 
b.  *[Only [JOHN READ A NOVEL]]; nothing else happened [strong subject] 
c.  *[Only [THERE WAS AN ACCIDENT]]; nothing else happened [+  strong subject] 
Taking there to be a locative subject expression locating a state opens a perspective on a range of 
notorious problems with presentational there sentences, such as possible disagreement between 
the copula and the alleged associate as in:  There's lots of cookies in the box.7  Agreement in 
presentational there sentences varies across languages. Thus in e.g. Finnish or French, the cop- 
ula is always third person singular, no matter what its alleged associate. In the Bantu language 
Ndendeule,  agreement in  presentational sentences seems to be with the location (cf.  4.3.1). 
The absence of  existential import in  sentences such as There are steps missing in that proof 
(Chomsky, 1999, p.  20)) could be rather straightforwardly accounted for presumably if  there 
be -  assumed to do the work of a quantifier essentially -is not associated with an NP (here: a 
book),  but rather with an entire (set of) state(s). Similarly, the oddity of  ??space is in the fridge 
as opposed to there is space in the fridge  (cf. McNally 1998b, p.  299) could be blamed on the 
essential lack of content of the concept associated with space, making it unsuitable as a (broadly 
speaking) topical expression (cf. 5.3). 
I will assume here that there is locative and that it corresponds to the logical subject in presenta- 
tional  sentence^.^  As to the nature of the predicate in presentational sentences, let us put down 
for the time being that it corresponds to a state that is location (time.)  dependent -  we return to 
the matter toward the end of the paper. 
There does not 'add' to meaning to the extent that whatever 'is' is somewhere. That there makes 
a difference to truth conditions shows in a pattern concerning scope, to which we turn. 
2.3  Scope in Presentational Sentences 
To capture the fact that in presentational sentences DINPs cannot be 'quantifier raised'  across 
there, Williams (1984) has proposed that there acts as a 'scope marker'.  For example, while in 
(16a) someone can take scope over the modal must, this seems impossible in (16b) where it is in 
the syntactic scope of there, cf. also Heim (1987, p. 24). 'x > y' should be read as 'x has scope 
over y': 
'For  lack of better terminology, the units comprising weak and strong suhjects are both dubbed 'clause' here. 
The unit associated with a weak subject should really be undcrstood as meaning 'clause - X', whcre 'X' stands in 
for syntactic material relating to temporality. 
'~reivik  (1997) suggests that there's here means something like I could ntention or Let me recall, which take 
propositional complements. 
8Bolinger (1977, p. 9 1) states: "Whether therea [existential there] is meaningless enough to force a distinction 
[from locative there] depends on onc's sense of proportion".  Kayne (class lectures) argues that there is always 
part of a larger structure comprising a silent demonstrative as well as an abstract noun like PLACE, THING or 
PERSON. (16)  a.  A man must be in the house [must > a man, a man > must] 
b.  There must be a man in the house [only: must > a man] 
This was unproblematic in principle under the assumption of  a level of  'deep  structure'  and 
a mechanism of  'late insertion'.  Under the 'minimalist'  (Chomsky (1986) and later) analysis 
according to which  there is replaced at LF by  its associate D/NP, the phenomenon  remains 
mysterious. Here, the assumption is that the two sentences have identical LFs and that only their 
phonological form differs. 
The 'scope freezing' property of presentational there sentences is reminiscent of the scopal prop- 
erties of  predications  involving individual  level predicates (Carlson (1978)).  The subjects of 
these very strongly take wide scope with respect to the D/NPs they c-~ommand:~ 
(17)  a.  A girl knew every answer (a girl > every answer, very hard: every answer > a girl) 
b.  A boy loves every girl (a boy > every girl, very hard: every girl > a boy) 
To the extent that a distinguishing feature of presentational sentences as well as individual level 
predications is that of encoding the ascription of a property to an individual, it seems reasonable 
to assume that predication and 'scope freezing' are related. 
3  DOCs and shifted SILCs: An extra predication and its contents 
Evidence for an 'extra' predication in DOCs and shifted S/LCs is presented. The view that this 
predication comprises a primitive relation HAVE is argued against. The predication is argued to 
comprise an event rather which is 'perfected', that is, a change of state. 
3.1  Evidence for an extra predication in DOCs and shifted SLCs 
It is assumed here that predication entails a subject-predicate relation as well as 'temporal loca- 
tion'.  That full-fledged DOCs and shifted S/L constructions indeed encode two separate predi- 
cations in this sense is suggested by a range of facts: 
3.1.1  Ellipsis, Anaphora, Comparatives 
Under the null hypothesis, ellipsis is licensed if what is elided can be recovered through a struc- 
turally (LF) identical antecedent. Consider (l8), adopted from Den Dikken et al. (1998): 
(18)  Shall I give you another sausage ? I can't [ XP 0  1.  I'm on a diet. 
We understand that what is unpronounced here -  traditionally, this projection would correspond 
to the VP -  has a meaning close to have a sausage. The most straightforward explanation is that 
the preceding sentence in fact comprises a structure that encodes this meaning." 
'According  to my intuition, a wide scope reading for every answer andlor every girl in  (17) IS about as hard 
to get as a wide scope reading for the universally quantified DINP in (i), where clearly a CP boundary intervenes 
between ein Mann "a man" and,jede Frau "every woman": 
(I)  Em Mann glauble  Ipp dabs jede  Frau  elnen L~ebhaber  haben muessel 
A  man  bel~eved  Lcr  that  every woman a  lover  have  must] 
I0If Hardt (1999) is right in that what we are dealing with in (1 8) is not ellipsis but involves an empty proform, 
then this is also a case of anaphora. 
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Similarly with DOCs and shifted SILCs, the anaphor it can pick up as an antecedent something 
propositional that is 'smaller'  than the predication superficially encoded by the main verb (cf. 
McCawley ( 1974)): 
(19)  a.  Max offered Anna his crocodile. But her mother won't allow it.  cf. 
b.  ?Max offered his crocodile to Anna. But her mother won't allow 3. 
It  is not Max's  offer that Anna's  mother doesn't  allow, but rather that  Anna have or get  a 
crocodile.  On the null assumption that anaphors need structurally encoded antecedents, this 
is straightforward if  in fact this 'smaller' propositional meaning is encoded in (19a). 
Although somewhat subtle, a contrast involving comparative ellipsis is worth mentioning here. 
Assume that comparative ellipsis involves the construction of a predicate that is structurally (LF) 
identical to an antecedent predicate, where what is compared is abstracted over. Consider now 
a) and b): 
(20)  a.  I'll give you more wine 
b.  I'll give more wine to you 
Both constructions have a reading according to which what is compared is the amount of wine 
involved in  an event of  giving:  I'll give you  more wine than someone else did before.  (20a) 
however has an  additional reading which seems to be absent in  (20b).  This reading amounts 
to something like:  I'll give you  wine and you  will have got  more wine as a result than you 
had before. Without further assumptions, this is predicted if the DOC in (20a) indeed encodes 
a propositional meaning corresponding to x  having (got)  y-much wine (at t),  in contrast to the 
OOC in (20b) which does not encode this 'extra' propositional meaning. 
3.1.2  Temporal Location 
McCawley (1974) notes that DOCs allow two temporal adverbs. These may be mutually incom- 
patible: 
(21)  a.  At the meeting yesterday the salesmanager gave Anna Europe next year 
b.  ??At the meeting yesterday the salesmanager gave Europe to Anna next year 
If we assume that it is clauses, i.e. units encoding a propositional meaning that allow for tempo- 
ral modification, then this is evidence that DOCs correspond to two clauses rather than one." 
Cinque (2000) argues that the temporal adverbs always and already can occur only once in a 
clause, thus providing a test for the number of clauses one is dealing with. What we find is that 
in shifted S/L constructions and DOCs, these adverbs can in fact appear twice:" 
(22)  a.  Immer hat Schimanski den Kiihlschrank immer mit  Bier vollgepackt 
always has Schimanski the  fridge  always with beer full-packed 
"Not all DOCs so easily allow independent temporal modification. Clearly, world knowledge and context play a 
decisive role here. No matter what the context is, however, 'simple' transitive predicates as well as 'ohlique object 
constructions' do not allow it. It would seem that the possibility to have independent temporal modification relates 
to a verb's ability to license a clausal complement overtly. However, as also the example with  'give' above shows, 
this is not a necessary condition for the availability of independent temporal modification. 
12'Schimanski'  is the name of an inspector in the German crime series 'Tatort' b. ?*Immer hat Schimanski immer Bier in  den Kiihlschrank gepackt 
always has Schimanski always beer into the  fridge  packed 
(23)  Schon  hat er ihr schon  (wieder) einen Kuss gegeben 
Already has he her already (again)  a  kiss  given 
Cinque's test supports the claim then that DOCs as well as shifted SILCs are 'biclausal', encod- 
ing two propositional meanings.'" 
3.2  Core Contents of the predication 
It is an old intuition going back at least to generative semantics that the meaning of give pred- 
icates in  DOCs can be decomposed into something like CAUSE-TO-HAVE. While this is in 
line with the general idea that DOCs are biclausal, it seems too simple to assume that the lower 
predication involves something like primitive 'possessive'  HAVE. Importantly for the issue at 
hand, there is reason to believe that the predication we are looking at is of an 'eventive', that is, 
'change of state' nature. 
3.2.1 Entailments 
If  predicates entering DOCS were indeed composed out of the primitive relations CAUSE and 
HAVE, we would expect that the constructions quite generally have this meaning, that is, that 
they generally carry what Oehrle (1976) has called a 'success entailment'  involving the HAVE 
relation. This is not the case, as some run-of-the-mill examples show: 
(24)  a.  I sent Otto a letter  7 +  Otto ended up having a letter 
b.  I threw Otto the ball  7 + Otto ended up having the ball 
(24a) and (24b) may be felicitously uttered also in circumstances where Otto does not end up 
having a letter or a ball. For example, the mail might have lost the letter; Otto might have failed to 
get hold of the ball because he stumbled. It is possible to put the blame on the CAUSE predicate, 
which amounts to the claim eventually that the CAUSE relation is idiosyncratically dependent 
on the particular verb entering the construction. This move would however deprive the idea of 
decomposition of its motivation, which is to capture systematically patterns of entailment. What 
is entailed by the examples given seems to be just what the sentences Otto was sent a letter 
and Otto was thrown a ball express -or maybe, putting more weight on the state following the 
sending: Otto has been sent a letter (thrown a ball). 
3.2.2 Event-related Adverbs and Particles 
That DOCs and shifted SILCs encode two events rather than just one is suggested by examples 
such as the following: 
(25)  She offered me tenderness through the phone 
"Interestingly,  Cinque notes that clitic climbing, a clausebound process, is generally allowed with raising pred- 
icates but cannot take place when -  on Cinque's view -  the raising predicate selects a dative argument. Cinque's 
example involves the raising predicate seem, but 'blocking effects'  related to the prcsencc of dative arguments are 
more frequent.  Ngonyani (1996, p.34) rcports that in Ndendeule and Swahili, clitic climbing of the direct object 
is impossible in what corresponds to the DOC. Cf. Anagnostopoulou to appear, chapter 1 and references there for 
blocking effects associated with the presence of a dative argument. Presenting and Predicating Lower Events 
(26)  Wir betraeufelten den Kuchen ordentlich mit  Zuckerguss 
We  be-dropped  the  cake  properly  with sugar-coating 
(25) is ambiguous: It can mean that the offer was made via the phone or that the transmission of 
tenderness was to proceed through the phone. The preferred interpretation of (26) is not that the 
dropping itself happens in the proper fashion but rather that the cake gets properly sugar-coated. 
In this connection, the following is an interesting pattern: 
(27)  Anna ist eine gute Nachbarin, weil sie  ... 
Anna is a good neighbor, because she  ... 
a.  ...  einem Nachbarn wieder ein Namensschild an die Tuer gebastelt hat. 
...  a  neighbor  again  a  name-tag  at the door tinkered  has. 
b.  ...  wieder einem Nachbarn ein Namensschild an die Tuer gebastelt hat. 
...  again  a  neighbor  a  name-tag  at the door tinkered  has. 
The reading we are interested in is the 'restitutive'  one -  on this reading, (27a) carries a pre- 
supposition  saying that a particular neighbor  'had'  a name tag at her door before  (which at 
some stage has fallen off say). Let us assume following (but oversimplifying) Kamp and Ross- 
deutscher (1 994) and Stechow (1996) that the element wieder triggering this presupposition has 
to have in its scope the event that 'restitutes'  that former state. Abstracting away from marked 
intonation, let us further assume that the scope of wieder is just what is encoded in its syntac- 
tic scope, that is, in its c-command domain (which in the example is everything to the right of 
wieder). 
Now the restitutive reading is available only as long as wieder occurs to the right of the shifted 
argument, as in  (27a).I4 If  wieder appears to the left of the shifted argument as in (27b), only a 
'repetitive'  reading is available: It is not the first time that Anna tinkered with some neighbor's 
name tag. Under the assumption that wieder has to combine with an event argument before this 
is 'closed off' by binding, this shows that an event leading to the state in question is bound in 
between the shifted argument and the arguments it c-commands. 
Adjectival  passive realizations  of  DOCS andlor shifted SLCs are still modifiable by event- 
related adverbs.  On the assumption that adjectival passives correspond in essence to the lower 
'causeless' parts of the full-blown structures, this shows that these lower structural parts encode 
an event (cf. Kratzer (1994) for discus~ion):~~ 
(28)  Ewige  Liebe ist schnell  versprochen 
Everlasting love  is  quickly promised 
I4~he  same goes for SLCs: Cf. Buuer Muller belud einen Wugen wieder mit Heu ("Farmer Miller loaded a cart 
again with hay"  with a restitutive reading available vs. Bauer Muller belud wieder einen Wagen mit Heu ("Farmer 
Miller loaded again a cart with hay" with only a repetitive reading). 
I5That the relevant predication is in a sense eventive is further supported by so-called 'Nixon-sentences', ob- 
served first, to my knowledge, by Oehrle (1976): 
(i)  a.  Nixon gave Mailer a book 
b.  Nixon gave a book lo Mailer 
(ii)  a.  Anna gave Otto a kick 
b.  '?*Anna gave a kick to Otto 
(ia) can he interpreted such that it was the writing ofa  book -  an event -  that Nixon made possible for Mailer. 
This interpretation is not available in the OOC in (ih). Similarly, if the theme argument encodes an event, such as a 
kick or a kiss, only the DOC is possible but not the OOC. Note however that one cannot say Otto has a kick. 4  Hidden Presentational Sentences in DOCs and shifted Sacs 
Parallels  between  presentational  sentences and the  'extra'  predication  in  DOCs  and  shifted 
S/LCs are pointed  out.  Core properties of  the latter constructions follow if  this predication 
is in essence presentational, i.e., comprises a locative subject. The 'scope freezing' property of 
the constructions is proposed to be rooted in this predication. 
4.1  Existentials, Possession and Location 
It  has  been  argued that DOCs  and  shifted SLCs cannot  be  decomposed satisfactorily  into 
CAUSE and HAVE. Still, there is something true about the intuition that DOCs encode 'pos- 
session' in a sense. However, it is more of an accident of Germanic that possession is expressed 
by  means of something like have.  The crosslinguistically productive pattern seems to be that a 
copula corresponding to he as well as some locative marking (case or a preposition) on the sub- 
ject of the predication are employed to express possession.'6 Here is an example from Russian, 
but languages as diverse as Hebrew, Hungarian, Hindi, Finnish, Japanese, Swahili and Yucatec 
exhibit the same pattern. 
(29)  U menja  byla sestra [Russian] 
at I sg.Gen was  sister 
'I had a sister' 
On the basis of a rich collection of data, Freeze (1992) argues that one and the same structure is 
employed in sentences involving 'predicate locatives'  (DP be PP), 'have' predication (DP+loc 
be XP) and 'presentational  locatives' (there be DP PP), where presentational sentences exhibit 
the 'underlying' structure. 
4.2  Parallels between Existentials and DOCs and shifted SLCs 
If the predication we are looking at is of the particular locative nature assumed here for presen- 
tational sentences, core properties of these constructions that are otherwise mysterious follow. 
Let me first give some initial plausibility to the idea that the lower predication in DOCS and 
shifted SlLCs is in  a sense locative and then point out in  some more detail parallels between 
presentational sentences and the predication under investigation in DOCs and S/LCs. 
4.2.1  'Locativeness' of DECs, DOCs and shifted SLCs 
Constructions encoding a meaning related to perception, especially 'experiencing' constructions 
in a broad sense such as DECs, regularly bear some locative marking across languages. This is 
not  so strange if  perception has to do with location.  Similarly, it is hardly  an  accident that 
in  DOCs the shifted argument crosslinguistically frequently bears what one might loosely call 
'locative case' (allative in  Finnish, dative in Russian and German, an originally locative prepo- 
sition in  Romance etc.).  Shifted SlLCs look quite different, and indeed it is not so clear how 
their surfax syntax agrees with that of the 'dative' constructions. As concerns their interpretation 
however, they seem very close. Thus in German, what seems to be the same concept may often 
I6cf. Benveniste (1966). Kayne (1983), Larson (1988). Den Dikken (1995) for expression of the idea that have 
is the phonological spellout of the copula be and a locative preposition. Presenting and Predicating Lower Events 
be encoded as a DOC or as a shifted SKC.  For example, the following two sentences are true in 
the same situations:  l7 
(30)  a.  Ich belud  den Wagen mit  Heu [shifted S/L] 
I  PRF-loaded the  wagon with hay 
b.  Ich lud  dem Wagen Heu auf  [DOC] 
I  loaded the  wagon hay  onto 
The inseparable prefix be- that is productively involved in German in the formation of shifted 
SLCs  has developed from a locative preposition bei ("at").  l8  It is unsurprising that be- prefixed 
verbs and locative complements are in complementary distribution if  he- prefixes really do the 
same job semantically as locative complements: 
(3  1)  a.  Ich lud  Heu auf  den Wagen 
I  loaded hay  onto the  cart 
b.  Ich belud  den Wagen *(auf  die Ladeflaeche) 
I  be-loaded the  wagon  *(onto the loading-floor) 
4.3  'There' and the shifted Arguments 
It is quite uncontroversial that there does not have number, person nor case features (cf.  for 
discussion Chomsky 1995, p.  287ff). That dative arguments tend to be crosslinguistically 'de- 
fective' as respects their syntactically relevant features is not news either. Iy  It seems sensible to 
take this as a reflex of their meaning. 
4.3.1 Binding1 Control, Agreement 
If we assume that the shifted arguments denote a location, it is straightforward why they do not 
control PRO andlor secondary predicates: Not carrying the right features (number, person), they 
cannot be identified with the anaphorically dependent empty categories involved: 
(32)  a.  *Mary gave Ottoi a sandwich hungryi 
b.  *Otto loaded the wagoni with hay dirtyi 
I70ther  examples from German which may surface as either a DOC or a shifted SLC  without truthconditional 
differences are: jemandem-DATetwas-ACC un-kleiden "dress somebody something on" (DOC) I  jemund-ACC mir 
etwas be-kleiden "dress someone with something" (shifted S/LC);,jmd-DAT em-ACC schenken (DOC)/ jmd-ACC 
mit etwas be-schenken (shifted SILC) "give something as a present" and following the same pattern: auffroepfeln 
/  be-troepfeln;  "drip something onto sth" uuf-dumpfen / be-dampfen "steam sth onto sth";  zu-denken /  be-denken 
"cquip sb with sth"; knchen/ be-kochen "cook something for sb" auf-streichen/be-streichen  "spread sth onto sth" ... 
I8Kluge (1989), cf. Maylor (1998) for extensive discussion. Marantz (1993, p.  1220 notes that Chichewa and 
Chaga employ the same applicative affix -ir for benefactive and what he calls 'locative applicative' constructions, 
which he suggests could be related to the presence of a locative class prefix indicating a locatively classified noun: 
(i)  Alenjc  a-  ku-  luk  -ir  -a  pa-  mchengamikeka 
hunters SP- prs- weave -APPL -fv loc- sand  mats 
'The hunters are weaving the sand with mats' 
"There  is of course parametric variation, cf. ex.  (33) helow.  For discussion cf.  McGinnis (1998), Anagnos- 
topoulou (to appear), Maling (1998). For argumentation that dative case in German is lexicallsemantic cf. Steinbach 
and Vogel  (1  998) Similarly, something like a locative classification  could be the reason why in e.g.  Germanic 
or Romance, the shifted dative arguments do not give rise to agreement:  There is no locative 
agreement in  these languages.  In  several Bantu languages such as e.g.  Ndendeule,  there is 
agreement between the shifted argument and the predicate. Note that Ndendeule also has loca-  -  - 
tive agreement in what looks like a presentational sentence (examples from Ngonyani (1996, p. 
34, 21 0)): 
(33)  a.  hokolo  a-  li-  sa-  pel  -a  sa- chokolo  hi-  tabu 
grandpa I SA- PST- 20A- give -FV 2-  grandchildren 8-book 
'grandpa gave the grandchildren books' 
b.  ku- ki- lisa  ku-  na  li- holo 
17- 7-  well 17SA- with 5- tortoise 
'at the well there is a tortoise' 
(SA = subject agreement, numbers = noun classifiers, FV = final vowel) 
In (dialects 00  Italian, the clitic ci largely corresponds to English there. Thus we have Ci vado 
("I  go there") and C' t. un huorno nel gurdino ("There  is a man in the garden").  Strong evidence 
for the kinship between datives and there comes the following pattern: 
(34)  a.  Spedise  nna lettera a  noi 
Sent-3rd-sg a  letter  to us 
b.  Ci  spedise una  lettera 
{to-us, ?there) sent-3rd-sg a  letter 
c. *?Ci  spedice a  noi 
{to-us, there)  sent-3rd-sg to  us 
Crucially, (34b) where we have the locative clitic ci but no overt dative DINP is ambiguous: It 
can either mean that he sent u letter there or that he sent a letter to us, where the latter reading 
seems to be peferred.''  (34c) shows that the locative clitic ci cannot replace the direct object. 
4.3.2 Interpretation 
Presentational sentences are famous for 'definiteness effects'.  For the constructions under dis- 
cussion, asymmetries between  the two arguments pertaining  to  strength are widely  attested 
across languages. There is parametric variation as there is parametric variation concerning def- 
initeness effects in presentational sentences (cf. McNally (1998a) and references there).  Some 
languages carry the asymmetry on their sleeves, such as Persian. Here, in what corresponds to 
the DOC, the dative is overtly marked with the suffix -ru encoding 'referentiality'.  The theme 
may not be marked with -ru in the DOC:" 
(35)  a.  shah vazir  -ra  ketab dad 
shah minister -RA book gave 
2oCf. Pinto (1997) who notes highly reminiscent phenomena with  postverbal  subject constructions in Italian. 
Interestingly, the only 'dative' interpretation available for ci seems to be first person plural. This seems to be related 
to the essentially deictic character of presentational sentences, cf. also 5.3,6.2. 
 he  Persian data are from Payne (2000) and have been checked with native speakers from Iran. Other sugges- 
tive cases include Russian (where the dativc argument is marked with a 'specific indefinite' article (Brandt (2000))) 
and Akan, which does not allow a definite theme with most 'give' verhs (Osam (1996)). Asymmetries pertaining to 
the interpretation of 'objects'  in ditransitive constructions are discussed in among others Basilico (1 998), Beckman 
(1996), Essegbey (2001), Givdn (1984),  Lefebvre (1998). Presenting and Predicating Lower Events 
h. ?*shah vazir  -ra  ketab -ra dad 
shah minister -RA hook -ra gave 
c. ?*shah vazir  ketab -ra  dad 
shah minister book  -RA gave 
'The shah gave (dthe) the minister (dthe) book' 
A test that has been proposed for strong argument positions is the interpretation of bare plurals 
which receive a generic reading in such a position (Kriflca et al. (1995)). The shifted argument 
in a DEC is interpreted generically: 
(36)  Laien  entgingen die Feinheiten der  Darbietung 
Lays-DAT missed  the intricacies of-the performance 
Judgments are more subtle with respect to shifted SILCs. While this is expected given that we 
are dealing with predication at an embedded level, Kiss' test from section 2.2 applied to the 
passive realizations of SILCs (as well as DOCs) yields the predicted result: 
(37)  a.  Wagons were loaded with bricks, weren't  somelthey ?  cf. unshifted 
b.  ??Bricks were loaded onto wagons, weren't somelthey ? 
(38)  a. '?*Only [a wagon was loaded with bricks]. Nothing else happened1 was the case  cf. 
b.  Only [bricks were loaded onto a wagon]. Nothing else happened. 
The asymmetries pertaining to 'strength' are expected if  what we are dealing with in  the con- 
struction is predication, the ascription of a property to the shifted argument. 
4.4  Scope in DOCS and shifted SLCs 
Like presentational there sentences, DOCs and shifted SLCs  exhibit 'scope freezing' effects (cf. 
Larson (1988) and Basilico (1998)). While in the 'unshifted' constructions the structurally lower 
argument easily takes scope over the higher one, in the shifted variants this seems impossible, 
cf.: 
(39)  a.  The teacher assigned a student every exercise 
b.  The teacher assigned an exercise to every student 
(40)  a.  I loaded a wagon with every bail of hay 
b.  I loaded a hail of hay onto every wagon 
Like 'there'  in presentational sentences, the shifted argument confines DINPs in its c-command 
domain to take narrow scope with respect to it.22  Again, a straightforward explanation could be 
that this is due to its being the logical subject of the predication encoded. 
22The  same scope asymmetry holds of DECs in German, cf.: 
(i)  Einem Lektor  entging jeder  Fehler  [only: a reader > every mistake] 
A  lecturer-DAT escaped every mistake 
In English, matters are complicated hy the fact that a DINP corresponding to ever) mistake here has to appear to the 
left of and c-commanding a D/NP corresponding to a lecturer, presumably for case reasons. Every mistake escaped 
a reader is amhiguous in English. 
57 5  Analysis: The predication in DECs, DOCS, shifted SILCs, and PCs 
In this section, we turn to a more detailed analysis of the format and contents of the predication 
we are looking at.  The first subsection collects (the relevant parts of) the constructions under 
discussion into one: the structure encoding the predication  in question is essentially that of an 
adjectival passive construction. Subsection 5.2 makes a proposal as to how the 'scope freezing' 
property that has been noted to pertain to the construction follows from how its structure encodes 
the ascription of a change of state (the reaching of an event's target state) to the shifted argument. 
In subsection 5.3, 'Argument shift' is argued to be rooted in the necessity of having subjects that 
provide a big enough restriction for their predicate to be assessed. 
5.1  Changes of State and Target States, Adjectival Passive Constructions 
The claim is that the predication we are looking at corresponds essentially to the ascription of 
a change of state to the shifted argument, where 'change of state' entails the 'perfection' of an 
event as encoded in a predicate with a clear 'target state'. 
Which predicates encode a target state and which don't ?  Following Kratzer (1994), I assume 
that the availability of  adjectival passive constructions shows the encoding of target states.  In 
a sense, maybe as a default, the adjectival passive realization of  a predicate IS the target state 
associated with that predicate:  an event of ,feeding a  cat is expected or intended to result  in 
a state where a cat is fed  (cf.  1.1).  Predicates that virtually  never encode target  states are 
lexically stative ones like know,  love or believe. These predicates do not have adjectival passive 
realizations and are predicted not to enter the constructions under discussion, which is borne 
(41)  a.  *Eine Frau  ist geliebt [Adj. pass.] 
A  woman is  loved 
b.  *Da  ist eine Frau  geliebt [PC] 
There is  a  woman loved 
c.  *Mir  ist eine Frau  geliebt [DEC] 
Me-DAT is  a  woman loved 
d.  *Peter liebte Otto  eine Frau  [DOC] 
Peter loved Otto-DAT a  woman 
e. **Peter beliebte  eine Frau  mit  Blumen [shifted SILC] 
Peter BE-loved a  woman with flowers 
21Another test for the mailability of a target state is the availability of prenominal adjcctival participles.  To 
exemplify with the morphosyntacically distinguishable variants of SLCs, prenominal participles are available on 
the basis of shifted SLCs  but not on the basis of unshifted SLCs: 
(i)  a.  Ich malte  Farhe  an die Wand -  *die gernalte Farbe 
I  painted colour at  the wall -  *the painted  colour 
b.  Ich bemalte  die Wand mit  Farbe -  die hernalte Wand 
I  hc-painted the wall  with colour  the painted  wall 
A test suggested hy Mourelatos (1978) points the same direction: Count Event Nominals are available on the basis 
of the 'shifted'  S/LC predicates but not on the basis oi  the 'unshifted'  ones: 
(ii)  a.  Die dritte Bcmalung (der  Wand) 
The third  painting  (of-the wall) 
b.  *Die dritte Malung der  Farbe 
The third  painting of-the color Presenting and Predicating Lower Events 
At the other end of the scale, there is a class of predicates that virtually always encode target 
states, namely the syntactically unaccusative (Levin and Rappaport (1995)) and semantically 
agentless and telic ones (Dowty (1991)) -  these predicates enter presentational constructions 
and dative experiencer constructions. 
Constructions comprising unaccusative predicates in turn bear considerable similarity to adjec- 
tival passive constructions: Both have a 'perfectivelresult state' interpretation, both select be as 
auxiliary (a form of sein in German, making them clearly distinguishable from verbal passives 
that select a form of werden "become"),  both obviously do not feed passive formation. In terms 
of thematic roles, they lack an agent argument but select a theme and a location argument, where 
this location argument is usually assumed to be optional (cf. e.g. Bresnan and Kanerva (1989)). 
But is the location argument optional?  The German data suggest otherwise.  Consider the pair 
in (42) that involves a verb usually taken to project an 'unaccusative'  structure (and that can be 
multiplied at will): 
(42)  a. *?Eine Vase ist gefallen 
A  vase is  fallen 
b.  Eine Vase ist {auf den Boden, herunter-) gefallen 
A  vase is  {to  the floor,  down.)  fallen 
Obviously, the realization of the location argument (be it as a locative PP or as a transparently 
locative prefix) matters for the availability of  adjectival passive realizations, hence for the en- 
coding of target states.24 
Exactly the same pattern  is exhibited in  a pair that involves a verb usually taken to project a 
'ditransitive'  structure (and that can be multiplied at will): 
(43)  a. *?Ein schweres Erbe  ist getragen 
A  difficult  inheritance is  carried 
b.  Ein schweres Erbe  ist {in  die naechste Generation ge-,  ueber-) tragen 
A  difficult  inheritance is  {into the next  generation  PRF-, over-)  carried 
Interestingly now, the predicates on the basis of which adjectival passive realizations are avail- 
able license a shifted argument also, where the resulting structure is a DEC andlor PC. (44) 
illustrates with a dative argument, (45) with the locative proform da:25 
24Quite  generally in German, adding a (directional) locative PP makes adjectival passive realizations available. 
The following inexhausive list gives an idea of the sort of prefixed verhs that achieve the same effect and could have 
heen used just as well in the examples. For the (separable as well as inseperahle) prefixes involved a locative origin 
is generally traceable (Kluge (1989), Maylor (1998)). 
(a) 'ditransitive':  an-vertrauen "on-trust",  ab-nehmen "away-take",  an-kuendigen "announce",  ueber-geben 
"over-give (hand)",  ueber-mitteln "over-mediate",  ueber-bringen "over-hring",  vergehen, verzeihen "forgive",  auf- 
tragen "on-carry (order)",  aus-sprechen "out-speak ", aus-leihen "out-lend, ver-machm "he-queathe",  ver-derben 
"spoil",  he-fehlm "order" 
(h) 'unaccusative':  er-scheinen "appear",  auffallen "strike",  wjider-firhren  "occur  " gelingm,  gluecken "be 
crowned by success",  ein-leuchten "be enlightening",  ent-kommen, ent-gehen "fleelget  away",  ent-wischen, ent- 
kommsn "escape",  entgegen-konlmen "come toward ", gegenueber-treten "oppose" 
a 'syntax as a fcature checking algorithm' perspective, the following pair from German suggests the syntac- 
tic (near-) equivalence of dative DNPs and locative rla For  syntactic well-lormedness, it does not matter whether 
an elementary clause contains just da,  da and a dative DNP  or just a dative DINP: 
(i)  a.  Da  wurde erzaehlt [cp dass Otto geheiratet hat] 
There was  told  [cp  that  Otto married  has] 
59 (44)  a.  Otto  ist eine Vase {heruntergefallen, entglitten) 
Otto-DAT is  a  vase {down-fallen,  away-slided) 
b.  Otto  ist ein schweres Erbe  {uebertragen,  in  die Wiege gelegt) 
Otto-DAT is  a  difficult  inheritance {across-carried, into the cradle laid) 
(45)  a.  Da  ist ein Geist {erschienen, aufgefallen}  [PC] 
There is  a  ghost {appeared,  up-fallen) 
b.  Otto  ist ein Geist {erschienen, aufgefallen)  [DEC] 
Otto-DAT is  a  ghost {appeared,  up-fallen) 
The formation of adjectival passives is a matter of  considerable debate.  There seems to be a 
general consensus however that adjectival passive constructions are not derived from 'richer' 
structures via syntactic manipulations (Borer (class lectures), cf.  e.g.  Wasow (1977), Bresnan 
and Kanerva (1  989) Kratzer (1  994)). 
Assume then that (a) syntactic structures feed interpretation and that (b) adjectival passives are 
not syntactically derived from more 'developed'  structures.  We have seen evidence above (cf. 
3.2) that fully fledged DOCS (as well as shifted SILCs) encode a meaning structurally that is es- 
sentially that of an adjectival passive construction. We have now seen that an adjectival passive 
(Iunaccusative) construction crucially involving a location argument suffices for the licensing 
of  a shifted argument.  Given what has been  discussed above, the obvious candidate for the 
licensing relation is predication.  Given that the adjectival passive constructions involving 'un- 
accusative' and 'ditransitive' predicates have the same selectional properties, look the same and 
are interpreted the same way (essentially as change of state 'at' the shifted argument), the strong 
conjecture is that they share the same structure.  Abstracting away from the copula, I propose 
that this structure is as given in (7) above.26 
5.2  The construction of target states: Explaining the scope asymmetry 
To arrive in  a systematic way at the predication we are looking at, let us consider the role of 
the constituents involved in  their  'bottom up'  order, that is, start with the structurally lowest 
constituent. For perspicuity, I will go through a concrete example given in (46) with the assumed 
(rough) structure given with the gloss: 
h.  Mir  wurde da  erzaehlt [cp  dass Otto geheiratet hat] 
Me-DAT was  there told  [cp  that  Otto married  has] 
26~s  cannot bc shown here for reasons of space, the structures in (43) -  (45) are not just superficially similar, but 
sharc also 'deep'  syntactic pn~pcrlies.  Essentially, they pass the standard tests for 'unaccusativity'  (ne- cliticiza- 
tion  in  Italian, (backward) binding, prenominal adjective formation etc.).  Discussing similarities and differences 
between what are called 'adjectival passive'  and 'unaccusative'  constructions at more detail is however a delicate 
issue deserving more space than can he offered here. Giving just one example bearing on the issue at hand, patterns 
pertaining to quantifier stranding and was  fuer split as we have seen already in  (12) and (13) in the context of 
presentational there sentences show that the dative argument c-commands the theme before movement: 
(i)  a.  Versprecheri  sind Meteorologen  einigei zugestanden 
Slips-of-the-tongue<  are  meteorologists somei  admitted 
h.  *Versprecheri  sind einigei Meteorologen  zugestanden 
Slips-of-the-tonguci  are  somc, meteorologists admitted 
(ii)  a.  Was;  sind Meteorologen  [fuer Versprecherli  zugestandcn '! 
What, are  meteorologists [for  slips-of-the-tongue]; admitted  ? 
h.  *Was,  sind [fuer Versprecherli  Meteorologen  mgestandcn ? 
Whati are  [for  slips-of-the-tongueli meteorologists admitted  ? Presenting and Predicating Lower Events 
(46)  (Die Gotter haben) einer Familie aus  Theben jedes  erdenkliche Ungliick  in 
(the gods  have)  [[a  family  from Thebes] [[every thinkable  misfortune] [into 
den Stammbaum geschrieben 
the  family-tree  written]]] 
As to the contribution the PP complement makes to semantic interpretation, I propose that to- 
gether with the lexical  verb it  supplies the predicative part of  the target state of  the event in 
question -  we have seen that the presence of  a locative complement (prefix) is crucial for the 
availability of  a target state.  The following representation roughly corresponds to the compex 
predicate expression 'into the family tree written': 
Next, we apply this predicate to the standard GQ denotation of the direct object. The constituent 
'every misfortune into the family written' can then be represented as follows: 
(48)  Vx  [thinkable misfortune (x) t  written-into-the-family-tree (x)] 
What we have here is a formula (type-theoretically: a truth value). At this point, the view taken 
here on the role syntactic derivations play for interpretation comes in  crucially:  The idea is 
that the whole of  (48) defines the target state in question.  What we have in (48) -  a timeless 
proposition -  is interpreted at the vP level only as something time-dependent, namely as the 
target state of an event. It is in this sense that the direct object 'incorporates'  into the predicate: 
It codefines the target state which in turn is the defining property of the event in question. 
Essentially, this amounts to reinterpreting the formula as a function from events to times to truth 
values. I assume that this 'promotion' goes along with movement of the lexical verb to the 'light 
verb' po~ition.'~ 
(49)  Xe  Xt  [((Vx (misfortune(x) t  written-into-the-family-tree (x)))(f-target(e)))(t)] 
This denotes the set of events e such that the times t at which their target states hold are times 
that make true the state of  affairs corresponding to every misfortune is written into the family 
tree. Applying the perfect operator (cf. 1. 2), we get: 
(50)  At  3tl 3t2 3e [l  ((Vx  (misfortune(x) t  written-into-the-family-tree (x))) (f-target(e))) 
(t,) & ((Vx (misfortune(x) i  written-into-the-family-tree (x))) (f-target(e))) (t2) & tl, t2 
5 t & t, 4  t~] 
This is the set of  times t that are such that there is an event e that has occurred such that its 
target state (that every misfortune is written into the family tree) does not hold at a time tl that 
is included in each of the times in this set and does hold at a time t2 that is also included in each 
of the times in this set. 
Z7A  more compositional (in the standard sense) solution would he to start out with a free-variable version of 
(49) and defer (only) lamhda abstraction to the functional layer above VP The intended analogy here is with  a 
suhstantive operation of 'predication' as assumed in property theorics, cf.  Chierchia (l985), Bowers (1993).  Cf. 
especially Chierchia (1989) for the assumption of  an operation of 'expletivization'  turning a proposition into a 
predicate. Cf. Pesetsky (1989) for argument in favor of main verb movement particularly with predicates involving 
locative complements. Patrick Brandt 
The last step is applying this predicate to the shifted argument. I propose that it is not interpreted 
as an ordinary object, but really as the spatiotemporal correlate of the object as denoted by the 
DINP in  the pertaining position (cf.  Quine (1960, p.  171),  Strawson (1959, p.  218ff)), the 
unique (space-) time that this object occupies. We get to this time via a function '7' that maps 
(ordinary) individuals onto the spacetimes they occupy -such  a function is sometimes assumed 
for the mapping of  events onto their run-times (cf.  e.g Galton  (1984), Krifka (1998)).  The 
unique time that the referent of the shifted argument occupies has the property then that an event 
of writing every thinkable misfortune into the family tree has occurred in it: 
(51)  3ti 3t2 3e ...  tl, tz 5  f family from Thebes) 
The theme argument cannot take scope over the shifted argument because it belongs to the event 
description in turn combining with the perfect operator yielding the predicate that licenses the 
shifted argument: it is incorporated or 'frozen'  in the expression encoding the property that is 
ascribed to the shifted argument. The scope asymmetry is the asymmetry of predication then." 
5.3  The predicate restriction: Motivating 'argument shift' 
Picking up the issue of target states as made available by  'perfected'  events (as understood to 
correspond to the binding of the pertaining event variable), consider the following pair adapted 
from Basilico (1998). Here, the passive realizations of an oblique object construction (OOC, cf. 
1.1)  and a DOC respectively have been put into a presentational context. 
(52)  a.  There were suitcases given to politicians 
3x suitcase(x) & given-to-politicians(x) 
3e give-suitcases-to-politicians(e) 
b.  ?There were politicians given suitcases 
3x politician(x) & given-suitcase(x) 
While in (52a) an 'event' reading is available, this reading is absent in (52b). On the assumption 
that there be corresponds to an existential quantifier along the lines of Milsark, the contrast could 
be explained as follows: There he has to bind a variable since vacuous quantification is banned. 
In  (52a), there he may bind either the individual variable restricted by  suitcases or the event 
variable provided by the predicate. In (52b), the event variable is not available for binding. On 
our assumptions, it is bound lower in the structure by  the perfect operator situated above vP. 
(Linguistically spoilt) speakers do not judge (52b) good, saying they feel a 'definiteness effect': 
Politicians  should not be in  a presentational context since it is interpreted 'specifically'.  This 
is in line with what has been argued, namely that the shifted argument is interpreted strong qua 
being a subject of predication, which could be why it does not lend itself to binding by  there 
be.29 
p-~~~- 
281f  one adopts a quantitier raising approach to scope, this implies that QR is restricted with respect to predication. 
If it is clauses (projections of material relating to temporality, cf.  I .3.4) that encode predication, this is not far though 
from the standard idea that clauses restrict QR. 
29~he  pattern  shows once more that to the extent that presentational sentences have to do with  quantification, 
there is good reason to assume that DOCS (and shifted SLCs)  indeed encode a predicate comprising a bound event 
and as a consequence a 'target state'. What the pattern also shows is that we cannot attribute the 'perfective' inter- 
pretation to the 'perfective' morphology since this leaves the availability of the eventive reading in a unexplained. 
That 'perfective' morphology is not responsible for 'perfective'  interpretation has been independently argued by 
several authors (e.g. Kratzer  1994, Iatridou et al. 2000.) Presenting and Predicating Lower Events 
Maybe unsurprisingly, we find a similar effect with 'unaccusative'  predicates, where now the 
difference involves choice of 'progressive'  versus 'perfective'  tense: 
(53)  a.  There were flowerpots falling from the balcony 
3e flowerpot-falling-from-balcony(e) 
b.  ?There were flowerpots fallen from the balcony 
3x flowerpot(x) & fallen-from-balcony(x) 
Again on a Milsarkian approach where there be is taken to correspond to an existential quantifier, 
we could explain (53b) saying that the event variable is bound and thatflowerpots does not lend 
itself to quantification since it receives quantificational force qua being the subject of predication. 
However, several questions arise: First, assuming vacuous quantification to be strictly banned, 
we predict strong ungrammaticality, which we do not find however. Second, the idea that there is 
corresponds to an existential quantifier hardly agrees with the idea that there is in fact interpreted 
strong, that it corresponds essentially to a definite DINP. Third, expressions usually taken to 
be referential -  like definite DINPs -  are not across the board  excluded from the  'scope'  of 
presentational sentences (cf. McNally (1998a)). 
We assume that there is in fact an individual expression denoting here and  now/there and then, 
as proposed by Kratzer and Kiss. (52b) and (53b) above are not odd due to a property of what 
is traditionally called the 'associate DINP' of there then. The reason why they are bad is really 
that the (space)time denoted by there is too small to contain the bound event. Being atomic, it 
cannot accommodate both a time at which the target state does not hold and a time at which it 
holds. 
That something like this might be on the right track is suggested by a fact that seems closely 
related: In English or Russian, sentences in simple present tense expressing events do not refer 
to the present time (here and now) but rather to the future.  A way to repair this in English is 
to use present progressive tense -  as a result, the predicate shares crucial properties with stative 
predicates (such as the subinterval property).  In particular, it can be evaluated with respect to 
a single atomic time.  There may be a more general clash then between  'perfected'  eventive 
predicates and something like atomic (space)times, where natural languages may treat deictic 
there as well as simple present tense as referring to such an atomic space time (cf.  discussion 
in Galton (1984)). One could maybe say that deicitc there combined with a completed (bound) 
event is in conflict with something like the 'conservativity' property as pertaining to Generalized 
Quantifiers: The time it denotes could not have as parts the times that would be necessary to 
assess the predicate. Call this the 'conservativity conflict'. 
That it could be the deictic here and now interpretation of  there that is responsible for what is 
known as the 'predicate restriction'  since Milsark is corroborated by the fact that definiteness 
effects often seem to be much weaker in the simple past, an essentially anaphoric tense, cf.: 
(54)  a. ?*There is a guy awarded the Fields medal at the party 
b.  ?There was a guy awarded the Fields medal at the party 
We expect then that the referring abilities of the element corresponding to there are a (maybe the) 
crucial factor for the strength of effects pertaining to the 'prediate restriction' and a (maybe the) 
locus for parametric varation:  Roughly,  languages treating there as essentially deictic should 
exhibit stronger effects than languages where there is more ready to refer anaphorically (andlor 
abstractly). 
63 The 'conservativity conflict'  does not arise at all if  the shifted argument's denotation is 'big 
enough' to assess the predicate from the start. This is the case when an 'object denoting' D/NP 
fills this position, which is however  interpreted as its  'spatiotemporal  correlate'  there.  This 
(space.)  time is 'big enough' to assess the predicate: 
(55)  a. ??Da  ist ein schweres Erbe  auferlegt 
There is  a  difficult  inheritance laid-on 
b.  Spaetgeborenen ist ein schweres Erbe  auferlegt 
Born-lates  is  a  difficult  inheritance laid-on 
A similar effect obtains when the theme argument appears sentence-initially.  The following 
example illustrates in  comparison  to the  'dative'  case, where the intended interpretation  for 
(56a) is deictic ('Look there are apples ...') : 
(56)  a. ??Da  sind Aepfel den Abhang hinuntergepurzelt 
There are  apples the  slope  down-tumbled 
b.  Mir  sind Aepfel den Abhang hinuntergepurzelt 
Me-DAT are  apples the  slope  down-tumbled 
c.  Aepfel sind (da)  den Abhang hinuntergepurzelt 
Apples are  (there) the  slope  down-tumbled 
Fronting the theme argument as in (56c) seems to be another way of solving the 'conservativity 
conflict' then.  But is upples the logical subject of predication here ?  Rather not.  First, it has 
moved presumably from a lower position (cf. above (lZ), (13), (46), (47)) and we do not expect 
predication -  a 'deep'  thematic relation - to be established through movement. Second, witness 
that apples needn't receive a strong (generic) interpretation, which would be predicted if it were 
the subject. (56c) can mean that there were some apples that had tumbled down the slope. The 
fronted argument in (56c) is however interpreted as the topic of the sentence (in a broad sense) 
-  I propose that this enables (silent) there lower in the structure to pick up the (space-) time it 
occupies as its referent, that is, there refers anaphorically in (56c). 
'Argument shift' is then a direct way of providing a big enough restriction for the predicate to 
be assessed, substituting a DINP that is interpreted as its (spatio-) temporal correlate for there. 
'Argument fronting' is an indirect way of solving the 'conservativity conflict', by providing an 
antecedent for there which is then interpreted anaphori~ally.'~ 
6  Conclusion: Results, Implications, Outlook 
This section sums up the main results, providing (short) answers to questions that have been 
addressed andlor arisen in the course of the above discussion. 
30~n  English, a parallel case could be: 
(i)  a.  ??There were children grown up 
h.  Children were grown up (there) Presenting and Predicating Lower Events 
6.1  Structure and Interpretation 
To the extent that the above has some substance, it suggests that grammar is 'uniform'  also 
at a more 'constructional  level' in employing 'simple'  constructions as parts of more complex 
constructions, where a structure akin to that of a presentational sentence has a prominent role. 
While it remains to be seen whether this hypothesis can be further established, it seems to lead 
some way toward explaining a range of facts that seem mysterious otherwise: 
The interpretive properties of what have been called 'shifted arguments'  here follow from their 
status as logical subjects, entailing a presupposition of 'existence', or rather: 'location'. 
The argument-atypical behavior of the shifted arguments (control, secondary predication, pas- 
sivization etc.) is rooted in the 'defectiveness' of their featural makeup which in turn is a reflex 
of  their locative nature.  'Blocking effects'  (to be discussed in  detail in Brandt (in progress) 
associated with the presence of the shifted arguments follow from their being subjects of predi- 
cation. Assuming that predication proper entails temporal location, the structure in which they 
are licensed is essentially clausal (at least comprising material related to temporal location). 
The often noted 'perfective meaning' of the structures under discussion follows from the nature 
of the predicate: It corresponds to the set of times comprising aparticular change of state, where 
this change of state consists in the bringing about of the 'target state' as encoded in the predicate. 
For the complex constructions under discussion (DOCS and shifted SILCs), the intuition that 
these encode 'possession'  is better explained by the structures'  comprising a structure akin to 
that of a presentational there sentence, where the predicate involves a change of state.31 
The scope asymmetries1 scope freezing properties of the constructions have been proposed to 
follow from the lower argument's  'incorporation'  into the target  state that defines the event 
encoded and bound lower in the structure: The lower argument is part of the complex property 
ascribed to the shifted argument and therefore cannot scope out. 
It has been proposed that the shifted arguments occupy the positions they do fulfilling a semantic 
well-formedness condition: subjects have to be 'big enough' for their predicates to be assessed. 
6.2  Aiming back at 'bare' presentational sentences 
Lexically stative predicates are ruled out from the constructions that have been discussed since 
they do not encode a 'target state'.  While a class of  presentational sentences comprises un- 
accusative predicates of  appearance1 coming into 'awareness' -  and are therefore 'change of 
(mental) state' -  the question arises as to what should be said about 'bare'  presentational sen- 
tences not comprising such a predicate.  I see no reason why these shouldn't have a structrue 
as depicted in  (7) above.  The suggestion is that the verbal part of  the predicate may remain 
unpronounced due to its minimal conceptual content. Language may have it not only that to be 
is to he somewhere but also that to he somewhere is to he PERCEIVED somewhere. Thus we 
could have the following parallel: 
(57)  a.  There appeared a man in the garden 
b.  There was PERCEIVED a man in the garden 
p~  ~~ 
"Among  other things, it follows from this that they do not generally carry an entailment that be sensibly analyzed 
as involving HAVE: The state succeeding the event as encoded in the lower predicate is (as a default) just what the 
adjectival passive realization of the predicate expresses: A letter has been sent succcssfully in this sense as soon as 
the letter is away from the sender. It has been  proposed  that in  DECs, DOCS and shifted SILCs, the shifted arguments have to 
occupy the positions they do to provide a big enough restriction  for the (lower) predicate to 
be assessed.  Analogously  in bare presentational sentences, one would want to argue that the 
predicate itself has to raise to achieve this effect, cf.: 
(58)  For example, 
a.  ... there is perceived by sight an object extended, coloured, and moved. 
b. ?*...there is an object extended, coloured, and moved perceived by sight 
(Berkeley (I 7  1  O), Introduction) 
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Measure instrumental in Russian* 
Abstract 
We will  argue that some seemingly adverbial free DPs in the instrumental in Russian which are 
traditionally termed measure instrumental are best understood as secondary predicates. We present 
the relevant syntactic assumptions and propose a semantics of this use of DPs in the instrumental. 
This proposal hears on the distinction between adjunct modification and secondary predication. 
1  Introduction 
Russian displays a curious use'  of non-argument (i.e.  free) NPs in the instrumental case illus- 
trated in (I). The use requires a NP in plural (we use DP in the following). 
(1)  a.  On pi1  vino  stakanami 
He drank wine glasses-instr 
He drank wine by the glass 
b.  *On pi1  vino stakanom 
He  drank wine glass-instr 
This use is sometimes subsumed under instrumental of  manner. But we consider this use to be 
exemplified also by (2), where there is a measure-DP in the instrumental hence we shall call it 
measure instrumental. 
(2)  a.  On pi1  vino  litrami 
He drank wine liter-instr 
He drank wine by the liter 
b.  *On pi1  vino litrom 
He  drank wine liter-sg;instr 
He drank wine by the liter 
Intuitively we measure some object of discourse in terms of a unit of which there must be more 
than one with a possible additional implication sometimes, that the result is rather bigger then 
expected.  The difference between (1) and (2) disappears, if  we assume that glasses can serve 
to denote measure units by  the process of  metonymy.  Another curious property of  measure 
instrumental is that it disallows numeric specification, cf. (3). 
*We would like to express our great thanks to Manfred Krifka  for his valuable criticisnl. 
'The Academic Russian Grammar distinguishes two uses of this kind, the lemporal and the qualitative. Both 
are considered to he a suhcase of the general meaning of  the instrumental the Grammar calls opredelitel'noe (de- 
terminative, attributive). Cf. (Svedova, 1980, vol. I, p. 482 and vol. 11, p. 434p) 
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(3)  Wn  pi1  vino p'at'ju litrami 
He  drank wine five  liter-instr 
He drank wine by five liters 
It seems that if  we treat the instrumental use of  the instrumental case (i.  e. when a DP in the 
instrumental is used to denote an instrument) as a DP- adjunct and semantically an adverbial, i. e. 
a predicate on events, the best solution would be to treat the measure instrumental as an adjunct 
and an adverbial, too. However, this use is not really instrumental, since even if  we conjure up 
some obscure kind of instrumentality to be involved in the reading, a real instrumental allows 
singular whereas the measure use does not, though singular measure DPs are perfectly OK in 
other contexts, cf. (4). 
(4)  a. On razbil okno  stakanom 
He broke the window glass-instr 
He broke the window with the glass 
b.  On otmeril  odin litr 
He measured one  liter-acc 
He measured off one liter 
Some other interesting things about measure instrumental can also be summed up by the state- 
ment that if we treat this use as a manner adverbial expressed by  a DP-adjunct and measure the 
event directly, we will experience difficulties. 
First, we need a derivative measure on events, since we actually measure some quantity of other 
stuff. We measure the stuff quantity which is expressed by the direct object in (2). We cannot 
directly encode what objects are the base of  the measure though, because the use allows to 
measure quantities of different objects of discourse, cf. (5,6,7,8). 
(5)  On nedel'ami  Eital etu  knigu 
He weeks-instr read this book 
He was reading the book for weeks 
We measure the quantity of time which is associated with the temporal course of the situation 
described by the sentence. 
(6) On xodil kilometrami  (peSkom) 
He went kilometers-instr (on foot) 
(He used to walk kilometers and kilometers on foot) 
Here we measure the spatial quantity of each of  the diferent  walks (i.e. paths traversed) which 
are involved in interpreting the iterative use of the verb. 
(7) Jajca pokupalis'  des'atkami 
Eggs bought-refl tens-instr 
Eggs were bought by tens 
In this sentence we measure the number of  the entities denoted by the plural subject of  the 
passivized sentence. 
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(8) Ludi  sxodilis'  tolpami 
People went-refl crowd-instr 
People were gathering in crowds 
This is a very loose measure on human pluralities applied to the plurality denoted by the subject. 
In general, the measure should just make sense intuitively, i. e. there seems to be a fair amount 
of reasoning involved cf. (9). 
(9) Bumagu  tratili  kilometrami 
Paper-acc squander-3pers-pl kilometer-pl-instr 
The paper was squanderedjthey squandered the paper by the kilometer 
The second difficulty in the adverbial treatment of this use of DPs is that some syntactic con- 
straints on the reading seem to be operative, too, since the reading is unavailable wrt.  indirect 
objects or prepositional phrase adjuncts, cf. (10,11,12). 
(10)  My davali im  den'gii patkamii 
We gave  them money pack-instr 
We gave them money in packs 
(1 1)  *My davali imi  den'gi  tolpamii 
We  gave  them money crowds-instr 
We gave them money (and they were) in crowds 
(12)  *My xranili  arbuzy  pod  krovat'amii des'atkamii 
We  preserved water-melons under beds  tens-instr 
We preserved the watermelons under beds (and the beds were) in tens 
On the other hand there are also semantic constraints on the verb, which require that the verb is 
imperfective or allows an iterative reading, cf. (13,14,15), so that we might conjecture that the 
structure of the event plays some role, too. 
(1 3)  *Policija arestovala  demon st ran to^^ sotn'amii 
Police  arrested-perf demonstrators  hundreds-instr 
The police arrested the demonstrators by the hundred 
(14)  Policija arestovyvala  demon st ran to^^ sotn'amii 
Police  arrest-imperfdemonstrators  hundreds-instr 
The police was arresting the demonstrators by the hundred 
(15)  *JaproCital  etu  knigu  nedel'ami 
I  read-perf book weeks-instr 
I (have) read the book in weekslduring weeks 
(16) *Ja vypil  vino  stakanami 
I  drank-perf wine-acc gasses-instr 
I drank (have drunk) the wine out by the glass 
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Such constraints seem to be  in  agreement with the hypothesis about the adverbial  status of 
measure instrumental DPs. What are then the syntax and the semantics of these DPs? Are they 
DP-adjuncts, modifying the event, or are they something else? 
We propose a syntax and a semantics of this use which treats plural DPs in instrumental case 
which denote measure units as secondary predicates. We adopt the proposal by Bowers and Bai- 
lyn that they are syntactically adjuncts with a specific structure: a functional category of pred- 
icates (PrrdP)  constituting a small clause of sorts. We will also provide a semantics for them 
which is based on Krifka's notion of 0-role homomorphism (Krifka, 1998). Under this treatment 
a NP in the instrumental is a secondary distributive predicate with the intrinsic meaning "more 
than one" provided by the plural.  This accounts for the lack of singular in this use.  The sec- 
ondary predicate introduces an event which is distributive and measures the event introduced by 
the main clause via the 0-role homomorphism. Thus, the restriction on the imperfectivity can be 
met. The distribution takes place because the event of the main clause and the event introduced 
by the second predicate share a participant. We suggest that measuring the event is semantically 
lowered to measuring any entity in the core part of the event. In other words, measuring it gives 
a characterization of an event in terms of its participants. We assume that the semantics involves 
the notion of inferential interpretation of an underspecified semantic structure relative to other 
possible interpretations.  The interpretation leading to the measure instrumental consists in (a) 
employing the intrinsic meaning of the plural (more than one) to make an assertion and (b) to 
weakly measure the event in terms of its homomorphic characteristic discourse objects, if mea- 
suring can be done. The assertion is that the event is distributed according to the measure with 
the unit given by the predicate. The interpretation also specifies what the basis of measurement 
for the event distribution is in terms of the core discourse referents (i.e. what is measured). The 
discourse referent which is measured is syntactically constrained, so we have reasons to believe 
that this is indeed a secondary predicate in terms of the model of predicative structure of Bow- 
ers and Bailyn.  The theory we propose allows us to draw a distinction to the temporal use of 
instrumental in (1 7). 
(17) Letom  on Easto bole1 
Summer-instr he often be-ill 
In summer he was often ill 
2  The Syntax of Secondary Predicates in Russian 
We consider the majority of uses of instrumental case DPs in Russian to be secondary predicates 
(Demjjanow and Strigin, 2000a,b).  We want to exploit this idea in  the present case too, and 
consider measure instrumental to have the same syntax as depictive adjectival predicates, which 
also occur in the instrumental. 
As far as the syntax of secondary predication in Russian is concerned, we shall treat secondary 
predicates in Russian as linguistic constructs sui generis. In other words, these are syntactically 
specialized constituents with an associated interpretation.  This section deals with  the syntax 
of secondary predication in  Russian, the next one with the semantics of  secondary predicate 
measure instrumental. 
The brand of the syntactic theory used here2 assumes that syntactic trees are binary. Granted the 
usual semantic definition of  a predicate secondary predicates (SP, also for secondary predica- 
tion) could potentially vary in the following two parameters: 
2Chornsky (2000) is the latest development. Measure instrumental 
I. the secondary predicate is a separate constituent vs. is always embedded into some other 
constituent; 
2.  the secondary predicate or the constituent which embeds it is itself a complement or an 
adjunct. 
We will proceed on the following assumption of categorial uniformity: 
Categorial Uniformity of SP 
In all cases a secondary predicate is embedded in a uniform predication structure, 
i.e.  a constituent of one characteristic type.  The predication structures are distin- 
guished according to their status:  a primary predication  structure is selected by 
a functional category providing temporal  interpretation,  say T, for definiteness, 
whereas  a secondary predication structure is an adjunct to a category or a com- 
plement of a verb. 
We consider however the second variation parameter to be free at least inasmuch as the position 
of an adjunct in the syntactic structure may vary, perhaps accompanied by some variation in the 
semantics, too. 
As far as we know, the assumption concerning the syntax was first made by Bowers (1993)3. 
According to him any English sentence has at least one (i.e. primary) predicative constituent, as 
in (18). Bowers uses I in the cited paper, and T in Bowers (2001). We shall keep the notation 
of the examples. 
IP 
A 
NP  I' 
A 
I"  PrP 
/". 
NP  Pr' 
A 
Pro  XP 
TheXPconstituent in this scheme can be any major constituent with head in YA,  N, P, according 
to Bowers. 
A simple copula sentence like (19) could have a partial  syntactic structure like in (20).  We 
shifted from NP to DP. 
(19)  [ [ John  Ii [ was ti a janitor. ]] 
 i is use of the terms primary  predication  and secondary predication  in the Appendix of  the paper does not 
coincide with ours! 
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In  PrP 
I  /", 
PAST  Dp  Pr' 
I  n 
John  pro  DP 
I\ 
a janitor 
Secondary predicates have then the structure in (21). 
PrP 
A 
DP  Pr' 
Consider the possibilities of secondary predication in English opened up by Bowers' syntactic 
model. We have three questions to answer. First, what is the syntactic site at which secondary 
predication phrase occurs, second what is the nature of the subject of the secondary predication 
phrase and third what is the relation between the host (i. e. subject of the secondary predication) 
and the subject of the predication phrase. 
Depictive secondary  predicates are treated in Bowers (2001) as small clause adjuncts.  The 
sentence (22) gets the relevant structure in (24), sentence (23) that in (25). 
(22)  John walked angry. 
(23) John drank the coffee cold. 
(24)  PrP 
PrP  PrP 
DP  Pr'  DP  Pr' 
/", 
I  cvp  n 
John  Pr  Pro  AP 
I  a  v"  angry 
I 
walk Measure instrumcntal 
PrP 
A 
DP  Pr' 
John 'A 
Pro  VP 
A/'-',  the coffee  vt 
PrP 
I  A 
V"  DP  Pr' 
I  A 
drink  Pro  AP 
-2 
cold 
Resultatives are usually subdivided into weak and strong, cf. (Wunderlich, 1997). Weak resul- 
tatives have a secondary predicate which characterises the resulting state of  the object of  the 
verb, strong resultatives characterise the state of  an argument which only is acceptable in the 
secondary predication construction and the verb is not sucategorised for it in the normal envi- 
ronment. Weak resultatives, e. g. (26), receive the relevant structure in (27), strong resultatives, 
e. g. (28), that in (29). 
(26)  John watered the tulips flat. 
(27)  PrP 
A 
DP  Pr' 
"-',  John 
Pro  VP 
-A  the tulips  vo  PrP 
I  /-', 
water  DP  Pr' 
& 
flat 
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PrP 
A 
DP  Pr' 
I"'-',  John 
Pro  VP 
-A 
his Nikes  VO  PrP 
1  A 
rull  t,  W 
LZ1 
threadbare 
Some verbs have three arguments. Bowers distinguishes verbs which take both a direct and an 
oblique object from verbs which take two direct objects at a first glance.  An oblique object is 
simply the complement of If.  This structural positioning will be important in a moment.  The 
quasi-ditransitive verbs on the analysis given by Bowes are actually syntactically complex pred- 
icates, i. e. they are embedded in a second predicative phrase. Bowers codes this characteristics 
of such verbs by assigning them a special syntuctic feature which he terms [+CAUSE]  and which 
should be checked in the appropriate environment. The verb give is an example, cf. (30). Note 
that there is no syntactically reflected semantic decomposition, we have only a feature, which 
however is probably usually assigned to causative verbs. 
(30)  a.  John gave Mary the book. 
b.  PrP 
A 
DP  Pr' 
'A  John  ~rp  VP 
& 
the book 
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To obtain the surface word order, the verb give  moves to the head of the chain indexed with i via 
the intermediate positions to check the feature [+CAUSE],  and the DP Mary moves to the head 
of the chain indexed with j.  This characterizes the DP as the subject of one predication and the 
direct object of  another.  The necessary condition is, of course, that the semantics of the verb 
marked [+CAUSE] decomposes in this way. 
We  will adopt this structure for our purposes, but  will have to say something about Russian, 
of  course.  Bailyn (1995) and Bailyn and Citko (1999) are two proposals to treat secondary 
predication in Russian. Russian does not have the resultative interpretation of SP, but does have 
depictive predicates.  The AP-predicate is either in the instrumental or has the case congruent 
to that of its host. Bailyn assumes the structure proposed by Bowers for the start and suggests 
that the instrumental case is assigned by the Pro  head of the predicate phrase to a case-bearing 
predicate. 
DP;,,, 
I  A 
Jo;  1' 
Spec 
pro  p'janym 
I(nom)  found  him(acc)  d~nk(instr) 
Russian has several other uses of DPs in the instrumental, including the use as measure instru- 
mental we are now discussing. We will assume that measure instrumental is a further example 
of  the structure which is assigned to depictives.  This will answer the first question about the 
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drank  wine(acc) 
We must now  say (provisionally) something on the status of DP  in the secondary PrP here. 
According to Bowers it is a phonetically null PRO-noun controlled from the primary predica- 
tion structure, either by the subject (SpecPrP) or by the secondary subject (i.  e.  direct object, 
SpecVP). Given the standard assumption that the controller of  PRO should be the closest c- 
commanding element we immediately obtain the syntactic restriction of  the use of  measure 
instrumental:  neither the oblique object, which is a sister to Vo,  nor the DP  in  the adjunct 
prepositional phrase are able to control PRO. There are, of  course, many more things to he 
said about this design decision which we relegate to the footnotes here, however, as points to be 
discussed4. 
To answer the third question about the relation between the host and the secondary predicate, 
we should note that PRO-control is not usually  supposed to cover the path and the temporal 
hosts of secondary predicates. We will assume that in Russian implicit controllers of PRO are 
possible, if they are consistent with the syntactic constraints. We must provide a formalization 
of this implicit control, of course. 
The interpretation of the SP construction is thus an important point 
4~ollowing  Borer (1989) and Huang (1 992),  fn. 2, we do  not distinguish between PRO and pro, and consider the 
whole predication constituent to be anaphoric, rather than the PRO-element, although we stick to the terminology 
of  the quotations. We therefore consider the null subject of  a small clause and the null subject of  a null-subject 
finite sentence to be the same element.  The proposal that depictives are small clauses with a PRO-subject dates 
back at least to Hornstein and Lightfoot (1987). Winkler (1997) criticized it, but inconclusively so, in our opinion. 
Both Franks and Hornstein (1992) and Huang (1992) seem to envisage the small clause with the PRO-subject as 
an explication of the notion of controlled predicate, i.  e. a predicate, for which the choice of a subject referent is 
not entirely free, but is not rigidly fixed by the governing functional category, as in primary predication, either. The 
term cunfrolledpredicafe is ours. Measure instrumental 
3  The Interpretation of the Predication Terms 
3.1  The Predicate: the semantics of the measure instrumental 
In discussing our views on the semantics of the measure instrumental we will use the representa- 
tional format of the Discourse Representation Theory, DRT, (Kamp and Reyle, 1993). We adopt 
the view that an interesting theory of measure instrumental should at least attempt to explain the 
apparent diversity of  uses of  the DPs in the instrumental by reference to some common core. 
We take this common core to be the semantic relation of predication accompanied by different 
contextual accommodations. This approach takes therefore the measure DP in the instrumental 
to be a predicate. 
It is impossible to recapitulate the whole DRT here, and we simply sum up the main technical 
conventions in the appendix. But some general remarks are in order. We postulate a sorted do- 
main of discourse which contains individuals, atomic and plurality, events and event complexes, 
states and state complexes5, and abstract measure units. Every one of these sorts including that 
of measure units is a complete atomic free upper semi-lattice with a bottom element 1.  Thus, 
every sort is a set S with a partial ordering relation 5 on it such that for all X 2 S  the least upper 
bound, l.u.b, V X  exists (S is complete), for all a,  b E S, if la  2  b,  then there exists an atom c 
such that c C  a & ~c C  b (S  is atomic), for all a t S, X C  S, if a is an atom, and a E X, then 
there is a b  E S such that a < b (S is free). The binary sum operation f3  which can be defined 
on these structures is simply the 1.u.b of  the two operands.  We shall use the convention that 
discourse referents which are in capitals get only pluralities (i. e. sums) as values. If something 
is predicated of a plurality, the predication is interpreted distributively by default. Thus, suppose 
the constant people denotes a plurality of people in context c.  then sang(peop1e) is an expres- 
sion with a predicate which has aparticular axiom sin.y(X)&X =  .x @ y +  sing(.r)&sing(y). 
This axiom can be applied recursively, until the atomic individuals are reached. For atomic in- 
dividuals the value of such predicates is determined in the model explicitly. Thus, if we have a 
predication like in (33), we can immediately go to (34), i. e. distribute via a conditional. 
To spell out the assumptions encoded in  (33, 34) we should note that predicate is an event 
predicate. Moreover, we follow Krifka (1989) and assume his Ereignishomomorphism, i. e. that 
the structure of events mirrors the structure of the complex individuals which are the participants 
SWe  shall adopt the common practice of calling events and states eventualities and will use one sort of variable 
for the two, e or E,  where the difference is not crucial. Demjjanow, Assinja and Anatoli Strigin 
in the event. Hence the distribution of the events parallel to the distribution over the parts of the 
complex individual.  Similarly for states.  As far as measure units are concerned, they were 
said to also form a complete atomic semi-lattice with a bottom element. This is a non-standard 
approach to measure functions and should be commented upon more extensively. 
3.1.1  Measure functions. 
A measure functionh is a function  with  values which can  be  interpreted as a result of mea- 
surement which uses the measure function.  The function litres, for example, maps quantities 
measurable in  liters onto the set of  real numbers.  The function bags maps quantities measur- 
able in bags onto natural numbers. We need more abstract entities than natural or real numbers, 
however, for our purposes.  Therefore we would like measure functions to be supplemented by 
measure quantities.  We let a measure function map objects of  measurement to mesure units 
via abstract measure quantities. Measure quantities can be defined as the results of measuring 
indexed by name of the function and the object which is measured.  Then each abstract mea- 
sure quantity provides a unique result of measurement.  In  other words, a measure quantity is 
a triple < mql,  mq2,  mq3 > where the first coordinate is the name of the function, the second 
coordinate is the object measured and the third coordinate is the result of  measurement, i.  e. 
mqs = rnql(mqz).  Nouns like 'liters'introduce predicates which may thus be true of any plu- 
rality of measure units of  the measure function litres, i.  e.  of  measure quantities such that 
Tnql  = litres, and 'three liters'  is a predicate true of measure quantities which measure three 
liters. The most common use of measure nouns is when they are modified by a noun denoting 
the measured stuff, and in such cases we are tempted to reinterpret such nouns as denoting the 
stuff itself.  Three liters wine is any measure quantity < mq,;  my2,  rrq3 > with the second co- 
ordinate of  mq2 being a quantity of wine, and which has mq, = litres and mq, = 3. But by 
metonymy three liters wine may be thought to be a quantity X of wine such that litres(X)  = 3. 
However, we still need that three liters wine is an object consisting of three-liter-quantities, since 
we say things like Three liters are more than two liters. Thus, we consider any representative of 
the equivalence class of measure quantities with litres as the first coordinate and 3 as the third 
coordinate to be a quantity of three liters. A process of metonymy must allow the indefinite plu- 
ral noun 'liters' to denote a sum of quantities of the corresponding measure function for liquids 
and simultaneously a sum of objects which are measured, i.e.  a volume of  a liquid. We shall 
use likre to denote the indexing measure function of liter measure quantities in the sequel. This 
function will have values in abstract liter quantities, if  applied to a volume of something. Thus, 
litre(x)  =< litre,  x, n >.  We also postulate, that whenever X = x $ y and Sd(liter(X))  = n, 
then n = Sd(liter(z))  C0  3d(liter(y)),  if the two objects x,  y are disjoint; 3d is the third coordi- 
nate of the triple.  Similar principle is true of the measure quantities: X  = z @ y, x,  y disjoint, 
and 3d(liter(X))  = n implies MX = m, @ m,,  where Mx,  m, m, are measure quantities 
associated with the objects. 
3.1.2Measure nouns as predicates 
To develop the idea of the metonymic use of bare measure nouns, we will simply leave it open in 
the lexicon which variable is abstracted on. The two representation possibilities of the semantics 
of the noun 'liters' can be then summed up in (35). Note that since only two discourse referents 
are listed as plural only they can be the basis of the plural predicate. 
"or  a discussion of the use of measure functions in the semantics of natural languages, see Krifka (1998) 
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We now have the option of taking either fils or Xs  be the denotation of  the noun, depending 
on the context.  In a similar vein  we may have a predicate which refers to  A!!  or to X as its 
abstracted variable. However, there is a problem with this approach as far as primary predication 
is concerned. Consider the sentences in (36). 
(36)  a.  These are liters 
b.  These are three liters. 
c. *The wine idare (three) liters. 
Of these three, (36a) is appropriate in a context where someone is shown a measure vessel and 
gets the scale on the vessel explained; (36b) is also possible in this context. It can also be used in 
acontext where someone is shown a flask of wine. But (36c) is not acceptable in this context. In 
fact it seems there is no context whatsoever where this sentence is acceptable. One explanation 
is that the metonymic process is restricted to some grammatical contexts, and is not available in 
the context of primary predication. The context we are interested in and where it is available is 
that of secondary predication. 
We have to define what secondary predication is semantically. For the purposes of this paper we 
consider the semantic relation of predication to hold between a case-bearing category which is 
the complement of Pro  (the predicate) and its specifier Pro (the subject). Given that agreement 
holds between  the two elements,  the interpretation of  Pro is a plural  individual variable, if 
the predicate is defined for pluralities (what Kamp and Reyle call a complex individual;  we 
use the term 'plurality  discourse referent'  equivalently).  We assume that the default internal 
interpretation of  plural  secondary predication is simply a distributive universal  quantification 
with substitution-like  equalities.  Thus, (37) denotes a set of  complex individuals which are 
measured in liters. 
Since there are no further constraints on X  except that it is a complex individual, the predicate 
measure noun cun be interpreted as denoting a predicate on individuals. We now have the PrP- 
internal interpretation of the secondary predication relation. Yet the semantics of the secondary 
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3.2  The Semantics of the PrP-adjunct. 
We explore the idea of Susan Rothstein (Rothstein, 2000) that secondary predicates introduce 
a new eventuality (more like a state than like an event) which has at least one participant  in 
common with the participants of the event of  the modified clause.  Moreover, the time course 
(run time) of the event in the main clause should be part of the time course of  the eventuality 
introduced by the secondary predicate. The semantics of secondary predication falls thus in two 
parts:  the internal semantics of the predicative adjunct and the external semantics relating the 
internal semantics to the semantics of the modified clause.  We assume this external semantics 
to be associated with the syntactic construction and not with any particular lexical item.  But 
it is certainly possible to chose an implementation which ties the external semantics to some 
syntactic feature in the predicative adjunct. We will not discuss this alternative here, since it is 
not the main problem of the paper. 
The first part of Rothsteins idea concerns the eventuality which is associated with a complex 
individual, and (38) is its implementation. 
The idea is that the abstract event or state of measurement of a complex individual consists of 
states of measurement of its parts. Note that we explicitly assign structure to the eventuality via 
individual states assigned to the parts of the complex individual using kind of homomorphism 
which  follows the proposal  of  Krifka (1989), as noted earlier.  We have to specify how this 
representation is integrated with the representation of the modified sentence. This is the second 
part of the interpretation of measure instrumental, the external part. 
The interacting discourse objects are an eventuality and an individual.  Given that the modified 
clause already introduced an eventuality we have to specify which relation holds between the 
eventuality of the main clause and the eventuality of the second predicate.  According to Roth- 
stein and a number of  other researches the time course of  the eventuality of  the main clause 
should be within the time course of the secondary predication eventuality. The specifics of the 
proposal of Rothstein is that the two should form a sum. This treatment follows the proposal of 
Laserson on the nature of conjunction. A conjunction of two sentences denoting eventualities el 
and e2 denotes the sum e of the two, i. e. e = el @e2.  We might assign the summing operation as 
the interpretation of the SP adjunct structure itself. Another condition of Rothstein, namely that 
the two eventualities should share one participant is automatically taken care of due to the fact 
that Pro  requires a controller within the discourse domain set up by the discourse representation 
of  the main clause. Note that the distinction between the event of the primary and the event of 
the secondary predication is still preserved in the temporal condition. 
Now, assume the representation of the main clause of (2a) without a secondary predicate in the 
instrumental is like in (39).  We skip the temporal information for the moment, and employ a 
more explicit format. Measure instrumental 
The format of the verbal information specifies the type of the situation which provides the object 
of measurement (drink(e,))  and lists the agent and the theme of the event (agent(e,)  = j, 
th,eme(e,)  =  v). Then the final representation of (2a) should be something like (40.) 
Here, ~(e,) c  r(E)  means the time course of the first event is in the time course of the second 
event. As noted already, we do not necessarily specify the sort of the eventuality, partly to avoid 
the controversy over the status of measurements. 
The difficult piece of  the proposal is how to ensure that the correct controller is chosen.  We 
might assume that as far as explicit arguments are concerned Pro  is controlled in accordance 
with general principles of control, i.  e. its discourse referent is constrained by some discourse 
referent of a DP which c-commands it. 
But for the proposal to function properly  we should also admit non-standard cases of  control 
where the referent is implicit, i. e. not realized overtly. This is not the kind of control which is 
characteristic of infinitives, though we have some similarities in the case of explicitly realized 
arguments, and we need a theory of implicit control. 
4  Implicit control 
4.1  Abduction as a mechanism of control 
The theory of  inferential interpretation which we propose is based on hypothetical inferen~e.~ 
Inference is a process by  which consequences are derived from assumptions.  The derivation 
'Strigin  (1999) contains more on the theory, cf. also Hobbs et al. (1993). 
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proceeds in steps which are justified by rules of inference. A rule of inference is based on a set 
of propositional patterns (premises) and a set of consequences.  Whenever a set of propositions 
matches the assumption pattern,  consequences corresponding to the rule can  be drawn.  An 
inference rule is sound if whenever the premises are true the consequences are also true, i. e. the 
consequences follow logically (in the sense of classical logic) from the assumptions (Genesereth 
and Nilsson,  1987). Deductive inference uses only sound rules. 
The situation with hypothetical inference is different.  If  we have a set of  propositions which 
matches the pattern of consequences of some sound rule, we could assume that the premises are 
satisfied, too. If there are alternative sets of premises which imply the consequences, we could 
speculate which of these are better assumptions given the task in question. This use of the rules 
of inference underlies the hypothetic or abductive inferencing. Suppose we take ~rrodusponens 
in (41). 
PP"  Q 
4 
If  we have p and p  -+  q, modus ponens allows us to infer q. Now suppose that what we have 
is (1  and use the rule in  the reverse direction.  We  get p, if  p i  (1  obtains.  We know that p 
implies q relative top i  q and we thus move to a smaller set of models in which not only q, but 
also p holds. This can be a hasty decision, of course, and our assumptions may turn out to be 
wrong, given more knowledge. The rule modus ponens used backwards is therefore not sound. 
Moreover, we would probably want to specify what rules are usable, so as e.  g.  not to derive 
q by hypothesizing it, since q 7'  q always holds, or not to use conditionals with always false 
antecedents, since we want our hypothetically derived knowledge to be consistent.  To do this 
we might select some qs as admissible hypotheses. 
C. S. Peirce was the first to take abduction seriously. The following quotation (42) is taken from 
Peirce (1  992). 
"If  p were true, n,  TI;  TI/  would follow as miscellaneous consequences. 
(42)  But n,  TI,  n11 are in fact true 
.:  Provisionally, we may suppose that p is true. 
This kind of reasoning is often called adopting a hypothesis for the sake of  explanation of 
known facts.  The explanation is the modus ponens 
If  LL is true, n,  nt,  TI/  are true 
p is true 
.'. n,  TI,  TI/  are true." 
A simple formalization of this idea Poole (1988) is as follows: a subset P of ground instances8 
of the set of some possible hypotheses Il is an explanation for 4, according to (43). 
(43) r U P explains 4 if and only if 
(i,) PUT  blp 
((2)  P U r  is consistent 
 round instances are hasically  substitution instances of formulae in which all variables are replaced by con- 
stants. 
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The set of propositions r represents our factual knowledge in the situation in which inference 
is done,  q5  is the observation to be explained, and P is the set of  hypotheses available to us. 
Whenever hypotheses must be used each time they can be consistently used, we can speak of 
defaults. In this case we shall use the notation A for defaults. A formal theory with hypotheses II 
or defaults A and with the facts r will also be sometimes called abductive,framework A = (r,  II) 
or A = (r,  A). 
Let us consider an example.  Suppose we have a theory which tells us that birds fly as a rule, 
but that ostriches definitely  do not fly.  Call this abductive framework Abird  It has a set of 
defaults, A, which contains the rule-like assumption that birds fly. It is actually an open formula 
which gives rise to a hypothesis whenever all its variables are replaced by some constants. Such 
a substitution instance can be used as a hypothesis only if  it is consistent, otherwise (43ii) is 
violated. 
(VX)  (ostrich(X)  t  bird(X)), 
r 
(VX)(ostrich(X)  t  7  f lies(X)), 
oskrich(polly), 
bird(t,weety) 
This theory allows us to explain that tweety flies, but not that polly flies, because such an expla- 
nation would contradict the facts. 
How to use abduction? 
We construct an abductive framework which we then use as the mechanism of implicit control. 
To do this we specify a set of hypotheses to the effect what discourse referent is available as an 
implicit controller of  Pro in SP-PrP. Since we use this kind of  control in a certain context, 
we include reference to the situation which provides the context.  In our case this situation is 
satisfactorily identified by the eventuality E provided by the SP. This is rendered by the notation 
E :. this notation is intended to restrict the availability of the hypotheses to a certain context, i. 
e. we use contextually restricted reasoning. 
The variable S is the interpretation of Pro  in  JJlpVp.  . . DPfnslr.  .  .I)), which is the interpretation 
of the secondary predication adjunct.  We use (E,  X)  to denote the occurrences of these argu- 
ments in  the expression.  Any contextually specified interpretation of  the predication relation 
is obtained by abductively specifying the choice of the predication term X in situation which 
introduced E. Any explanation hypothesis is then a substitution instance of Cntrl which  we 
use here instead of y in X = y. Thus, if we choose the temporal coordinate t as a substitution 
instance of Cntrl,  we get the reading in (46). Choosing the implicit path referent gives us apath 
measurement. 
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Abduction will help us to use logical inference to narrow the range of available implicit referents 
for the measure instrumental in the next section. 
4.2  Jakohsons theory of the Russian instrumental 
Jakobson (1936) (reprinted in Jakobson (1984)) divides all case forms of Russian into two parts 
which he termed full case and peripheral case (Jakobson, 1984, p. 78). 
"'...I will  call  the I<nstrumental>  and the D<ative>  peripheral  cases and the 
N<ominativ>  and the A<ccusativ> full cases, and for the opposition between the 
two types I will use the designation status-correlation [Stellungskorrelation] in 
what follows. A peripheral case indicates that its referent occupies a peripheral 
status in the overall semantic content of the utterance, while a full case indicates 
nothing about such a status. A periphery presupposes a center; a peripheral case pre- 
supposes the presence of a central point in the content of the utterance, which 
the peripheral case helps determine.. .I  would like to emphasize that what is specific 
to the peripheral cases is not that they indicate the presence of the two points in the 
utterance, but only that they render one peripheral with respect to the other."' 
We will not attempt to explicate notions like Stellungskorrelation or periphery, but only use the 
partitioning.  What is important in  this partition is that the distinction is based not so much on 
the semantic properties of  arguments, as on their status in the semantic representation, so that 
if  they are important at all, then as a semantic or a pragmatic motivation for being classified in 
either way. It should be emphasized that according to Jakobson, if an argument gets instr instead 
of nom assigned, this assignment is made sometimes in accordance with the point of view of the 
speaker on the entire situation, i.e. the assignment can depend on the intention of the speaker to 
make some referent peripheral, if  there is a choice. We therefore will assume that the speakers 
of Russian partition the situation characteristics represented by the semantic form of a sentence 
into two groups: the core and the periphery. Secondary predication characterises one part of the 
periphery, and logical inference plays a role in this. 
4.3  Assigning instrumental 
Since we noted that case assignment to a senlantic argument can sometimes reflect intentions of 
the speaker, we may assume that case assignment can have both semantic and pragmatic aspects. 
We are therefore almost forced to consider case assignment of other cases in our theory of case 
assignment of the instrumental, though it is naturally impossible to consider all questions of case 
assignment in one paper. The reason is that an abductive explanation uses formulae which can 
be used to reason both ways: from an observation to its explanation to explain the observation, 
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and from its explanation to the prediction, but to a hypothetical prediction only. When treating 
case assignment in this inferential theory, we have something like an interpretation of the case 
form in this first case, whereas in  the second case we have a case assignment rule.  So case 
interpretation and case assignment are closely related in the theory of abductive interpretation. 
We may assume that all the verb arguments are introduced into the semantic interpretation of a 
verb by means of argument relations like argsubject(z,  a), stating the requirement for a subject, 
or argsubject(y,  e),  stating that an object is required by the verb. With the two relations we have 
therefore a very rough and underspecified characteristics of the semantic behavior of the verb 
which is valid for a large verb class of transitive verbs. These argument relations are treated as 
pendents to the syntactic subcategorisation frame of the verb. The status of the argument relation 
in the abductive framework associated with the verb is that of evidence which is to be explained. 
The computed syntactic relations are used as constraints and facts. 
We  will now assume that full cases in Jakobson's  terminology are assigned by hypothetical 
reasoning basically to the terms of the argument relations.  But the instrumental is a peripheral 
case, and is only assigned to non-arguments.  Which means that we have a classification of the 
cases as part of the semantic-syntactic interface, perhaps as in (47). 
This is a small case assignment theory.  It works as follows. Both NOM and ACC are full cases 
represented as predicates based on feature sets. The classification of these predicates is a fact, 
i.  e.  it cannot be dropped or changed in the task of explanation.  But we also need a default 
to the effect that full cases are only those which are explicitly classified as such. To do this we 
hypothesize that all the cases are peripheral, unless something contradicts it. The prefix -  here 
is a kind of negation, because the predicates f  ullcase(x)  and -  fullcnse(x) are incompatible, 
as stated in fullcose(z) & -  f~ullcase(x)  4 I,  i.  e. their conjunction implies the (always) 
false proposition 1.  But it is a special kind of  negation, called negation us failure  or NAF  9. 
Moreover, it is an abductive formulation of NAF (Kakas et al., 1995). It functions as a default 
and is always applied, unless there is an explicit positive case. Now the case f ullcase(x)  &  ,-- 
fullcase(x) can never occur, because - fullcase(s) is only  a hypothesis which cannot be 
applied when there is a positive statement, i.  e.  a full case is present.  Furthermore,  we do 
not want to exclude the state of things when there are other peripheral cases, and therefore we 
assume that -  f~illcase(x) i  INSTR(X) is only a default, too. What we now achieved is that 
the individual arguments x of ar,qsubject(x,  e)  or an argobjer:t(x,  e)  never require a realization 
in the instrumental. It could be that this requirement is too strong for Russian, but we leave it at 
that here. 
According to this theory, all the discourse referents x which are introduced in the situation which 
are not argsub,ject(x,  e)  or argobject(x,  e)  can in principle occur in the instrumental, e. g.  a 
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means of  transport  referent in a situation which allows for some means of transport, a path 
referent, a referent which denotes an instrument, a temporal specification, etc.. The hypothetical 
character of the case assignment rule does not require that they must occur in  the instrumental, 
however. There may be other case assignment rules which compete. 
Thus, the assumption that the dative in Russian  is a structural  case of  the indirect object is 
plausible, cf.  Bailyn (1995), but Jakobson considered the dative also to be a peripheral  case. 
What are then the ways to choose between the two? 
It can be assumed that the case assignment of  two different peripheral cases is based on the 
specificity criterion. Anything more specific that pure predication about a peripheral individual 
will have a realization different from the instrumental, if  Russian provides one. These specific 
properties are additional semantic constraints and must then be associated e. g. with the dative 
or with some preposition. One linguistically minded application of the specificity criterion as a 
criterion for the choice of hypotheses is to be found in Strigin (1998). With this addition the rules 
for the assignment of the instrumental would be like in (48), R(y,  e)  ranges over the relations in 
the situation description. 
Any more specific mentioning of a relation would override this assignment, so if  dative is asso- 
ciated with some additional information, it will win by specificity. An alternative to this could 
be to assign a subset of discourse referents to the dative outright, on the basis on some explicit 
property, and make these assignments facts.  This would block both the assignment of the in- 
strumental, and the assignment of the status of a prepositional object, but allow for the dative 
assignment to the indirect object of the verb. 
Note that it is actually the empty pronominal Pro which gets instrumental syntactically assigned 
(or checked) by the Pro,  and not the discourse referent which requires it according to the case 
assignment rules given above. Since there are no positions which check instrumental within the 
structure of the modified sentences, it gets checked indirectly via Pro. 
It would be an insurmountable task to discuss both the principles of assignment of all the possible 
peripheral cases and those of the prepositions. Therefore we will leave the question open here, 
though we may remark that we would expect the solution be based on the specificity criterion. 
The position of  the paper is that only peripheral  implicit arguments are available as implicit 
controllers. But since full case arguments are available via syntactically based standard control, 
we have exactly the cleavage which excludes the indirect object and the prepositional phrases. 
However, if we accept our assumption that the arguments of the verb receive full cases, then it is 
impossible to explain, why they sometimes receive dative instead of the accusative. The complex 
predication structure cases like (30) is not observed in Russian, since the two quasi-accusatives 
are distinct case forms, the accusative for the argument corresponding to the book and the dative 
for the argument corresponding to Mary. But we might modify the theory of Jakobson in the 
direction of postulating two functions of dative: the case for the third argument and the case for 
the adjuncts. Then the dative is chosen on the basis of some more specific semantic constraints 
which override the instrumental, if  the dative is the adjunct case, and it does not qualify as a 
controller via syntactically licensed control. Alternately, all the DPs in the dative can probably 
be analyzed as peripheral arguments, so specificity accounts for all occurrences of the dative in 
opposition to the instrumental. This question requires more research. 
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But can we have double instrumental?  Since instrumental is assigned to peripheral discourse 
referents, there should be in principle no problem with that. However, in general measure instru- 
mental does not refer to another instrumental via implicit control. If we assume that the standard 
realization of the instrument is in instrumental, the second, measure instrumental should be pos- 
sible, but is not. Similarly, if path is realized by an instrumental DP, it should be possible to use 
this referent as a measure base, but it it impossible, cf  (49) and (50). 
(49)  *Oni stuEali  molotkami  des'atkami 
They knock-past-pl hammer-instr-pl ten-instr-pl 
They knocked with the hammers by tenslin tens 
(50') *Oni Sli  dorogami  sotn'ami 
They go-past-pl road-instr-pl hundred-instr-pl 
They went hundreds of roads 
We think that this is a matter of pragmatically caused competition between ways of expressing 
things. Our motivation is due to the observation that the intended meaning is expressed by the 
numeral measure phrases in the instrumental, cf. (51) and (52). 
(51) Oni  stuEali  [des'atkami  m~lotkov]~,,~, 
They knock-past-pl ten-inst-pl hammer-gen-pl 
They knocked with the hammers by tenslin tens 
(52)  *Oni Sli  [ sotn'ami  dor~gli~str 
They go-past-pl hundred-instr-pl road-gen-pl 
They went hundreds of roads 
5  Further applications 
There are some interesting problems with the temporal use of the instrumental case. The most 
interesting one from the current point of view is that of a certain class of singular temporal nouns 
in the instrumental. We call these nouns distributive temporal predicates, for reasons which will 
immediately become obvious. 
A noun  like leto (summer) is predicated of  a temporal discourse referent.  We consider this 
referent to be the reference time of the situation, i.e. a temporal anchor of the situation. 
(53) Letom  on bole1 
Summer-instr he ill 
He was ill this summerlin summer 
That the sentence is acceptable is puzzling on the aqsumption that we have a measure instru- 
mental here, too. It might be expected that some rather similar temporal uses of nouns denoting 
temporal measure units in the instrumental singular are impossible, and indeed, this is so. 
(54)  *&om  on Eital 
Hour-instr he read 
He was reading for an hourlthis hour 
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What is the the specifics of these predicates? To determine this we need some comparisons with 
other temporal adverbial elements. 
If the temporal measure is used in the accusative singular, the sentence is OK with the durative 
reading of the DP,,,.  But the plural of the accusative temporal unit phrases are impossible, cf. 
(56), unless we use a numeric specification of the time, in which case the measure noun modifies 
the numeral in the accusative, cf. (57). 
(55)  Cas  on Ei tal 
Hour-sg-acc he read 
He was readinglread for an hour 
(56)  *easy  on Eital 
Hour-pl-acc he read 
He was readinglread for hours 
(57)  P'at'  E asov  on Eital 
Five-acc hour-gen-pl he read 
He was readinglread for 5 hours 
As was mentioned in the introduction, measure units in plural in the instrumental are OK, on 
the contrary, unless used  with a numeric specification.  Let us assume that a sentence refers 
to a situation, if  used in  an assertion, which is classified as belonging to the situation type 
characterized by the sentence.  Then the accusative of  a numeral with the unit specification in 
the genitive gives the duration of  the event(s) in the situation.  The measure instrumental, on 
the contrary, only measures something. The anchoring use of the temporal distributive singular 
predicates anchors the situation temporally, but is not really durative. cf. (58). 
(58)  a.  Letom  on bolel p'at'  dnej 
Summer-instr-sg he ill  five-acc day-gen-pl 
He was ill two days this summerlin summer 
b.  *Sem'  dnej  on bolel dva  dn'a 
Seven-acc day-gen-pl he ill  five-acc-sg day-gen-pl 
He was ill five days seven days 
The intended interpretation of  (58b) - he was ill,for,five days in seven days - is not available. 
Duratives proper are ruled out, if doubled. 
Consider the following line of  reasoning suggested to the authors by  Manfred Krifka.  The 
accusative case is used  to mark arguments which are incremental themes.  In this function it 
'measures out' the event, using th terminology of Tenny (1994) producing at least in English 
and in German a telic predicate by delimiting the event.  The temporal  use of  the accusative 
picks up this semantic function in  the temporal domain.  The bare plural  cannot express the 
delimitation, due to its semantic property of divisivity, hence (56). 
The case with distributive temporal predicates in singular is ambivalent. Thus, e. g. den' (day), 
can be used in two ways, as a temporal anchor in the instrumental and as a durative singular 
temporal predicate in  the accusative.  It can also be used as a plural  genitive in  the numeral 
temporal phrase base on the accusative. The first two uses may be teased apart, formally. Only 
in the first use, which requires the instrumental, such words cannot be modified by celyj (whole). 
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(59)  on  Eital (*celym)  dnem 
He read (*whole-instr) day-instr 
He was reading (*the whole day) at some time of the day 
(60)  on Eital (celyj)  den' 
He read (whole-acc) day-acc 
He was reading for a ( whole) day 
Assuming that the adjective constructs a delimiting adverbial of sorts, the instrumental becomes 
unavailable, because this is the function of the accusative. Our inferential theory of case assign- 
ment codes that whatever appears in the full case cannot appear in the instrumental. This implies 
a somewhat more precise picture of the periphery, of course. 
We also obtain the authentic measure instrumental of  distributive predicate, which admits of 
celyj, cf. (61), but this only supports the intuition that celyj den' in (60) is a measure unit. 
(61) on bital (celymi)  dn'ami 
He read (whole-instr) day-instr-pl 
He was reading (whole) days on end 
So what do we have now? We proposed that singular DP,,,,,  in (59) are situation restrictors, i. 
e. anchors. The accusative is then the case which is reserved for duratives, and duratives do not 
anchor situations, but simply specify the duration of the events in the situation. In other words 
they are pure modifiers and, presumably, adjuncts. 
There is a substantial semantic difference between the two kinds of temporal phrases. The ones 
we call distributive predicates are really  divisive.  Any part of  summer is summer.  Units are 
quantized, e. g. no part of a week is a week. The modifier celyj (whole) disallows distribution, 
since no part of a whole day is the whole day. The interesting question is why the distributivity 
of the predicate is required in the anchoring use''.  We would like to assume that the anchoring 
function of temporal predicates (i.  e.  their functioning as restrictors) is to facilitate a unique 
identification  of  the temporal location of the situation in time, and time is divisive, if unmea- 
sured. Then the anchoring function requires the preservation of the potential for distributivity, 
so temporal units in the instrumental singular are excluded in the anchoring use. 
However, one may think that if  temporal  units are pluralised, they should acquire the ability 
to distribute, if  the theory of plural in Krifka (1989) is assumed.  This seems to be born out at 
first, because temporal unit nouns in plural can be used in free instrumental. The plural creates 
cumulative predicates, so distribution is allowed as an option of the interpretation of predication 
with such predicates. 
(62)  Casarni  on Eital 
Hour-instr he read 
He was reading for hours on end 
'O~he  distrihutivityldivisivity  scems to be in general a property of the class of temporal adverbials which Kamp 
and Reyle (1993) call locating adverbials, e.  g. on Sunday,  on Ma):  27. because every part of Sunday is still Sunday 
and every part of May, 27 is May, 27. But Kamp and Rcyle do not comment on this property. Locating adverbials 
are called temporal anchors in this paper. 
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What we have here is our measure instrumental.  Is there then a difference between temporal 
singular distributive predicates and temporal measure instrumental? 
It seems there is. A plural temporal unit in the measure instrumental is best regarded as pred- 
icated of the event or state which characterizes the situation, and not of its reference time.  To 
be more precise, the distributive predicates are predicated of the time course of the whole com- 
plex situation and locate it in time, the measure instrumental predicate is predicated of the time 
course of the event introduced by the verb and characterizes it as measured in some way. 
This can be easily shown. Perfectivizing the verb immediately blocks the interpretation with the 
plural unit, but not with distributive temporal predicates in singular. 
(63)  *Casami  on profital knigu 
Hour-instr he read  the book 
He read the book in hours 
(64)  VeEerom  on proEital knigu 
Evening-instr he read  the book 
He read the book (to the end) in the evening 
The complex [event :  state after  it] which is characteristic of  Russian perfectivization is not 
distributive.  It should be, however, because of the homomorphic requirement associated with 
the distributive nature of the temporal referent of iusami (hours-instr), as was discussed in sec- 
tion 37. This homomorphism is the cornerstone of the theory in Krifka (1992), and was adopted 
by us, too. No homomorphism is required by the temporal noun anchors, which are singular and 
distribute on conceptual demand, and not as a matter of  grammar, since they refer only to the 
temporal course of the situation and not to temporal characteristics of its constituent parts, like 
events, etc.. Thus, (65) is OK, (66) is out, but if we let dvaidy (twice) have scope over nedel'ami 
(weeks-instr), the sentence becomes OK with a kind of durative reading for nedel'ami,(67). 
(65)  Letom  on dvaidy bolel 
Summer-instr-sg he twice  ill 
He was twice ill this summer/in summer 
(66)  *Nedel'ami  on dvaidy bolel 
Weeks-instr-pl he twice  ill-past 
For weeks he was twice ill 
(67) On dvaidy bolel  nedel'ami 
He twice  ill-past weeks-instr-pl 
He was twice ill for weeks. 
The same operation can be done on Letom in (65), cf.(68). 
(68)  On dvaidy bolel  letom 
He twice  ill-past summer-instr-sg 
He was twice ill in summer. 
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The interpretation is however that he was twice ill in summer (different summers perhaps), but 
not that he was twice ill during the whole summer (different or same), whereas (67) requires that 
he be ill some weeks every time.  The relative interpretation is a matter of scope, but the core 
interpretation remains still the same: letom locates something like a time course of a situation, 
and measure instrumental of unit phrases measures some other temporal referent, perhaps the 
time course of the event. In fact temporal units in plural instrumental can measure the event by 
reference to time in different syntactic positions, cf. (69), which is parallel to (9). 
(69)  Vrem'a  tratili  Easami 
Time-acc squander-3pers-pl hour-pl-instr 
Time was squanderedlthey squandered time by the hours 
We cautiously conclude that a distributive temporal predicate characterizes the reference time of 
the situation, and that this time is not identical with the time of the event of the situation. The 
durative meaning is associated with the accusative and is predicated on the event argument of 
the situation, whereas temporal measure instrumental measures the event in terms of some of its 
properties which are associated either with one of its participants or with its temporal course. 
6  Conclusion 
We proposed  a syntax and a semantics of  the measure instrumental.  We  treated plural DPs 
denoting units of measurement in instrumental as secondary predicates.  Syntactically they are 
adjuncts with a specific structure:  a functional category of  predicates (PredP) constituting a 
small clause of  sorts, as proposed for the English adjectival secondary predication by Bowers 
and for the Russian by Bailyn. We also provided a semantics for this use. Under this treatment 
a NP in the instrumental is a secondary distributive predicate with the intrinsic meaning "more 
than one"  provided by the plural.  This accounts for the lack of  singular in this use.  The sec- 
ondary predicate introduces an event which is distributive due to the plural noun and the @-role 
homomorphism proposed in Krifka (1998).  The event of  the small clause also measures the 
event introduced by the main clause, hence requires it to be distributive. The distribution takes 
place because the event of the main clause and the event introduced by the secondary predicate 
small clause share a participant, due to the control mechanism involved in the interpretation of 
the empty pronominal Pro, which is the subject of the small clause PredP. We suggested, sim- 
ilar to Krifka, that measuring the event is semantically lowered to measuring any entity in the 
core part of the event. In other words, measuring it gives a characterization of an event in terms 
of its participants.  We assumed that the semantics also involves the notion of inferential inter- 
pretation of an underspecified semantic structure, in our case of Pro.  The interpretation leading 
to the measure instrumental consists in (a) employing the intrinsic meaning of the plural (more 
than one) to make an assertion and (b) to weakly measure the event in terms of its homomorphic 
characteristic discourse objects, if  measuring can be done, where the objects measured are in- 
ferred with the help of abductive inference. The interpretation therefore specifies what the basis 
of measurement for the event distribution is in terms of the core discourse referents (i.e.  what 
is measured), and is used to assign the instrumental case. The discourse referent which is mea- 
sured is syntactically constrained, so we have reasons to believe that this is indeed a secondary 
predicate in terms of the model of predicative structure of Bowers and Bailyn. The theory we 
proposed allowed us to draw a distinction to the temporal use of instrumental in (70). Demjjanow, Assinja and Anatoli Strigin 
(70) Letom  on Easto bole1 
Summer-instr he often be-ill 
In summer he was often ill 
The distinction we made referred to a different use of the instrumental as a temporal anchor of the 
situation which is takes to verify the sentence. The upshot of the treatment is the conclusion that 
the model of measure instrumental which takes it to be a PredP-adjunct possesses explanatory 
adequacy for a number of diverse phenomena. Thus, we have argued that if secondary predicates 
are adjunct small clauses one use of Russian instrumental can be well accommodated. Measure instrumental 
A  Appendix. The Semantic Basics of DRT 
For the sake of  better integration of  the results of  this work into general  semantic theory we 
present a small portion of  the discourse representation theory, DRT. The main references are 
Kamp and Reyle (1993), Kamp and Rossdeutscher (l994), Cooper et al. (1994), Asher (1993). 
The exposition here follows mostly Cooper et al. (1994). The definition of the part of a language 
of DRT used in this paper is given in  (71). In general we let small variables in  the definitions 
denote both simple and complex DRs, if it makes no difference in the context. 
(71)  The vocabulary of a simple DRS language consists of 
(i)  a set Cons of individual constants, e. g. now 
(ii)  a set Ref  of five different sorts of discourse referents 
Ind = 1x1  . .  . x,,  X1  . . . X,},  a set of individual and group or plurality referents 
Time = {tl  . . . t,}, a set of referents for times 
Event = {el .  . .en,  El . . .En),  a set of event referents 
State = {sl  . . . s,,  S1  . .  . S,),  a set of state referents 
Units = {mI  . . . m,,  MI . .  . A&),  a set of abstract units of measurement 
(iii)  a set Pred of predicate constants including C,  C 
(iv)  a set Fur~c  of function symbols, e. g. T,  @,  agent, th,eme 
(v)  a set Sym of logical symbols. e. g. =, + 
The set of terms is Terms = {Const~Ref~{tlt  = fn(tl  . . . t,,)} 
where f  is a function symbol of arity n,  and ti a term. 
A discourse representation structure (DRS) is essentially a set of discourse individuals (the uni- 
verse of DRS) with a set of conditions on them which are required to hold in a situation modeled. 
(72)  DRSs and DRS conditions are usually  defined by  simultaneous 
recursion. 
(i)  if  U is a (possibly empty) set of discourse referents zi  E Ref, 
CON a (possibly empty) set of conditions con?, 
then < U,  CON > is a DRS and U is its universe 
(ii)  if xi,  . .  . xj E Ref,  then xi  = xj is a condition 
(iii)  if ci  E Const and xj  E Ref, then ci =  xj is a condition 
(iv)  if P is an n-place relation name in Pred and tl,  . . .  t, E Terms, 
then P(tl,  .  . . ,  t,,) is a condition 
(v)  if P is an n-place event relation name in Pred, and e,  tl,  . . .  t, E  Term.s, 
then e : P(tl,  . . . ,  t,)  is a condition 
(vi)  if x, xl . . .  z, 2 Ref,  then x = xl @ x,~,  ,fn(xl,  .  . . ,  x,)  = x are conditions 
(vii)  if Kl and 1(2 are DRSs, then K1 +  K2 is a condition 
DRS are defined in  (i), atomic conditions in (ii)-(vi).  Complex conditions in  (vii).  There are 
more logical symbols used in the examples which do not occur in the definition of a condition, 
&, -,  1  and +.  They are not needed in the standard development of the DRT. We use them 
in their standard logical meaning or explain them only to compute the semantic representations 
and do not want to use any of  the deduction rules of  the DRT for this purpose.  The move is 
harmless, but since we do not attempt to integrate the logical terminology, we simply take care 
that standard modell-theoretical notions of DRT are defined on DRS which contain the results 
of abductive inferencing and no expressions containing & and +. 
95 Demjjanow, Assinja and Anatoli Strigin 
In the model theory of this fragment of DRT we represent the world by a total model M =< 
U,  S > with U  the domain of individuals of M and 3  the interpretation function of M,  which 
maps constants in  Const into elements of U,  n-ary function  names into the set of functions 
p(Un) -t U  and n-ary relation names in Pred into elements of the the set p(Un).  A total model 
evaluates all sentences of the language we model as either true or false. We want a discourse 
representation  structure (DRS) I<  =<  U,  CON > to come out true in M, if  its discourse 
referents u  E  U are mapped into the elements of U in such a way that under this mapping all 
the conditions coni  E CONK  come out true in M. Let g [y]  .f  be an extension g  of f, i. e. a 
function such that Dom(g)  = Dom(  f)  U y 
(73)  (i)  h +M,~<  U,  CON > iff h [U]  g and for all coni E CON : 
k~,h  con, 
(ii)  kM,q  xi = zj iff g(xi)  = g(xj) 
(iii)  /=,u,g  ci =  n: iff S(ci)  =  g(z) 
(iv)  FM,~  P(t1,.  . . ,  tn)  iff < g(ti),  . . . ,g(t,)  >E 3(P) 
(v)  +M,~  e : P(~I,.  . . ,  tn)  iff < g(e),  g(t~),  . . . ,  g(tn)  >E S(P) 
(vi)  +M,~  X =  XI @ 22  iff g(X)  = V{S(XI),~(X~)) 
(vii)  J=M,~  fn(tl,.  . . ,  tn) =  x  iff 3(fn)(.9(tl),  . .  . ,  .9(tn))  =  .Y(X) 
(viii)  kM,<,  (KI + K2)  iff for all h such that h kM  Kl there 
exists a k such that k  FM,h K2 
A mapping from K to M like in (73) is called a ver~fiing  embedding ojK  into M, 
(74)  A DRS K is true in a model M with respect to an assignment g 
iff there exists a verifying embedding /I  for K in M with respect 
to g. In mathematical terms, kM,9  K iff h +M,g K. 
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Abstract 
Adjectival secondary predicates can enter into two Case frames in Russian, the agreeing form and 
the  Instrumental. The  paper  argues  that  these  Case frames  go  together with  two  syntactic 
positions in the clause which are correlated with two different interpretations, the true depictive 
and the temporally restricted reading, respectively. The availability of  the two readings depends 
on the houndedness of the secondary predicate. Only bounded predicates can enter into both Case 
frames and  only  partially non-bounded predicates can appear  in  the Instrumental. The paper 
therefore argues  that  the  pertinent  two-way  SLIU-contrast is  to  he  replaced  by  a three-way 
distinction in  terms of  boundedness. The paper outlines the syntax and  semantics of  the true 
depictive and  the temporally restricted interpretation  and  discusses how  adjectival secondary 
predicates whose salient properties involve a cotemporary interpretation with the matrix predicate 
and a control relation of  an  individual argument, differ from temporal adjuncts as well as from 
non-finite clauses. 
1  Introduction 
In  recent  years,  work  on  the  much  discussed  Stage-levelIIndividual-level contrast  has 
accumulated which argues convincingly that the pertinent distinction should not be handled in 
terms of a difference in the argument structure of the respective predicates (cf. Higginbotham 
& Ramchand  1996, Jager  1999). Nevertheless, the distinction is real and is relevant in one 
way or other in various environments. One such environment is the depictive use of adjectival 
secondary  predicates.  Already  Rapoport  (1991)  noted  that  only  SL-predicates  can  be 
depictives, as is illustrated in (1). 
(1)  a.  Ronnie bought the dog sick 
b.*  Ronnie bought the dog intelligent 
In this paper, I argue that the distribution and interpretation of adjectival secondary predicates 
in  Russian  implies that, at least in  the realm  of  adjectival  predicates, instead of  a two way 
distinction a three way distinction is called for, namely one between bounded, partially non- 
bounded and unbounded predicates. 
1.1  Case (Non-) Agreement 
In  Russian,  adjectival  predicates  agree  with  the NP they  are  predicated  of  in  gender  and 
number.  Depending  on their  own  meaning  and on  the  meaning  of  the  sentence they  are 
contained in, they can also agree with the case of their antecedent NP, or appear in a distinct 
non-agreeing case, namely the Instrumental, as is illustrated in (2)'. 
I thank Natalia Gagarina and Anatoli Strigin for discussion of the data. A special thanks goes to Ljudmila Geist 
for extensive discussion and help with the data. 
1 There  are  two  exceptions  to  this  generalization:  odin (alone)  and  sam (self)  always  agree  with  their 
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(2)  a.  Ivan rabotujet golyj 
John works naked-NOM 
b.  Ivan rabotajet golyrn 
John works naked-INS 
In  this paper, I will show that only bounded  adjectival predicates can appear in either form, 
with  the  agreeing  form  (in  short  NOM)  being  the  unmarked  form  and  the  Instrumental 
occurring when  additional conditions obtain, whereas non-bounded adjectival predicates can 
only  appear  in  the  Instrumental  form. I  will  also  show  that  the  interpretation  that  these 
predicates receive systematically correlates with their syntactic position in  the clause and the 
Case they are licensed with, as is summarized in (5). 
1.2  1.2  Types of Modification Relations 
Adjectival predicates can in principle enter into three types of modification relations, which I 
call the circumstantial reading, the pure depictive and the temporally restricted reading. In the 
circumstantial  use,  which  is  illustrated  in  (3),  the  secondary  predicate  describes  the 
circumstances in which the assertion formed by the remainder of the clause holds. I propose 
that the adjective in the circumstantial reading is interpreted as forming the restriction of an 
unselective  operator,  whose nuclear  scope is then  provided by  the rest  of  the clause, as is 
indicated in the translations in (3). 
(3)  a.  Golodnyj, on vemulsja domoj 
Hungry-NOM he returned home 
"When he was hungry, he returned home" 
h.  Sladkij etot caj nevkusnyj 
Sweet this tea not-good 
"If  it is sweet, this tea is not good" 
c.  On i spjacij ne mog zabyt' etogo 
He even sleeping not could forget this 
"Even when he was sleeping he could not forget this" 
The depictive reading and the temporally restricted  reading are illustrated in  (4a) and (4b), 
respectively. In  (4a), the adjective describes the subject at the time it is engaged in the event 
expressed by the main  verb. I propose that  in the depictive use, the adjective expresses an 
independent  event  and  that  the  clause  is  interpreted  as  a  (logical)  conjunction  of  two 
(independent) assertions. 
(4)  a.  On ienilsju nu nejpjanyj 
He married her drunk-NOM 
"He married her (at time t) and he was drunk (at t)" 
b.  On ienilsja nu nej molodym 
He married her young-INS 
"When he married her, he was young" 
antecedent in case. 
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In  (4b),  where  it  appears  in  the  Instrumental,  the  adjective  receives  a  rather  different 
interpretation  from  the  one  in  (4a).  Here  the  adjective,  in  contrast  to  the  circumstantial 
reading, forms the nuclear scope of  an unselective (temporal) operator, whose restriction is 
provided  by  the  remainder  of  the  clause.  In  the  remainder  of  the  paper,  I will  only  be 
concerned  with  the  distinction  between  the  depictive  interpretation  and  the  temporally 
restricted interpretation of adjectival predicates. 
(5) 
The  paper  is  organized  in  the  following  way.  In  Section  2,  I  will  discuss  the 
differences in interpretation and distribution between the long form and the short form of the 
adjective.  In  Section  3, 1 will  define the  notion  of  a  bounded  predicate  and discuss the 
behavior of bounded and non-bounded predicates with respect to the Case forms they can be 
realized with. In Section 4, I discuss the factors that determine the choice between agreeing 
form and Instrumental with bounded predicates. In  Section 5, I discuss the different semantic 
properties of the true depictive and the temporally restricted reading and provide an account 




2  Long Form/Short Form of the Adjective 
In this section, I will show that the secondary predicates in (2) -(4)  above are truly APs and 
rule  out  the  possibility  of  analyzing  them  as  "hidden"  NPs.  It  is necessary  to make this 




Modern Russian has two types of  adjectives, the so-called long form (If) and the so- 
called  short form (sf). The long form has additional morphology and appears in  attributive 
position, where the short form is impossible, as is shown in (6). 










However, as is shown in  (7) both  forms are possible in predicative position. Babby (1973, 
1987,  1999)  and  Bailyn  (1994)  provide  convincing  arguments  that  the  long  form  in 
predicative position is actually contained in an NP with a null nominal head, as is illustrated 
in  (8). Bailyn  (1994)  shows  that  (7a)  and  (7b)  differ  slightly  in  their  meaning  as  well. 
Whereas  (7a) means the  girl  is smart in absolute  terms, (7b) asserts that  the girl  is smart 
compared to other members of her class, i.e., she is smart for a girl or a woman. Bailyn (1994) 
argues that  this  semantic difference can  be  nicely coupled with the presence  of  an empty 
nominal  in  (7b), which provides  the reference class  with  respect  to  which the predication 
expressed by the adjective is made. 
(7)  a.  Devuska unzna 
girl smart-sf  'the girl is smart' Roland Ninterholzl 
b.  Devusku umnaja 
girl smart-If 
(8)  Devuska [~p  [AP umnaja] N ] 
As (9) shows only the long form is possible, when the adjective is used as a secondary 
predicate.  This  is  surprising  given  the  facts  in  (7) and  the  question  arises  whether  the 
secondary predicate in sentences like (9) really is an AP or had better be analyzed as an empty 
headed  NP containing an  adjective  as modifier.  In  this  way,  the contrast in  (9) could be 
related to the constrast in  (6). In  other words, the question arises whether (9) really means 
something like 'he came home as a hungry person'? 
(9)  On vemulsja domoj golodnyj/*goloden 
He returned home hungry-NOMhungry-sf 
The answer is no and the argument is fairly simple. Note that an NP in the very same 
position  as the  adjective hungry  in  (9)  can only  appear  in  the  Instrumental,  never  in  the 
argeeing form, as is shown in (10). If golodnjj in (9) really were an NP then is it unclear why 
it can be spelled out with an agreeing Case, namely Nominative, which is the preferred option 
in (9). 
(10)  On vernulsja s vojny oficerod  *oficer 
He returned from the war an-officer-WS/*NOM 
Thus it follows that the secondary predicate in structures like (9) is an AP. On the other hand, 
the possibility  remains that  at least adjectival  secondary predicates  in  the Instrumental  are 
hidden NPs. Though a split along these lines is a highly unlikely state of affairs, we would 
like to rule it out if  possible. This possibility can be ruled out with the help of certain nouns 
which can only appear with the short form of the adjective in predicative position. These are 
nouns which are not members of a class by virtue of being unique. One such noun is 'kosmos' 
which does not admit any long form in predicative position, as is illustrated in (I la). 
(11)  a.  Kosmos  neobitaem/?neobitaemyj/*neobitaemym 
the universe  uninhabited 
b.  Kosmos mne nravitsja nebitaemyd*neobituem 
the universe me pleases uninhabited 
As (1 lb) shows the same adjective applied to the noun Kosmos as a secondary predicate can 
appear in the Instrumental while the short form is ungrammatical. Again, if  the adjective in 
the Instrumental  were part of  an  NP,  then  it remains unclear why the long form should be 
possible  here.  Thus we can safely conclude that  adjectival  predicates both  in  the agreeing 
form and in the Instrumental are true APs. 
The  question  remains,  though,  why  adjectival  secondary  predicates,  contrary  to 
primary  adjectival  predicates,  cannot  appear  in  the  short  form.  In  order  to  explain  the 
distribution of  the short and the long form in Russian, Bailyn (1994) proposes that the long 
form morphology heads the functional category ModP (for Modifier Phrase). What unites the 
attributive use of the adjective and the use as secondary predicate is the fact, that in both cases 
the adjective modifies another category, an NP and a VP respectively. Semantic Construints on Case Assignment in Secondaq Adjectival Predicates in Russian 
This  is certainly  an interesting  proposal,  though  it  is unclear whether  the semantic 
relation  of modification  needs to be expressed by  a syntactic head rather than being merely 
represented as syntactic adjunction. Thus, I will leave this question open for future research. 
3  Semantic Constraints on Case assignment 
In this section, I will explicate one factor that determines which of the two forms, the agreeing 
form  or the Instrumental, is  appropriate  in  a given  context. It  is the  semantic type of  the 
adjective itself  which restricts the availability of  the two forms in the following way. Only 
adjectives that denote a temporary state can  appear in the agreeing form. Being drunk is a 
paradigm  case of  a temporary  state. As (12a) and (12b) show, an  adjective like drunk can 
appear  in  both  forms,  whereas  an  adjective  like young,  which  is generally  thought  of  as 
denoting a property, is only good in the Instrumental. 
(12)  a.  On ienilsja na nej pjanyj/pjanym 
He married her drunk-NOMIdrunk-INS 
b.  On ienilsja nu nej molodym/??molodoj 
He married her young-WSIyoung-NOM 
This immediately raises the question of how we can define a temporary state? Afterall, 
being young is not a permanent property  like being intelligent or having blue eyes. It is less 
temporary than being drunk, for sure, but it denotes a property that is being lost in the second 
or third decade in one's life. Also, the ripeness of  a fruit is a relatively short temporary state 
(it  lasts  a  couple  of  days), whereas  the  sickness  of  a  person  can  last  for several  weeks. 
Nevertheless,  ripe  can  only  appear  in  the  Instrumental,  whereas  sick  can  be  used  in  its 
agreeing form (cf. (1 3)). I will define a temporary state as given in (14). 
(13)  a.  On sobral slivy spelymi/* spelye 
He plucked the plums ripe-INSIripe-AKK 
b.  Ona vstretila jego bol'nogo/bolizym 
She met him sick-AKWsick-INS 
(14)  An  adjectival  predicate  P  denotes  a  temporary  state  (i.e.,  is  bounded),  if  P  is  both 
preceded  and followed by  a state the can be characterized  by  not P in  the language 
system 
Note that it is crucial in (14) to refer to the language system. While it is true that when 
a fruit is rotten  it is not the case that it is ripe, it is not strictly speaking non-ripe. That is to 
say,  the  past  ripe  state of  a  fruit is  not  conceptualized  as  non-ripe.  A  good  test  for how 
adjectives are categorized with respect to this property are the so-called phase quantifiers and 
their negations (cf. Lobner (1989). Noch nicht P (not yet P) requires that P is preceded by a 
state characterizable as non-P. Nicht mehr P (not P anymore) requires that P is followed by a 
state characterizable as non-P. The Russian equivalences are ne..,jesce and ne ...  uze. 
(15)  a.  Kogduja sobral slivy, oni  jeEe/  *we  byli ne spehje 
When I plugged the plum, it yetlanymore not was ripe 
"... it was not yet ripe/  ... it was not ripe anymore" Roland Hinterhiilzl 
b.  Kogda ja  vstretil Ivana, on  jeiFe/uze by1 ne bolnym/pjanym/serditym 
When I met Ivan, he yet/anymore not was sickldrunklangry 
c.  Kogda ja  vstretil Ivana, on *jeiFe/uze  ne by1 molod/naiven/nevinen 
When I met Ivan, he yet/ anymore not was young/naive/innocent 
d.  Kogda ja  vstretil Ivana, on  jeEe/*uze  ne by1 stmym/xoroso obrazovanym 
When I met Ivan, he yet/ anymore not was oldlwell-educated 
e.  Kogda ja  vstretil Ivana, on *jeiFe/*uze  ne by1 umnydglupym 
When I met Ivan, he yet/ anymore not was intelligentlstupid 
As  (15b) shows, typical  temporary predicates like sick, drunk  and angry meet both 
criteria.  I will  call these predicates  bounded,  i.e., they  have an  upper  and  a lower bound. 
Predicates like ripe and young  only meet one of the tests. (15) also shows that typical cases of 
individual level predicates like intelligent and stupid meet none of the two tests. I will call the 
latter two types of predicates non-bounded. 
According to the criterion in (14) raw and cooked are non-bounded, as is illustrated in 
(16ab). Thus, it is predicted that  these predicates cannot appear in  the agreeing form. This 
prediction is borne out. In (16c) only the Instrumental is possible. 
(1 6)  a.  Kogda on kupil mjaso, ono *jeiFe/uze  bylo ne syroje 
When he bought the meat, it yeuanymore not was raw 
b.  Kogda on kupil mjaso, onoje~Fe/*uze  bylo ne varjonoje 
When he bought the meat, it yetlanymore not was cooked 
c.  On sjel mjaso syiym a  frukty  varjonymi 
He ate the meat raw but the fruits cooked 
The semantic type  of  the adjective also restricts  the availability of the Instrumental 
form. If  an  adjective  is  non-bounded  (intelligent, stupid, well-educated,  literate,  innocent, 
naive), only those that denote a property that can be either acquired (well-educated, literate) 
or lost (innocent, naive) that is, those that meet one or the other of the above tests, can appear 
in the Instrumental form, as is illustrated in (17). 
(17)  a.  On vysel iz universiteta  xoroso obrasovannyd* umnym 
He came out-of the University well-educatedl intelligent 
b.  On ienilsja nu ne absolutno naivnym/* glupym 
He married her completely naive/ stupid 
I will call the predicates that admit the Instrumental partially non-bounded and those 
that  don't  unbounded predicates.  We thus  arrive at the  following  correlation  between  the 
semantic type of a predicate and the Case forms it admits in Russian (where NOM  is short for 
agreeing Case): 
(18)  bounded  partially non-bounded  unbounded 
NOMIINS  *NOM/lNS  *NOW  "INS Semantic Constraints on Case Assignment in Secondary Adjectival Predicates in Russian 
I will conclude this section with  an  example that  illustrates the correlation between 
semantic type and syntactic Case form by  the way of a minimal pair. In  (19a), the adjective 
'big' in its agreeing form means 'big compared to other individuals of  the class of elephants'. 
The adjective in the Instrumental means 'grown to full size', i.e., big compared to other stages 
of  an  elephant. If  the  adjective is  used  as  a  secondary predicate  only  the Instrumental  is 
possible (19b). This is entirely expected since it is the Instrumental in (19a) that expresses a 
property that can be acquired, whereas the agreeing form is used  to  specify the unbounded 
reading in (1 9a). 
(19)  a.  Etot slon  by1 bolsoj/bolsim 
This elephant was big-NOMANS 
b.  Ivan vstretil  etogo slona  *bolsogo/bolsim 
Ivan encountered this  elephant big-AKK/INS 
4  The Choice of the Case form with Bounded Predicates 
When the secondary adjectival predicate is a bounded predicate, the choice of the correct Case 
form in a given context seems to depend on a number of factors. I have to make clear at the 
outset that in this area I found a lot of speaker variation. The distinctions seem to be rather 
subtle  and  in  many  cases  are  just  a  matter  of  preferences  rather  than  a  matter  of 
grammaticality. 
In the following, I will thus report only the factors which proved to be the most robust, 
that is, I will discuss the factors that were considered relevant by the majority of the native 
speakers  asked  and  will  then  compare  my  findings  with  those  reported  in  the  literature, 
especially  with  Nichols  (1981)  and  Timberlake  (1986).  In  general,  the  agreeing  Case 
represents the unmarked form with the Instrumental showing up when  additional conditions 
obtain. 
If  the adjective is a bounded predicate like naked, the choice between the agreeing and 
the Instrumental form depends on the temporal reference of  the sentence, as is illustrated in 
(20). If the sentence has a specific time reference, the agreeing form is obligatory (20a). If  the 
sentence has a generic or habitual reading, the Instrumental is preferred (20b). I will call this 
interpretation  the  temporally  restricted  reading  to  distinguish  it  from  the  pure  depictive 
reading in (20a). 
(20)  a.  lvun rabotajet golyj 
John works naked-NOM 
"John works and is naked now" 
b.  Ivan rabotajet golym 
John works naked-WS 
"John usually workslhas the habit of working naked" 
For some speakers the adjective in  (20b) has a kind  of  manner interpretation. Whereas the 
process of John's working and the state of  his being naked  seem to coincide accidentally in 
(20a), John's nakedness appears to be volitional and controlled by the subject. In other words, 
(20b) may also express that being naked is the way or manner in which John (usually) works. 
We may assume that the manner reading is a derivative of the habitual reading -  an inference 
which some speakers seem to make hut is seemingly not necessary for all speakers. Roland Hinrerholzl 
The manner  interpretation  of  (20b) goes  very  well  with  the following  observation. 
Adjectives  describing  psychological  states  (sad,  angry,  happy)  cannot  appear  in  the 
Instrumental. First, note that psychological adjectives cannot describe the manner in which an 
event is performed:  to purposefully perform  some act  in  a certain manner  requires control 
over that manner. Psychological adjectives express inner states that are not controllable and 
unvolitional.  Hence, they  can  only  be  interpreted  as true depictives.  This  is  illustrated  in 
(21a). There is one systematic exception to  the generalization that psychological  adjectives 
cannot appear in  the Instrumental. As shown in (21 b), sentences that explicitly contrast the 
states expressed by adjectival predicates permit the Instrumental. 
(21)  a.  Ivan rabotajet grustny/*grustnym 
John works sad-NOMIsad-INS 
b.  Segodnja on use1 veselym, a prisel grustnym 
Today he left cheerful-INS and returned sad-INS 
The interpretational differences in  (20) and the difference in  grammaticality in  (21a) 
seem to suggest that the adjective in the Instrumental is interpreted in  a lower position, that is, 
within  the scope of  the abstract causative verb v  (cf. Hale & Keyser  1993, Chomsky 1995) 
than the adjective in the agreeing form. This reasoning is supported by the fact that, if the two 
forms are combined in  one clause, which yields a marked sentence, only the order in which 
the agreeing form occupies the higher position is grammatical, as is shown in (22). 
(22)  a.  Ivan rabotajet golym serdityj 
John works naked-INS angry-NOM 
b.*  Ivan rabotajet serdityj golym 
John works angry-NOM naked-INS 
Let us now have a brief look at the literature on the subject and see how our findings 
square with the observations found there. The two most comprehensive investigations of the 
issue at hand  are Nichols  (1981) and Timberlake (1986). Nichols  describes a dozen or so 
factors comprising stylistic, morphological, syntactic, semantic as well as pragmatic ones, that 
influence the choice of case. This study, thus, reflects rather directly my own observation that 
speakers seem to have difficulties to agree on a relatively small set of factors. 
Timberlake's (1986) study is of more explanatory value. In a statistical survey of texts 
that  he  augmented  with  the  judgments  of  8  native  speakers,  he  extracts two  factors  as 
decisive.  He also notes  that  the agreeing Case is the unmarked form with the Instrumental 
appearing when  additional  conditions  are observed. He distinguishes  between  the temporal 
and the modal use of  the Instrumental. According to Timberlake, "the temporal instrumental 
signals that the event denoted by the adjective occurs in temporal sequence in relation to other 
events in the textn(p.  142). 
The  temporal  use  of  the  Instrumental  is  illustrated  in  (23)  and  (24). In  (23), the 
adjective sets the stage for the subsequent events expressed in  the remainder in the clause, 
whereas in (24), the event expressed by the adjective is temporally located with respect to the 
other events in the narrative. 
(23)  Here's what happened once: I came home from the Academy hungry-NOM, stoked up the 
cookstove, and started to cook some kasha from the remains of  the groats Semantic Constraints on Case Assignment in Seconduq, Adjectival Predicates in Russian 
(24)  Stepan, having lolled around the hospital for a month, returned home healthy-INS 
The modal use of the Instrumental is illustrated in (25). According to Timberlake, "the 
modal instrumental  signals that  the state not only holds at the narrated occasion, but  holds 
contrary  to  expectations  derived  from  general  principles"  (p.  146). What  these  general 
principles  are in the concrete case is left undefined by Timberlake. In  (25), it is the general 
expectation that the grass wilts in the fall before it is covered with snow in early winter. 
(25)  Thefollowing spring the grass grew thick and lush, and went under the snow green-INS 
In Nichol's study change of  state is an important factor for choosing the Instrumental 
over the agreeing form. Also Kennedy & Filip (2000) argue that the Instrumental conveys an 
added meaning of  'change of stage'. However, some of Timberlake's examples clearly show 
that 'change of state'  cannot be a decisive factor. In  (25), the grass went unchanged, namely 
still green, under the snow. And in (26), the subjects talked about remain unnoticed and the 
jug  remains  empty.  Nevertheless,  the  Instrumental  is  obligatory  in  these  sentences,  as is 
confirmed by the unequivocal native speaker judgments in (26a): of eight speakers consulted, 
all eight said that they would use the Instrumental in the given sentence. 
(26)  a.  They passed through the front lines of the enemy unnoticed-INS 
(8 INS, 0 NOM) 
b.  Twice on that day he descended to the bottom of the jug and twice he came up 
empty-INS 
In  our account,  it  is  quite  clear  why  the  Instrumental  is  obligatory  in  (26a). The 
adjective unnoticed  is  not  a bounded predicate. It  only  has  an  upper boundary.  The same 
holds for (27). The person in question was already well-educated before he came to us. Again, 
there is no change of  state implied in (27). Nevertheless, the adjective has to appear in the 
Instrumental Case, since the adjective does not denote a bounded predicate. 
(27)  On prisel k nam xoroso obrazovannym 
He came to us well-educated-INS 
What is really necessary for an  adjective to enter into a secondary predication relation is the 
fact that  the adjective denotes  a state that  has the potential  for change.  In  my  account,  a 
predicate has a potential for change if it has at least an upper or a lower bound. 
To summarize, what Timberlake calls the temporal use of the Instrumental looks very 
much like what I called the temporally restricted interpretation of the Instrumental. And what 
Timberlake  calls  the  modal  use  of  the  Instrumental  might  simply  be  a  subcase  of  the 
contrastive  interpretation  of  the  Instrumental  that  I  pointed  out  in  connection  with 
psychological predicates. 
Thus, we  may  conclude that  with  bounded  adjectival predicates  the Nominative is 
used as a default and that the Instrumental is preferably used when either the state expressed 
by the adjective is contrasted with another state (modal use) or when this state is temporally 
restricted by  or temporally ordered with respect to other events in  the clause or the context 
(the temporal use). Roland Hinterhiilzl 
5  The Syntax and Semantics of Depictives 
Contemplating the semantic contribution  of  depictive  predicates,  it  seems that  a depictive 
predicate describes its subject at the time it is engaged in another event. In  other words, we 
may say that the main verb and the depictive adjective are predicated of the same stage of an 
individual.  Though  these  two  characterizations  of  the  role  of  depictives  sound  almost 
synonymous, I will show below that they are not and that only the second characterization is 
correct. 
In  clauses  with  depictives, we  are  dealing  with  two  independent  events which  are 
solely related by sharing a participant. That is to say that with depictives, contrary to temporal 
adjunct clauses, neither  event directly specifies (the temporal location of) the other. In  the 
following, I want to address two questions. A) How are depictives to be distinguished from 
verbal  adjuncts, that  is, other event-predicates, in  a Davidsonian framework? B) Where and 
how do depictives attach to the clause? 
Let us first discuss the question of how depictives can be distinguished from verbal 
adjuncts. A typical case of verbal modification is given in (28). In this situation, some adjunct 
XP, for instance,  a manner  adverb, adjoins to  the VP. The semantic interpretation  of  this 
syntactic operation is that the two event arguments are identified. 
(28)  VP  modification: el=ez 
,'-', 
This is of course not what we want in the case of a depictive secondary predicate as in 'John 
works  naked  (now)'.  I  assume that  naked  is  a  two  place  predicate  comprising  an  event 
argument and an individual argument (naked (x,e)). As I stated above clauses with depictives 
really involve two events. If  anything is to be identified it is the external argument of the verb 
and the  individual  argument  of  the  depictive  predicate  in  the  example  above.  There  are 
basically two ways of achieving this. 
The first option  is to treat functional heads as argument selectors as is illustrated in 
(29).  Aspectual  heads  would  then  select  the  event  argument  of  the  verb  for  further 
modification  whereas Agreement heads would select the respective individual argument for 
additional specification. To yield the correct interpretation of  depictives, only one additional 
condition has to be ensured, namely that the depictive event ez  properly contains the matrix 
event el . In  depictive relations the event expressed by the depictive adjective and the event 
expressed  by  the  main  verb  overlap, but  there is  no  implication  that  the  depictive event 
incepted with the matrix event nor that it ends when the matric event ceases. Thus, the correct 
characterization between matrix event and depictive event seems to be that  el  6 e2. Semantic Constmints on Case Assignment in Secondury Adjectival Predicates in Russian 
(29)  AAgrP 
xp  ,", 
Agr A 
x  XP  AspP 
A 
Asp  VP 
e  & 
V(x,e) 
This account has several advantages. First, it would provide us with a unified theory of the 
syntax and semantics of adjuncts. Secondly, it would give semantic justification to Agreement 
Phrases (cf. Chomsky  1995, who dismisses AgrPs for lack of  semantic impact). Thirdly, if 
one desires so, one could get rid of PRO which is needed to achieve what otherwise is done 
with argument identification. 
However,  there  are  also  problems  with  this  approach.  First,  English  data  (VP- 
preposing,  though-movement, Wh-clefting)  indicate  that  both  subject  and  object  oriented 
depictives are part  of  the VP (cf. Andrews  1982), as is illustrated in  (30). Secondly, I will 
argue below that adjectives in the Instrumental are licensed in the VP. 
(30)  a.  Noa said that she would eat dinner nude, and eat dinner nude she did 
a,'  Noa said that she would eat the meat raw, and eat the meat raw she did 
b.  Eat dinner nudelthe meat raw though Noa did, nobody thought she was crazy 
c.  What Noa did was eat dinner nudelthe meat raw 
The second option  assumes that depictives are base-generated in  the VP and may adjoin to 
Agr-projections in the course of the derivation In this approach, we assume that the effect of 
argument  identification  is  achieved  via  a  control  relation  of  PRO  within  the  depictive 
predicate. 
I do not take any stand here on whether the Larsonian approach as illustrated in (3  1 a) 
or the standard approach in terms of right-adjunction  as illustrated in (31b) should be taken. I 
only  want  to  mention  that  in  the Larsonian  approach  it  is  more  difficult  to  identify  the 
controller of PRO structurally, whereas in the standard approach the controller can be simply 
identified as the closest m-commanding DP. 
(31)  a.  b. 
VP 
A  vp A 
DP  /",  Avp  AP 
v  A  v  A 
AP  /\  VP  AP 
V  AP 
meat  eat  raw  nude  eat the meat  raw  nude 
I assume that depictives in the Instrumental are base-generated and licensed in the VP 
and can thus remain there. Following Bailyn and Citko (1999), I assume that the Instrumental 
is an inherent Case that is assigned by predO  just in case predO  is not itself assigned Case (cf. 
(32)).  This  Case  is  then  checked  by  movement  of  AgrP  into  [Spec,PredP]. The  event Roland Hinterhiilzl 
argument  of  the  depictive  in  the  Instrumental  is  then  bound  by  a  temporal  operator  the 
restriction of which is formed by the rest of the clause, as is illustrated in (34) below. 
Furthermore,  I assume that depictives in the agreeing case are base-generated in the VP as 
well,  but  are  licensed  by  adjoining  to  the  respective  AgrP  where  they  receive  the  true 
depictive interpretation (neither event locates the other). 
Let us again look at the semantics of depiction with respect to predicates which only 
have a  lower boundary  like ripe, well-educated  and  literate. We saw that  these predicates 
cannot  be  interpreted  as true depictives.  They cannot  appear  in the agreeing form  and are 
realized  in  the  Instrumental,  receiving  the  restrictive  temporal  interpretation.  Given  the 
semantics of depictives in which the depictive event properly contains the matrix event and 
given  the  fact  that  predicates  with  a  lower  boundary  once  they  are  acquired  become 
permanent properties, it follows why these predicates pattern with unbounded predicates like 
intelligent  in  not admitting a true depictive  interpretation: at the interval  during which the 
matrix  event holds  predicates  with  only  a  lower  boundary  have  already become  timeless 
properties, as is illustrated in (33). 
(33)  a.  He left the University well.educated-INS 
U  leaving the University (e) 
b.  F  well educated (e) 
The question then arises why predicates with only a lower boundary can be rescued by 
being put in the Instrumental Case while unbounded predicates like ,intelligentG  cannot, as is 
illustrated  in  (34a). As  the contrast in  (34bc) shows, this  distinction  can  be  reduced  to a 
distinction that holds between the respective interpretations of  (34a). I assume that  (34c) is 
out for pragmatic reasons. It is simply infelicitous to temporally restrict an atemporal property 
like intelligent. 
(34)  a.  On vysel iz universitetu xoroso obrusovannym/*umnym 
He came out-of the University well-educated/intelligent 
b.  When he left the university, he was well-educated 
c.??  When he left the university, he was intelligent 
Let us now  look at the semantics of  depiction with respect to predicates which only 
have an upper boundary like young, naive and raw, as is illustrated in  (35). With the given 
semantics,  namely  that  the  depictive event properly  contains the  matrix  event, we cannot 
explain  why  these predicates  cannot be  true depictives.  At  the  interval  during which  the 
matrix event holds predicates with an upper boundary do not denote a timeless property and 
are in this respect clearly distinct from unbounded predicates. Note also that so far we have no 
explanation for why true depictives must be stage level predicates, that is, must be bounded 
predicates. Semantic Constraints on Case Assignment in Secondary Adjectival Predicates in Russian 
(35)  a.  On senilsja na nej molodym 
He married her young-INS 
marry (el 
b.  young (el 
Below  I  will  argue  that  this  restriction  follows  from  two  assumptions.  A)  In  adjectival 
predication, subject and  predicate  agree in  boundedness.  B) While temporal  clauses relate 
intervals, depictives relate stages. 
I think  that  Carlson  (1977)  was  right  in  proposing  the  existence and relevance  of 
stages, but not with respect to the assumption that stages are arguments of specific predicates. 
I like to propose to treat stages as interpretations of DPs, where a stage is defined as a pair of 
indices, an individual one and a temporal one such that (i, t):= the stage of individual i at time 
t.  Furthermore, I  will  assume that  a  bounded  individual  is  interpreted  as  a  stage of  that 
individual. 
To illustrate that not only events but also individuals have a temporal dimension, let us 
look at an utterance like (36) in  the context that Peter is dead now. Kripke, establishing the 
causal theory of  names, convincingly argues that a name keeps on  referring to the causally 
related bearer however that person  or the world around him may change. In  this theory, we 
may  wonder  what  the  name Peter  refers  to,  now  that  Peter  is dead. Depending on one's 
philosophical  preferences  it  could be Peter's  eternal  soul  or  a bundle  of  bones  in Peter's 
grave. In  any event, and this is only half jokingly put, we do not want (36) uttered now to 
mean that Peter's eternal soul or his bones visited Mary a year ago. In an intensional semantic 
framework (36) would not render  any difficulties. One would evaluate the expression Peter 
with respect to a past time and it would denote the set of properties that Peter had at this time 
and (36) would then state that among those be the property of visiting Mary. However, within 
a purely extensional framework like Davidson's this option is not available and it seems to me 
that to solve this problem one needs to be able to talk about temporal slices of an individual, 
that is, in the case at hand, of a past stage of Peters'. 
(36)  Peter visited Mary last year. 
That stages are not necessarily arguments of particular predicates may be illustrated in 
the following way.  One may wonder  whether a predicate  like green  is  a stage-level or an 
individual level predicate. It seems that the answer to this question depends on the choice of 
the subject (37a). And (37b) is a case where both readings are available with the same subject. 
(37) can mean that the light has a green phase just  now or that the light as physical object is 
(painted) green. In my view, the readings depend on what the DP die Ampel is meant to refer 
to, to an individual or to a stage of that individual. 
(37)  a.  Die Erbsen sind griin. Die Bananen sind (noch) griin 
Peas are green. Bananas are (still)  green 
b.  Die Ampel ist griin. 
The truflic-light is green 
Given the assumptions made so far, how can we derive the restriction on stage-level 
predicates with depictives? I don't know whether there is a genuine semantic account of this 
restriction but a syntactic account could look like this. If  depictive predicates do not contain a 
tense-head, as I have assumed in (32), then  the proposition expressed by  the depictive can Roland Hinterhiilzl 
only be  temporally  anchored, if  the subject of  the depictive is assigned (via control by its 
antecedent) an interpretation of  a stage. In  other words, the subject is assigned, instead of a 
single index of an individual, a pair of indices, an individual one and a temporal one. This is 
different from the control relation in infinitival clauses. As (38a) shows, in infinitival clauses 
two assertions can be made about two different stages of the same individual. This is possible 
since infinitival clauses contain an extra Tense-head which is subject to independent temporal 
control  by  the matrix  verb. This is  also different from  temporal  adjuncts which specify or 
restrict  the  temporal  index  of  the  matrix  predicate. As  (38b) illustrates,  these expressions 
relate intervals. 
(38)  a.  Peter promised [ PRO to visit Mary tomorrow] 
b.  Yesterdaylwhen Mary came in, Peter slept 
Coming back  to depictive secondary predicates, since subject and predicate agree in 
boundedness as I have assumed above, it follows that only bounded predicates may appear in 
true  depictives.  With  predicates  in  the  Instrumental,  the  event  argument  is  bound  by  a 
temporal operator. Thus they are not subject to temporal anchoring via Tense and only have to 
obey the weaker pragmatic condition of denoting temporally restrictable properties. 
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Abstract 
Even if we can generate a logical form, principles of use may  limit the ways in  which we can 
use it. In this paper, I motivate one such principle of use, and explore its effects. Much of the 
discussion  involves  kinds  of  sentences  that  have  received  attention  in  the  literature  on 
"individual-level predicates." 
1  A possible line of argumentation, and reasons to reject it 
Here  is  a  familiar  line  of  argumentation  similar  to one  advanced  by  Kratzer  1995. The 
argument starts from the idea that in the logical  form of a sentence containing an adverbial 
quantifier like always,  the quantifier bears an index. The logical form for a sentence like (la) 
on this approach is something like (lb). (And on this approach logical forms that conform to 
the  schema [,  [...alwaysl...]  p ] are interpreted roughly  as in (Ic).) The argument calls 
attention to the fact that, unlike sentences like those in (la), sentences like those in (2) sound 
bizarre. It points out that  we can explain why they sound bizarre if  we assume, along with 
some  other  assumptions,  that  their  possible  logical  forms  contain  no  item  that  can  be 
coindexed with the quantifier. It concludes on this basis that indeed (2) contains no item that 
can be coindexed with the quantifier. 
(1)  a.  Ingrid is always on the phone. 
b.  If: [,  [...alwaysl...] [p ... 1 ... Ingrid on the phone ... ] 
c.  [[  cx ]Ig (w) = 1 as long as for all time intervals t that satisfy in w the 
g l->r  contextually salient property of time intervals, [[ P 11  (w) = I. 
(2)  Ingrid was always Swedish. 
My hope in this paper is to defeat this line of argumentation. My thesis is that there are 
principles of grammar that (2) violates even if we analyze it as containing an item that can be 
coindexed with the quantifier. If this is correct, then just on the basis of the strangeness of (2), 
we have no evidence for the claim that its logical form lacks these additional indices (or for 
that matter for the assumptions that derive the bizarreness of  (2) given the lack of additional 
indices). Maybe there is evidence for something like this, but it doesn't come from sentences 
like (2). 
My main  goal  in  this paper  is to independently motivate  a principle  from which  it 
happens to follow that (2) sounds bizarre. I will demonstrate some of the consequences of this 
principle,  and I will  conclude by  suggesting that once we recognize this principle, we gain 
some  insight  into  the  question  of  what  interpretations  sound  natural  for  sentences  with 
indefinites. As far as this workshop is concerned, this paper should serve as a cautionary note. 
- - 
 h his is the first draft ever of the material under discussion, and likely contams many errors. Comments and 
corrections are more than welcome.  Thanks to the ZAS Workshop on Predicative Constructions for the 
opportunity to present the work here, and to Andrea Bonomi, Gennaro Chierchia and Manfred Krifka for related 
chats. 
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(2) sound bizarre  and  what interpretations  sound natural  for sentences with indefinites, we 
should not use the same facts to motivate syntactic stipulations that do the same work. 
To see why I think that (2) incurs problems that should not be traced to the presence or 
absence of an item coindexed with the quantifier, consider the sentence in (3). 
(3)  The student who finished first was always Swedish 
Imagine  that  we  were  both  present  at  a  series of  exams, which  took  place from Monday 
through Saturday. We both saw that each time a different person finished first. In fact, the 
pattern was as in (4a): 
(4)  We both see: 
a.  date:  M  T  W  Th  F  S 
fastest student:  Max  Ingrid  Olof  Ingmar  lngvar  lngeborg 
You just  saw the students, you don't know who they were or what their nationalities were, 
and so I tell you  (3) to inform you  of their nationalities. There is nothing bizarre about (3) 
when  used  in  this  context. What  can  we  conclude  from  this?  If  the  absence  of  an  item 
coindexed with the quantifier would render the sentence bad, and in fact the sentence is good, 
we can conclude that the sentence admits a logical form containing an  item coindexed with 
the quantifier. 
Now  that  we  have  established that  (3)  admits  a  logical  form  containing  an  item 
coindexed with  the  quantifier,  imagine  a different  situation. Just  as before,  we  were both 
present at the exams, but this time the pattern is different: 
b.  date:  M  T  W  Th  F  S 
fastest student:  Ingrid  Ingrid  Ingrid  Ingrid  Ingrid  Ingrid 
Since we were both there, we both saw that the same person finished first each time. Still, you 
don't know who it was or what her nationality was. In this context, I cannot use (3) to inform 
you of the student's nationality. It sounds bizarre. And, since we have already concluded that 
the sentence admits a logical form containing an item coindexed with the quantifier, it can't 
be that its bizarreness is due to the lack of such a logical form. 
I think that it is reasonable to expect that the same thing that renders (3) bizarre in this 
context renders (2) bizarre. That is why I think that (2) incurs problems that have nothing to 
do with the lack of an item that can be coindexed with the quantifier. 
A similar point can be made by considering sentences like (5). Unlike the sentence in 
(6), which sounds fine and therefore must contain an item coindexed with the quantifier, (5) 
sounds bizarre, at least on an initial reading and encountered in isolation. 
(5)  John always knows whether Ingrid is Swedish. 
(6)  John always knows whether Ingrid is on the phone. 
Now, when  it comes to the sentence in  (6), it can  be  argued not only that the quantifier is 
coindexed with another item, but more specifically that it is coindexed  with an item in the Pragmatic Constraints on (Adverbial)  (Temporal) Quantification 
matrix  clause. (I will  sketch how in  a moment.) On the assumption that the only syntactic 
difference between (5) and (6) is the embedded clause, this means that (5) too must contain an 
item in the matrix clause that always  can be coindexed with. So it can't be that the bizarreness 
of (5) is due to the lack of this kind of item. 
I think  that  it  is  reasonable  to  expect that  the same thing  that  renders  (5)  bizarre 
renders  (2) bizarre, and  so that  is another reason  for thinking that  (2) incurs problems that 
have nothing to do with the lack of an item that can be coindexed with the cluantifier.' 
The  argument  that  sentences  like  (6)  contain  an  indexed  item  in  the  matrix  is 
complicated but its rough outline is as follows. It assumes that the possible logical forms for 
(6) are as in (7b) 
(7)  a. John always knows whether Ingrid is on the phone 
b. [...alwaysi...] [p ...  John know whether ... [y  ]  ] 
where the embedded constituent y is the same kind of  constituent that you  get in the logical 
form of simpler sentences like Ingrid  is  always on the phone, a constituent that contains an 
index: 
(8)  a. Ingrid is always on the phone. 
b. [...alwaysi...] [y ...  i ...  Ingrid on the phone  ] 
On  the  basis  of  this,  it  argues  that  to  make the  right  predictions  about  the  semantics of 
sentences like (7a) and @a), the constituents P and y must be interpreted as follows: 
(9)  [[ p ]Ig = hw. if, in w, Ingrid is on the phone for the duration of g(i) 
then, in w, John for the duration of g(i) believes Ingrid 
to be on the phone; and 
if, in  w, Ingrid is not on the phone for the duration of g(i) 
then, in w, John for the duration of g(i) believes Ingrid 
not to be on the phone 
(abbreviated further: hw. in w, for the duration of g(i) John knows whether 
Ingrid is on the phone) 
(10)  [[ y ]Ig = hw. in w, Ingrid is on the phone for the duration of g(i) 
It  is important to  note here that, in  the semantics of  p,  g(i) plays a role in  determining the 
duration of John's beliefs. 
The argument then points out that, on certain ideas about semantic composition, to say 
that  the matrix clause in  (7b) does not contain an indexed item amounts to saying that the 
matrix clause material  behaves semantically like a function that, given the denotation that you 
get for y,  will yield the denotation that you  get for P.  That is, it will behave like a function 
that, for any arbitrary assignment g and index i such that g(i) yields a time interval, will take a 
proposition of the kind in (10) and give you a proposition of the kind in (9). 
2 See de Swart 1991 for arguments of a similar nature. 
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for any time interval y, 
F( hw. in w, Ingrid is on the phone for the duration of y ) 
= hw. in w, for the duration of y John knows whether Ingrid is on the phone. 
But at this point problems arise. On the one hand, one can make a case that it is implausible to 
assume that the matrix clause behaves like this. On the other hand, assuming that the matrix 
clause behaves like this seems to make wrong predictions. Therefore, we do not want to say 
that the matrix clause in (7b) lacks an indexed item. 
The wrong predictions that the proposal in (1  1) makes are as follows. Parallel to the 
pair of sentences in (7) and (8), we have pairs of  sentences like those in (12a) and (13a), for 
which we would posit parallel logical forms: 
(12)  a. John always knows whether at 5pm on the following day Ingrid is on the phone. 
b. [...always  ;...  ] [p ... John know whether ... [6  ] ] 
(13)  a. At 5pm on the following day Ingrid is always on the phone. 
b. [...always;...] [s ...j ...  at Spm on the following day Ingrid on the phone  ] 
Given the way (13a) is interpreted, the right semantics for 6 seems to be: 
(14)  [[ 6 ]Ig  = hw. in w, Ingrid is on the phone at Spm on the day after g(i) 
Now by assumption to obtain [[ P ]Ig we apply the function F to [[ 6 I]?  So take an arbitrary 
assignment g and index j. What will F yield for the proposition in (14)? F will yield: 
(15)  [[ P ]Ig = F([[ 6 11'  ) = 
hw. in w, at 5pm on the day following g(i), John knows whether Ingrid is 
on the phone 
Glossing over some steps, the consequence will be that a sentence like (12a) should express 
that all relevant times are such that John knows one day later at 5pm whether Ingrid is on the 
phone. But it doesn't express that. It expresses that all relevant times are such that John knows 
then whether one duy later at 5pm Ingrid is on the phone. 
2  What is the generalization about when (3) (=(16))  can be used? 
I will now return to the sentence in (16), and attempt to describe the conditions under which it 
is infelicitous. On the basis of  this description, I will then propose a principle of pragmatics 
that determines when it is appropriate to use sentences of this kind. 
(16)  The student who finished first was always Swedish. 
The discussion in this section will rely on some assumptions that I will make about the logical 
forms available for sentences like (16) and about aspects of  the way these logical forms are 
interpreted. These assumptions are intentionally simplified, and in the rest of the paper I will 
take the simplifications for granted. I will hope that on different assumptions, the essence of Prafnlutic Constraints on (Adverbial) (Tenzporul) Quantification 
what  I  have  to  say  will  remain  even  though  the  details  will  have  to  be  different.  The 
assumptions are these: 
First, as far as the syntax of sentences like (16), I will be consistent with what I have 
been  assuming  until  now. I will  assume that  in the  lfs  of  these  sentences  all  items  have 
reconstructed to below the VP level, and I will be assuming that there is nothing interpretable 
above always, which is adjoined to VP, so that everything above always can be ignored. (This 
is a big simplification for one thing because it means that I am ignoring tense nodes, and thus 
tense information.) As before, I will assume that adverbial quantifiers like rrlways are indexed. 
The interpretable pieces of (16)'s If  are thus as in (17). 
When  it  comes to my assumptions about how  lfs like (17) are interpreted, I will be 
departing slightly from an idea that I alluded to earlier (in (Ic)). Earlier, I assumed that the 
context makes salient a property of time intervals, and that we use this property to determine 
the intervals that always quantifies over (informally speaking). Now, I will assume that the 
context makes salient a set of  time intervals, and that we interpret quantifiers like always as 
quantifying over the members of this set. Specifically, an If  like (17) will be interpreted as in 
(18). This simplification will strongly affect the terms of the coming discussion. 
(18)  [[ alwaysi 1,  I  ]Ig= 
hw. for all time intervals t in the contextually salient set S of time intervals, 
[[a]]gi-"(w)=  1. 
In general, interpretation will work in such a way that, when we compute the denotation of a 
sentence's If  with respect to an assignment, we will get a function from worlds to truth values. 
The way in  which these denotations fit into a theory of  the way truth judgments  depend on 
syntactic structures is the usual one: on this theory, when we say that a sentence is true, we 
are  saying that  we  can  find  an  if  for it  and  an  assignment  such that  the  actual  world  is 
characterized by the function we get by evaluating the if with respect to the assignment. 
Once we make assumptions like these, we can draw conclusions about other aspects of 
the semantics of  (16). Consider once again sentence (16) as uttered in  the first scenario, on 
which the student who finishes first is different each time. 
(19)  Exam date:  M  T  W  Th  F  S 
Fastest student:  a  b  c  d  e  f 
The fact is that, if  we know that the students who finished were all Swedish-born, we would 
say that the sentence is true. If  we assume that the If  of  (16) conforms to the format in (17), 
then  we might draw the following conclusions from this. First, the context makes salient a 
series of exam days ((20a)) -  specific time intervals during which the actual exams occurred. 
Second, in the If  of  (16), the denotation of the constituent that combines with always is as in 
(20b). 
(20)  a. S = { Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday, Saturday ) b. [[ a ]Ig  = hw. the individual who in w is the student first to finish the exam 
held in g(1)  is Swedish-born in w. 
With this, we account for the fact that, if we think that the students who finished first were all 
Swedish, then we take the sentence to be true. (Reasoning: Take any assignment. Given (18) 
and (20), the function that we get by evaluating the If  of (16) with respect to that assignment 
will be as in (21) below. This function characterizes the actual world as long as on each exam 
day the first student to finish was Swedish. Now, by hypothesis, to say that (16) is true is to 
say that the actual world is characterized by a function that we get when we evaluate (16)'s If 
with respect to some assignment. So suppose that we think that the actual world is such that 
on each exam day the first student to finish was Swedish. Well, this amounts to saying that we 
think that the actual world is characterized by the function in (21). So given that the function 
in  (21) is a function that we get by evaluating (16)'s If  with respect to some assignment, we 
should take (I 6) to be true.) 
(21)  hw. For all days t in S, the individual who in w is the student first to finish the 
exam held in t is Swedish-born in w. 
(= [[ (17)  ]I9 for all g) 
In  what follows, I will assume that these are the right conclusions to draw. If these are 
the right conclusions to draw, then to say that (16) is true is to say that the function in  (21) 
characterizes the actual world. Equivalently, to say that (16) is true is to say that all of  the 
functions in Z characterize the actual world: 
(22)  f  hw. the individual who in w is the student first to finish the exam held on MONDAY is  Swedish-born in w.  1 
1  hw, the individual who in w is the student first to finish the enam held on TUESDAY is Swedish-born in  w.  1 
= {  hw, the individual who in w is the student first to finish the exam held on WEDNESDAY is Swedish-born in w.  / 
1  hw. the individual who in w is the student first to finish the exam held on THURSDAY is Swedish-born in w.  I 
1  hw, the individual who in w is the student tint to finish the exam held on FRIDAY is Swedish-born in w.  1 
1  hw. the individual who in w is the student firsr to finish the enam held on SATURDAY is Swedish-born in w. 
Now.  here is the generalization that I am proposing specifically about when (16) can 
be used. This generalization makes reference to the function in (21). On the assumptions so 
far, (21) is the denotation of (16)'s If  with respect to any assignment, so on the assumptions so 
far the generalization makes reference to the denotation of (16)'s if. 
(23)  Proposed generalization about (16): 
The cases where (16) sounds strange are the cases where we could determine whether 
(21) holds of the actual world by determining whether the propositions in some proper 
subset of C  hold of the actual world. (And moreover -  as will be discussed below -- 
the smaller the subset, the worse (16) sounds.) 
Consider for example our second scenario, repeated in (24). 
(24)  Exam date:  M  T  W  Th  F  S 
Fastest student:  a  a  a  a  a  a 
We  were both present at all the exams, and I tell you (16) afterwards to inform you of 
a's nationality. Pragmatic Constraints on (Adverbial) (Temporal) Quastificution 
At the point when I utter this sentence, we are both aware that the student who finished first is 
the same for all t in S. That is, 
(25)  We are both aware that the actual world wO  has the following property: 
For all tl,  t2 in S, the individual who in wO  is the student first to finish the exam in tl 
is the individual who in wO  is the student first to finish the exam in t2. 
This  means  that,  to  determine  whether  (21)  holds  of the  actual  world,  it  is enough  to 
determine whether just one of the propositions in C, say (26), holds of the actual world. 
(26)  hw. the individual who in w is the student first to finish the 
exam held on TUESDAY is Swedish-born in w. 
(Suppose it does. Then 
(27)  the individual who in wO  is the student first to finish the exam held on Tuesday is 
Swedish-born in wO. 
And then from (25) -  omitting some steps -- it will follow that 
(28)  For all days t in S, the individual who in wO  is the student first to finish the exam held 
in  t is Swedish-born in wO. 
i.e. that (21) holds of the actual world. On the other hand, suppose it doesn't. Then 
(27')  the individual who in wO  is the student first to finish the exam held on Tuesday is 
NOT Swedish-born in wO. 
And then from (25) it will follow that 
(28')  For all days t in S, the individual who in wO  is the student first to finish the exam held 
in t is NOT Swedish-born in wO. 
i.e. that (21) does not hold of the actual world.) 
Here, then, we can determine whether (21) holds of  the actual world by  considering just  a 
singleton subset of C. And the intuition is that (16) is very strange. 
I  think  that,  when  we  consider  variations  on  the  scenario  that  we  have  been 
considering, we find  that  the  strangeness  of  (16)  is  (inversely)  related  to  the  size of  the 
smallest subset of Z that can serve to verify (21). Imagine, for example, the variation in (29i), 
on which we see one student finishing first every day from Monday through Wednesday, and 
a different student finishing first every day from Thursday through Saturday. The intuition, I 
think, is that in this slightly altered scenario it is still quite strange to utter (16), but perhaps 
not quite as strange as in the scenario on which the same student finishes first each time. In 
this new  case, we can't determine whether (21) holds of the actual  world by considering a 
singleton subset of C,  but we can by considering a two-membered subset -  for example, {hw. 
the individual who in w is the student first to finish the exam held on TUESDAY is Swedish- 
born in w, hw. the individual who in w is the student first to finish the exam held on FRIDAY is Swedish-born in  w}. When  we alter the scenario still further, so that  three students are 
involved ((29 iv)), (16) gets better still. And so on. 
(29) Other scenarios 
#propositions in Z that 
we need  lrl vcrify to knnw 
MTWThF  S  whcther 121 i  is true  Judrlnent 
i.a  a  a  b  b  h 
ii,  a  a  a  a  a  b 
iii.  a  a  a  h  a  a 
iv,a  ah  b  c  c 






3  A constraint on the use of sentences with adverbial quantifiers 
One way of looking at these facts is as follows. A speaker who utters (16) in the scenarios that 
differ  from  our  first  scenario  (on  which  a  different  student  finished  first  each  time)  is 
quantifying  over  more  things  than  he  needs  to  in  order  to make  his  point.  In  using  the 
sentence in  (16), he is stating that all of the times in  one set have a certain character -  but he 
knows that we could have drawn this conclusion if he had informed us that all of the times in 
a smaller set had that character. Specifically, in  using the sentence in (16) he is stating that all 
members  of  (  Monday,  ..., Saturday  }  are  such  that  the  fastest  student  on  that  day  was 
Swedish. But he knows that we could have drawn this conclusion if he had informed us that 
all of the times in  a smaller set have this character. On our second scenario, one such smaller 
set is  { Tuesday 1. 
Conjecture: perhaps there is something wrong with quantifying over more things than 
you need to in order to make your point. 
I think that judgments of the sentence in (30) reinforce this impression. The judgments 
of (30) are parallel  to the judgments  of  (16). In the context of our first scenario, it seems a 
reasonable  sentence for the speaker to utter in order to communicate something (negative) 
about the nationalities  of  the fastest students. In  the context of  our second scenario, it does 
not. On a plausible analysis of  (30), a speaker who used it in this context would be claiming 
that none of the members of { Monday, . . ., Saturday }  are such that the fastest student on that 
day was Swedish. In  the case of the second scenario, however, the speaker is aware that, to 
get the addressee to draw this conclusion, he could confine himself to the claim that none of 
the members of a smaller set -  say { Tuesday ) -  have the relevant property. 
(30)  The student who finished first was never Swedish 
So I  will  follow  through  with  the  conjecture. I  propose,  roughly  speaking, that  a 
principle of pragmatics tells us not to use a sentence like (16) (or (30)) to quantify over the 
times in one set when we know that the hearer could draw the conclusion that the sentence is 
true by considering a parallel quantification over a smaller set. A sentence like (16) (or (30)) 
will sound funny if  we think that the speaker who used it violated that principle. 
To be more precise, the principle that  I have in  mind regulates the sentences that  a 
speaker can make use of by regulating the l$r  that he can make use of. Given my assumptions 
so far, it is natural to suppose that a speaker who asserts a sentence has in mind a particular If 
for the sentence (call  it L) and  a particular  assignment  (call  it  g),  and that his purpose  in 
uttering  the sentence is (among other things) to convey that  [[L]]%haracterizes  the actual Pragmatic Constraints on (Adverbial) (Temporal) Quantification 
world. Let's assume this.'  The principle that I have in  mind narrows down what a speaker can 
hope to  convey  in  this  way  by  declaring  some lfs, on  some occasions,  off  limits.  Some 
sentences have only one If, some have more than  one. The principle will effectively ban  a 
speaker  from  asserting  a  sentence  if,  for example, the  sentence  has  only  one If,  and the 
principle blocks the use of this If. 
To talk about lfs, I will use the following (informal) terminology: 
First of all, consider again the way an If  with a1wuy.s gets interpreted. 
(31)  [[ always; [,  ]  ]Ie = 
hw. for all time intervals t in the contextually salient set of time intervals, 
[[  (w) = 1. 
Informally speaking, lfs of  the form [alwaysi a ] quantify over members of  the contextually 
salient  set  of  time  intervals.  We  might  express  this  by  calling  this  set  the  domain  of 
quantification for [[ alwaysi a ]Ix. 
For every If  of the form [alwaysi a ] and assignment g, we can imagine an alternative 
function that differs only with respect to what set is being quantified over. 
(32)  a. hw. for all time intervals t in set 01,  [[  a]lgi>'  (w) = 1. 
b. hw. for all time intervals t in set 02, [[  (w) = 1. 
c. hw. for all time intervals tin set 03, [[ a ]lei-" (w) = 1. 
.  .  . 
Let us call these functions domain-variants of [[ alwaysi a I]?  (32a) is a domain-variant of [[ 
alwaysi a ]IS with domain 01,  (32b) is a domain-variant of [[ always; a ]IS with domain 02, 
etc. Similarly, 01 is the domain for the domain-variant of [[ alwaysi a ]Ig given in (32a), etc. 
In  general, lfs of the form [QUANT; a ] -  where QUANT ; stands for an adverbial quantifier 
-- will behave analogously to lfs of the form [alwaysi a 1. That is, their denotations will be as 
in (33). Accordingly, we will be able to talk analogously about domain-variants of [[QUANT, 
allg. 
(33)  [[ QUANTi a  ]Ig  = 
hw. for proportion  6of the time intervals t in the contextually salient set of 
time intervals, 
[[a]~~~-''(w)  = 1. 
With this in mind, here is a stab at the principle that constrains a speaker's choice of If. 
It is a rule for speakers to follow: 
In general, when people talk about the readings that sentences have, they might be presupposing something like 
this.  One way of construing the claim that a sentence doesldoes not have a particular reading is as saying that a 
speaker canlcannot come up with a relevant If  and assignment that together yield a particular kind of function 
from worlds to truth values.  In Section 5, I too will talk about readings, I will assume that this is the right way 
of construing talk about readings, and moreover I will assume, together with a lot of literature, that people have 
intuitions about the readings that a sentence can havc. (P) Rule: 
(For any g), 
Do not use an ifof the,fom  [QUANT, a ] to express that [[QUANTi  allg 
holds of the actual world 
when you can find a domain-variant of [[QUANTi  allg,  A, with the following 
characteristics: 
i.  the domain for the domain-variant A is a proper subset of the domain for 
[[QUANTi  allg 
ii.  it follows from what the parties to conversation are taking for granted about 
the actual world that [[QUANT, allg  holds of the actual world as long as A 
holds of it.4 
On its own, of course, this principle does not explain why sentences sound strange. Over and 
above this, I assume that a hearer can reflect on whether the assertion of a sentence obeys (P) 
or not, and will find the sentence strange if it does. Specifically, I propose (Q) (both aspects of 
which hopefully derive from more general aspects of the way we judge sentences). 
(Q)  a.  A sentence whose only if is of the form [QUANT, a  ] will sound strange if 
we think that the use of this If  (together with any assignment) violates (P)." 
b.  If  we know that the speaker can find a A that has the relevant characteristics 
and that has only one element in its domain, then the sentence will sound 
terrible. Less terrible if two, etc. 
Now here is how principle (P) will apply to the use of (16) on our second scenario. By 
assumption, (16) has only one kind of If -  the one given in (17) -  and the denotation of this if 
with respect to an arbitrary assignment g is repeated in  (34a,b). (The denotation will be the 
same no matter what assignment the speaker chooses. In  what follows I will be sloppy and 
write [[ (17)  ]Ig  to  mean  this  one object that  is the denotation of  (17) with respect to any 
assignment. This might cause some confusion but I trust the reader to correct for it.) 
(34)  a. [[ (17) ]Ig = hw. For all days t in S,  the individual who in w is the student 
first to finish the exam held in t is Swedish-born in w. 
b. S = { Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday. Friday, Saturday ] 
One possible domain-variant A of [[ (17) ]Ig  is the one given in (35) 
(35)  One possible domain-variant: 
A = hw. For all days t in {Tuesday), the individual who in w is the student 
first to finish the exam held in t is Swedish-born in w. 
( = hw. The individual who in w is the student first to finish the exam held on 
Tuesday is Swedish-born in w. ) 
It so happens that the domain of A is ( Tuesday 1, which is a proper subset of the domain of 
4 Call C the set of worlds compatible with the information that the parties to conversation are taking for granted 
(cf. Stalnaker 1979). Then another way of putting (ii) is as follows: For every world w in C, [[QUANT,  a1lg(w) 
= l iffA(w)= I. 
'  More precisely: if, given what we think about what the speaker thinks is beinl: taken  ranted about the uctuul 
world,  it rollows that the speaker would violate (P) by using the relevanl If. Pragmatic Constraints on (Adverbial)  (Temporal) Quantification 
[[ (17)  ]Ig .  What  this  means  given  (P)  is  that,  if  it  follows  from  what  the  parties  to 
conversation are taking for granted about the actual world that [[ (17) ]]"olds  of the actual 
world as long as A does, then the speaker is banned from using (17). 
Now, on  our  second scenario, this  does  plausibly  follow  from  what  the parties  to 
conversation  are  taking  for  granted.  The  important  aspect  of  this  scenario was  that  both 
parties to conversation were present at all the exams and saw that the same student finished 
first each time. This makes it likely that the following is being taken for granted: 
(36)  For all tl,  t2 in S,  the individual who in wO  is the student first to finish the exam in tl 
is the individual who in wO  is the student first to finish the exam in t2. 
But given (36), if  A(wO) = 1 we can conclude that [[ (17) ]IS(wO) = I  and if A(w0) is not 1 we 
can conclude that  [[ (17) ]Ig (wO)  is not  1. (We went through the relevant reasoning in the 
previous section.) In other words, given (36) we can conclude that [[ (17) ]IS  (wO) = 1 as long 
as A(w0) = 1. So -  assuming (36) is indeed being taken for granted -  (PI will prohibit the use 
of If  (17) on the second scenario. Moreover, since by assumption (17) is the only If  that the 
sentence in (16) has, (P) will effectively prohibit the use of the sentence in  (16). 
What will  be  the consequence? If  we think that  (36)  is being taken for granted (or 
more  precisely  that  the  speaker  thinks that  it  is), then  we  will  think  that  the  speaker  is 
violating (P) by using (16). Accordingly, the utterance of  (16) will sound strange. And given 
that the relevant domain-variant had only one element in its domain, the utterance of (16) will 
sound very strange. 
In what follows, in discussing examples like these, I will sometimes take an expository 
shortcut: I will draw a diagram that represents the knowledge of the world that the parties to 
conversation  are  taking  for  granted.  In  the  case  of  the  scenario  we  just  considered,  the 
diagram would look like this: 
a is first  a is first  a is first  a is first  a is first  a is first 
I will  only  be considering cases of  lfs whose  denotations are the  same with  respect  to  all 
assignments.  To show that  (P) blocks  a particular if, 1 will show that:  (i) if  we add to the 
diagram  the  information  that  a certain domain-variant  characterizes  the actual  world, then 
from  the  information  on  the  diagram  we  can  conclude  that  the  denotation  of  the  if 
characterizes the actual  world;  if  we add to the diagram the information  that  the domain- 
variant does not characterize the actual world, then from the information on the diagram we 
can conclude that the denotation of the If  does nut characterize the actual world. For example, 
if we add to the diagram the information that A characterizes the actual world a is first  a is first  a is first  a is first  a is first  a is first 
we have enough information in the diagram to conclude that [[ (17) ]Ig characterizes the actual 
world. If instead we add to the diagram the information that A does not characterize the actual 
world 
a is first  a is first  a is first  a is first  a is first  a is first 
a is not Swedish-born 
we have enough information in the diagram to conclude that [[ (17) ]]"oesn't  either. 
4  Some consequences of this constraint 
I will  now  demonstrate some of  the consequences  of  the pragmatic  constraint that I have 
identified.  I  am  going to  go through  a  number  of  sentences  which  have  lfs  of  the  form 
[QUANTi  a 1, and see what it predictions it makes about the felicity of these sentences. 
If  the approach that I have been taking is correct, then there are a number of  factors 
that play a role in determining the infelicity of a sentence with an If  of the form [QUANTi a]. 
One is the denotation of a,  because that will play a role in determining the denotation of the 
whole if  and therefore its possible domain variants. Another is the specific set of times that 
the context makes salient, because that is what functions as the domain of  [[QUANTi allg. 
Another is what we think is being taken for granted about the world, since this will play a role 
in  determining what we can conclude about the truth of the original sentence given the truth 
of a domain variant. So demonstrating the predictions that (P) makes will potentially require 
us  to take a stand on all  of  these factors. We will  see, however, that  in  a large number of 
cases, just  taking  a  position  on  one  or  two  of  these  factors  will  be  enough  to  make  a 
prediction. 
One remark in advance. In examining the predictions that we make once we take (P) 
into account, I am going to assume that apart from (P) there is an additional constraint on the 
use of quantifiers like always  and never: 
(39)  Only use [ QUANTi a ] if  (for some g) the domain of quantification fot 
[[ QUANTi a ]Ig contains more than three objects. 
This can be independently motivated, and should follow from more general restrictions on the 
use of  quantifiers (parallel restrictions apply to  every, etc.).  (Cf. de Hooplde Swart  1989.) 
Without going through the reasoning, I will just note that some evidence for (39) comes from 
judgments  of  our old sentence (16) (= (40a)) on some variants of  our first scenario. On a Pragmatic Consrraints on (Adverbial)  (Temporal) Quantification 
scenario where there are only two exam days instead of six ((40b)), the sentence sounds very 
odd. When there are three ((~OC)),  it still sounds odd (though less odd). When there are four 
((40d)), it doesn't sound bad at all. 
(40)  a. The student who finished first was always Swedish. 
h. M  T  ?'??  c.MT  W  '!  d. M  T  W  Th  nolhad 
a  h  a  hc  a  hc  d 
The first case that I will consider is the case of the sentence we started out with ((41a)). I will 
assume that the only ifs it has are of  the kind we have considered so far, one where always 
combines with another constituent ((41b)). 
(41)  a. Ingrid was always Swedish. 
b. If: alwaysi  .[  ... J 
What we assume to be the denotation of  this other constituent will obviously play a role in 
when we predict the If  in (41b), and thus the sentence in (41a), to be usable. I will assume the 
following  about the constituent  that  always attaches to."  will  assume that  the constituent 
contains an index but the only purpose of  this index is to restrict the domain of the function 
that we get out of this constituent. (This assumption isn't innocuous, and we will see that the 
contribution  of the index plays a role in our reasoning about when (41a) will be felicitous.) 
The denotation  of  this  constituent  with  respect  to  an  assignment  will  be  specifically as in 
(42b). 
(42)  a. alwaysi .[  ...  i  ] 
h. [[ a ]Ig = 
hw: Ingrid is alive in w for the duration of  g(i). Ingrid is Swedish-born in w. 
(cf. Musan 1995) 
The result is that the If  of (41a) will have a denotation as in (43), where S is the contextually 
salient set of time intervals, 
(43)  [[ (41b) ]]g (w) = 1 as long as for all t in S,  Ingrid is alive in w for the duration oft  and 
Ingrid is Swedish-born in w. 
and accordingly domain-variants of [[ (41b) ]Ig will be of the form 
A(w) = 1 as long as for all t in o,  Ingrid is alive in w for the duration oft 
and Ingrid is Swedish-born in w. 
Given this, we can derive (by making an additional  assumption) that, no matter what 
exactly the salient time intervals are, a speaker is not permitted  to utter (41a). This in turn 
means that a sentence like (41a) should always sound bizarre. Since it is hard to imagine an 
utterance of (41a) that sounds sensible, this prediction seems right. 
6 This can he seen as a minor change from what I have assumed so far in talking about The student whofinished 
first  was always Swedish, but it is not a change that affects the preceding discussion in any serious way. In  brief, the reasoning is as follows. Lfs of the kind  in (41b) are the only ones that 
(41a) admits, so if a speaker is prevented from using those he can't use (41a). Now, I assume 
that  an  independent principle  of grammar (I will  elaborate briefly below)  guarantees that a 
speaker is only allowed to use (41b) when it is already established that Ingrid is alive at all the 
intervals in the contextually salient set. But if it is already established that Ingrid is alive at all 
the intervals in the contextually salient set (and there is more than one interval in this set), a 
speaker who uses (41b) will  violate (P). To see this, imagine first the information that the 
parties to conversation are taking for granted: 
lngrid is  Ingrid is  lngrid is  lngrid is  Ingrid is 
alive  alive  alive  alive  alive 
Now consider the domain-variant of [[(41b)]Jg  whose domain consists only oft,, the first time 
interval in the contextually salient set. (Call it A again.) A characterizes a world w as long as 
for all t in { t, ), Ingrid is alive in w for the duration oft  and Ingrid is Swedish-born in w. That 
is, it characterizes a world w as long as Ingrid is alive in w for the duration of tl and Ingrid is 
Swedish-born  in  w. Suppose we add to the diagram the information that A characterizes the 
actual world. This amounts to adding: 
b.  Ingrid is Swedish-born 
and now from the information in the diagram we can conclude that [[(41b)]lg characterizes the 
actual world.  Suppose instead we add to the diagram that  A doesn't characterize the actual 
world. The only way of doing this consistently with the information already there is to add 
C  Ingrid is not Swedish-horn 
and from this we can conclude that [[(41b)]lg does not characterize the actual world. 
(How about if  there is only one interval in the contextually salient set? In this case, we 
will  not be  able to find a relevant  domain  variant  of  [[(41b)]Jg whose  domain is a proper 
subset of [[(41b)Jlg 's domain, so (P) will not be violated. But the principle in (39) will be, so 
even in this case the speaker will be prevented from using the If  in (41b).) 
The  independent  principle  of  grammar  that  I  made  use  of  in  the  course  of  my 
reasoning here is one that has been  identified in  discussions of  "presupposition  projection" 
(e.g. Heim 1983).~  Given the domain condition in the denotation of the sister of ulwa)ls ( the 
denotation given in  (42b)), this principle limits the conditions under which a speaker can use 
an  If  that  contains  this  constituent.  Specifically,  if  the  If  is  one  where  this  constituent 
combines with  a quantifier  (a quantifier  coindexed  with  the index  in  this constituent), the 
speaker can only use the If  when it is being taken for granted that a certain property holds of 
every item in the set the quantifier ranges over. Without going into detail, in this case, where 
7 One formulation that will do for the purposes here is: Do not use [ QUANTi a  ] to express that  [[ QUANTi 
a 11'  holds of wO  unless it is takcn for granted about wO  that, for every x in the domain of [[ QUANTi a ]Ig, 
[[ a ]IS  'L'"  (wO) is defined.  See Percus  1998 for a version of the principle that is very close to this one. Prujimatic Constraints on (Adverbial)  (Temporal) Qurrntificatiun 
the quantifier ranges over time intervals, every one of these time intervals must be one during 
which Ingrid is alive. 
(45)  Consequence of one view of "presupposition projection"and  (42b): 
A speaker is entitled to use (41  b) to express that [[ (41  b) ]]%ools  of w0 only 
when (46) is taken for granted. 
(46)  For every t in the domain of quantification for [[ (41b) ]Ig, Ingrid is alive in 
w0 for the duration of  t. 
The next case I want to consider is (47). Here as before, I will assume that there is just one 
possible  kind  of  If,  one  in  which  always attaches  to  another  constituent,  and  that  this 
constituent is interpreted as in (48b). 
(47)  Napoleon was always dead 
b. [[ alls  = hw. Napoleon is dead in w for the duration of g(i). 
This means that the If  of  (47) will have a denotation as in (49), where S is the contextually 
salient set of time intervals. 
(49)  [[(48a)]lg = hw.  for all t in S, Napoleon is dead in w for the duration oft 
and accordingly domain-variants of [[(48a)]]bill be of the form  hw.  for all t in o,  Napoleon 
is dead in w for the duration oft. 
The fact is that, as with the previous sentence, it is hard to imagine an utterance of (47) 
that does not sound bizarre. My feeling is that when we try to imagine a speaker uttering the 
sentence, we have the impression that the speaker who utters it expects that at any moment 
Napoleon could have come back to life, as in "I kept checking the coffin, but Napoleon was 
always dead." That a speaker should expect something like this itself seems bizarre. 
What we can derive on these assumptions about the syntax and semantics of  (47) is 
that (47) will be unusable when it is taken for granted that anyone who is dead at one point is 
dead at all later points ((50)) -  again, irrespective of what exactly those time intervals are that 
the context makes salient. This is because, no matter what set of  intervals the context makes 
salient, a speaker who uses the If  in  (4%)  while (50) is taken for granted will  violate (P). 
Since lfs of the kind in  (48a) are the only ones that (47) admits, as long as (50) is taken for 
granted, a speaker will never be able to felicitously utter (47). 
(50)  Fact about the actual world wO: 
For all x, t, t', if x is dead in wO  at t and t' contains no moment that precedes t 
then x is dead in w0 at 1'. 
To see this, again imagine the information that is being taken for granted: (51)  a.  S = { t,, ....  t,) 
if N is  if N is  if N is  if N is  ifNis 
drad now,  drad now,  dead now,  dead now,  dend now. 
he is dend  he is dead  he is dead  he is dead  he is dsad 
181cr  too  laler too  later 100  lnler 100  Inter too 
Now consider the domain-variant (call it A again) whose domain consists only of tl, the first 
time interval  in  the contextually salient set. Suppose we add to the diagram the information 
that A characterizes the actual world: 
if N is  if N is  if N is  if N is  if N is 
dead now,  dsad now,  dend now,  dead now,  dead now 
IIC is devd  he is  dead  he is  devd  he is dead  heir  dead 
Inter loo  Inter too  later too  later too  later too 
N is dead 
new 
From this we can conclude that [[(48a)]lg characterizes the actual world. Suppose instead we 
add the information that A does not characterize the actual world: 
if N is  if N is  if N is  if N is  if N is 
dead now,  dend now,  devd now,  dead now,  dead now, 
he is dead  he is dead  he is dead  he is dead  he is dead 
later loo  Inter loo  later too  later too  later too 
N is not 
dead now 
From this we can conclude that [[(48a)]lg does not characterize the actual world 
Here as in  the previous case, the conclusion that (47) is unusable depends in part on 
the idea that the parties to conversation  are accepting certain  assumptions  about the world. 
The relevant assumption here is that once you  are dead, you're dead. Unlike in  the previous 
case, however, there is no principle that links the acceptance of this assumption to the fact that 
the speaker has decided to use (47). Therefore, we predict that in cases where it is clear that 
the parties  to  conversation  are not  making  this  assumption,  the  sentence  might  not  seem 
strange. Although we generally do accept that once you are dead, you're dead, stories about 
resurrection or about supernatural beings that come back to life suggest that one might choose 
not to accept this. Here is a case parallel to (47) in  which the speaker specifically disavows 
the assumption that once you are dead, you're dead. The relevant clause here does not sound 
so bizarre, so this at least is consistent with the story we have told. Pragmatic Constraints on (Adverbial)  (Tempml)  Quarztification 
(52)  Vampires are supposed to come back to life after midnight, but I checked the 
coffin every half hour and I can assure you that this vampire was always dead. 
Here is a minimal pair that suggests that the story of the kind here is on the right track. 
It doesn't involve dead but rather tall and blue-eyed. A parallel  account of (53) would yield 
roughly the following: if the parties to conversation presume that once you are tall and blue- 
eyed, you are tall and blue-eyed for good, then (53) will lead to a violation of (P). This is the 
kind  of  assumption  that we might  normally make, but  not  in  a context where the speaker 
acknowledges the existence of supernatural forces, like witches'  spells, that can induce shape- 
changing. (55) is a case where the speaker acknowledges the existence of such forces; (54) is 
a case where he doesn't. My impression is indeed that in (54) but not in (55), the last sentence 
comes as  a bit  of  a surprise. It  seems to  suggest that  the medication  could  have changed 
John's height or eye color, and this is not what we nomlally expect medication to be able to 
do. 
(53)  John was always tall and blue-eyed, 
(54)  The experimenters gave them a new medication every Tuesday evening. The next 
morning, the two of them generally looked in the mirror to see if it had had any effect 
on them physically. Ingrid went through quite a variety of changes over the weeks, 
without much of a common denominator. One week she would find that she was more 
muscular, the next week she would find that she was a little wrinkly. John, on the 
other hand, was always tall and blue-eyed. 
(55)  The witch cast a spell on them every Tuesday evening. The next morning, the two of 
them generally looked in the mirror to see what changes she had made to their 
appearance. Ingrid went through quite a variety of changes over the weeks, without 
much of a common denominator. One week she would find that she was large and 
muscular, the next week she would find that she was frail and wrinkly. John, on the 
other hand, was always tall and blue-eyed. 
A variant of this case that is worth considering is the example in  (56) -  I assume that 
as before the only kind of If  that the sentence has looks like (57a), that the denotation of this if 
is  as in  (58)  and that  accordingly domain-variants  will  be  of  the form hw, for all  t  in  o, 
Napoleon is alive in w for the duration oft. 
(56)  Napoleon was always alive. 
(57)  a. alwaysi ,[  ... i ] 
b. [[ a]]G  kw. Napoleon is alive in w for the duration of g(i) 
(58)  [[(57a)]]"  hw. for all tin  S,  Napoleon is alive in  w for the duration oft 
Here we again derive that the sentence will be unusable when the speaker is taking for granted 
that anyone who is dead at one point is dead at all later points -- irrespective of what exactly 
those time  intervals  are  that  the  context makes  salient. However, this  example is slightly 
different from the earlier one. In the absence of accepted knowledge about whether Napoleon 
was born  yet  at the time  of  the first  interval, the kind  of  domain-variant  that  we need to 
consider  in  order to demonstrate a  (P)  violation  is  different  from  the kind  we  needed  to 
consider earlier. It is one with a larger domain. Specifically, its domain must consist of two intervals: the first interval and the last interval of the contextually salient set. (I leave it to the 
reader  to  verify  this.) Now, the  bizarreness  of  our  old  example (47) when judged  in  the 
absence of context suggests that in  the absence of context we seem by default to take it for 
granted that once you are dead you're dead. So, given the proposal thus far, one might expect 
that this sentence too will sound bizarre when judged  in the absence of context -  but perhaps 
a little less bizarre. That seems to be the prediction. 
In  the case of the sentences we just  looked at, anytime the parties to conversation are taking 
for granted the kind of assumptions that we all generally make about the world -  for instance, 
that once you're  dead you're dead -  the speaker will violate (P). And this is true irrespective 
of what set of time intervals it is that the context makes salient. Accordingly, as long as we 
have no reason  to think that  the  parties  to conversation  are  departing  from these normal 
assumptions,* we don't need to make any additional commitments as to what the salient set of 
time intervals is in order to reject the sentence as bizarre. At least, that is what follows from 
the picture I have presented so far. 
The case of (61) (= (5)) is different. (I will assume as before that (61) has just one kind 
of if -  given in (62a) -  and that the denotation of this lf is as in (63).) 
(61)  John always knows whether Ingrid is Swedish. 
(62)  a. alwaysi ,[  ... i ] 
b. [[ allg  = hw. in w, John knows for the duration of g(i) whether Ingrid is swedish9 
(63)  [[ (62a) 11"  kw.  for all t in S, in w John knows for the duration oft 
whether Ingrid is Swedish 
We would be able to say the same thing about (61) if we could maintain, for instance, that a 
normal assumption that we make about the world is that, once you know whether Ingrid is 
Swedish, you retain that knowledge forever. But I think that is not the kind of assumption that 
we normally make. We normally imagine that knowledge of this kind tends to fade, especially 
if you are never called upon to access it. In this case, if indeed the sentence sounds bizarre to 
us,  that must have something to do with assumptions we are making about the set of time 
intervals that is being quantified over. 
Here is the kind  of  situation in which  we predict that  a speaker who uses (61) will 
violate (P). We predict a violation of (P) when it is taken for granted that the distance between 
intervals is smaller than the amount of  time that it would typically take for John's memory to 
fade. The idea is this: suppose it is taken for granted that, ifJohn knows at interval t2  whether 
Ingrid is Swedish, then he knows this also at the succeeding interval t3. 
8 Or more precisely: as long as we have no reason to think that the speaker is assuming this kind of departure 
from normal assumptions. 
  ore precisely, to he consistent with the assumptions so far: Swedish-horn. Pragmatic Constraints on (Adverbial)  (Temporal) Quantification 
John's memory 
will no1 fade 
between now 
and the end of  13 
Then to determine whether he knows at all of  the intervals in S  whether Ingrid is Swedish, it 
is enough  to determine whether he  knows  at all  the intervals except  t3 whether Ingrid is 
Swedish. Consequently, we can show that the use of the if (62a) violates (P) by considering a 
domain variant of [[ (62a) ]Ig  whose domain consists of all the intervals except t3. 
What this means is that, to the extent that we feel that the sentence is bizarre when we 
have no clue as to what the relevant time intervals are, we must be making some additional 
assumption along these lines:  the distance between  intervals is smaller than  the amount it 
would take for John's memory to fade.''  On the approach that I have been taking, this is the 
conclusion we are led to. 
To test whether the approach is on the right track, what we should do is consider two 
kinds of scenarios, one where it is clearly taken for granted that the distance between intervals 
is smaller than  the amount of  time it takes for John's  memory to fade, and one where it is 
clearly taken for granted that it is larger. A sentence like (61) should seem odd in  the first 
scenario, but all right in the second. In fact, it is hard to think of any scenario where the kind 
of information that (61) conveys might be of interest, but the contrast between the following 
two dialogues might bear out the prediction. I think that the final sentence of the first dialogue 
sounds a lot worse than the final sentence of the second dialogue (where a natural paraphrase 
would  use  "remember"  instead  of  "know").  When  we  hear  the  first  dialogue,  our  first 
impression  is  that  "always"  is just  redundant.  If  we  try  to justify  it  to  ourselves,  then  if 
anything we  have the strange feeling that the  speaker thinks  that  the relevant  information 
might suddenly vanish from John's  mind, and when  we know nothing else about John this 
comes as a surprise. 
(65) -- I heard that Ingrid is Scandinavian, and I wanted to know whether she is Swedish. 
--  For some reason this question comes up a lot. I always send people to John to find out. 
He isn't very knowledgeable, it's true, but he does always know whether Ingrid is 
Swedish. 
(66) -- I heard that Ingrid is Scandinavian, and I wanted to know whether she is Swedish. 
--  For some reason this question comes up a lot. I always send people to John to find out. 
He has a lousy memory for many things, but he does always know whether Ingrid is 
Swedish. 
(A more realistic minimal pair might be as in (67)-(68), which I think behave similarly.) 
(67) -- I was advised to buy a box of Fenistil, but I need to know first whether it contains 
antihistamines. 
'O  Or more precisely: that the speaker is taking this for granted 
131 --  For some reason this question comes up a lot. Why don't you go ask the assistant 
pharmacist? He isn't very knowledgeable, it's true, but he does always know whether 
Fenistil contains antihistamines. 
(68) -- I was advised to buy a box of Fenistil, but I need to know first whether it contains 
antihistamines. 
--  For some reason this question comes up a lot. Why don't you go ask the assistant 
pharmacist? He has a lousy memory, it's true, but he does always know whether 
Fenistil contains antihistamines. 
5  Consequences for "semantic partition" 
Here is  a very  general pattern  of  reasoning. It  starts from the claim  that  we do not  use a 
sentence S to express the proposition that would be derived from an If  L."  It concludes on 
this basis that L is not a possible If  for a sentence S. 
Now that we have seen that principles of pragmatics can prevent us from using an If, 
we can see that this kind of reasoning is questionable. If we do not use a sentence to express 
the proposition  that would  be derived from an If  L, that could be because other principles 
prevent  us  from using L.  It  doesn't  have to be  because our mechanism  for generating  lfs 
prevents us from generating L for the sentence in question. 
One  place  where  this  questionable  pattern  of  reasoning  has  been  used  is  in  the 
treatment  of  sentences like Ingrid  was alwaq~s  Swedish. We saw that  there an independent 
principle  of  pragmatics, (P), could explain  why we do not  use an  If  that  contains an item 
coindexed  with  the  quantifier. I  want  now  to  look  at another case  where  this  pattern  of 
reasoning has been  used, and ask if  instead of  saying that the sentence lacks an  If  that  we 
might otherwise expect, we can again say that while in principle we can generate this If, in 
practice (P) will typically prevent us from using it. 
The sentences that I am interested in are sentences with "individual-level predicates," 
and I am interested in the way they behave with respect to "semantic  partition."  Discussions 
of the syntax and semantics of  sentences with singular indefinite subjects often start with the 
idea that sentences like (69) have among their possible lfs one that gives rise to a proposition 
like (70). They propose what that If  is and then argue that the parallel  If  is not available for 
sentences like (71). 
(69)  A secretary is always on the phone, 
(70)  hw. For all intervals t in the set of intervals that the context makes salient, 
there is some individual who in w is a secretary for the duration oft 
and who in w is on the phone for the duration oft 
(71)  A secretary is always Swedish. 
The argument follows the pattern of reasoning that I just  sketched: We do not use a sentence 
like this to express the proposition that we would derive from the relevant if. Therefore, the 
sentence does not have the relevant If. 
"  I am using proposition here to mean a function from worlds to truth values.  I am using express proposition p 
to mean "convey that p characterizes the actual world."  See Section 3. 
132 Pragn~atic  Constraints on (Adverbial) (Temporal)  Quantification 
The kind of ifs that we are interested in  are lfs like those in  (72) and (73), or minor 
variants of these. 
(72)  always,  [VP [DP a2  secretary el ] [tz on the phone el ]  ] 
(73)  always1  [VP [OP  a2 secretary el ] [tz  Swedish el  ]  ] 
I have sketched in (74)-(76) a few aspects of  the way these lfs are interpreted. Some things 
that are worth  noting are that the indexed e items are silent items that function as variables 
over times, and that the DP functions as a quantificational expression with existential force. 
(74)  [[  [  [DP ai  secretary e, ]  a ]  ]IS 
= hw. there is some individual x 
such that, in w, x is a secretary for the duration of g(j) 
and such that [[ a ]lg  i~'  (w) = I. 
(75)  [[  VP(72)  ]Ig = hw. there is some individual x 
such that, in w, x is a secretary for the duration of g(1) 
and such that, in w, x is on the phone for the duration of g(l) 
(76)  [[ VP(77)  ]Ig = hw. there is some individual x 
such that, in w, x is a secretary for the duration of g(1) 
and such that x is Swedish-born in w 
The propositions that we would get out of these lfs are what I have written  in  (77) and (78). 
The If  in (72) would say that we can find a secretary on the phone at each of the contextually 
salient time intervals; the parallel if in (73) would say that we can find a Swedish secretary at 
each of the contextually salient time intervals. The position I am examining has it that, while 
we can generate the if in (72) for the sentence A secretary is always on the phone, we cannot 
generate the parallel if in (73) for the sentence A secretary is always Swedish. Is this position 
justified? 
(77)  [[ (72) ]Ig = 
hw. For all intervals t in the set of intervals that the context makes salient, 
there is some individual who in w is a secretary for the duration oft 
and who in w is on the phone for the duration oft 
(78)  [[ (73) ]Ig = 
hw. For all intervals t in the set of intervals that the context makes salient, 
there is some individual who in w is a secretary for the duration oft 
and who is Swedish-born in w 
The point that I want to make is that, even if A secretary is always Swedish does have 
the If  in (73), the use of this If  will be very restricted. As long as we take it for granted that at 
two of the contextually salient time intervals exactly the same people are secretaries, (P) will 
prevent us from using it. Suppose for instance that it is accepted that the pool of secretaries is 
the same from, say, t2 to the end of tS; then  (P) will  prevent a speaker from using (73) by 
virtue of the domain-variant whose domain simply excludes t3. This is because, to determine 
whether  there is  a Swedish-born  secretary at each of  the relevant  intervals, it is enough to determine whether there is a Swedish-born secretary at every interval but t3. (By contrast, to 
determine whether there  is  a Swedish-born  secretary on the phone  at each of  the relevant 
intervals,  it  is  not enough to  determine  whether  there  is a  Swedish-born  secretary on  the 
phone at every interval but t3. So (P) will not prevent a speaker from using (72) in the same 
situation.) 
(79)  contextually salient set: (  tl, ..  ., tS] 
the pool of 
secretaries is 
the same from 
here to the cnd 
of r, 
In  fact, if  the contextually salient time intervals are close together, it is pretty reasonable to 
imagine that the pool of secretaries will stay the same from one time interval to the next. 
What does this mean? It means that, to the extent that we do not naturally take the 
sentence to express the proposition  in  (78) in  the absence of  information about the relevant 
time  intervals, this might  not  be because the sentence lacks the If  in  (73). It  could just  be 
because,  in  the  absence  of  contrary  information,  we  tend  to  imagine  that  the  pool  of 
secretaries  will  stay  the  same from one interval  to  the  next - maybe because  we tend  to 
imagine  that  the  intervals  are close  together.  This  kind  of  default  assumption  would  be 
analogous to the  kind  of  default  assumption  we  considered  at the end of  the last section: 
namely that, in  the absence of contrary information, we imagine that knowledge of  whether 
Ingrid is Swedish will stay present from one interval to the next. If  we really want to know 
whether the If  in (73) is a possible one, we should at least make sure to look at cases where it 
is clear that changes in the secretary pool occur between the contextually salient intervals, and 
cases like these will have to have intervals that are fairly far apart. A candidate case is (80). 
(To judge by the nods at the workshop,) it seems that (80) can convey that every change of 
office staff results in the inclusion of a Swede in the secretary pool, and this suggests that the 
If  in (73) is possible.'2. " 
I2 I think that there is an additional aspect of (SO) that contributes to bringing out the reading I am interested in. 
This is the contrast between secretary and technical assistant.  (On the natural way of pronouncing (SO), there is 
pitch accent on both technical and secretary.) A near minimal pair (for me) that suggests that the contrast makes 
a difference is (i).  The continuation in (a) is bizarre, suggesting that none of its possible lfs is appropriate.  By 
contrast, the continuation in (h) is good and conveys that most staff reviews turn up a Swedish secretary. 
(i) We require them to hire Swedes for as many positions as possible.  With this in mind, we review 
their staff every year.  In fact, 
a. ?I a secretary is usually Swedish. 
h. none of the technical assistants are ever Swedish.  Still, a SEcretary usually is. 
Significantly, I think, for the analysis of this contrast, replacing "a secretary" in (i a) by  "one of the secretaries" 
redeems the sentence. 
13 One might imagine that the lfs for sentences like Some secretary is always Swedish or At least one of the 
secretaries is always Swedish yield propositions just like the one (73) yields.  Suppose they do. I have suggested 
here that, in the case of  (73), assumptions that we make in the ahsence of contrary information prevent us from 
using lfs like (73).  Does this imply that these other sentences should sound odd in the absence of special 
information'? The prediction here depends on other factors.  When we are exposed to a sentence and find that (P) 
taken together with our natural assumptions rules out one of its lfs, we have various options other than rejecting 
the sentence.  If the sentence has another If  that yields a different proposition, and that does not violate (P), we 
could decide to maintain our natural assumptions and to take the sentence as expressing that different 
proposition.  Or we could decide to revise our assumptions.  (In the case of sentences like (71), it has been Pragmatic Constraints on (Adverbial) (Ten~porul)  Quantification 
(80)  Every five years, we change office staff entirely. We never wind up with any 
Scandinavians as technical assistants, but by sheer chance a secretary is always 
Swedish. 
If  this line of  reasoning is right, there are still some questions to ask. But they have 
nothing to do with the lfs that (71) admits. The main question is why, when we ask ourselves 
whether it gives rise to the reading in (78), we have a strong tendency to  imagine that the 
times being quantified over are close together rather than far apart. We seem not to exhibit 
this tendency, for example, when we ask ourselves what a sentence like (81) expresses. Here, 
we seem to imagine that there is only one relevant time interval per reign." 
(81)  A blond is always King of Sweden, and a brunette is always Queen. 
I want to close this section by mentioning a prediction that we can now make. I just 
said with regard to sentences like (71) that, when we have to guess what kind of time intervals 
might be under consideration, unless we know otherwise, we apparently do not imagine that 
changes in the secretary pool occur between  the intervals. That is the conclusion we have to 
draw if (71) allows the If  in (73). As we saw earlier, we can draw a parallel conclusion from 
the fact that a sentence like John always knows whether Ingrid  is Swedish sounds bizarre in 
the absence of information about the time intervals under consideration. The conclusion there 
is that, unless we know  otherwise, we apparently do not imagine that changes in  a person's 
knowledge as to whether Ingrid is Swedish can occur between the intervals. 
When we put these two conclusions together with what we have said so far, we make a 
prediction. Consider the sentences in (82a) and (83a), which in some sense are parallel to the 
sentences we started out with in this section. On assumptions that can be reconstructed easily 
enough from the discussion thus far, one possible If  for (82a) -  abbreviated in (83b) -  yields 
the proposition  in (82c), and similarly one possible If  for (83a) -  abbreviated in (83b) -  yields 
the proposition in (83c). The If  for (82a) says that, at each of the relevant time intervals, there 
is some secretary who knows at the time whether Ingrid is Swedish. The If  for (83a) says that, 
at each of the relevant time intervals, there is some secretary who knows at the time whether 
Ingrid is on the phone (at the time). 
(82)  a. A secretary always knows whether Ingrid is Swedish. 
b. always,  [vp  [DP a2  secretary el ] [t2 knows whether In. is Sw. el ]  ] 
c. hw. For all intervals tin  the set of intervals that the context makes salient, 
there is some individual who, in w, 
is a secretary for the duration oft 
and knows for the duration oft  whether Ingrid is Swedish 
(83)  a. A secretary always knows whether Ingrid is on the phone. 
b. always!  [vp  [~p  a2  secretary el ] [tz knows whether In. is on the ph. el ]  1 
c. hw. For all intervals t in the set of intervals that the context makes salient, 
there is some individual who, in w, 
is a secretary for the duration oft 
argued that another kind of If  is available, and so the first course is open.  In the case of sentences like Some 
secretav  ..., perhaps this option is not available.) 
l4 Parallel sentences with quantifiers like halfthe  rime might he of use in verifying this claim 
135 and knows for the duration oft  whether Ingrid is on the phone 
The prediction  is  this:  in  the  absence  of  information  about  what  time  intervals  are under 
consideration, it will not be natural to take (82a) to express the proposition that derives from 
that first If; by contrast, it should be natural to take (83a) to express the parallel proposition 
that derives from the second If. In  other words, the "semantic  partition"  difference that we 
find between A secretary is always Swedish and A secretary is always on the phone should be 
preserved across this kind of attitude context. (Why do we make this prediction? Because, if 
at one time interval we can find a secretary who knows whether Ingrid is Swedish, then we 
should also be able to find such a secretary at another time interval -the  very same secretary. 
So the relevant if for (82a) will violate (P). But if at one time interval we can find a secretary 
who knows  whether  Ingrid is on the phone, there is no guarantee that  we can find such a 
secretary  at  another time  interval.  So the  relevant  If  for (83a)  will  not  violate  (P).) This 
prediction  seems to me to be correct. This is of  interest because, contrary to what is often 
claimed, the ability to use lfs like those in  (82b)-(83b) apparently does not depend on the 
identity of  the matrix verb: the matrix  verb is the same (know) in  both lfs, but it looks as 
though the first If  is usable while the second is not. 
6  Concluding remarks 
In this paper, I have argued for a conception of  grammar under which principles of use may 
prevent us from availing ourselves of  representations that we nonetheless have the resources 
to generate. I pointed out specifically that, since principles of use may sometimes block the 
use of lfs, we have to be careful when arguing that a sentence does not admit such and such an 
If. 
I tried to motivate a particular principle of use, (P), and my concern was to explore its 
effects. The questions that arise are the usual ones. Are there alternative lines of explanation 
that would have accounted for the same facts that I used (P) to account for? If indeed a theory 
that incorporates a principle like (P) is on the right track, is the relevant principle really (P), or 
is there a better way of formulating it? Does the principle follow from anything? Does it relate 
in any way to other principles of grammar that we know about? 
To motivate (P), I used the fact that the sentence The student who  finishedfirst  was 
always Swedish is unsuited to communicate the nationality of a certain student of whom it is 
known that she finished first each time. What other lines of explanation might one pursue to 
account for this fact? On the one hand, one might conjecture that the semantics of  sentences 
like  these  is  not  what  I  claimed,  and  that  the  sentence's  interpretation  alone  renders  it 
incompatible  with  the  situation  in  question.  On  the  other  hand,  one  might  attribute  the 
responsibility for this fact to other principles of use. One position to take, for example, is that 
it follows as a quantity implicature from the use of the sentence that the same student did not 
finish first each time. I can't address all the different options, but I am  skeptical of  this last 
position. To take this position is in part to say that we have a systematic way of  generating 
alternatives  to  sentences  like  the  one at  issue,  and  that  in  the  case of  this  sentence,  the 
procedure will yield a sentence that is logically stronger and that entails that the same student 
did finish first every time. (One such alternative sentence might be: The student who always 
finished  first  was (always) Swedish.) I am  skeptical  because I do not see exactly how this 
procedure for generating alternatives would work. 
Assuming something like (P) is on the right track, is the formulation of the principle in 
need of  refinement? Probably. For one thing, some provision  has to be made somewhere for 
the communicative intentions of the speaker: while in the scenario considered it is odd to utter Pragmatic Constraints on (Adverbial)  (Temporal) Quantification 
The student who finished first  was always Swedish in  order to  communicate the student's 
nationality, it is not so odd to utter the sentence in  order to communicate a simple statistical 
generalization. Maybe a better formulation of the principle would reflect this. Apart from this, 
I think there is a further inadequacy with (P) and (Q) as they stand now. They predict that 
sentences of the kind in (84) should have the same status, when my intuition is that (84b) is 
less bizarre  than  (84a). (While I haven't  come up  with  a context  in  which  (84b) sounds 
perfect, my impression is that it evokes the kind of  scenario in which someone checks every 
so often to see whether Napoleon  has died.) They predict that the two sentences should have 
the same status because, in both cases, one can determine the sentence's truth by determining 
the truth of  a domain-variant whose domain consists of a single time interval -  in the case of 
(84a), the relevant time interval is the earliest one in  the contextually salient set, and in  the 
case of (84b) it is the last one. Accounting for the difference between (84a) and (84b) would 
certainly mean revising (P), perhaps  in such a way as to take into account the chronological 
order (or some other natural ordering) of the time intervals in the domain of quantification.'' 
(84)  a. Napoleon was always dead. 
b. Napoleon was never dead. 
There is another potential  refinement worth mentioning: since my concern in  this paper has 
been exclusively with  adverbial quantifiers, I have formulated (P) to account only for facts 
involving adverbial quantifiers,  but naturally (P) should be extended to cover parallel  facts 
involving quantifier phrases in other positions. If I tell you (85) alluding to the Marx Brothers, 
that sounds as odd as telling you The student who  finished,first was always Swedish when we 
know that the same student finished first each time. Presumably it sounds odd for the same 
reason. 
(85)  Each one's mother was named Minnie. 
Is  there  any  connection  between  the principle  of  use  that  I  have  argued  for,  and 
anything  else  that  we  know  about?  As  a pragmatic  principle,  (P)  looks  very  different  in 
character from certain others that have been posited, in that it compares propositions that are 
equally informative. Perhaps it could be viewed as a subcase of  Grice's Maxim of Manner 
("Be  brief.")  (Its effect is radically different from the effect of the Maxim of Quantity, since, 
of  the propositions it compares, it instructs the speaker to reject the logically stronger ones.) 
As for the facts that (P) is designed to account for, there do seem to be facts that bear  a 
surface  similarity:  the  bizarreness  of  sentences  like  those  in  (86)  is  reminiscent  of  the 
bizarreness of the familiar sentences in (87). 
(86)  a. ?? At that time, Ingrid was Swedish. 
b # On Tuesday, the student who finished first was Swedish 
(given our second scenario) 
IS There are many candidates to think about. Here is an example (whose predictions I havcn't thought about). 
Starting from a salient (strong) lincar ordering of the intervals in the domain of quantification of [[ QUANTi 
a 115  establish a corresponding ordering of those domain-variants whose domain consists exclusively of a single 
element of that set. (For instance, if the domain of (84a) is {March 1810, April  18 10, May  1 810,  ...), order kw. 
in w Napoleon was deadfor the duration of March 1810 before dw. in w Napoleon was dead for  the duration of 
April 1810 before kw. in w Napoleon was dead for  the duration ofMay 1810, etc.)  New principle: Don't use 
[[ QUANTi  cc ]IS if the truth of one of these domain-variants guarantees the truth of the next domain-variant in 
the order. (87)  a. ?? Ingrid was always Swedish. 
b. #The student who finished first was always Swedish. 
(given our second scenario) 
(P) does not account for the bizarreness of the sentences in  (86). Since it is tempting to think 
that the problems with (87) can be reduced to the problems with (86), superficial similarities 
like these might  lead one to pursue an  approach  very  different from the one I have taken 
here.I6.  l7 
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In  this paper I examine the approach to incremental themes developed in  Krifka  1992,1998, Dowty 
1991 and  others, which  argues that  the  extent of  a telic event  is  determined by  the extent of  its 
incrementally affected theme.  This approach identifies the defining property of  an accomplishment 
event as being the fact that the theme relation is a homomorphism from parts of the event to parts of 
the (incremental) theme.  I show that there are a large number of  accomplishments, both lexical and 
derived via resultative predication, which  cannot be characterised in  this way. I then show that it is 
more insightful to characterise accomplishments in  terms  of  their internally complex structure: an 
accomplishment event consists of  a non-incremental  activity event and an  incrementally structured 
'BECOME' event, which are related by  a contextually available one-one function in  such a way  that 
the incremental structure of  the latter is imposed on  the activity. 
1  The Question of Incremental Themes 
In  this paper, I want to address the question of incremental themes, to discuss what they are 
and what  role they  play  in  determining the aspectual class of  the VP in  which they occur. 
Incremental themes surfaced in linguistics discussion notably in  work of  Tenny  1987, 1994, 
Dowty 1991, and most importantly in the work of  Krika  1989, 1992, and 1998.  The basic 
idea is that some arguments of verbs, such as the direct object argument of the verbs  and 
mow in (1) are used up 'bit by bit' as the event denoted by the verb progresses. 
(1) a. Mary ate the sandwich. 
b.  Jane mowed the lawn 
One can plot the progress of the event of Mary eating the sandwich by looking at changes in 
the sandwich, and similarly the progress of the event of Jane mowing the lawn can be plotted 
by watching changes in the lawn.  As Dowty  1991 puts it "if I tell my son to mow the lawn 
(right now) and then look at the lawn an hour later, I will be able to conclude something about 
the "aspect" of  the event of  his mowing the lawn from the state of  the lawn, viz., that the 
event is either not yet begun, partly done but not finished, or completed, according to whether 
the  grass  on  the  lawn  is  all  tall,  partly  short  or  all  short.  On  the  other  hand  I will  not 
necessarily  be  able to inspect  the state of  my  son  and  conclude anything at all  about  his 
completion of  his mowing the lawn.  In this event, my son is the Agent and the lawn is the 
Theme,  in  fact  the  Incremental  Theme."  Formally,  Krifka  has  argued,  there  is  a 
homomorphism from the parts of  an  incremental theme to the parts of the event of which it 
the theme. 
Incremental themes are argued to be relevant in the literature in two domains; in the 
theory  of  thematic  roles  and  the  theory  of  aspect.  Dowty  1991  argues  that  being  an 
incremental theme is a property typically associated with patient arguments.  Thus it is one of 
the properties on his 'cluster' list for contributing properties for the role of proto-patient.  But a 
far more central  role has been  claimed for it in  the determining the aspectual properties  of 
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VPs. Verkuyl  1972 and Dowty 1979 both noticed that accomplishment predicates behave as 
telic or non-telic depending on the properties of the direct object.  The contrast between the 
examples in (2) and those in (3) show that while activity predicates always behave as activity 
predicates  no  matter  what  direct  object  they  have,  accomplishment  predicates  behave  as 
activities when the direct object is a bare plural or a mass NP. 
(2) a. John pushed the cart for an hour/#in an hour. 
b. John pushed carts for an hour/#in an hour. 
(3) a. Mary built the house #for  a yearlin a year. 
b. Mary built houses for a year/#in a year. 
Krifka argues that the fact that the theme is incremental and that there is a homomorphism 
from  the denotation  of  the theme to the event means that  the 'quantized' properties  of  the 
direct  object percolate up to the  VP of  which  it  is part  and allow the  quantized or non- 
quantized status of  the VP to  be  determined by  the direct object.  When the direct object 
denotes quantity of a determined or determinable size and there is such a homomorphism, the 
telic point of the whole event is identifiable, and the event behaves like an accomplishment. 
But when the size of the denotation of  the direct object is undeterminable because the NP 
expression  is mass or a bare plural, no telic point is identifiable for the event, despite the 
homomorphism, and the event has the characteristics of a non-telic activity.  Tenny's notion of 
the direct object 'measuring out' the event captures essentially the same idea. 
In  this  paper,  I  want  to  examine more  closely  the  role  of  incremental  themes  in 
determining the aspectual properties of the event.  I will start by examining some problems 
which Krifka  1992, 1998 himself brings up.  I shall show that the problem extends to lexical 
accomplishments  such  as  repair  the  computer. Then, drawing  on  my  2000a  analysis  of 
resultative constructions, I will  argue that derived resultatives such as sing  the baby asleep 
and clap the players off the stage, as in (4), provide further evidence that the themes of events 
cannot always be incremental in the way that Krifka suggests. 
(4) a. John sang the  baby asleep 
b. The audience clapped the players off the stage 
In the final part of the paper I shall argue that the determining property of accomplishments is 
not  the  homomorphism  between  theme  and  event  that  Krifka  describes  (although  it  is 
sufficient  to  characterise an  event predicate  as an  accomplishment).  Instead,  the  crucial 
property is that an accomplishment is associated with an activity event and a gradual change 
of  state, or BECOME  event,  the  culmination  of  which  determines  the  telic  point  of  the 
accomplishment. Incremental Themes 
2  Activities vs. accomplishments 
I assume (for the moment) that activities and accomplishments have the internal structures in 
(5): 
(5) activities:  Xe.  (ACTIVlTY(P))(e) 
accomplishments:  he. 3el3e2[e= elUe2 A (ACTIVlTY(P))(el)  A cul(e)=e2] 
The culmination (cul), or telic point is the point at which the event is completed, the point at 
which  there is enough  of  the event for the predicate to apply correctly to  it.  It is usually 
agreed (see discussion  in  Dowty 1979) that the arguments of el are the arguments normally 
associated with the verb: the argument of the culmination event  el is the theme or patient of 
the verb.  Thus, in  (6) the endpoint of the event is determined by what happens to the house, 
namely it gets built, and not by what happens to the agent of the action, Mary: 
(6) Mary built the house 
An  obvious question is whether verbs should properly be  assigned to aspectual classes, or 
whether the classification should apply to Verb Phrases. Following Dowty 1979, who argues 
that VPs where the modifier is in x time are accomplishments and VPs where the modifier is 
for  x time  are activities, the examples in (7) and (8) make it look as if the answer should be 
VPs. (cf.  Dowty 1979, Kriika 1992, 1998, Tenny 1987, 1994 and others): 
(7)  a. John walked for an hour. 
b.#John walked in an hour. 
c. #John walked a mile for an hour 
b.  John walked a mile in an hour. 
(8)  a.#John built a house for a month 
b. John built a house in a month. 
c.#John built houses in a month. 
d. John  built houses for a month. 
The data in (7db) show that walk is an activity verb, but (7cld) show that walk can head a VP 
which is an accomplishment. Conversely in (8db) we see that build a house is naturally an 
accomplishment, while the same verb build can head an activity VP when the direct object is 
a bare plural.  However, the data in (9) contrast with (8): 
(9)  a. John pushed a cart for an hour. 
b.#John pushed a cart in an hour. 
c. John pushed carts for an hour. 
d.#John pushed carts in an hour. 
While build apparently allows the properties of the direct object to determine whether it heads 
an accomplishment or an activity VP, (9) shows that push  heads an activity VP independent 
of the properties of  its direct object.  So, we can in principle distinguish between those verbs 
which  allow  the  grammatical  properties  of  the patientltheme  argument  to determine their telicity (accomplishments) and those which don't (activities).  The question then is what is the 
basis of that distinction. 
3  Krifka's theory of quantization 
Krifka 1992, 1998 argues that predicates can be characterised as cumulative or quantized 
(1  0) cumulative predicates: 
VX [CUM(X) tt  3x 3y X(x) A X(y) A 7 x=y] A VxVy [X(x) A X(y) -+ X(xuy)]] 
"If a predicate X is cumulative, then if X applies to x and y it will also apply 
(non-trivially) to the sum of x and y." 
Examples of cumulative predicates are water or apples: if  x and y fall under apples, then the 
sum of x and y also fall in the denotation of  apples. 
(I I) quantized predicates 
VX [QUA(X) tt VxVy[X(x) A X(y)  7  y < x]] 
"If X is quantized, then if x and y fall under X, y cannot be a proper part of x. 
An example of  a quantized predicate is  three apples: if  x falls under three apples it cannot 
have a proper part which is also three apples.  Krifka 1992, 1998 argues that if  a verb has the 
appropriate  relation  with  its theme,  then  the  quantized/non-quantized  status  of  the  theme 
determines whether the VP is quantized (telic) or non-quantized (atelic), as illustrated in (12): 
(1 2) a.  John ate apples for an hour. 
b. #John ate apples in an hour. 
c. #John ate 3 apples for an hour. 
d.  John ate 3 apples in an hour. 
The 'appropriate relation'  is  determined  by  the relevant  thematic  role.  Thematic roles  are 
functions from events to their participants,  (Parsons  1990, Landman 2000), and the feature 
[f quantized]  percolates  from  the  theme NP to  the  VP if  the  function  expressed by  the 
thematic role 'theme' is a homomorphism from the event to its themelpatient participant, as 
represented in (1 3), taken from Krifka 1992. 
t  e  + 
time axis 
Krifka 1998 shows that a thematic role 0 is a homomorphism from the event to the object if it 
has  the following properties,  (under  the  assumption  that  each  thematic  role  has  a unique 
value) (Krifka 1998): Incremental Themes 
- mapping to suhevents: 
b'x,y,Ve [O(e,x) A y < x 3  3!e'[e'<e r\O(e', y)]] 
"if x is the theme of e and y is a proper part of x, then there is some unique 
proper part of  e which has y as it theme". 
- mapping to subohjects: 
Vx Ve,e' [8(e,x) A e' < e -t 3y[ y<x A O(e', y)]] 
"if x is the theme of e and e' is a proper part of e, then there is some (unique) proper 
part of  x which is the theme of  en'.  (Here note that uniqueness follows from the 
general properties of 8.) 
Together these properties constitute what Krifka 1992 calls 'graduality', and Krifka 1998 calls 
incrementality.  Krifka  thus  explains how  quantized  DPs  lead to telic  events:  graduality 
means that if each subevent of e has a different unique part of x as its theme, and each part of 
x is the theme of a unique part of e, and if each part of x can be the theme of no more than one 
event, then at some point the object will be used up;  this is the culmination point, the point at 
which the event is over. An event is telic if  the linguistic expression of the theme of e gives 
enough information to determine the size of the object which is the theme, and thus the point 
at which it will be used up.  So graduality is a necessary condition for telicity, and graduality 
plus a quantized theme  is sufficient.  Thus in  (14a) and (14b), the thematic role 'theme' is 
gradual. But (14a) is non-telic  although the thematic role  'theme' is gradual or incremental 
because  the  direct  object  cannot  be  used  to  identify  a  telic  point;  put  differently,  the 
description  of  the event does  not  include  information  about  when  the culmination  occurs. 
(14b), on the other hand does give such information; the event under discussion is over when 
the eating of  three apples was completed.  And because there is such a difference between 
(14a/b),  the verb  eat is  considered  to  belong  to  the  class  which  denotes  accomplishment 
events.  In  contrast, push  does not have a gradual theme, and thus both (14c) and  (14d) are 
non-telic  independent of  the quantized or non-quantized  status of  the theme argument. So, 
push denotes an activity event: 
(14)  a. John ate apples last night. 
b. John ate three apples last night. 
c. John pushed carts last night. 
d. John pushed three carts last night. 
4  Problems with Krifka's approach 
Krifka brings up a number of problems for his theory of quantization, and suggests solutions 
to them.  He shows that there are VPs such as peel  an apple where what determines the extent 
of the event is not the extent of the whole theme of the V (the apple), but only the extent of an 
aspect  of  it,  namely  its outside surface which  determines  the  extent  of  the peeling  event. 
There are also cases where events have parts which do not directly affect a part of the theme: 
thus in an event of building a house there is the stage at which you put up the scaffolding and 
the point at which you take it down again; in neither case is the extent of the house affected 
by the event at that stage. A more serious problem which Krifka  1998 discusses are events 
like read War  and Peace  which can 'affect' the same part of the object more than once, since 
the reader can go back and read, say, chapter 1 many times in the course of reading the book. 
Here, the suggestion is that although an  event e of this kind may not be incremental in the strict, non-repetitive sense, there is an  'idealised' event which can  be defined in terms of e 
which is strictly incremental. 
Here, though, I want to mention three other problems  which  are a problem for the 
homomorphism theory of telicity. The first problem concerns minimal pairs such as (15): 
(IS) a.  John wiped the tablelpolished the vase in five minutes. 
b.  John wiped the tablelpolished the vase for five minutes 
If telicity is determined by the graduality of the theme, then we assume from (15a) that wipe 
and polish assign gradual themes. But in  (15b) we see that exactly the same VP can also be 
treated as non-telic. Unless  we assume that the verb assigns two different thematic roles in 
each example in  (IS), one gradual and the other not, we need to ask why in the one case the 
quantized direct object determines a culmination point and in the other it doesn't. 
The second problem are examples which  are clearly telic,  but  in  which  intuitively it 
makes no sense to see the  shape of the event as  define by the 'extent' of  the direct object 
incrementally.  Here are some examples: 
(16)  repair the computer  teach the child 
spice the soup  close the suitcase 
wash the clothes/shirt  close the door 
solve the rubik's cube  lock the door 
prove the theorem  dry the clothes. 
Repairing  a  computer,  for  example,  frequently  does  not  involve  affecting  the  computer 
incrementally, but rather fiddling around with it and trying various things until you hit on the 
cause of the problem and thus its solution.  Washing the clothes or the shirt does not affect the 
extent of the clothes or the shirt bit by bit: the event is not over when the last part of the last 
item of clothing or the last part of the shirt is washed.  All the clothes are put in the machine 
together and washed together when the last stage of the process (washing rinsing spin-drying) 
is over.  Similarly an event of closing the door does not affect the door incrementally: what is 
incremental is movement of  the door over the path or space which it is necessary to cross to 
get from being open to being closed. 
The third problem for a homomorphism theory of telicity is an extension of the second 
problem and concerns transitive and intransitive derived resultatives.  In what sense could the 
'extent' of the direct objects in (17) dictate the 'extent' of the event? 
(17)  a.  John sang the baby asleep. 
b. The audience booed the player of the stage. 
c.  The dog scratched the wound open. 
If  a baby falls asleep gradually it is not a gradualness which affects its extent incrementally. It 
does not fall asleep feet first and then legs and then torso; put differently, the size of the baby 
does not affect the extent of the event of  singing it to sleep. Similar arguments can be made 
for (17b). In  (17c) the extent of the wound does not affect how  long the event took at all. 
(17c) can  be true if  the dog scratched and  scratched at one part  of  a big  wound  so that it 
opened at that point, irrespective of  what happened to the rest of it. Note crucially that the 
direct objects here behave as themes with respect to quantization: 
(1 8)  a.  John sang the baby asleep in ten minutes/#for ten minutes. 
b. John sang babies asleep #in  half an hourlfor hours last night. lncrementul Themes 
So if  the  culmination point  of  an  accomplishment  is not  determined  by  the  extent of  the 
incremental theme, what does determine it?  And if the incrementality of the accomplishment 
is not determined by the way in which the incremental theme is 'used up', then what makes an 
accomplishment incremental? 
5  A Closer look at Resultatives 
The kinds of examples we are interested in this section are given in (19): 
(19) a. Mary painted the house red. 
b. John wiped the table clean. 
c. Mary hammered the metal flat. 
d. John sang the child, asleep,. 
A resultative predicate expresses a property which  is true of  the culmination  of the matrix 
event.  So a plausible paraphrase of (19a) is  "Mary painted the house, and at the culmination 
of the painting event the house was red." 
I give a detailed  analysis of these constructions in Rothstein  2000~1,  and here I will 
explain  the  major  points  which  are  relevant  for  our  discussion  of  incremental  themes. 
Resultative predication, like depictive predication, sums the eventuality denoted by the matrix 
verb with the eventuality denoted by the secondary predicate.  The condition on the summing, 
which  gets the interpretation  that  we  want,  is that  the  culmination  of  the matrix  event is 
PART-OF the eventuality expressed by the secondary predicate, where 'PART-OF' is defined as 
in (20): 
(20) PART-OF(el,ez,y) iff  (i) z(e1) C z(e2) (i.e. el is temporally contained in el ); and 
(ii) el and e2 share a thematic argument, y 
'PART-OF' is not the standard part-of  relation, defined in terms of the sum operation, forming 
a partial  order, but  is  a  non-transitive  relation  which  identifies  one atomic  eventuality  as 
inherently  connected  to,  or  part  of,  another  eventuality.  Its  analogy  in  the  domain  of 
individuals is the part-of  relation  which  holds  between  John  and  his hand, which  is non- 
transitive,  but  which  allows John  and his hand to  be treated as atoms of equal weight for 
summing in conjunctions such as (21): 
(21) Holistic doctor to John: "I can't  just treat your hand. I have to treat both your 
hand and you." 
The formal operations and derivations are given  in  (22)-(24).  (I follow Rothstein 2000b in 
treating meanings of verbs as expressions in which the subject variable is free and abstracted 
over  by  an  operation  of  predicate  formation  at  the  VP level.  Transitive  verbs  denote 
expressions of type <d,<e,t>> (where d is the type of individuals and e the type of events), 
and  are  of  the  form  hyhe.V(e)  A  0l(e)=x  A  02(e)=y,  while  intransitive  verbs  denote 
expressions of type <e,t>, of the form he.V(e) A 0l(e)=x. 
(22) Summing operation for resultative secondary predication 
RSUM[a,P 1 = hyhe.3e13ez[e=(elUez)  A a(el,y) A P(e2,y) 
A PART-OF(cul(el),ez,y)] (23) [paint red]vp + 
RSUM[hyhe.PAINT(e) A Ag(e)=x A Th(e)=y, hxhe.RED(e) A Arg(e)=x ] 
=  hyhe.3e13e2[e=(elU  e2)  A PAINT(el)  A Ag(el)=x  A Th(e,)=y 
A RED(e2)  A Arg(e2)=y 
A PART-OF(cul(el),eZ,y)] 
(24) [Mary paint the house redIIp + 
3e 3el  3e2  [e=(elU  e2)  A  PAINT(el)  A Ag(el)=MARY  A Th(el)=  THE HOUSE 
A RED(e2) A Arg(e>)=THE  HOUSE 
A PART-OF(cul(el),  e2,THE  HOUSE)] 
The PART-OF condition guarantees that that cul(e,) and the resultative predicate must share 
an argument. I assume (essentially following Dowty  1979 and others, such as Tenny  1987) 
that the argument of the culmination event is the theme, or  the affected entity). By the PART- 
OF condition, the theme must  also be  the  argument of  the resultative.  (Thus the so-called 
'direct object restriction', which states that the resultative must be predicated of a direct object, 
turns out to be a condition that  resultatives must be predicated of themes, and this itself  is 
explained in terms of the PART-OF condition.) 
Given that the resultative predication rule requires the event introduced by the matrix 
verb to have a culmination, the question is how resultative predicates can occur with activity 
verbs,  either the transitive kind, as in (19b/c),  or the intransitive kind, as in (19d). 
I assume that a single rule of resultative interpretation applies whether the matrix verb 
is an activity or accomplishment, and thus in  (19b-d) the result  predicate  adds information 
about the culmination of the event determined by the matrix verb. 
I assume that  there  is  a culmination  modifier of  type  <<e,t>,<e,t>>,  which  can be 
added to activities, and which specifies that the argument of cul(e) is the incremental theme of 
This modifier denotes a function from activities to accomplishments: in other words applying 
the function in (25) to an  activity yields an  accomplishment predicate. When applied to the 
verb wipe, in (26a), the culmination modifier gives the verb meaning in (26b). 
(26) a. hyhe. WPE(e) A Ag(e)=x A Th(e)=y 
b. hyhe. WPE(e) A Ag(e)=x A Th(e)=y A 3e'[cul(e)=e'  A Arg(e')=Th(e)] 
This  presence  of  this  culmination  modifier  is  what  distinguishes  between  activity  and 
accomplishment readings of  wipe the tahlelpolish the vase in (15), repeated here: 
(15) a.  John wiped the tablelpolished the vase in five minutes. 
b.  John wiped the tablelpolished the vase for five minutes. 
The V' wipe the table is ambiguous between  (27ah), with (27b) being used in (l5a) and (27a) 
being the interpretation of  the activity V' in  (15b).  As we would predict, only (27b) can be 
used  in  the  resultative,  and  we  assume  that  the  presence  of  the  resultative  forces  the 
interpretation in (26bl27b) to be used: Incremental Themes 
(27) a. he. WIPE(e) A Ag(e)=x A Th(e)=THE TABLE 
b.he. WIPE(e) A Ag(e)=x A Th(e)=THE TABLE A 3e'[cul(e)=e1  A Arg(eq)=Th(e)] 
c.#John wiped the table clean for ten minutes. 
d. John wiped the table clean in ten minutes. 
(27b) is paraphrased as: "There was an event of John wiping the table and the culmination of 
that event was PART-OF the event of the table being clean, and the culmination of the event 
was  within  ten  minutes."  Again,  the  theme  of  the  matrix  verb  is  the  argument  of  the 
culmination  relation,  and  of  the  resultative.  Adding  the  culmination  modifier  is  thus 
equivalent to  type  shifting  the  verb  from  one aspectual  class,  the  class  of  activities,  to 
another, the class of accomplishments. 
With intransitive resultatives, as in (19d), not only must the verb be shifted from one 
aspectual class to another, but its (argument) type must be shifted so that the matrix verb has 
the right number of arguments to sum with resultatives:  I assume the following: 
-  the resultative triggers the addition of the culmination modifier. 
- the culmination modifier, which requires its argument to be the theme of  the matrix verb, 
triggers  the  type  shifting  operation  on  the  intransitive  matrix  verb  in  (28),  and  the 
interpretation of (l9d) is as in (29): 
(28) resultative shift (R-SHIFT): 
R-SHIFT(he.V(e) A Ag(e)=x) = hyhe.V(e)~Ag(e)=x  A 3e'[cul(el)=e'  A Arg(et)=y] 
(29) John sang the baby asleep. 
3e3el3e2[e=(e1Uez  ) 
A SING(el)  A Ag(e)=JOHN A 3e'[cul(el)=e'  A Arg(e')=THE BABY 
A ASLEEP(e2)  A Arg(e)=THE BABY 
A PART-OF(cul(el),e2.THE  BABY)] 
"There was an event which was the sum of a singing event and an event of the baby 
being asleep, and the culmination of the singing event was PART-OF the 
event of the baby being asleep". 
PART-of(cul(el),e2,y) forces cul(e1) and ez to share an argument; thus the culmination of the 
singing event must have THE BABY  as its argument.  But, if THE BABY is the argument of 
cul(el), then by definition, it must be the theme of el. It is a peculiar kind of theme argument, 
since its relation with V is not defined by a standard participant role -  by which I mean that 
the in  (19d29) the verb sing cannot be said to assign a theta-role to the direct object, as we 
can see from the ungrammaticality of (30): 
(30) *John sung the baby. 
The peculiarness  of  the  argument  shows up  in  the  contrasts  in  (31),  noted  originally  in 
Rothstein 1992: 
(3  1) a. Which table did you ask whether John wiped t clean? 
b.??Which baby did you ask whether John sang t asleep? 
Chomsky 1986 argues that wh- extractions may violate subjacency if they are from a position 
directly theta-marked  by  a head. What we  see in  (31a) is that  extraction from a transitive 
resultative construction  which violates subjacency is acceptable, whereas extraction from the 
parallel  position  in  an  intransitive  resultative  construction  is  not  good.  This contrast  is explained (in  Chomsky's theory) on the assumption that  the trace in  (31a) is in  a position 
directly theta-marked  by  transitive wipe, while in (31 b) the trace is not thematically marked 
by  the intransitive V  sing.  Nonetheless,  and this  is  the crucial  point  which  makes the 
discussion  in  this  section  relevant,  these non-theta-marked  nominals  are  predicted  by  our 
theory to be themes of the verb, and they behave as such.  Thus the NP the baby behaves as 
the incremental theme in the following crucial sense: the quantized or non-quantized status of 
this argument determines whether the VP is telic or non-telic, as shown in  (32): 
(32)a. John sang the babies asleep in half hour /#for half an hour last night 
b. John sang babies asleep #in half hourlfor half an hour last night. 
Furthermore, our theory  of  resultatives applied to (19d), and as expressed in  (29), involves 
assigning  a  culmination  to  a  singing event  and  requires  us  to analyse  the  baby  as  the 
argument  of  this  culmination,  and  thus  the  incremental  theme  of  the  complex  derived 
accomplishment. The point is that in this resultative construction the activity sing has shifted 
into an accomplishment which has a culmination of  which the haby  is the argument. What 
sort  of  accomplishment  is  it?  What  does  it  mean  to  say  that  the  singing  event  had  a 
culmination? And, most important for us here, what does it mean to say that the baby, as the 
argument of the culmination, must be the incremental theme of the singing event? 
6  Back to Incremental Themes 
What might incremental themes be?  If, as I have been suggesting, they are the arguments of 
culminations, then in  order to give an answer we need first to answer the question  what are 
culminations?  There are three obvious possible answers that I know of: 
- the culmination of an event e is determined by the extent of a bounded object of e. 
A culmination occurs when the object occurs when the object is 'used up' in the 
event. 
- the culmination of e is the result state, or the beginnings of result state, brought into 
being by the action determined by the matrix verb. 
- the culmination of e is an achievement event, or minimal change of state 
associated  with the end point of e. 
We have already argued in section 4 that the first approach to culminations cannot be correct. 
What about the other two approaches?  Both are implicitly involved in Dowty's 1979 account 
of  accomplishments: this gives the template for accomplishments in  (33a), translated into an 
event-argument  framework  as  in  (33b),  which  incorporates  the  twofold  claim  that 
accomplishments consists of  an activity event and a BECOME event and that they are related 
via a causal relation: 
(33) a.  [ACTNITY(P) [CAUSE  [BECOME (P')]]] 
b. he.3ej3ez[e= elUe2 A(ACTIV~TY(P))(~~)A(BECOME(P'))(~~)ACAUSE(~~,~Z)] 
The two parts of the claim are not inherently related: it  is plausible - and in fact correct - to 
argue that the structure of an accomplishment is complex, consisting of an activity part and a 
BECOME event as in (33b), but that the relationship between them is not causal. Incremental Themes 
The fact that the relation  between  the activity and the culmination is not causal and that 
the culmination is not the result of the activity can be seen very clearly from accomplishments 
derived by resultative predication as in (34): 
(34)  a. On May 5 1945, the people of Amsterdam danced the Canadians 
to Dam Square. 
b. Reluctant to let him go, the audience clapped the singer off the stage. 
c. At the opening of  the new Parliament building, the crowd cheered the 
huge gates open. 
d. Mary drank John under the table/sick/dizzy. 
e. Every night the neighbour's dog barks me asleep. 
In these examples, the activity does not cause the result: in (34a)  the people of Amsterdam do 
not cause the Canadians to get to Dam Square by  dancing: the Canadians were going there 
anyway.  In (34b) the audience did not cause the singer to leave the stage by clapping; on the 
contrary, they would probably have been happy if their clapping had managed to prevent the 
singer  from leaving the  stage.  The examples  in  (34c-e)  give similar examples  with  AP 
resulative predicates instead of PP predicates.  Sometimes, intransitive resultatives do imply a 
causal relation between the activity and the result, but this is a matter of  pragmatics, as the 
minimal contrast between (34b) and (35), which does have a causal implication, shows: 
(35)  The audience hissed/booedllaughed the singer off the stage. 
But, if culminations are not result states caused by the activity, we are left with the idea that a 
culmination is some minimal event which indicates the end of the activity.  This fits in with 
the conceptually attractive idea that  activities and  achievements  are the two basic kinds of 
non-stative events, and that the complex accomplishment is constructed out of  a sum of an 
activity and an achievement. 
If  we take the 'CAUSE' relation out of  the representation in  (33b), we are left with 
(36): 
Since Dowty  1979 suggests that  achievements  are to be represented as having  a BECOME 
component, it looks at first sight as if  (36) represents exactly what we want, namely that an 
accomplishment consists of an activity el, and an achievement, ez.  However, this would be a 
misreading  of  Dowty's  claim  that  accomplishments  contain  a  BECOME  component,  since 
Dowty is explicit about the fact that the BECOME part of an accomplishment takes place over 
an extended period of time, while achievement BECOME events are near-instantaneous.  And 
if  the BECOME  event in (36) takes place over an  extended period of time, then  e2 in (36) 
cannot be the telic point, or culmination event we are looking for. 
What  I  want  to  suggest  is  that  Dowty's  original  suggestion  that  accomplishments 
involved an extended BECOME event, which I have represented in (36),  is indeed the crucial 
part of the definition of accomplishments. Although it is possible to analyse accomplishments 
as consisting of  an  activity and an achievement, representing their meaning as I did in the 
template  in  (5b)  so as  to  make  reference  only  to  the  activity  and  the  achievement  (or 
culmination) subevents is to miss the crucial point about how an accomplishment works. 
An accomplishment consists of  an activity event and an extended BECOME process, 
which  is  incremental  in  the  way  I  shall  make  precise  below.  The  culmination  of  an 
accomplishment is defined in terms of this BECOME event as the final minimal event in the 
incremental process, the event which  is the final part of  the BECOME  event, or, in other words, the upper bound of the BECOME event. On this account, since the culmination event is 
part  of  the  BECOME  event, it  must  share  an  argument  with  it; thus  the  argument of  the 
culmination event is the argument of  the BECOME  event, which,  as Dowty argues, is the 
affected object or theme.  In  order to make this analysis of accomplishments precise, we need 
to  do two  things:  the  first  is  to  determine  what  are  the  identifying  characteristics  of  a 
BECOME event, and the second is to characterise the (non-causal) relation that holds between 
the  activity  event  and  the  incremental  event  which  are  summed  together  in  an 
accomplishment. 
7  Incremental processes and incremental relations 
I  suggest  then  that  an  accomplishment  is  analysed  as consisting  of  an  activity  e, and  a 
BECOME  event  which  is  an  incremental  event  which  'accompanies'  it;  we  call  this 
accompanying event the incremental process, and the culmination of the accomplishment is 
the final minimal event in this incremental process. 
BECOME events are incremental in the sense that their parts are individuable, that each 
has a distinguishable upper bound, and that these parts have a natural and inherent order.  This 
order  is  determined  by  our  real-world  knowledge  of  what  the  BECOME  event  under 
discussion  actually  entails. BECOME  events are naturally  conceptualised  as ordered  by  an 
incremental chain as follows: 
(37)Incremental chain 
Let e be a BECOME event: 
An incremental chain C(e) is a set of parts of e such that: 
I. the smallest event in C(e) is the initial bound of e 
2. for every el,e2 in C(e) el C ez or el  C el. 
3.e~  C(e) 
(38) Culmination 
Let C(e) be an incremental chain in e. 
ub(C(e)) = {ub(e7):  e'~  C(e)]  (the set of upper bounds) 
The culmination of e  is defined as follows: 
cul(e),jer  = ub(e) 
An incremental event can be represented graphically as in (39): 
(39)  Incremental event (=BECOME event): 
initial bound(e)  ub(e~)  ub(e2) ub(e3) ub(e) 
The function of  the  incremental BECOME  event  is to  "keep track"  of  the progress  of  the 
activity.  This requires imposing a developmental structure, or ordered part structure, on the 
activity  (this  includes  assigning  it  a  culmination), and  we  do this  by  relating  it  to  the 
developmental structure of the BECOME event via an incremental relation: Incremental  Themes 
(40)Incremental relations: 
Let  el be an activity, e2 be a BECOME event, and C(e2) be an incremental chain 
defined on e2. 
INCR(el,ez,C(e2))  (el is incrementally related to e2 with respect to the chain 
C(e2))  iff: 
there is a contextually available one-one function p from C(e2) into PART(el) (the 
set of parts of el such that  for every e E  C(e2): s(e) = s(p(e)). 
We define the set of culminations of the parts of el as the upper bounds of the event parts 
of el which are the values of the u function: 
WCR is used  in the meaning  of  accomplishments  as follows (where .x,  and .y,  give the 
content of the activity and BECOME events: 
(41) Accomplishment template: 
hyhe,3el,e2[e  = elue2 
A ACTIVITY,x,(el)  A Ag(e1) = x A Th(e~)  = y 
A BECOME,y,(e2)  A Arg(e2) = Th(el) 
A INCR(e1, ez,C(ed)l 
Since the accomplishment inherits the properties of the activity, cul(e)=cul(el)=cul(e2). 
An event structure following the template in (41) can be pictorially represented as in (42): 
(42)  Accomplishment event structure: 
The intuition that this reflects is the following.  Activities are inherently non-structured.  They 
are, following Dowty, homogenous down to minimal  intervals.  Thus an minimal interval of 
an  activity  of  walking  is  a  minimal  walking  event,  say taking  a  step, and  an  activity of 
walking is  a string of  minimal walking events without (relevant) breaks.  This is the reason 
that any part of an activity event of walking  which is at least as long as a minimal interval, is 
also an event of  walking.  A  similar  account of  the activity of  reading can  be given, with 
'minimal  reading  activity  event'  defined  appropriately  as,  say  an  event  of  associating  a 
perceived symbol, be it a word or a morpheme, with a meaning.  Neither of these activities 
has an internal structure or inherent order.  To give an example, if a child is practising reading she can do it by  picking  out words at random from a book, and indeed, lots of children's' 
'word books' are designed to allow them to practice the activity in just  such an unstructured 
way.  It doesn't matter whether the child reads the words in the book in  any order or not; the 
minimal events of reading of which the activity consists can in principle be strung together in 
a number of ways, not just in the way they were in the  actual event.  We might well describe 
an  event of a child engaged in  such an activity as in (43a) and describe the end of such an 
event as in (43b), both indicating that read is being treated as an activity verb. 
(43) a.  The child read for an hour. 
b.  The child stopped reading. 
An accomplishment event of reading is one which we identify as having an inherent order. An 
event described by read the story of Snow White does not just consist of  a number of minimal 
reading activities; these minimal activities have to be strung together in a particular way in 
order for the reading activity to be an event of reading the particular story.  The order of the 
parts of the event read the story ofsnow White is determined by what is necessary for there to 
be an event which is in the denotation of the predicate &.BECOME  READ(=)  A Th(e)=the story 
of Snow White. The words have to be read in  particular order, the beginning has to be read 
before the middle and the middle before the end and so forth.  The demands of this event are 
imposed on the reading activity which must perforce accompany it.  The activity involved in 
this accomplishment is over when  the event determined by  the incremental process is over, 
i.e.  when  the  story  of  Snow White  is  read.  The story  of  Snow  White is  the  incremental 
argument of the accomplishment because it is the argument of the incremental process: as the 
theme  of  the  activity  event  and  argument  of  the  incremental  process  event,  it  is  the 
incremental theme. 
The incremental relation INCR uses the contextually determined one-one function p 
which  maps from  the parts  of  the incremental chain C(e2) into PART(el), the parts  of the 
activity el. Context plays a role here in two ways. First, the incremental chain C(e2) consists 
of  a set of events which are part of ez which are arranged in a partial order.  Context plays a 
role in the choice of which event-parts of ez are in the chain C(el), in other words which event 
parts of e2 are in the domain of p.  If the event is read a hook then the relevant parts will be 
different depending on whether the agent  is my four year old and the book is Big  Egg, or 
whether I am the agent and the book  is  War and Peace.  In  the first place the contextually 
relevant parts of  the  incremental event determined by  Big  Egg  becoming  read may be  the 
event of reading a page of the book, or even a word of it, while in the second, the contextually 
relevant part  events of  the event of  War and Peuce  becoming  read  are likely to be  much 
bigger: at least the events of reading a chapter.  Second, the existence of a relevant p  function 
depends on there being some contextually  available 'connection' between  the incremental 
event and the activity which makes it plausible to impose the developmental structure of one 
upon the other.  When the accomplishment is a lexical one such as read, the whole point is 
that the nature of  the event itself guarantees a relation  between  the activity and a BECOME 
event which  leaves little, if  anything, for context to determine. But, the role of  context in 
establishing a plausible incremental relation  is crucial in determining the acceptability of the 
derived accomplishments used in resultative constructions, whose formal properties we will 
look at in the next section.  Thus compare (444 and (44b): 
(44) a. Mary sang the baby asleep. 
b.# Mary ate the baby asleep. 
(44a) is easily considered acceptable by most native speakers, because the contextual relation 
between  singing  and  a  baby  becoming  asleep  is  easily  recognised.  (44b)  is  generally Incrementul Themes 
considered  infelicitous  because  such a contextual  relation  is not  available.  But, suppose I 
provide one.  Suppose that Mary's child is a very bad sleeper, and Mary, who is thoroughly 
exhausted, has to sit with the child for hours in the middle of the night to get her to sleep. The 
only way Mary can manage to keep going is by sitting by  the baby's bed with a large box of 
candies and cookies, and by eating and eating. Under such circumstances, she might say "I  ate 
the baby asleep again tonight". And most informants then find the sentence much improved. 
To sum up then,  an incremental process is a BECOME event with an inherent internal 
progression  expressed by  the fact that  it  has  distinguishable parts  which  have  an  inherent 
order, and which form an incremental chain.  The incremental relation between an activity 
and  an  incremental  process  (with  respect  to  an  incremental  chain)  relates  parts  of  the 
incremental process to parts of the activity, using the developmental structure of the process 
to assign a developmental structure, and thus a culmination, to the activity. The incremental 
argument  is the argument of the incremental process.  We can see then that what structures 
the accomplishment event is not  (necessarily) the gradualness with which the parts  of  the 
theme are affected, but the fact that the process which affects the theme is a gradual process 
with recognisable stages ordered in a particular way is determined by the process. The process 
may affect the theme gradually: this is the case in particular with  verbs of  consumption and 
creation; but these are special cases of the more general incremental process. 
8  Abstract accomplishments 
With  lexical  accomplishments such  as build  a house  and read  Snow  White the activity is 
obligatorily associated with an inherently related incremental process; in other words there is 
no choice which incremental activity is chosen to 'measure out' or developmentally structure 
the activity.  I assume that verbs such as wipe, which can head VPs  such as wipe the table 
which  have  an  activity  and  an  accomplishment  reading,  are  lexically  associated  with  an 
incremental process, but that the association is optional. However, in  addition to the lexical 
accomplishments, where the association is lexical, the English resultative rule can also trigger 
a type-shifting operation which shifts activities into an accomplishment reading, and derives 
what  I call  'abstract'  or 'derived'  accomplishments.  These  are  of  course the  constructions 
which we discussed in section 5.  In these cases, exemplified by hammer the metalflat  and 
sing  the baby asleep, an  activity is  associated with  an  incremental process  which  itself  is 
identified by the property that its culmination has.  Thus  hammer the metalflat associates an 
activity  of  hammering the  metal  with  an  incremental  process  defined by  the  fact  that  its 
culmination is  PART-OF  the event of  the  metal  being  flat.  Thus the  string of  minimal 
hammering-the-metal  events of which the activity consists is ordered by the degree to which 
the metal being hammered is flat, with the upper bound of the event being the point at which 
the metal has the flat property.  ACCOMPLISHMENT SHIFT applied to a transitive activity as 
in (45): 
(45) accomplishment shift (for transitive activities): 
SHIFT(hyhe. ACTIVlTY,x,(e)  A AG(e)=x A Th(e)=y)  = 
hyhe.3el,ez[e  = elUez A ACTIVITY,x,(el)  A Ag(e1) = x A Th(e1) = y 
A BECOME,y,(e2)  A Arg(e2) = y 
A WCR(~I,~~,C(~Z)) 
The interpretation for Mary hammered the metalflat is as in (46): (46) Mary hammered the metal flat. 
a. the short form (as in section 5 above): 
3e,elre2[e  = elUe2  A HAMMER(el)  A Ag(el)=MARY  A Th(e2)=THE  METAL 
A FLAT(e2)  A Arg(ez)=THE  METAL] 
A PART-OF (cul(el),  e2,  THE  METAL)] 
"There was an event which was the sum of a hammering event with Mary as 
agent and the metal as theme, and an event of the metal being flat, and 
the culmination of the hammering event was PART-OF the event of the 
metal being flat." 
b. the long form: 3e,el,e2,  e3,e4[e = elUe2 A el= e3Ue4 
A ACTNITY<HAMMER,(~~)  A Ag(ei) = MARY A Th(ei)=THE METAL 
A BECOME,y,(e4)  A Arg(e,)=THE METAL 
A INCR(e?,e4,C(ed) 
A FLAT(ez)  A Arg(e2)=THE  METAL 
A PART-OF (cul(el),  e2,THE  METAL)] 
The structure is given in (47): 
Accomplishment shift for intransitive activities, such as is used in sing the baby asleep, must 
add an argument to the intransitive activity, as in (48): 
(48) accomplishment shift (for intransitive activities): 
SHIFT(he. ACTIVlTY,x,(e)  A AG(e)=x) = 
hyhe.3el,el[e = elUe2  A ACTNITY,x,(el)  A Ag(e1) = x 
A BECOME,y,(ez)  A Arg(ez)  = y A Arg(e2)=Th(ei) 
A INCR(e~,ez,c(ez)) 
The interpretation for John sang the baby asleep is as in (49): Incremental Thenzes 
(49)  John sang the baby asleep. 
a. the short form: 
3e,el,e2[e = elUe2  A SING(el)  A Ag(e1) =JOHN 
A ASLEEP(e2) A Arg(e2)= THE BABY 
A PART-OF (cul(el), en,)] 
b. the long form:3e,el,e2, e3,e4[e  = elue2 A el= e3Ue4 
A ACTIVlTY,slNG>(e3)  A Ag(ei) = JOHN 
A BECOME,U,(e4)  A Arg(e4) = THE BABY A Arg(e4)=Th(e3) 
A WCR(e3,e4,C(e4)) 
A ASLEEP(e2) A Arg(e2) = THE BABY 
A PART-OF (cul(el),  en, THE BABY)] 
9  Quantization and Telicity 
The account of  accomplishments  that  I have  been  giving makes  the claim that  there is  a 
lexical  difference  between  simple  transitive  activities  like  p~rsh  and  transitive 
accomplishments like read or build; the simple activities have an interpretation of the form 
~~.AcTIvITY,,,(~)  while accomplishments have complex structures of the form in (41).  If  so, 
then we would expect build to have the same interpretation in both (5 la) and (5  1  b). 
(51) a.  Mary built a house in a month. 
b.  Mary built houses for a month. 
But, as we have seen, the VP in (5 1 aj  behaves as a telic predicate and the VP in (5 Ib) behaves 
as non-telic  predicate.  As we saw  in  section 3, Krifka assumes that the quantized or non- 
quantized status of the direct object is responsible for this.  He argues that the crucial property 
of  verbs like build is that the thematic relation theme is a homomorphism from event to the 
extent of the theme argument, structured in such a way that if we know the size or extent of 
the value of theme, we will know when the endpoint of the event occurs.  The account I have 
presented here argues that telic points are not determined by the extent of  objects, but by the 
'natural' course of  an  incremental process associated with the verb.  Nonetheless, the data in 
(51) show that the status of the direct object does directly affect the telic status of the VP, and 
the question is why. 
The question is far to big to discuss in this paper, and I shall just sketch an  outline to 
an  answer.  I  assume  that  the  defining  property  of  being  an  accomplishment  is  being associated with the template in (41), and that the example in (51b) as well as (51a) involves 
an  incremental predicate.  "John was building houses last week" does not entail "John built 
houses  last week",  which  is  a  clear  indication  that  the  VP is  indeed  an  accomplishment. 
However, the infelicity of  (52) does indicate that the bare plural object is associated with an 
atelic reading: 
(52) #John built houses in a month 
I suggest that what makes (52) atelic is that the plurality of  the direct object means that the 
event  is  an  event  which  must  be  associated  with  a  plurality  of  BECOME  events,  whose 
number  is unspecified.  The end point  of the  accomplishment  is  determined  by  when  the 
endpoint of all these BECOME events is reached, but there is no evidence as to how many of 
them there are nor as to whether they are running cocurrently or sequentially.  The location of 
the endpoint is then unidentifiable.  A plural like (53) is telic because we know exactly how 
many BECOME events there are, and thus when they are over (at least on an 'exactly three') 
reading. 
(53)  John built three houses. 
Similarly (54) is telic, although its direct object is cumulative, because there need be only one 
BECOME event associated with the activity: 
(54) John ate some sandwiches in a very few minutes, and then left. 
Note further, that  (55a) shows that  resultatives can  occur with  atelic predicates.  Since we 
have  argued  that  resultatives  can  occur only  with  incremental  events,  atelic resultatives 
should  be  impossible  if  atelicity  meant  non-incrementality.  But  (55a)  is  grammatical 
precisely because the resultative expresses a property  of  the culmination of each individual 
BECOME event, and the atelicity of the sentence derives from the plurality.  This is shown 
very clearly in (55b), where the individual event wipe a table clean is asserted to take place in 
less  than  five  minutes,  and  is  thus  telic,  but  the  plural  event  which  is  the  sum  of  an 
unspecified number of these individual events is atelic: 
(55) a. John wiped tables clean for three months. 
b. John wiped tables clean in two minutes for three months this summer 
Clearly, this is only the beginning of  a discussion of the effects of quantized and cumulative 
direct objects on the teliclatelic status of VPs; in particular I have not even begun to discuss 
the cumulativelnon-quantizing effect of  mass nouns in direct object position.  But I hope the 
discussion  in  this  section  is  enough  to  show  that  the  theory  of  incrementality  and 
accomplishments which I have been  developing is compatible with, and in  fact requires, an 
explanation of the quantizing effect of direct object nominals. 
References 
Chomsky, Noam (1986): Knowledge of Language. New York: Prager. 
Dowty, David (1979): Word Meaning and Montague Grammar. Dordrccht: Kluwer (Reidel). 
-  (1991): Thematic Proto-Roles and Argument Selection. Language 67, 546-619. 
Krifka, Manfred (1989): Nominal Reference, Temporal Constitution and Quantification in Event Semantics. In: 
Renate Bartsch, Johan van Bentham and Peter van Emde Boas(eds.1 Semantics and Contextual Expressions, 
Dordrecht: Foris. Incremental Themes 
-  (1992): Thematic Relations as Links between Nominal Reference and Temporal 
Constitution. In : Ivan Sag and Anna Szaholsci (eds.) Lexical Matters,CSLI Publications. 
-  (1998): The Origins of Telicity. In: S. Rothstein (ed.) Events and Grammar, Dordrecht: Kluwer. 
Landman, Fred (2000): Events and Plurality. Dordrecht: Kluwer. 
Parsons, Terry (1990): Events in the Semantics of English. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. 
Rothstein, Susan (1992): Case and NP Licensing. In Natural Language and Linguistic Theory 10, 119-139. 
-  (2000a): Secondary predication and aspectual structure. In: E.Lang, C. Fahricius-Hansen and 
C. Maienborn (eds.)  ZAS Papcrs in Linguistics 17:  Papers from the Oslo Conference on Adjuncts. 
-  (2000h): Predicates and their Suhjccts. Dordrecht: Kluwer. 
Tenny, Carol (1987): Grammaticalizing Aspect and Affectedness. Ph.D. disscrlation, MIT. 
-  (1994): Aspectual Roles and the Syntax-Semantics  Interface. Dordrecht: Kluwer. 
Verkuyl, Henk (1972): On the Compositional Nature of the Aspects.  Dordrecht: Kluwcr (Reidel). Nominal Predication and Focus ~nchorin~* 
Sze-Wing Tang 
The Hong Kong Polytechnic University 
sw.tang@polyu.edu.hk 
Abstract 
It  will be  shown that  verbs can be missing in  predicative sentences by  using the data from 
Chinese. Copula-less sentences in  Chinese are subject to 'Generalized Anchoring Principle' 
(GAP), which requires that every clause be anchored at the interface for LF convergence. To 
satisfy GAP, clauses may be either tensed or focused. It is shown that copula-less sentences in 
Chinese are subject to focus anchoring. It will be further argued that whether a verb is needed 
in predication depends on the syntax of predicate nominals. 
1  Introduction 
In  English,  every  sentence  must  have  a  verb.  Basically,  sentences  without  a  verb  are 
ungrammatical. 
(I)  John *(is) a genius. 
(2)  John *(is) very clever. 
Suppose that the existence of verbs is a mandatory requirement in English. Some questions 
arise: 
(3)  a.  Is such a requirement universal? 
b.  If it is not universal, how can verbs be omitted? 
c.  If  omission of  verbs  is  permitted  by  Universal  Grammar, why  do we need 
verbs? 
I will try to answer these three questions in sections 2, 3, and 4, respectively. The focus of the 
discussion in this paper will be on Chinese copula-less predicative sentences. 
2  Nonexistence of verbs 
Chinese is a  language that has verbs. For example, shi 'be'  and xihuan  'like'  are verbs in 
Chinese. 
(4)  Ta &i  Deguoren. 
he be German 
'He is a German.' 
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ZAS Papers in Linguisrics 22, 2001,159 -172 (5)  Wo  xihuan  dongtian. 
I  like  winter 
'I like winter.' 
The  claim  that  every  sentence  needs  a  verb  can  be  immediately  refuted  by  Chinese  as 
omission of verbs is allowed in Chinese. There are two major types of  'verbless'  sentences in 
Chinese, namely 'copula-less sentences'  and 'empty verb sentences'.' Consider the data given 
below. 
Copula-less sentences 
(6)  Jintian xingqiyi. 
today  Monday 
'Today is Monday.' 
(7)  Zhangsan Zhongguoren. 
Zhangsan Chinese 
'Zhangsan is a Chinese.' 
Empty verb sentences 
(8)  Wo niurou mian,  Zhangsan zhurou mian. 
I  beef  noodle Zhangsan pork  noodle 
'I orderfeat beef noodle and Zhangsan pork noodle. 
(9)  Meige ren  san-hen  shu. 
every  person three-C1 book 
'Everyone has three books.' 
A major difference between copula-less sentences and empty verb sentences is that the 
second nominal  in  copula-less  sentences is a predicate  while the second nominal  in empty 
verb sentences is the logical object of the event. The relation between the two nominals in the 
copula-less sentences is  'predication':  the second nominal  is a predicate nominal  which is 
predicated of the first nominal, i.e. the ~ubject.~ 
Predicate nominals in the copula-less sentences denote the character and quality of the 
subject. They can be common nouns, proper names, and numerals. 
(10)  Zhangsan [shagua].  (common nouns) 
Zhangsan  fool 
'Zhangsan is a fool.' 
(1  1)  Zhege haizi [da yanjing]. 
this  kid  big eye 
'This kid has big eyes.' 
(12)  Qu nian [huang nian], jin nian [feng  nian]. 
last year famine year  this year  bumper year 
'Last year was a famine year and this year a bumper year.' 
(1 3)  Wo [Zhangsan].  (proper names) 
I  Zhangsan 
'I am Zhangsan.' 
I  'Empty verb sentences' are also known as  'eventive constructions' in Zhang (2000). 
Other differences between  these two types of verbless sentences are: (i) unlike the copula-less sentences, the 
second nominal  in the empty verb sentences should not be existentiallindefinite (Tang 1998, Zhang 2000), and 
(ii) the interpretation of the relation between the two nominals in the empty verb sentences relies on discourse 
information (Wang 2000). Nominal Predication and Focus Anchoring 
(14)  Yi-bei  kafei [wu  kuaiqian]. 
one-C1 coffee five dollar 
'A cup of coffee costs five dollars.' 
(1 5)  Ta [sanshi sui]. 
he  thirty  year 
'He is thirty years ago.' 
(numerals) 
The copula shi 'be' can be inserted in most of the copula-less sentences. For example, 
both (16)(=(7)) and (17) are acceptable in Chinese. 
(16)  Zhangsan Zhongguoren. 
Zhangsan Chinese 
'Zhangsan is a Chinese.' 
(17)  Zhangsan &i  Zhongguoren. 
Zhangsan be  Chinese 
'Zhangsan is a Chinese.' 
Notice that omission of the copula shi  'be'  is restricted to predicative sentences. The 
copula shi 'be'  cannot be omitted in specificational sentences and equative sentences. 
(18)  Wo  mai de *(shi) zhe duo hua. 
I  buy DE  be  this Cl  flower 
'What I bought is this flowers.' 
[description -  item] 
(19)  Zhe duo hua  (shi) wo mai de. 
this CI  flower be  I  buy DE 
'This flower is what I bought.' 
[item -  description] 
(20)  Acht *(shi) ba. 
eight  be  eight 
'Acht is eight.' 
(21)  Ba *(shi) acht. 
eight be  eight 
'Eight is acht.' 
(specificational) 
(equative) 
Although  some sentences are regarded as predicative sentences, the copula shi  'be' 
cannot be omitted. Based on the contrast among (22)(=(10)), (23), and (24), we may assume 
that  the copula shi  'be'  can  be  omitted  in  predicative  sentences  only  when  the  predicate 
nominal is not preceded by the numeral-classifier phrase.' 
(22)  Zhangsan shagua. 
Zhangsan fool 
'Zhangsan is a fool.' 
(23)  Zhangsan *(shi) yi-ge  shagua. 
Zhangsan  be  one-Cl fool 
'Zhangsan is a fool.' 
'  Zhang (2000) argues that  shagua  'fool'  in  (24) undergoes  NP  raising.  Suppose that  predicate  nominals  in 
Chinese copula-less sentences must be 'bare' (Tang 1998 and our discussion in section 4 of this paper). After NP 
raising, the predicate nominal becomes  'bare'  in  a sense that  it  is  not c-commanded by  the numeral-classifier 
phrase and thus (24) obeys the bareness requirement. (24)  Zhangsan (shi) shagua yi-ge. 
Zhangsan  be  fool  one-Cl 
'Zhangsan is a fool.' 
Furthermore,  the  omission  of  the  copula  shi  'be'  is  prohibited  in  the  'coda' 
construction, such as (25).4 
(25)  Wu-li  you  yi-ge  ren ["(shi) shagua].  (the 'coda' construction) 
house-in have one-C1 person be  fool 
'There is a person in the room who is a fool.' 
By  using  the  data  from  Chinese,  I  have  shown  in  this  section  that  copula-less 
predicative  sentences  are  grammatical  in  Chinese.  Consequently,  the  claim  that  every 
sentence must have a verb should not be universal. 
3  Constraints on copula-less predicative sentences 
3.1  Salvaging devices for making an unnatural copula-less predicative 
sentence natural 
Although copula-less predicative sentences exist in Chinese, their use is not unconstrained. In 
some situation, copula-less  sentences may sound unnatural. For example, (26) and (27) are 
'unnatural'  and  'incomplete'  if  they  are  uttered  in  an  out-of-the-blue  context.  In  this 
subsection, I will  illustrate how  the judgment  of  copula-less  sentences  in  Chinese can  be 
improved. 
(26)  ??  Zhangsan xuesheng. 
Zhangsan  student 
'Zhangsan is a student.' 
(27)  ??  Taxiaotou. 
he thief 
'He is a thief.' 
First  of  all, juxtaposing  a  copula-less  sentence  with  a  parallel  one  in  a  contrast 
structure will improve the judgment. Compare (26) with (28). 
(28)  Zhangsan xuesheng, Lisi jiaoshou. 
Zhangsan student  Lisi professor 
'Zhangsan is a student and Lisi a professor.' 
Second,  modifying  the  predicate  nominal  by  an  adjective  may  also  improve  the 
judgment, particularly  when  an adjective that has an  'evaluative' judgment  is inserted. For 
example, the predicate nominal in  (29a) (=(26)) is unmodified. The sentence becomes more 
natural once the adjective hao 'good' is inserted. There is a contrast between (29a) and (29b). 
9 To explain the ungram~naticality  of (25). one possibility  is to assume that the coda must be  'clausal'  (Wilder 
2000). If the bracketed element without shi 'be'  in (25) is not a clause, it cannot be the coda. What happens if the 
coda without shi 'be'  is a bare small clause, i.e. a clause without a verb? If Wilder (2000) is right, a null operator 
undergoes  movement  out of  the  coda. The ungrammaticality  of  (25) is  due  to extraction  out of  bare  small 
clauses, which violates constraints on movement (Tang 1998). Nominal Predication and Focus Anchoring 
(29)  a.  ??  Zhangsan xuesheng. 
Zhangsan  student 
'Zhangsan is a student.' 
b.  Zhangsan hao  xuesheng. 
Zhangsan good student 
'Zhangsan is a good student 
Third,  even  if  one  does  not  add  any  adjective,  if  the  meaning  conveyed  by  the 
predicate nominal  is  'specific'  enough, we can  produce  sentences like (30b) and (31b) as 
'natural'  and 'complete'  sentences.  'Specificity'  here refers to a subset of a presupposed set. 
For example, duxue sheng 'university student' in (30b) is a subset of xuesheng 'student'. The 
former should be more  'specific'  than  the latter. In  (31b), as the meaning of Zhongguoren 
'Chinese'  is more  'specific'  than  ren  'human',  the judgment  of  (31b) is much  better  than 
(31a). 
(30)  a.  ??  Zhangsan xuesheng. 
Zhangsan student 
'Zhangsan is a student.' 
b.  Zhangsan daxue  sheng. 
Zhangsan university student 
'Zhangsan is a university student.' 
(31)  a.  *  Zhangsan ren. 
Zhangsan human 
'Zhangsan is a human being.' 
b.  Zhangsan Zhongguoren. 
Zhangsan Chinese 
'Zhangsan is a Chinese.' 
Fourth,  it  may  be  more  felicitous if  the  predicate  nominal  conveys  the  speaker's 
judgment and attitude rather than fact. For example, the (b) sentences convey more subjective 
judgment of the speaker than those (a) sentences in  (32) and (33). The copula-less sentences 
in  (32b) and (33b) describe a characterization about which an opinion or judgment  can be 
expressed. 
(32)  a.  ??  Zhangsan xuesheng. 
Zhangsan student 
'Zhangsan is a student.' 
b.  Zhangsan shagua. 
Zhangsan fool 
'Zhangsan is a fool.' 
(33)  a.  ??  Zhangsan nanren. 
Zhangsan man 
'Zhangsan is a man.' 
b.  Zhangsan nanzihan. 
Zhangsan man 
'Zhangsan is a man (more vivid) 
Fifth, adding a focus adverb, such as cai 'only', may improve the sentence, as in (34). 
However, notice that having other kinds of adverbs, such as temporal adverbs, does not help. For example, even though temporal adverbsjintian 'today' and gang  'just'  are added in (33, 
the copula-less sentence still sounds 'unnatural'  and 'incomplete'. 
(34)  Zhangsan cai  zhujiao. 
Zhangsan only research assistant 
'Zhangsan is only a research assistant.' 
(35)  *  Zhangsan jintiadgang zhujiao. 
Zhangsan todayljust  research assistant 
'Zhangsan is (just) a research assistant (today).' 
Last but not least, I observe that embedding the copula-less sentence within a larger 
sentence  may  help  complete  the  sentence.'  The  embedded  contexts  encode  'epistemic 
modality'.  Copula-less  sentences  are  not  permitted  in  'factual'  contexts. See the contrast 
between (36) and (37). 
(36)  Wo dang  [Zhangsan xuesheng] 
I  consider Zhangsan  student 
'I consider Zhangsan a student.' 
(37)  *  Wo zhidao [Zhangsan xuesheng]. 
I  know  Zhangsan student 
'*I know Zhangsan a student.' 
Based on the above discussion, we may notice that the use of copula-less sentences is 
not  unconstrained  in  Chinese. Their  usage  will  be  more  natural  only  in  some particular 
contexts. The contexts that may contribute to the 'naturalness' and 'completeness' of copula- 
less sentences in Chinese can be summarized in (38). 
(38) Contexts thut contribute to naturalness of copula-less sentences in Chinese 
(a)  in contrastive contexts 
(b)  having a modified predicate nominal 
(c)  having a 'specific' predicate nominal 
(d)  having a subjective judgment 
(e)  having a focus adverb 
(f)  embedding 
Without the above contexts, copula-less sentences become  'unnatural'  and 'incomplete'.  If 
these contexts are regarded as 'salvaging devices', it seems that copula-less sentences can be 
'licensed'  by  any  one of  these devices in order to  be  used  naturally and freely. Are these 
contexts unrelated? Do they share any similarities? Can we further derive any generalizations 
from these contexts listed in (38)? I will address all these questions in the next subsection. 
3.2  Generalized Anchoring Principle 
Before  discussing  the  properties  of  copula-less  sentences  in  Chinese,  let  me  spell  out  a 
working hypothesis in this paper. I assume that all sentences, including copula-less sentences 
in Chinese, are subject to a constraint that requires that every sentence in natural language be 
licensed  at the  interface  levels,  which  is dubbed as  'Generalized  Anchoring Principle'  or 
'GAP'  (Tang and Lee 2000). 
The bracketed constituent in (36)  is also known as a 'small clause'. See Tang (1998) for a detailed discussion 
on the small clause construction in Chinese. Nominal Predication und Focus Anchoring 
(39)  Generalized Anchoring Principle (GAP) 
Every clause must be either tensed or focused at the LF interface level 
Why do we need GAP? Even though a derivation that derives a linguistic expression 
violates  no principles  internal to the computation  system of  human  language CHL,  such as 
economy  principles  and  cyclicity,  the  expression  is  not  necessarily  ready  to  be  used. 
Universal Grammar has to make sure that every object generated by CHL  is accommodated to 
the external systems. 
Along these lines, GAP, which requires that every sentence be anchored, is imposed at 
the LF interface from the external systems that make use of the information provided by CHL. 
In  other words, GAP can be regarded as a 'bare output condition'. In this vein, the examples 
of  copula-less  sentences  I  have  shown  in  the  previous  subsection  are  considered  to  be 
incomplete because they are not anchored in order to be fully interpretable at the LF interface 
and to be used by the external systems. 
There  are  two  strategies  to  satisfy GAP in  natural  languages:  sentences  are either 
tensed  or focused in  the sense that  it  highlights an item  in  contrast to  a set of  alternatives 
supplied by the context of utterance. 
In  the case of tense, on a par with the analysis of  tense by  En$ (1987), an event is 
anchored with respect to the moment of  speech or a reference event. In  the case of focus, I 
propose  that  an  item  is  anchored  with  respect  to a  reference set of  items, or  an event is 
anchored vis-A-vis a reference set of events. 
'Focus'  discussed  in  this  paper  refers  to  the  inducing  of  a  contrasting  set  of 
individuals, properties or events by means of focusing devices associating with constituents in 
a sentence, a notion central to most theories of  focus (cf. Konig  1991, Krifia 1992, Rooth 
1992).  It  subsumes  phenomena  such  as  'symmetric  contrastive  focus'  explored  in  Rooth 
(1992), which involves two clauses or sentences, or even a single sentence in which there are 
two elements of  the same type in focus; one contrasting with the other. Anchoring by focus 
provides another route to temporal anchoring, satisfying GAP. 
How  does  GAP  account  for  the  salvaging  devices  for  copula-less  sentences  in 
Chinese? 
Contrast  structures  such  as those in  (28) make it clear that  we  are speaking of  an 
arrangement of participants and situations having a 'list reading'. The copula-less sentence is 
juxtaposed  with  an  alternative  situation.  The  invoking  of  a  contrast  set  is  a key  element 
underlying focus structure. 
Regarding the  role  of  the  adjectives  in  the modified  predicate  nominals,  they  may 
introduce new  information in certain contexts and receive a contrastive stress or contrastive 
accent. For example, the adjective hao 'good'  in (29b) can be marked a new, as repeated in 
(40a). With intonation focus, (40a) contributes a set of propositions of the form, such as (40b) 
to the representation, which can be regarded as a set of alternatives to the assertion  'He is a 
good student' in the sense of Rooth (1992). 
(40)  a.  Zhangsan HA0  xuesheng. 
Zhangsan good student 
'Zhangsan is a GOOD student.' 
b.  Zhangsan is ax  student. I  assume  that  the  'specific'  predicate  nominals  and  those  predicate  nominals that 
convey  a  subjective judgment  of  the  speaker  have  a  similar  effect  as  what  the  modified 
predicate nominals have. They are contrasted with some presupposed properties. For example, 
in  (30b), as repeated in (41), the speaker seems to contrast the predicate nominal with other 
properties:  'Zhangsan  is a UNIVERSITY student (and not an ordinary student).'  In (32b), as 
repeated  in  (42), the predicate  nominal  shagua  'fool'  is highlighted  in  contrast to a set of 
alternatives: 'Zhangsan is a FOOL (and not a genius).' 
(41)  Zhangsan daxue  sheng. 
Zhangsan university student 
'Zhangsan is a university student.' 
(42)  Zhangsan shagua. 
Zhangsan fool 
'Zhangsan is a fool.' 
The observation that the predicate nominal in copula-less sentences is juxtaposed with 
some presupposed  properties  seems to be  reminiscent of  Ma's  (1998) analysis of  Chinese 
predicate nominals. According to him, a nominal that can be used as a predicate in Chinese 
should  convey  an  'ordinal  meaning'.  For  example,  chuntian  'spring',  xiatian  'summer', 
qiutian 'fall', and dongtian 'winter'  are in  a particular sequence and their meaning is known 
as the 'ordinal meaning'. 
Along  these  lines,  the  nominal  daxue  sheng  'university  student'  in  (41)  can  be 
associated  with  other  nominals,  such  as  xiaoxue  sheng  'elementary  school  student'  and 
zhongxue sheng  'high school student', all of which are in a sequence and convey an  'ordinal 
meaning'. Hence, the acceptability of (41) is predicted under Ma's (1998) analysis. 
However,  as  noted  by  Ma (1998:67),  acceptable examples like  (31b) and (42)  are 
problematic  in  his  analysis  as  some  Chinese  nominals  that  denote  properties,  such  as 
Zhongguoren  'Chinese'  in  (31b) and  shagua  'fool'  in  (42), have  nothing  to  do with  the 
'ordinal  meaning'.  Their acceptability will be unexplained  unless we propose  some ad hoc 
definitions of ordinality (cf. Ma 1998:68 fn 9). 
Without appealing to any  ad hoc solutions, focus anchoring provides  a unified  and 
very natural explanation: all these contexts induce focusing effects in contrasting the situation 
depicted  with  an  alternative  set  of  situations.  The  copula-less  sentences  with  modified 
predicate nominals and those having a 'specific'  meaning and a subjective judgment  are all 
anchored by focus, satisfying GAP. 
In  the case of  having a focus adverb in copula-less sentences, such as cai  'only'  in 
(34), the focus adverb invokes a contrast set and induces focusing effects in contrasting the 
situation depicted with an alternative set of situations. 
If  a copula-less sentence is embedded in a context that denotes epistemic modality, the 
matrix epistemic verb, such as dung 'consider'  in  (36), contributes to focus anchoring in that 
modality in embedding contrasts a possible world with the actual state of affairs. 
Focus  anchoring  may  save some  apparently  unacceptable  copula-less sentences  in 
Chinese. As  noted  by  Shi  (2001), it  is  normally unacceptable  in  isolation  if  the predicate 
nominal is too long, such as (43). He points out that the judgment will be improved if  a 'well- 
defined' context is provided to force a particular reading. For example, (43) will be acceptable 
if  it is given as the answer to a question like (44). Under the present analysis, we may say that 
the 'well-defined'  contexts for copula-less sentences are those anchored by focus, satisfying 
GAP. If  the long predicate  nominal Jiaodong  bandao toushang yi-ge xiao yu-cun-de  ren 'a Nominal Predication and Focus Anchoring 
person from a small fishing village at the tip of the Jiaodong Peninsula' in  (43) is contrasted 
with Liaodong  bandao ren  'people  from  the  Liaodong Peninsula'  in  (44), the copula-less 
sentence (43) will be anchored by focus and thus it becomes ac~eptable.~ 
(43)  (??)  Wo [Jiaodong bandao  toushang yi-ge  xiao  yu-cun-de  rcn]. 
I  Jiaodong  peninsula tip  one-C1 small fishing-village-Mod person 
'I am a person from a small fishing village at the tip of the Jiaodong Peninsula.' 
(44)  Women dou shi Liaodong bandao  ren.  Ni  ne? 
we  all  be Liaodong peninsula person you Q 
'We are all from the Liaodong Peninsula. What about you?' 
If  the discussion  in  this paper is on the right track, copula-less sentences in Chinese 
will become  'natural'  and 'complete'  unless they are anchored. All the unnaturalness of the 
copula-less sentences is due to the violation of GAP. The so-called salvaging devices are all 
subsumed under focus anchoring. 
(45)  Copula-less sentences in Chinese should be anchored by focus. 
If  (45) is a correct generalization for Chinese, is it a language-particular rule? Why is 
it the case that copula-less predicative sentences are not easily found in English? How is the 
parametric  variation  between  Chinese  and  English  with  respect  to  predicative  sentences 
accounted for? All these questions will be addressed in  the next section. 
4  Syntax of copula-less sentences 
Recall that in  section 2 I have argued that the claim that every sentence must have a verb is 
not universal. For example, the copula can be omitted in predicative sentences in Chinese. If 
omission of the copula is possible in natural language, why can't verbs be omitted in English 
predicative sentences? 
I  propose  that  nominals  in  natural  languages  can  be  classified  into  two  types: 
'predicative' and 'non-predicative'. Predicative nominals vs. non-predicative nominals can be 
defined in a sense of  Higginbotham's  (1985) 0-binding: a predicative nominal has an open 
place in  it, which has to be closed off by  a referential category whereas the open place in a 
non-predicative  nominal  is closed off  (see also Stowell  1991).  In  terms of  syntax, all NP 
nominals are basically predicative. If  the nominals are dominated by  a functional projection, 
for instance Determiner Phrase DP, they are non-predicative or 'argumental'  (Szabolcsi 1987, 
1992,  Stowell  1991a,b,  Longobardi  1994).  Predicative  nominals  and  non-predicative 
nominals may serve as predicates and arguments, respectively. 
(46)  Predicative nominals: e.g. NP 
Non-predicative nominals: e.g. DP 
Let  us  assume that  predicative  nominals  can  be  predicated  of  the  subject directly 
without any verbal categories whereas non-predicative nominals can't. Consider the contrast 
between  (47a)  and  (47b),  in  which  'SU'  stands  for the  subject.'  In  (47a),  N  (or N')  is 
Meanwhile copula-less sentences in Chinese are perhaps constrained by some discourse factors, in addition to 
focus anchoring. See Shi (2001) for a discussion along these lines. 
'  (47a) should he permitted by Universal Grammar. See Stowell (1983). predicative as it is not headed by any functional categories. On the other hand, N (or NP) in 
(47b) is headed by  D and thus  is no longer predicative. The element in the specifier of DP 
cannot serve as the subject for the NP. The configuration in (47b) is ungrammatical. 
(47)  a.  NP  b.  *DP 
A  A 
SU  N'  SU  D' 
A  A 
...  N...  D  NP 
Now  let  us consider some empirical  data. In  (48)  a genius  is  a DP whose head is 
realized as the article u (Abney 1987). As a genius is not predicative, it cannot be predicated 
of the subject John directly without a verb. (48) will have a structure like (47b) and should be 
ungrammatical. 
(48)  * John a genius 
In  order  to  make  predication  possible  in  (48),  a  verbal  category  is  needed  in  the 
structure.  However, bare verbs  are prohibited  in  English,  as illustrated  in  (49).  Whenever 
there is a verb in  English, it must be associated with some tense morphology. The contrast 
between (49) and (50) shows that the copula in English predicative sentences is inflected to 
indicate tense. Along these lines, verbs cannot be missing in English as they are required to 
support the inflectional suffixes. I assume that the copula be in English is used to bear tense 
features; its existence is required by tense. 
(49)  * John be a genius. 
(50)  John idwas a genius. 
Even if we suppose that there is a 'null verb' in English, its existence is ruled out as it 
cannot support the inflectional tense morphemes. For example, the inflectional  morphemes 
are supposed to be attached to a 'null  verb'  in (51). (51) is ruled out by  the morphology of 
English that suffixes cannot be attached to null elements. 
(5  1)  * John -s/-ed a genius. 
In any event, (48) is ungrammatical in English regardless of whether a contrast set is invoked 
to anchor (48), such as (52). If  (48) is already ruled out by syntax, focus anchoring does not 
help. 
(52)  * John a genius, and Bill an idiot. 
The situation in  Chinese copula-less  sentences  is  different.  The predicate  nominal 
shaguu 'fool'  in  (53)(=(42)) is a bare noun. As it is a bare noun, it can be predicated of  the 
subject Zhungsan directly, having a structure similar to (47a).R 
Shi (2000) argues that the first nominal in copula-less sentences should be a 'subject'  rather than a 'topic'. Nominal Predication and Focus anchor in^ 
(53)  Zhangsan shagua. 
Zhangsan fool 
'Zhangsan is a fool 
The discussion  here has  a very  interesting implication: the existence of  copula-less 
predicative  sentences is associated with the syntax of the predicate nominal. If  the predicate 
nominal is 'bare'  in English, it is predicated that  it may enter copula-less sentences. I notice 
that  in  some contexts,  verbs  can  be  missing  in  predicative  sentences  in  English  and the 
prediction is borne out. Consider the following examples. 
(54)  You idiot! 
(55)  You Martha, me professor 
(56)  Next station Jordan. 
Expressions  like  (54)  are  known  as  'you idiot  expressions',  which  are  mainly  used  in 
exclamations involving a strong value judgment  and an opinion (Tang 1998). Unless being a 
student is associated with some bad quality and having a negative status, (57) may not sound 
natural. The contrast between  (54) and  (57) suggests that  only the  nominals  that  have an 
'evaluative meaning' may felicitously enter the you idiot expressions. 
(57)  # You student! 
(55) is recorded from a conversation in a movie. What the speaker of  (55) wanted to 
convey was to emphasize the contrast of the identity between the hearer and himself. 
(56) is from the broadcast in Mass Transit Railway in Hong Kong. Similar expressions 
can also be found in  German. For example, (58) is from the broadcast in S-Bahn in Berlin. 
Interestingly, the copula is always missing in such expressions. 
(58)  Nachste Bahnhof FriedrichstraBe. 
next  station  FriedrichstraRe 
In (54) and (53,  as the predicate nominals idiot and professor do not have any determiner and 
article, they are regarded as 'bare'  and are not dominated by DP. Bare NPs are predicative and 
they can be predicated of the subject directly. On the other hand, if there is a determiner, such 
as (59),  the judgment  is  deviant.  The ungrammaticality  of  (59)  is  obvious: the  predicate 
nominal an idiot is a non-predicative DP by virtue of the existence of  the article and thus it 
cannot be predicated of the subject directly. 
(59)  * You an idiot! 
Although  Martha  in  (55)  and Jordan  in  (56) are  proper  names,  they  are used  as 
indefinite common nouns in those two sentences. Such an indefinite usage of proper names is 
not impossible in natural languages. For example, plural  markers can be attached to proper 
names.  expressing an indefinite meaning in English (=(60)) as well as in  Chinese (=(61)). I 
assume that definite proper names are in the D position (Abney 1987) while indefinite proper 
names are Ns (Longobardi 1994, Li 1999). 
(60)  I saw three Johns this morning. (61)  Zhangsan-men shenme shihou lai? 
Zhangsan-PI  what  time  come 
'When are Zhangsans (or Zhangsan and the others) coming?' 
How  are  the  copula-less  sentences  in  (54)-(56)  in  common?  (54)  has  a  strong 
evaluative context. Although such a strong evaluative meaning is not involved in the locative 
expressions,  the  predicate  nominal,  such  as  Jordan  in  (56),  is  contrasted  with  some 
presupposed  stations. The hearer is expected to be aware that Jordan is one of the stations 
along the  railroad.  Similar to  some copula-less  sentences  in  Chinese (e.g.  (28)),  (55) is a 
contrast structure and thus it is licensed by focus anchoring. In  other words, all these copula- 
less  sentences  in  English  are  anchored  by  focus,  satisfying  GAP.  It  seems  that  the 
generalization stated in (45) can also hold in English. 
Data  from  Chinese  and  English  show  that  copula-less  predicative  sentences  are 
anchored by focus only. Why is it the case that these sentences are anchored by focus instead 
of tense? 
I propose that the choice of GAP is determined by syntax. Suppose that there must he 
a tense operator in temporal anchoring. En$ (1 987) argues that tense is indexical like all other 
referential expressions and is conceived  of  as a pronominal  variable, in  that  the truth of  a 
tensed sentence is relative to the speech time.9  A tense is anchored through its complementizer 
C (or a tense operator embedded in CP). 
As copula-less predicative sentences are hare, there is no CP in the structure and thus 
the  tense  operator  cannot  occur.  Temporal  anchoring  is  never  available  in  copula-less 
sentences.1° If  the discussion here is on the right track, the generalization stated in (45) that 
copula-less sentences in Chinese is only anchored by focus can be derived from the syntax of 
copula-less predicative sentences. 
The bareness property of copula-less predicative sentences can be extended to English. 
The accusative Case of  the subject me in  (55) may support the present analysis that copula- 
less predicative sentences are bare. Let us assume with Schiitze (1997) that the 'default'  Case 
of the English subject is the accusative Case when it cannot get the nominative Case. If  the 
copula-less predicative  sentences in (55) are bare, the subject cannot receive the nominative 
Case from a functional category, for instance, T. Hence, the subject gets the default accusative 
Case. Focus anchoring  in  English copula-less predicative sentences follows the bareness of 
the structure in syntax. 
5  Conclusion 
In  the  literature,  it  is  claimed  that  every  sentence  must  have  a  verb  in  English.  In  the 
beginning of this paper, three questions regarding this claim were raised, as repeated in (62). 
(62)  a.  Is such a requirement universal? 
b.  If  it is not universal, how can verbs be omitted? 
c.  If  omission  of  verbs  is permitted  by  Universal  Grammar, why  do we  need 
verbs? 
4 See also Partee (1973), Gutron and Hoekstra (1995). and Stowell (1996) for similar ideas. 
'O  If we need a focus operator in focus anchoring, on a par with temporal anchoring, it could be the case that the 
focus operator can be adjoined to bare projections freely, regardless of whether there is CP. 
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Regarding the first question, the answer is 'no'. I have shown that verbs can be missing in 
some Chinese sentences. Copula-less predicative sentences are possible in Chinese. 
If  the  existence  of  verbs  is  not  obligatory  in  some  sentences, how  can  verbs  be 
omitted? By using the data from Chinese, I have shown that copula-less predicative sentences 
are  acceptable  when  they  are  (i)  in  contrastive  contexts, (ii) having  a modified  predicate 
nominal, (iii) having a  'specific'  predicate nominal,  (iv) having a subjective judgment,  (v) 
having a focus adverb, and (vi) embedded. 
Regarding (62c), if  omission  of  verbs is permitted  by  Universal  Grammar, we may 
wonder why English needs a copula in predicative sentences in the first place. I proposed that 
the existence of  copula-less  predicative  sentences is associated  with the syntactic status of 
predicate  nominals.  Bare  NP  nominals  are  predicative  whereas  DP  nominals  are  non- 
predicative. Ungrammaticality  of  copula-less sentences in  English is due to the morphology 
of tense as well  as the usage of  non-predicative predicate nominals. It  is argued that  if the 
predicate  nominal  is  bare,  the  copula  can  be  omitted.  Supporting evidence  comes from 
Chinese copula-less sentences, you  idiot expressions,  and  locative expression in English.  I 
have also argued that the unavailability of temporal anchoring in  copula-less sentences is due 
to syntax. 
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1  Introduction 
In  general,  object  shift  occurs in  Chinese only  when  contrastive focusing is involved. In 
indicative sentences, numeral NPs survive object shift only when they are specific or definite. 
This is shown by the contrast between (la) and (lb,~):' 
(1)  a. *wo liang-ben shu nian-guo,  san-ben shu  mei  nian-guo. 
I  two-C1 book  read-Exp  three-Cl book  have-not read-Exp 
'I read two books, not three.' 
b.  wo you liang-ben shu nian-guo, you  san-ben shu  mei  nian-guo. 
I  have two-C1 book read-Exp  have three-Cl book  have-not read-Exp 
'I read two of the books, but not the other three.'  (specific) 
c.  wo zhe liang-ben shu  nian-guo,  na  san-ben shu  rnei  nian-guo. 
I  this two-C1 book  read-Exp  that  three-Cl book  have-not read-Exp 
'I read these two books, but not those three.'  (definite) 
Here the numeral object NP liang-ben shu 'two books' is in a preverbal position, and it must 
be bound either by the existential modal you 'have', as in (lb), or by a demonstrative like zhe 
'this', as in (Ic). Otherwise the sentence is simply out, as in 
However, this requirement is not observed when a modal  is present. This point can be 
seen by comparing (2a,b) with (la): 
(2)  a.  wo liang-ben shu nian-de-wan,  san-ben shu  jiu  bu  xing  le. 
I  two-CI book read-can-finish  three-CI book  then  not possible  Inc 
'I can finish two books, not three.'  (nonspecific) 
'  I would  like to exprcss my  gratitude to Lisa Cheng, Gasde Horst-Dieter,  Paul Law, Thomas Lee, Sze-wing 
Tang for sharing their thoughts with me. I am also in great debt to Niina Zhang and Chris Wilder, without whose 
friendship and encouragement I wouldn't have enough drive to finish this paper. 
I  The  abbreviations  used  in  this  paper  are glossed  as bllows: CI:  classifier;  Exp:  experiential aspect;  Inc: 
inchoative aspect; Prf: perfective aspect; Prg: progressive aspect; Top: topic marker. 
2  The idea that object shift induces specificity is certainly not new. See Mahajan (1990), En$ (1991), Diesing 
(1992) for discussions on the syntax and semantics of specific NPs in various languages. 
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b.  wo liang-ben shu keyi  nian-wan,  san-ben shu  jiu  bu  xing  le. 
I  two-C1  book can  read-finish three-C1 book  then  not possible  Inc 
'I can finish two books, not three.'  (nonspecific) 
Here the numeral object NP liang-ben shu 'two books' is again in  a preverbal position. The 
difference lies in the fact that the presence of an infixal modal -de- in (24  and the presence of 
a modal verb keyi 'can' in (2b) license the otherwise ungrammatical sentence. 
This  indicative-modal  asymmetry  is  reminiscent  of  a  similar  contrast  of  Chinese 
numeral NPs in  subject positions, which has been  under close examination  in  the literature 
(see,  for instance, Lee  1986, Li  1996, Tsai  2001,  among many  others).  As  shown  by  the 
contrast  between  (3a)  and  (3b,c),  nonspecific  indefinites  are  not  allowed  in  the  subject 
position of an indicative sentence. 
(3)  a.*liu-geren  tai-qi-le  na-kuai  shitou. 
six-CI  person  lift-up-Prf  that-C1  rock 
'Six persons have lifted that rock.'  (nonspecific) 
b.  you  liu-ge  ren  tai-qi-le  na-kuai  shitou. 
have six-C1  person  lift-up-Prf  that-CI  rock 
'There are six persons who have lifted that rock.'  (specific) 
c.  ua  liu-ge  ren  tai-qi-le  na-kuai  shitou. 
that  six-C1  person  lift-up-Prf  that-C1  rock 
'Those six persons have lifted that rock.'  (definite) 
While subject NPs are ruled out when they are nonspecific, as in  (3a), similar construals are 
licensed either with the existential modal you, as in (3b), or with the demonstrative zhe, as in 
(3c). By contrast, nonspecific NPs are quite comfortable  serving as the subject of  a modal 
construction, as evidenced by (4a) and (4b): 
(4)  a.  liu-ge  ren  tai-de-qi  na-kuai  shitou. 
six-C1 person  lift-can-up that-C1  rock 
'Six persons can lift that rock.'  (nonspecific) 
b.  liu-ge  ren  keyi  tai-qi  na-kuai  shitou. 
six-Clperson  can  lift-up  that-C1  rock 
'Six persons can lift that rock.'  (nonspecific) 
Nonetheless, when it comes to bare NPs in Chinese, the situation gets a bit murky: The 
interpretations  of fronted  object NPs  seems sensitive to the choice of  tense.  As  shown by 
(5a,b), bare NPs can be either definite or nonspecific under realis tense in postverbal object 
positions: On Object Specificif) 
(5)  women  zuotian  chi-le  zhurou, qiantian  chi-le  niurou. 
we  yesterday  eat-Prf pork  day-before-yesterday  eat-Prf  beef 
a.  '(As for the meat in the refrigerator,) we have eaten the pork yesterday, 
and the beef the day before yesterday.'  (definite) 
b.  '(As for dinner,) yesterday we have eaten pork, not beef.'  (nonspecific) 
There are therefore two ways to interpret (5): If  the conversation has to do with the meat in 
the refrigerator, for example, then the reading is definite, as in (5a). If it is about the dinner, 
the reading is nonspecific,  as in (5b). Once object shift applies, only the definite reading is 
available, as indicated by the contrast between (6a,b): 
(6)  women  zuotian  zhurou  chi-le,  niurou  mei  chi. 
we  yesterday  pork  eat-Prf  beef  have-not eat 
a.  '(As for the meat in the refrigerator,) yesterday we have eaten the pork, 
not the beef.'  (definite) 
b.# '(As for dinner,) yesterday we have eaten pork, not beef.'  (nonspecific) 
By contrast, sentences with  irrealis tense behave quite differently: While bare NPs can be 
either definite or nonspecific in postverbal object positions, as in (7a,b), both the definite and 
nonspecific readings survive object shift, as indicated by the ambiguity of (8a,b): 
(7)  women  mingtian  chi  zhurou, houtian  chi  niurou. 
we  tomorrow  eat  pork  day-after-tomorrow  eat  beef 
a.  '(As for the meat in the refrigerator,) we will eat the pork for tomorrow, 
and the beef for the day after tomorrow.'  (definite) 
b.  '(As for dinner,) we will eat pork for tomorrow, and beef for the day 
after tomorrow.'  (nonspecific) 
(8)  women  mingtian  zhurou  chi,  niurou  bu  chi. 
we  tomorrow  pork  eat  beef  not  eat 
a.  '(As for the meat in the refrigerator,) tomorrow we will eat the pork, 
but not the beef.'  (definite) 
b.  '(As for dinner,) tomorrow we will eat pork, but not beef.'  (nonspecific) 
Moreover, when we shift the bare object NP further across temporal adverbials such as 
zuotian  'yesterday'  and  mingtian  'tomorrow',  the  only  possible  reading  in  both  cases  is 
definite, as evidenced by (9) and (10) respectively: 
(9)  women  zhurou  zuotian  chi-le,  uiurou  qiantian  chi-le. 
we  pork  yesterday  eat-Prf  beef  day-before-yesterday eat-Prf 
a.  '(As for the meat in the refrigerator,) we have eaten the pork yesterday, 
and the beef for the day before yesterday.'  (definite) 
b.# '(As for the dinner,) we have eaten pork yesterday, and beef the day 
before yesterday.'  (nonspecific) Wei-Tien Dylan Tsui 
(10)  women  zhurou  mingtian  chi,  niurou  houtian  chi. 
we  pork  tomorrow  eat  beef  day-after-tomorrow eat 
a.  '(As for the meat in the refrigerator,) we will eat the pork for tomorrow, 
and the beef for the day after tomorrow.'  (definite) 
b.#  '(AS  for the dinner,) we will eat pork for tomorrow, and beef for 
the day after tomorrow.'  (nonspecific) 
In  other words, the distinction between  realis tense and irrealis tense is neutralized when the 
object NP in question is raised over temporal adverbials. 
The  distributive-interpretive  pattern  of  Chinese  object  specificity  can  then  be 
summarized in the following table: 
Table 1 
As shown above, the definite reading is always there as an option, whereas the non-specific 
reading is on and off depending on the choice of tense, and on the syntactic position where a 
given object NP occurs. 
In this paper, we would like to explore the possibility of deriving the subject and object 
specificity in a principled and unified way, mainly through the so-called Extended Mapping 
Hypothesis  developed in  Tsai  (1999, 2001). Section  I  and 2 give an overview  of  how the 
issues  with  subject  specificity  can  be  approached  from  a  vantage  point  of  the  syntax- 
semantics interface.  In  section  3,  we  proceed  to  show  that  subject  specificity  and object 
specificity  are  basically  the  same phenomena,  except  for  a  few  twists  on  their  licensing 
conditions. Section 4, on the other hand, provides a brief review on the interpretations of bare 
NPs in Chinese. Finally, in  section 5, it is argued that the realis-irrealis distinction based on 
the  interpretation  of  object  indefinites  follows  from  a  more  general  dichotomy  between 
indicative and modal constructions. 
2  A Dynamic View of Syntax-Semantics Mapping 
Let's first consider the following two questions: Is there a unified solution to the subject and 
object  specificity?  Can  we  provide  a  principled  account  of  the  asymmetry  between  the 
indicative  and modal  constructions? Diesing  (1992) has provided  an explicit answer to the 
former, based on the well-known tree-splitting mechanism (I 1): On  Object Specificity 
(1 I) Mapping Hypothesis: 
a.  Material from VP is mapped into the nuclear scope. 
b.  Material from IP  (excluding VP) is mapped into a restrictive clause. 
The mapping mechanism maps a GB-theoretical  representation to a tripartite quantificational 
structure, including a quantifier, its restrictive clause, and the nuclear scope (Kamp 1981 and 
Heim  1982). In addition, it is claimed that existential closure applies to VP, rather than to IP 
or Text as originally proposed  by Heim. It is instructive to note that the above mechanism 
doesn't seem to have a global character, since existential closure is in general clause-bound. 
Consequently, we  need to define the domain  of  existential  closure  locally, and implement 
mapping step by step, as stated in (12), a more "dynamic" version of the Mapping Hypothesis 
(Tsai 1999, 2001): 
(12)  Extended Mapping Hypothesis (EMH): 
a.  Mapping applies cyclically, and vacuous quantification is checked derivationally. 
b.  Material from a syntactic predicate is mapped into the nuclear scope of a mapping 
cycle. 
c.  Material from XP immediately dominating the subject chain of a syntactic predicate 
(excluding that predicate) is mapped outside the nuclear scope of a mapping cycle. 
A subject chain is an A-chain with its tail in  a subject position. 
d.  Existential closure applies to the nuclear scope of a mapping cycle. 
Under this approach, the focus of inquiry is shifted to how to define a local domain of syntax- 
semantics mapping, i.e., a "mapping cycle". 
On  the  other  hand,  the  Mapping  Hypothesis  doesn't  have  much  to  say  about  the 
indicative-modal asymmetry illustrated above. To provide a feasible answer, we would like to 
establish  a  typological  correlation  between  the  absence  of  nonspecific  subjects  and  the 
absence  of  V-to-I movement. Namely,  in  a V-10-1 language like English, the domain  of  a 
primary predicate, as well as the corresponding nuclear scope, is extended from V' to I'  in LF, 
as dictated by (12b,c). Given the VP-internal  subject hypothesis, a subject chain typically has 
its head above the nuclear scope, while submerging its tail under the nuclear scope, as shown 
in the diagram (13): 
(13)  English type 
IP + mapping cycle 
A 
Subj,  ti Wei-Tien Dylan Tsai 
This move leads us to examine the issue further from the vantage point of Chomsky's (1995) 
Copy Theory: If  the lower copy in  Spec-VP is deleted, the upper copy in  Spec-IP must get 
strongly quantified, either by its own determiner or by a sentential operator like an adverb of 
quantification. This is because existential closure is not available at this altitude. If the upper 
copy is deleted, then the lower copy is licensed by existential closure introduced according to 
(12d). 
By contrast, Chinese-type languages lack agreement morphology, and do not license V- 
to-I raising. As a result, a subject chain is typically outside nuclear scope, and cannot be saved 
by existential closure on V', the defucto syntactic predicate, as illustrated by (14): 
(14)  Chinese type 
IP  4 mapping cycle 
A 
A 
~ubj,  (3)  V' + nuclear scope 
This move provides a straightforward account of the contrast between (15a) and (15b,c) ( (3a- 
c) repeated here): 
(1  5)  a. * liu-ge  ren  tai-qi-le  na-kuai  shitou. 
six-C1 person  lift-up-Prf  that-CI  rock 
'Six persons have lifted that rock.'  (nonspecific) 
b.  you  liu-ge  ren  tai-qi-le  na-kuai  shitou. 
have six-CI  person  lift-up-Prf  that-C1  rock 
'There are six persons who have lifted that rock.'  (specific) 
c.  na  liu-ge  ren  tai-qi-le  na-kuai  shitou. 
that  six-CI  person  lift-up-Prf  that-C1  rock 
'Those six persons have lifted that rock.'  (definite) 
In  (15a), the subject chain is outside the nuclear scope, and the numeral liu 'six' cannot serve 
as a strong determiner in Milsark's (1974) sense. (15a) is therefore ruled out due to vacuous 
quantification. By contrast, the subject indefinites of  (15b,c) are licensed  by the existential 
modal you 'have' and the demonstrative nu 'that' respectively. 
3  Mapping Geometry of Subject Indefinites 
Interestingly  enough,  we  often  observe  the  English  type  behavior  in  Chinese  modal 
constructions, where it is not unusual to find overt verb raising from V to Mod, as shown in On  Object Specificity 
(16a) ((4a) repeated here): 
(16)  a.  Liu-ge  ren  tai-de-qi  na-kuai  shitou. 
six-C1 person  lift-can-up that-C1  rock 
'Six persons can lift that rock.'  (nonspecific) 
b.  liu-ge  ren  keyi  tai-qi  na-kuai  shitou. 
six-Clperson  can  lift-up  that-C1  rock 
'Six persons can lift that rock.'  (nonspecific) 
In (16a), the compound tai-qi  'lift-up' raises to the infixal modal -de- 'canr,  creating a mapping 
geometry very  similar to the one in  the English type configuration  (13),  as sketched in the 
following diagram: 
(17)  + mapping cycle 
Subj,  Mod' + nuclear scope 
A 
Therefore, we would  like to entertain the hypothesis that the mapping geometry of Chinese 
modal sentences is isomorphic to that of English indicatives, to the extent that verb raising is 
limited to a light or modal verb, rather than to a higher functional category such as T or Agr.' 
As a result, the subject indefinite of  (16a) can be licensed by  existential closure when  the 
upper copy of the subject chain undergoes LF deletion, as illustrated below: 
M  dP 4  mapping cycle  A 
Mod'  liu-ge ren,  Mod'  0  (3x)Mod' 4  nuclear scope 
A  A 
-"  A ' 
taideqii  tai-de-q~i 
liu-ge ren  V'  liu"  renk A  liu-ge ren(x)  V' 
A  A 
tai-qi  ...  'i  .  .  .  ti  ... 
This move accounts for the nonspecific reading of  (16a). The same analysis carries over to 
(16b) except that V-to-Mod raising applies in LF rather than in overt syntax, as shown by the 
'  In contrast to V-to-I raising, raising to a light verb or a modal  verb is quite common in Chinese. For detailed 
discussion, see Huang (1994, 1997) and Lin (2000). 
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derivation of ( 19): 
ModP +  mapping cycle 
A 
Mod'  liu-ge renk  Mod'  0 (3x)Mod' +  nuclear scope 
A  A 
taiqii-keyi V  A 
taiqi,-keyi 
liu-ge ren  V'  liu-ge ren,  V'  liu-ge ren(x)  V' 
A  A  A 
taiqi  ...  'i  .  .  .  ti  ... 
In  other words, the indefinite subject gets its nonspecific reading through existential closure 
on Mod', given the EMH (12a-d). 
4  Mapping Geometry of Object Indefinites 
For all we have said about the subject specificity, one may well  wonder whether the same 
story can  be told  about the  indicative-modal  asymmetry between  (la) and (2a,b) (repeated 
here as (20a) and (20b,c) respectively): 
(20)  a. *wo liang-ben shu nian-guo,  san-ben shu  mei  nian-guo. 
I  two-C1 book  read-Exp  three-Cl book  have-not read-Exp 
'I read two books, not three.' 
b.  wo liang-ben shu nian-de-wan,  san-ben shu  jiu  bu  xing  le. 
I  two-C1 book read-can-finish  three-Cl book  then  not possible  Inc 
'I can finish two books, not three.'  (nonspecific) 
c.  wo liang-ben shu keyi  nian-wan,  san-ben shu  jiu  bu  xing  le. 
I  two-C1  book can  read-finish three-C1 book  then  not possible Inc 
'I can finish two books, not three.'  (nonspecific) 
First consider the following mapping geometry of (20b,c) after object shift occurs: On Object SpecificiQ 
F  (3)  ModP +  nuclear scope 
Here both the subject chain and the object chain have their tails submerged under the nuclear 
scope, and thus subject to existential closure. Since the verb has been raised to Mod (overtly 
in (20b) and covertly in  (20c)), the predicate domain has been extended to ModP, which in 
turn forms the nuclear scope. Now if the lower object copy undergoes LF deletion, the upper 
copy in Spec-FP must get extra licensing since it is outside the nuclear scope. However, this is 
impossible because Chinese numerals cannot serve as a strong determiner. Alternatively, if it 
is the upper  object copy that is deleted in LF, the lower copy is then  subject to existential 
closure. Hence the nonspecific reading of (20b,c). 
It  follows  from  our  treatment  that  both  the  subject  and  object  indefinites  can  be 
nonspecific in the modal construction. This is indeed the case, as evidenced by (22a,b): 
(22)  a.  san-ge  ren  liu-wan fan chi-de-wan,  jiu-wan fan jiu  bu  xing  le. 
three-C1 person-C1  six-C1 rice eat-can-finish nine-CI book then not possible Inc 
'Three persons can finish six bowls of rice, not nine.'  (nonspecific) 
b.  san-ge  ren  liu-wan fan keyi chi-wan, jiu-wan fan jiu  bu  xing  le. 
three-Cl person-C1  six-C1  rice  can eat-finish  nine-C1 book then not possible Inc 
'Three persons can finish six bowls of rice, not nine.'  (nonspecific) Wei-Tien Dvlan Tsai 
Note that there are altogether four possibilities of interpreting (22a,b) given the Copy Theory, 
as illustrated below: 
(23)  a.  Subj, ... Objk ... [,,,I  ,,,,,,,, ... 0  ... 0  ...  1 
b.  Subji ... 0  ... [,,,,~,,,,,,,,  ... 0  ... Objk ... ] 
c.  0  ... Objk ... [,,,,I ,,,,,,,,  ... Subji ... 0  ... ] 
d.  0 ... 0 ...  [nuclear  scope ... Subj, ... Objk ... ] 
In (23a), both the lower subject and object copies are deleted, leaving the upper copies outside 
the nuclear scope, and hence outside of the domain of  existential closure. Since there is no 
sentential  operator  around  either, we  should  dismiss  this  possibility  in  view  of  vacuous 
quantification.  (23b) and (23c) are ruled out for exactly the same reason except that there is 
only one offending indefinite in each case, i.e., the upper subject copy in the former and the 
upper object copy in  the latter. Consequently, the only possible interpretation turns out to be 
(23d), where  both  the  upper  copies  are  deleted,  and  the  lower  copies  are  licensed  under 
existential closure on the nuclear scope. The dual nonspecific readings of (22a,b) thus follows 
quite naturally from our account. 
By contrast, the case with (20a) is more problematic: As shown by (24), when an object 
stays in situ in an indicative sentence, the reading is unambiguously specific: 
(24)  wo  nian-guo  liang-ben  shu. 
I  read-Exp  two-C1  book 
'I read two books.'  (specific) 
Here the crucial. factor lies in the aspectual licensing from -guo, an experiential aspect in Li & 
Thompson's  (1981)  terms.  The  dependency  can  then  be  formalized  as  an  instance  of 
unselective  binding  between  the  aspectual  operator  and  the  variable  introduced  by  the 
numeral NP, as visualized in the following diagram: 
nian-guo,  liang-ben shu(x) 
This observation raises the issue as to why (20a) cannot be saved in the way described in (25), 
i.e., by assigning a specific reading to the object indefinite: When the lower object copy is 
deleted, the upper copy is outside the nuclear scope (hence outside the domain of existential 
closure), resulting in vacuous quantification, as in (26): On Object Specificitjl 
When the upper object copy is deleted, the lower copy is subject to the licensing from the 
experiential aspect, as in (27): 
Subj  V' +  nuclear scope 
This seems to be a natural consequence from what we have seen in (25), which, nonetheless, 
is not borne out. 
One way  to  approach  the problem  is to say that  aspectual licensing, in  contrast with 
existential  closure,  only  licenses  a  trivial  chain  (that is,  a  chain  with  only  one member). 
Alternatively,  it  may well be the case that  aspectual  licensing,  in contrast with  existential 
closure, applies to a chain rather than a member of the chain: In other words, the whole chain 
has to be under the scope of the aspectual operator to get a specific reading. We will leave the 
choice open here, while concentrating on finding a feasible solution to the indicative-modal 
asymmetry in general. 
5  Interpreting Chinese Bare NPs 
Before we go any further, it is worthwhile to take a closer look at the semantic properties of 
Chinese bare NPs. Basically, if  we discount generic and habitual construals, a Chinese bare 
NP can be either definite or non-specific, as shown by the contrast between (28a,b): Wei-Tien  Dvlan Tsoi 
(28)  wo  zaoshang  zongsuan  zhao-dao  ren  le. 
I  morning  finally  search-reach  person  Inc 
a.  '(I could not find John to help me yesterday.) I finally found him this 
morning.'  (definite) 
b.  '(I could not find anyone to help me yesterday.) I finally found somebody 
this morning.'  (nongeneric and nonspecific) 
In (28a) the bare NP ren 'person' refers to the salient individual in the discourse, and can be 
paraphrased  as a pronoun. In  (28b), there is no reference to a particular individual, and the 
reading  is  quite  like  sornehody  in  English?  Although  the  definite  construal  of  (28a)  is 
anaphoric in nature, bare NPs can be deictic sometimes, as evidenced by (29a,b): 
(29)  ren  lai  le! 
person come  Inc 
a.  'That person/He/She is coming!' 
b.  'Those people/They are coming!' 
By contrast, as Huang (1987) points out, Chinese bare NPs can never be specific. This 
point can be illustrated by comparing (30) with (3  1): 
(30)  * wo zongsuan  zhao-dao-le  renk  [Opt [ tk  hen  nenggang]]. 
I  finally  search-reach-Prf  person  very  capable 
'"I  have finally found somebody, who is very capable. 
(3  1)  wo zongsuan  zhao-dao-le  yi-ge  renk  [Opk [ tk hen  nenggang]]. 
I  finally  search-reach-Prf  one-CL  person  very  capable 
'I have finally found a certain person, who is very capable.' 
In  (30), the bare object NP ren 'person' cannot take a secondary predicate. By contrast, the 
numeral  object  NP of  (31)  is capable of  serving as the  subject  of  secondary  predication. 
According to our analysis, the subject of the local mapping cycle is outside the nuclear scope 
which corresponds to the open sentence headed by hen nenggang 'very capable'. If it is indeed 
the  case  that  a  bare  NP cannot  be  specific,  then  we  can  rule  out  (30)  without  further 
stipulation. 
A numeral NP, on the other hand, differs from its bare counterpart in being subject to 
aspectual licensing: For instance, the object indefinite of (31) is in fact unselectively bound by 
the perfective aspect -le, which asserts the existence of the people-finding event. To see this, 
(31)  should  be  further  contrasted  with  (32),  where  the  aspect  has  been  changed  into 
progressive: 
(32) *  wo  zai-zhao  yi-ge  renk  [Opk  [ tk  hen  nenggang] 
I  Prg-find  one-CL  person  very  capable 
I??  I am looking for somebody, who is very capable.' 
See Cheng & Syhesma (1999) for a comprehensive discussion on the distinction  between bare and numeral 
NPs across Chinese dialects. On Object Specificity 
Here  the  progressive  aspect  does  not  trigger  existential  quantification,  and  secondary 
predication  fails  because  the  subject  of  the  local  mapping  cycle  (defined  by  secondary 
predication) cannot get extra licensing. 
6  Realis Tense vs. Irrealis Tense: Indicative-modal Asymmetry 
Revisited 
Keeping the above discussion in mind, it's time to explore the distribution and interpretation 
of bare NPs in presence of object shift. First consider (8) (repeated here as (33)), where the 
object is fronted in-between the temporal adverbial mingtian 'tomorrow' and the main verb chi 
'eat': 
(33)  women  mingtian  zhurou  chi,  niurou  bu  chi. 
we  tomorrow  pork  eat  beef  not  eat 
a.  '(As for the meat in the refrigerator,) tomorrow we will eat the pork, 
but not the beef.'  (definite) 
b.  '(As for dinner,) tomorrow we will eat pork, but not beef.'  (nonspecific) 
It is worthwhile to note that (33) can be paraphrased as (34) respectively with a future modal 
hui 'will' preceding the main verb: 
(34)  women  mingtian  zhurou  hui  chi,  niurou  bu  hui  chi. 
we  tomorrow  pork  will  eat  beef  not will  eat 
a.  (As for the meat in the refrigerator,) tomorrow we will eat the pork, 
but not the beef.  (definite) 
b.  (As for dinner,) tomorrow we will eat pork, but not beef.  (nonspecific) 
Given what we have seen in  (20b,c), where an fronted object indefinite is licensed through 
possibility modality, it is a simple deduction that it may also get licensing from a epistemic 
modal  such  as hui. This intuition translates  into  following  two parts  under  our approach: 
Firstly, (33) has an implicit future modal locating between the object indefinites and the main 
verbs. This modal, implicit or not, is the locus of the irrealis tense in Chinese. Secondly, the 
nonspecific readings of  (33) should be credited to existential closure on ModP, as illustrated 
by the diagram (35): Wei-Tien Dl'lan Tsai 
F  (3)  ModP +  nuclear scone 
Namely, ModP serves as a syntactic predicate after V raises to Mod in  LF, and effectively 
extends the nuclear scope from V' to ModP. 
As we have demonstrated  in  the previous  sections, there are essentially two ways  to 
interpret an object chain link in  terms of Copy Theory: If  LF deletion applies to the lower 
copy, the only option left for the bare NP zhurou 'pork' is to get strongly quantified, since the 
upper copy is outside the domain of existential closure. This accounts for the definite readings 
of (33a). Alternatively, if  it is the upper copy that undergoes LF deletion, then the lower copy 
benefits from the licensing from existential closure, resulting in  the nonspecific readings of 
(33b).' 
With the realis sentence (6) (repeated here as (36)), on the other hand, we run into the 
same type of problem encountered in (20a), except that this time around, bare NPs have one 
'  It appears that our theory also provide a solution for the object specificity displayed by the Dutch sentences (i) 
and (ii): 
(i)  Rudy  hoopt  dat  Onno  morgen  zes  brieven  verscheurt. 
Rudy  hopes  that  Onno  tomorrow  six  letters  tears up 
'Rudy hopes that Onno will tea  up six letters tomorrow.'  (specific, nonspecific) 
(ii)  Rudy  hoopt  dat  Onno  zes  brieven,  morgen  t,  verscheurt. 
Rudy  hopes  that  Onno  six  letters  tomorrow  tears up 
'Rudy hopes that Onno will tear up six letters tomorrow.'  (specific) 
As observed by Reuland (1988), the numeral object NP of (i) can he either specific or nonspecific. If Bobaljik & 
Jonas's (1996) version of Holmberg's generalization is on the right track, the numeral NP has already undergone 
object shift to a VP-external  position. By contrast, when  we raise  the numeral NP further over the temporal 
adverbial morgen 'tomorrow', only the specific reading is available. In this case, Dutch differs from Chinese only 
in that the numeral can be construed as a strong determiner. On Object Specificity 
more reading to keep the derivation alive, i.e., the definite interpretation of (36a): 
(36)  women  zuotian  zhurou  chi-le,  niurou  mei  chi. 
we  yesterday  pork  eat-Prf  beef  have-not eat 
a.  '(As for the meat in the refrigerator,) yesterday we have eaten the pork, 
not the beef.'  (definite) 
b.# '(As for dinner,) yesterday we have eaten pork, not beef.'  (nonspecific) 
When the bare object NP gets interpreted as definite, it doesn't matter whether it is the upper 
or lower copy that  undergoes  LF deletion, since it  does not  rely  on  existential  closure to 
remain  legitimate.  By  contrast, when  the bare object NP gets interpreted  as indefinite, the 
licensing  conditions  vary,  depending  on  which  copy  is  deleted  at LF:  When LF deletion 
applies to the lower copy, the variable introduced by the upper copy is left unbound, causing 
vacuous quantification, as shown by (37): 
When LF deletion applies to the upper copy, the situation becomes relatively complicated, as 
illustrated below: 
Subj  (3)  V' +  nuclear scope Wei-Tien Dylan Tsai 
Here the lower copy is subject to the licensing from the perfective aspect -le, which would 
results  in  a  specific  reading.  This  option, as we  have  shown in  section 4, is nonetheless 
incompatible with the semantics of  Chinese bare NPs. The problem, therefore, is reduced to 
why the lower object copy cannot be bound by existential closure as a last resort, producing a 
nonspecific reading, as visualized in (39): 
(39)  ...  FP 
A 
"  A 
F  A 
Subj  A 
V' +  nuclear scope 
Here we would  like to entertain the possibility that the licensing from existential closure is 
blocked  by  the perfective operator, which serves as a potential unselective binder. We thus 
have  a  classic  case  of  relativized  minimality  violation.  It  turns  out  that  the  only  reading 
available for (36) is definite, which is a desirable result. 
Finally,  we  still  have  to  deal  with  the  question  why  the  nonspecific  readings  are 
completely ruled out for pre-adverbial  object indefinites. To begin with, I would like to point 
that (9) and (10) pattern  with left dislocation structures like (40a) in  allowing a resumptive 
pronoun: 
(40)  a.  Akiuk (a),  wo  taoyan (tak). 
Akiu Top  I  hate  him 
'As for Akiu, I hate him.' 
b.  wo  Akiuk  taoyan (*tak),  Xiaodi,bu  taoyan (*taj). 
I  Akiu  hate  him  Xiaodi not  hat 
'I hate Akiu, but not Xiaodi.' 
him 
Object shift, on the other hand, disapproves the resumptive strategy, as evidenced by  (40b). 
This  observation  holds  regardless  of  the  choice of  tense, as  indicated  by  the  contrast of 
(41a,b) and that of  (42a.b): 
(41)  a,? wo  Akiuk zuotian  jian-guo  tak , 
I  Akiu  yesterday  meet-Exp  him 
'As for Akiu, I met him yesterday, ... On Object Spec$city 
b.* wo  zuotian  Akiuk  jian-guo  tak , ... 
I  yesterday  Akiu  meet-Exp  him 
(42)  a,? wo  Akiuk mingtian  hui  jian-dao  tak,  .. 
I  Akiu  tomorrow  will  meet-reach  him 
'As for Akiu, I will meet him tomorrow, ... 
b." wo  mingtian  Akiuk hui  jian-dao  tak , 
I  tomorrow  Akiu  will  meet-reach  him 
All these point to the conclusion that the seeming object on the pre-adverbial position is in 
fact a discourse topic, which is either specific or definite by nature. Since a bare NP can never 
be construed  as  specific,  we  correctly predict  that  the  (9) and (10) only  allow  a  definite 
interpretation. 
Our position is further strengthened by the fact that numeral NPs cannot appear higher 
than temporal adverbials, as evidenced by (43) and (44): 
(43)  * wo liang-ben shu zuotian  nian-guo, 
I  two-Cl book  yesterday  read-Exp 
san-ben shu  qiantian  nian-guo. 
three-C1 book  the day before yesterday  read-Exp 
'I read two books, not three.' 
(44)  * wo liang-ben shu  mingtian  nian-de-wan, 
I  two-Cl book  tomorrow  read-can-finish 
san-ben shu  houtian  nian-de-wan. 
three-CI book  the day after tomorrow  read-can-finish 
'I can finish two books tomorrow, and three the day after tomorrow.'  (nonspecific) 
The phenomenon would make sense if  the pre-adverbial  position  hosts a discourse topic, for 
which a numeral NP by itself can never be qualified. 
7  Concluding Remarks 
To sum up, we have demonstrated that the object specificity follows from the same principle 
as the subject specificity under the EMH. Furthermore, the semantic discrepancy between the 
realis  and irrealis  object  shift constructions  turns  out to be a subcase of  the more general 
indicative-modal asymmetry. Although our analysis presented here is nothing but conclusive, 
it  does  suggest  that  the  EMH  is  a  potent  candidate  for  explaining the  indicative-modal 
asymmetry, as well as for building a general theory of the specificity effects in question. 
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In this paper I firstly argue that secondary predicates are complement of v, and v is overtly 
realized by Merge or Move in secondary predication in Chinese. The former option derives the 
de-construction, whereas the latter option derives the V-V construction. Secondly, I argue that 
resultatives are hosted by complement vPs, whereas depictives are hosted by adjunct vPs. This 
complement-adjunct asymmetry accounts for a series of syntactic properties of secondary 
predication in Chinese: the position of a secondary predicate with respect to the verb of the 
primary predicate, the co-occurrence patterns of secondary predicates, the hierarchy of 
depictives, the control and ECM properties of resultative constructions, and the locality 
constraint on the integration of secondary predicates into the structure of primary predication. 
Thirdly, I argue that the surface position of de is derived by a PF operation which attaches de 
to the right of the leftmost verbal lexical head of the construction. Finally, I argue that in the 
V-V resultative construction, the assumed successive head-raising may account for the 
possible subject-oriented reading of the resultative predicate, and that the head raising out of 
the lower vP accounts for the possible non-specific reading of the subject of the resultative 
predicate. 
1 Introduction 
This paper discusses the syntactic structures of depictive and resultative constructions in 
Chinese. According to Halliday (1967: 63), resultatives describe a resultant state which is 
caused by the action denoted in the primary predication, whereas depictives describe the state 
of their subject at the time when the action denoted by the primary predication occurs. In 
Chinese, depictives precede whereas resultatives follow the verb of primary predication (Vpri 
hence), respectively. In (1) the resultatives follow the Vpri da ‘beat’, whereas in (2) the 
depictives precede the Vpris zhuo ‘catch’ and he ‘drink’.
1 Both resultative and depictive 
constructions are represented in either the de-construction, where the functional word de 
occurs, or the V-V construction, where the lexical head of the secondary predicate is adjacent 
to Vpri. The a-sentences in (1) and (2) are in the V-V construction, whereas the b-sentences 
there are in the de-construction. We can also see that in the resultative de construction, de is 
right-adjacent to the Vpri, as in (1b); whereas in the depictive de construction, de is right-
adjacent to the depictive, as in (2b). 
2 
                                                 
* For helpful comments on this paper, I am grateful to Chris Wilder, Anatoli Strigin, and Gerhard Jäger. All 
remaining errors are mine. 
1 The abbreviations used in the Chinese examples are: EXP: experience aspect, PRF: perfect aspect, PROG: 
progressive aspect, BA: causative particle, CL: classifier, MOD: modification marker. 
2 Pre-Vpri de and post-Vpri de are graphically different in Mandarin Chinese and phonologically different in 
some Chinese dialects. However, the different phonological or written forms do not mean that they are 
syntactically different. The different forms can be viewed as positional variants of the same category, as we often 
see in phonology. Crucially, the two forms of de occur in non-primary predication only, and they themselves do 
not have any semantic features to distinguish each other. 
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(1)  a.  Wusong da    si  le     laohu.        (resultative, V-V) 
  Wusong  beat  die  PRF tiger 
    ‘Wusong beat the tiger so that it died.’ 
  b.  Wusong da   de  laohu liuxue le.      (resultative, de) 
  Wusong  beat  DE tiger  bleed  PRT 
    ‘Wusong beat the tiger so that it bled.’ 
(2)  a.  Wusong huo   zhuo le    yi   zhi laohu.    (depictive, V-V) 
  Wusong  alive  catch  PRF one CL  tiger 
    ‘Wusong caught a tiger alive.’ 
  b.  Wusong rere de  he     le    yi   wan  jiu.    (depictive, de) 
  Wusong  hot    DE drink PRF one bowl wine 
    ‘Wusong drank a bowl of wine hot.’ 
 
  This paper will make three claims. First, both depictives and resultatives are base-
generated as complement of a functional head, which is realized either by the word de or 
head-raising. Second, depictive constructions have an adjunct control structure, whereas 
resultative constructions have either a complement control or ECM-like structure. Finally, the 
surface position of de is derived by a PF operation which attaches de to the right of the 
leftmost verbal lexical head of the construction. Following Hornstein (2001: 103), no null 
operator for the syntactic structure of predication is assumed in this study. 
  In section 2, I will argue that the phrase that hosts secondary predicates is a functional 
category. In section 3, I will show that this functional phrase is merged as a complement of 
Vpri in resultative constructions and as an adjunct of the structure of the primary predication 
in depictive constructions. The surface positions of de and the secondary predicate in the V-V 
construction are discussed in section 4. In section 5, the subject-orientation of resultatives, 
and the possible nonspecific reading of the subject of resultatives, in the V-V construction, are 
accounted for by the effect of head-raising. The paper is concluded in section 6. 
2  The functional phrase in secondary predication 
The following two assumptions have been proposed by Hornstein & Lightfoot (H&L 1987) 
and Bowers (1993, 1997, 2000), among others. First, the phrase hosting a resultative or a 
depictive is a functional phrase. Second, a secondary predicate is the complement of the head 
of the functional phrase. In 2.1, I introduce the alternation between two constructions of 
secondary predication in Chinese, supporting these two assumptions. In 2.2, I claim that the 
functional phrase is vP. 
2.1  The projection of a functional phrase in secondary predication 
My first argument for the projection of a functional phrase is that secondary predicates such 
as depictives and resultatives in Chinese are represented in either the so-called de-
construction, where the functional word de occurs, or the V-V construction, where Vpri is 
adjacent to the lexical head of the secondary predicate. In the following data, the secondary 
predicates in (3) and (4) are resultatives, and those in (5) and (6) are depictives. (3) and (5) are 
in the V-V construction, while (4) and (6) are in the de-construction.  
  If we classify these data according to the relevant position of the secondary predicates 
to Vpri, the resultatives in (3) and (4) are to the right of Vpri, whereas the depictives in (5) 
and (6) are to the left of Vpri. We will discuss this order issue in section 3.1. If we classify 
these data according to the orientation of the subject of the secondary predicates, we see that 
the secondary predicates in the a-sentences of (3) through (6) are subject-oriented, those in the 
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b-sentences of (3) through (6) are object-oriented, and those in (3c) and (4c) have a subject 
independent of the argument structure of Vpri. 
(3)  a.  Akiu ku  lei    le. 
  Akiu  cry  tired  PRF 
    ‘Akiu cried and as a result he felt tired.’ 
  b.  Akiu da   shang   le   Fanjin. 
  Akiu  beat  wound  PRF Fanjin 
    ‘Akiu beat Fanjin so that Fanjin was wounded.’ 
  c.  Akiu ku shi le     shoujuan. 
  Akiu  cry  wet  PRF handkerchief 
    ‘Akiu cried and as a result the handkerchief was wet.’ 
(4)  a.  Akiu wanr de wang le    zuoye. 
  Akiu  play    DE forget PRF homework 
    ‘Akiu played so much that he forgot the homework.’  
  b.  Akiu kua     de Fanjin buhaoyisi     le. 
  Akiu  praise  DE Fanjin embarrassed PRF 
    ‘Akiu praised Fanjin so that Fanjin felt embarrassed.’ 
  c.  Akiu ku  de shoujuan       ye    shi  le. 
  Akiu  cry  DE handkerchief also wet PRF 
    ‘Akiu cried and as a result the handkerchief was wet.’ 
(5)  a.  Jia Zheng zai    nu      da    Baoyu.
3 
  Jia  Zheng  PROG angry beat Baoyu 
    ‘Jia Zheng is beating Baoyu angry.’  
      b.  Akiu huo zhuo le     Nanbatian. 
  Akiu  alive  catch  PRF Nanbatian 
    ‘Akiu caught Nanbatian alive.’ 
(6)  a.  Akiu hulihutu  de mai le    yi   bao        shipin.   
  Akiu  confused  DE buy PRF one package food 
    ‘Akiu bought a package of food confused.’ 
      b.  Akiu lala   de chi le   yi   wan  Dandan-mian. 
  Akiu  spicy  DE eat PRF one bowl Dandan-noodle 
    ‘Akiu ate a bowl of Dandan-noodle spicy.’ 
 
  The alternation between the de-construction and the V-V construction of secondary 
predication is further shown by the unacceptability of (7) below. (7a) is neither a V-V 
construction nor a de-construction, whereas (7b) has both de and a V-V form. Both sentences 
are intended to encode a resultative meaning. 
(7)  a.  *Baoyu da    na  ge haizi haotaodaku. 
      Baoyu beat that CL child cry.loudly 
  b.  *Baoyu da    ku de  na   ge haizi. 
      Baoyu beat cry DE that CL child 
    Intended: ‘Akiu beat that child so that the child cried.’ 
 
                                                 
3 Adjectives are not morphologically different from adverbs in Chinese. Thus the subject-oriented nu ‘angry’ and 
hulihutu ‘confused’ in (6a) and (6b) respectively can also be manner expressions. Thus these sentences are 
ambiguous. In this paper, I discuss the argument-depictive reading of these sentences only. See Dechaine (1993) 
section 3.3.3.2 ‘Manner adverbs as (derived) event depictives’ for a discussion of the semantic and syntactic 
relations between subject-oriented adjective depictives and the corresponding –ly adverbs in English. 
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  To capture this alternation, I assume that in Chinese, a functional phrase FP (to be 
specified in section 2.2) is projected in secondary predication, and F is realized by either de or 
a lexical head raised to F, as shown in (8a) and (8b), respectively.
4  
(8) a.  [FP [F’ de [XP ]]]    b.  [FP [F’ Xi   [XP [V’   ti ]]]] 
 
  My second argument for FP is that within the same type of secondary predication, a 
resultative one or depictive one, the de construction and the V-V construction share many 
syntactic properties, indicating that the two constructions are derived in similar ways. The 
projection of FP in both constructions and the similar way of integration of the FP into the 
structure of primary predication represent their syntactic similarities. 
The two resultative constructions, the V-V and the de-construction, for instance, share 
at least the following six properties, calling for a unitary treatment. First, if Vpri is 
intransitive, and there is no other overt nominal to serve as a subject of the resultative, the null 
subject of the resultative in both the de and the V-V constructions must be co-referential with 
the subject of Vpri. In the following b-sentences, the null subject of the resultative must be 
co-referential with Akiu rather than any other person. 
(9)  a.  Akiu shui  de zhentou dou  diao di-shang le. 
  Akiu  sleep  DE pillow   even fall  land-on  PRF 
    ‘Akiu slept and as a result even the pillow fell on the ground.’ 
  b.  Akiu shui   de yuntouzhuanxiang.        (de) 
  Akiu  sleep  DE dizzy 
    ‘Akiu slept and as a result he felt dizzy.’ 
(10)  a.  Akiu ku   xing   le   Taotao.       
  Akiu  cry  awake  PRF Taotao 
    ‘Akiu cried and as a result Taotao got awake.’ 
b.  Akiu ku   xing    le.            (V-V) 
  Akiu  cry  awake  PRF 
    ‘Akiu cried (in his dream) and as a result he got awake.’ 
 
  Second, if the object of Vpri is absent, the verb is detransitivized, and the null subject 
of the secondary predicate must be co-referential with the subject of Vpri. In (11), the null 
subject of lei ‘tired’ is co-referential with Taotao, rather than the implicit patient of the Vpri. 
(11)  a.    Taotaoi zhui  de hen lei.          (de) 
  Taotao  chase  DE very tired 
  ‘ T a o t a o i chased Xj and as a result {hei/*Xj} got tired.’ 
 b.  Taotaoi zhui   lei    le.           (V-V) 
  Taotao  chase  tired  PRF  
  ‘ T a o t a o i chased Xj and as a result {hei/*Xj} got tired.’ 
 
  The above two points follow the general constraint on resultatives that their subject 
must have an overt antecedent (Carrier & Randall 1992: 215, Rothstein 2000a). We will say 
more about this issue in section 3.4.2. 
  Third, in neither construction does the subject of the resultative predicate need to be 
the patient of the Vpri, which can be transitive in other contexts.  
                                                 
4 Based on the alternation between the de and the V-V foms in resultative constructions, Sybesma (1999: 19) 
proposes that ExtP (Extent Phrase) is projected. The current study extends his ExtP to a more general functional 
phrase to cover the syntactic structures of all types of secondary predicate constructions. 
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(12)  a.  Akiu ti      de qiuxie   dou  po        le.           (de) 
  Akiu  kick  DE sneaker even broken PRF 
    ‘Akiu kicked so much that even the sneakers were broken.’ 
    Akiu ti     po         le  qiuxie.            (V-V) 
  Akiu  kick  broken  PRF sneaker  
    ‘Akiu kicked so much that the sneakers were broken.’ 
(13)  a.  Akiu chi de ta fuqin  dou   mei        qian     le.      (de) 
  Akiu  eat  DE he father even not.have money PRF 
    ‘Akiu ate and as a result his father even had no money.’ 
  b.  Akiu chi qiong le   ta  fuqin.            (V-V) 
    Akiu eat poor  PRF he father 
    ‘Akiu ate and as a result his father became poor.’ 
 
As noted by Cheng (1997), qiuxie ‘sneaker’ in (12) is not the patient of the verb ti ‘kick’. 
What Akiu kicked is a football, not his sneakers. Similarly, in (13), ta fuqin ‘his father’ is not 
the patient of the verb chi ‘eat’. In both cases, the Vpris function like intransitive verbs. Data 
like (12) and (13) call for a unified approach to the two resultative constructions. Similar data 
in English, as shown in (14), are treated as constructions where Vpri is intransitive in Bowers 
(1993: 621). 
(14)  John drank himself/ his friends under the table. 
 
Fourth, in both the V-V and the de-construction, the subject of Vpri can be a causer 
rather than an agent. In the following (15), the subject is both a causer and a patient; whereas 
in (16), the subject is simply a causer. 
(15)  a.  zhe  dun fan   chi de Akiu hen  bao.          (de) 
  T h i s   CL   meal eat DE Akiu very full 
    ‘Akiu ate the meal and as a result he got very full.’  
    Lit: ‘This meal ate Akiu very full.’ 
  b.  zhe shou ge     chang hong le  Akiu.         (V-V) 
  T h i s   CL    song sing    red   PRF Akiu 
    ‘Akiu sang this song and as a result he became famous.’ 
    Lit: ‘This song sang Akiu red.’ 
(16)  a.  zhe ju hua         xiao  de Akiu liuchu-le       yanlei.      (de) 
  this  CL sentence laugh DE Akiu come.to-PRF tear 
    ‘This sentence got Akiu to laugh so much that he came to tears.’ 
    Lit: ‘This sentence laughed Akiu to tears.’ 
  b.  ta  xiao   si   wo le.              (V-V) 
    he laugh die I    PRF 
    ‘He made me laugh to the extent that I felt dead.’ 
    Lit: ‘He laughed me dead.’ 
 
  In the current literature, a causer is base-generated at Spec of vP. It does not need to be 
an agent, and it does not need to interact with the structure below vP. In addition, verbs like 
chi ‘eat’ or chang ‘sing’ do not assign an agent theta role. An agent, if it occurs, gets its theta 
role from v (Kratzer 1994). Huang (1994, 1997: 56) indeed assumes that the causer subject of 
the de-constructions like (16a) is merged at a higher verbal projection, although he does not 
apply his analysis to the V-V construction. A unified approach to the two constructions 
proposed here correctly predicts that the two constructions can have the same type of vP 
projection in the structure of their primary predication. 
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  Fifth, if the subject of Vpri is a non-causer theme, no agentive adverbial such as guyi 
‘deliberately’ is allowed. Compare (17), where the subject of the Vpri is a non-causer theme, 
with (18), where the subject of the Vpri is an agent: 
(17)  a.  tudou (*guyi)         dun  de hen   lan.         (de) 
  potato  deliberately  stew  DE very pappy 
    ‘The potatoes were stewed pappy (*deliberately).’ 
  b.  tudou (*guyi)         dun  lan      le.          (V-V) 
    potato deliberately stew pappy PRF 
    ‘The potatoes were stewed pappy (*deliberately).’ 
(18) a.  Akiu  guyi            da    de  erzi haotaodaku.        (de) 
  Akiu  deliberately  beat  DE son  cry.loudly 
    ‘Deliberately, Akiu beat the son so that the son cried loudly.’  
 b.  Akiu  guyi            da  po        le   yi    ge beizi.      (V-V) 
    Akiu deliberately hit broken PRF one CL  cup 
    ‘Deliberately, Akiu hit a cup so that it was broken.’ 
 
  According to Den Dikken & Sybesma (1998), the ban of an agentive adverbial and the 
absence of the causative meaning in sentences like (17) indicate that vP, which hosts either an 
agent or causer, is not projected in the structure of the primary predication. Similar data can 
be found in Yorùbá (Dechaine 1993: 4.3.3), and Japanese (Nishiyama 1998: 189). As pointed 
out correctly by Nishiyama (1998: 199) “it is not that ‘a transitive verb must have the external 
argument’, but it is the other way around: the external argument must have a transitive verb.” 
It is possible that the null subject of the secondary predicate is co-referential with the theme 
internal argument of the Vpri, which surfaces as the subject of the Vpri. The same constraint 
on the V-V and the de-construction again calls for a unified treatment of the two 
constructions.  
 Sixth,  the  de-construction and the V-V construction show the same pattern of A’-
movement possibilities. Audrey Li (1999) presents quite a few arguments to show that 
topicalization in Chinese can be a movement operation. I adopt her conclusion as a 
background assumption. The following contrast between (19a) and (19b) shows that the 
internal argument of Vpri can be topicalized whereas the subject of a resultative which is not 
co-referential with any argument of the Vpri cannot be topicalized. The contrast between 
(19c) and (19d) shows that the internal argument of Vpri can be relativized, whereas the 
subject of a resultative which is not co-referential with any argument of the Vpri cannot be 
relativized. 
(19)    a.  na   ben shui   Akiu kan  de ti dou   lan       le.    
  t h a t   CL    book Akiu read DE    even broken PRF 
    ‘That book, Akiu read and as a result it was broken.’ 
 b.    *Taotaoi Akiu ku  de ti hen  shangxin. 
      Taotao  Akiu cry DE    very sad 
  c.  Akiu kan  de ti dou  po        le   de   na  ben shui  
  Akiu  read  DE   even broken PRF MOD that CL    book  
    ‘the book that Akiu read and as a result became broken.’ 
    Lit: ‘the book that Akiu read broken’ 
  d.   *Akiu ku  de ti hen  shangxin de    na  ge reni 
      Akiu cry DE    very sad         MOD that CL person 
    Lit: ‘the person that Akiu cried sad’ 
 
The same contrasts are observed in the V-V construction: 
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(20)  a.  Na ge beizii, Akiu da po        le          ti. 
  t h a t   CL cup    Akiu hit broken PRF 
    ‘That cup, Akiu hit and as a result it was broken.’ 
 b.  *Akiui, Taotao ku   xing    le   ti. 
      Akiu   Taotao cry awake PRF  
  c.  Akiu da po        le   ti de     na   ge beizii 
  Akiu  hit  broken  PRF    MOD that CL cup     
    ‘the cup that Akiu hit and as a result became broken’ 
  d.  *Taotao ku  xing    le   ti de    na  ge reni 
      Taotao cry awake PRF    MOD that CL person 
 
In fact, the subjects of the resultative predicates in (12), (13), (15), and (16) cannot undergo 
topicalization and relativization, either. They all pattern with the data where Vpri is 
intransitive. I will discuss this extraction issue in section 3.4.3.  
  Based on the above six similarities between the de-construction and the V-V 
construction, I propose a unitary analysis of the two resultative constructions: a functional 
phrase FP is projected, and although the head of FP is realized differently, the integration of 
FP into the structure of the primary predication is the same. 
  The shared syntactic properties of the two constructions, on the other hand, are in 
concord with the assumption of the Distributive Morphology framework (Marantz 1997) that 
compound words are derived in the computational component rather than in the lexicon. My 
unitary syntactic approach is thus different from Yafei Li’s (1990, 1998, 1999) non-unitary 
approach, which deals with the V-V construction in the lexicon. For a discussion of the 
problems of the lexical approach, see Zou (1994) and Cheng (1997), among others. 
2.2  The nature of the assumed functional phrase 
The conclusion made in the last subsection supports H&L and Bowers’ assumption that there 
is a projection of a functional phrase in secondary predication. H&L claim that the phrase is 
IP, whereas Bowers claims that it is PrP. I will, however, use v to represent the functional 
head, instead of H&L’s Infl and Bowers‘ Pr, for the following reasons. 
  H&L (p. 28) assume that Infl, like all other heads, can be followed by any phrasal 
category as a complement, and that if Infl is [±tense], the complement must be a VP; if Infl is 
empty, as in the non-primary predication constructions under discussion, the complement may 
be NP, PP, or AP, but not VP. First of all, however, this category contrast between primary 
and non-primary predicates is not universal (Dechaine 1993). In Chinese, a primary predicate 
can be a category other than VP, as shown by the AP predicate hen gao ‘very high’ in (21a), 
and a secondary predicate can be a VP, as shown by the VP resultative liuxu ‘bleed’ in (21b). 
(21)  a.   gongshui yijing (*shi) hen gao    le. 
    flood       already  be   very high PRT 
    ‘The flood has reached to a very high level.’ 
  b.  Wusong da   de  laohu liuxue le.      (= 1b) 
  Wusong  beat  DE tiger  bleed  PRT 
    ‘Wusong beat the tiger so that it bled.’ 
 
  Moreover, H&L claim that the Infl in primary predicates has [±tense] features, 
whereas the empty Infl in non-primary predicates does not. If so, one wonders why an IP 
headed by such an empty and featureless Infl is projected in the structure of non-primary 
predication at all. I do not claim that the head of the functional phrase in (8) is Infl, because 
the way the functional head is realized is not sensitive to a tense or finiteness contrast.  
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  I do not adopt Pr either, because it is not clear how to distinguish Pr from v, because 
we have no evidence that v and Pr can co-occur, and because what Pr can do can be covered 
by v, which is motivated independently anyway. 
  One might wonder why there is no de-V-V alternation in a vP which encodes primary 
predication. The situation may be similar to the realization of the functional head related to a 
yes-no question in English. According to Chomsky (1995), if realizes this functional head. 
However, it never occurs in a root yes-no question. 
  I conclude this section by claiming that vP is projected in the structure of secondary 
predication. In Chinese, v is realized by either de or a head-raising in secondary predication. 
  One may assume that the choice between the de-merger and head-raising is 
determined in the Array (Chomsky 1998, 1999), in the sense that if de is present in the Array, 
the  de-construction is derived; whereas if de  is absent there, a head-raising occurs. 
Alternatively, one can assume that de, like do of the do-support in English, is a formative not 
present in the Array, and is used only when head-raising is impossible (cf. Chomsky 1957, 
Arnold 1995, Hornstein 2001: 184 on this analysis of the do-support). A typical case where 
head-raising is impossible is when the XP selected by v contains a degree word hen ‘very’, as 
in (22). 
(22)  a.  Lao Wang pao de hen lei. 
  Lao  Wang  run  DE very tired 
    ‘Lao Wang run so that he got very tired.’ 
  b.  *Lao Wang pao lei  hen. 
  c.  *Lao Wang pao hen lei. 
 
The choice of the de-construction rather than the V-V construction in (22) follows the 
constraint on head movement that no modifier can be stranded (Hoekstra 1988, see Sybesma 
1999: 21). 
3  Adjunct vP vs. Complement vP 
Resultatives have been argued to be base-generated inside a complement of Vpri in English 
(Hoekstra 1988, Larson 1991a, Bowers 1993, 1997, 2000, among many others) and Japanese 
(Koizumi 1994). Subject-oriented depictives have been generally claimed to be base-
generated inside an adjunct of a verbal projection of the primary predication in both English 
and Japanese (H&L 1987, Larson 1991a, Bowers 1993, 1997, 2000, Koizumi 1994). The 
base-position of object-oriented depictives, however, is under debate. Some including H&L 
and Bowers, assume that object-oriented depictives are hosted by adjuncts of a verbal 
projection of the primary predication, whereas others, including Williams (1980), Culicover 
& Wilkins (1984), Roberts (1988), Larson (1991a), and Koizumi (1994) claim that object-
oriented depictives have the same structure as that of resultatives, i.e., they are hosted by a 
complement of Vpri.  
  In this section I show that in Chinese, the vP which hosts resultatives is a complement 
of Vpri, whereas the one that hosts depictives, regardless of whether the depictive is subject-
oriented or object-oriented, is an adjunct of the structure of primary predication.  
3.1  The position with respect to Vpri 
In English, a VO language, secondary predicates are to the right of Vpri, as shown in (23). 
The resultative predicate flat is to the right of the Vpri watered in (23a), and the depictive 
predicate raw is to the right of the Vpri ate in (23b). In German as well as in Japanese, both 
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OV languages, both types of predicates precede Vpri (abstracting away from V2). The 
German data in (24) show this point. 
(23)  a.   John watered the tulip flat.     (resultative) 
  b.  John ate the fish raw.      (depictive) 
(24)  a.  Frank hat den Tisch sauber gewischt.    (resultative) 
    Frank has the  table  clean   wiped 
  b.  Frank hat das Fleisch roh geschnitten.    (depictive) 
    Frank has the meat    raw cut 
 
  In Chinese, however, depictives precede, while resultatives follow, Vpri, as shown in 
the contrast between (2) and (1). In the de-construction, the former also precede de, while the 
latter also follow de. The surface positions of de will be argued to be decided at PF (section 
4.2). Here I only consider the position of a secondary predicate with respect to Vpri.  
  The positions of secondary predicates are strict with respect to Vpri in Chinese, and 
may provide information about the integration of the vP argued for in section 2 into the 
structure of primary predication. In Chinese, complements of a verb occur to the right of the 
verb in unmarked cases, whereas adverbials of a verb occur to the left of the verb, as 
illustrated in (25a) and shown in (26). Similarly, as illustrated in (25b) and shown in the data 
in (27) as well as other Chinese data in this paper, resultatives occur to the right of Vpri while 
depictives occur to the left of Vpri. 
(25) a.  adverbial  V  complement 
  b.  depictive   V   resultative 
(26) a.  Akiu  {zuotian/like}              xi       le  na   jian chenshan. 
  Akiu  yesterday/immediately  wash  PRF that CL   shirt 
    ‘Akiu washed that shirt {yesterday/immediately}.’ 
  b.  *Akiu xi     le   na  jian chenshan {zuotian/like}. 
    Akiu  wash  PRF that CL   shirt          yesterday/immediately 
(27) a.  Akiu  qihuhu de ti     de men  zhi                yaohuang. 
    Akiu angry   DE kick DE door continuously shake 
    ‘Akiu kicked the door shaky angry.’ 
  b.  *Akiu zhi                yaohuang de ti     de men qihuhu. 
      Akiu continuously shake      DE kick DE door angry 
 
  These data show that depictives occur in a typical adverbial position, and resultatives 
occur in a typical complement position. The syntactic positions of depictives and resultatives 
with respect to Vpri in Chinese suggest that in the integration of a secondary predication into 
a primary one, depictives are hosted by a vP which is an adjunct of primary predicate, 
whereas resultatives are hosted by a vP which is a complement of Vpri. 
3.2  The co-occurrence restriction 
Resultatives do not co-occur with resultatives, while depictives can co-occur with depictives, 
as shown in (28). The restriction in English is discussed in Simpson (1983) and Rothstein 
(1985). The same contrast is observed in Chinese, as shown in (29). 
(28)  a.  *John kicked the door open to pieces.        (resultative) 
  b.  They ate the meat raw tender.          (depictive) 
(29)  a.  *Akiu da de Baoyu haotaodaku shou   le   shang.      (resultative) 
      Akiu hit DE Baoyu cry.loudly   suffer PRF wound 
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  b.  Akiu huoshengsheng de xinglixingqi de chi le  na   tiao yu.    (depictive) 
    Akiu alive                  DE stinky          DE eat PRF that CL  fish 
    ‘Akiu ate that fish alive stinky.’ 
 
  According to Winkler’s (1997:7) semantic account, (28a) is unacceptable because 
resultatives are delimiting expressions and an event can only be delimited once in a sentence, 
whereas (28b) is acceptable because depictives are not delimiting expressions, and thus the 
restriction does not apply. The contrast can also be accounted for structurally. It is generally 
assumed that an element cannot have two or more complements of the same type. The two 
complements, direct and indirect object, of a ditransitive verb bear different thematic roles. 
However, an element can have two or more adjuncts of the same type. The above co-
occurrence contrast between resultatives and depictives in English and Chinese provides 
another argument for the distinctions between complement and adjunct phrases which host 
secondary predicates. 
3.3  The hierarchy of depictives  
In this subsection we show that like adverbials, different types of depictives are structurally 
ordered in a hierarchy showing the properties of adverbials. 
  First, multiple depictives are ordered. When multiple depictives co-occur, we see 
mirror images of the orders in English and Chinese: In English, the order is object-oriented 
depictive - subject-oriented depictive (Carrier and Randall 1992), while in Chinese the order 
is just opposite; however, in both languages, object-oriented depictives are closer to Vpri than 
subject-oriented ones, as shown in the following: 
(30)  a.             V   depictiveobj depictivesbj (English) 
 b.  depictivesbj  depictiveobj  V      (Chinese) 
(31) a.  Johni sketched the modelj nudej [drunk as a skunk]i. 
 b.  *Johni sketched the modelj nudei [drunk as a skunk]j. 
(32) a.  Akiui yukuaii de rerej de  he     le  [na   wan  cha]j. 
    Akiu  happy   DE hot  DE drink PRF that bowl tea 
    ‘Akiu drank that bowl of tea hot happy.’ 
 b.  *Akiui rerej de yukuaii de  he    le   [na   wan  cha]j. 
      Akiu  hot   DE happy  DE drink PRF that bowl tea 
 
In (31), the depictive nude is closer to the Vpri sketched than the depictive drunk as a skunk. 
In the acceptable (31a), the subject of nude is co-referential with the model, which is the 
object of the Vpri, and the subject of drunk as a skunk is co-referential with John, which is the 
subject of the Vpri. (31b), with the opposite co-indexing, is unacceptable. Thus the object-
oriented depictive is closer to the Vpri than the subject-oriented one. In (32), there are also 
two depictive predicates, rere ‘hot’ and yukuai ‘happy’. In both sentences the subject of rere 
is co-referential with na wan cha ‘that bowl of tea’, which is the object of the Vpri he ‘drink’, 
and the subject of yukuai is co-referential with Akiu, which is the subject of he. Rere is closer 
to he ‘drink’ than yukuai in the acceptable (32a), whereas it is the other way around in the 
unacceptable (32b). Like (31), (32) also shows that the object-oriented depictive is closer to 
the Vpri than the subject-oriented one. 
  The pattern of the orders is similar to that of adverbials. In the following data ((34) is 
from Hornstein 2001: 116) the adjunct which has a dependency relation with the object of the 
matrix verb must be ordered closer to the matrix verb than the adjunct which has a 
dependency relation with the subject of the matrix verb. 
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(33) a.    Johni arrested Billj [for PROj driving his car too fast] [after PROi leaving  
  the  party] 
 b.    ??Johni arrested Billj [after PROi leaving the party] [for PROj driving  
    his car too fast]  
(34) a.  Johni bought Moby Dickj [for Mary to review ej] [PROi to annoy Sam] 
 b.  *Johni bought Moby Dickj [PROi to annoy Sam] [for Mary to review ej] 
 
  There is no doubt that the non-finite clauses above are adverbials. Hornstein (2001: 
97) claims that the adjunct which has a dependency relation with the object of the matrix verb 
is adjoined lower than the adjunct which has a dependency relation with the subject of the 
matrix verb. This difference in height indicates that the former has a closer structural relation 
to the matrix verb than the latter. In the linear order, the former is also closer to the matrix 
verb than the latter. The order restriction in (31) and (32) indicates that like the adverbials in 
(33)/(34), object-oriented depictives and subject-oriented depictives are ordered in a certain 
structural hierarchy. In H&L (1987: 27), the functional phrase hosting a subject-oriented 
depictive is a VP-adjunct, whereas the functional phrase hosting an object-oriented depictive 
is a V’-adjunct. The Chinese data in (31) and (32) are compatible with this distinction. 
  Second, the interactions with adverbs show the structural order of different types of 
depictives. For instance, subject-oriented depictives can occur to the left of the adverb like 
‘immediately’, while object-oriented depictives cannot, as shown in (35): 
(35)  a.  Akiu (like)            gaoxing de (like)            chang le   yi  shou ge. 
    Akiu  immediately glad     DE  immediately sing   PRF one CL    song 
    ‘Akiu sang a song glad (immediately).’ 
  b.  Akiu (like)            rere de (*like)           he     le   yi   bei cha. 
    Akiu immediately hot  DE immediately drink PRF one cup tea 
    ‘Akiu drank a cup of tea hot (immediately).’ 
 
  This restriction shows that the vP hosting the object-oriented depictive may be ordered 
lower than both the adverb and the vP hosting the subject-oriented depictive on the adverbial 
hierarchy, and thus has a closer structural relation with the Vpri. 
  The similarity of the order-patterns of depictives to the order-patterns of adverbials, 
and the interactions with other adverbs suggest that the vP hosting depictives has properties of 
adverbials. This order fact supports our claim that vPs which host depictives have an adjunct 
status in their integration into the structure of primary predication. 
  A remaining issue is what syntactic operation enables co-reference between the null 
subject of a depictive and an argument of Vpri. In other words, what are the syntactic 
representations of the so-called subject-orientation or object-orientation of a depictive 
predication? Following H&L, I assume that depictive constructions have a control-into-
adjunct structure. In other words, the null subject of a depictive is a PRO, controlled by an 
argument of the relevant Vpri.  
3.4  The control and ECM properties of resultative constructions 
In this subsection, we show that resultative constructions are either in a complement-control 
or in an ECM structure.
5 This in turn suggests that the phrase hosting resultatives is merged as 
a complement of Vpri. 
                                                 
5 Huang (1992) claims that resultative constructions have a control structure. I do not discuss his argumentation 
here since he uses many data of the causative BA-construction and the passive-like BEI-construction, which 
makes the issue complicated and unclear. 
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  I argue for Bowers’ (1993, 1997, 2000) claim that the resultative construction where 
the Vpri thematically selects the unique overt affected argument has a control structure 
whereas the construction where the Vpri does not do so is an ECM-like structure. I call the 
former construction TRC (Transitive Resultative Construction) and the latter IRC (Intransitive 
Resultative Construction). In (36a), the Vpri wipe selects the affected argument the table, thus 
(36a) is a TRC. In (36b), the Vpri ran does not select the affected argument their Nikes, thus 
(36b) is an IRC. The parallel Chinese resultative examples are (37) and (38), respectively. 
(36)  a.  John wiped the table  clean.     (TRC) 
  b.  The joggers ran their Nikes threadbare.    (IRC) 
(37)  a.  Akiu da    si   le   laohu.    (= 1a)    (TRC, V-V) 
  Akiu  beat  die  PRF tiger 
    ‘Akiu beat the tiger so that it died.’ 
  b.  Akiu da   de laohu liuxue le.    (= 1b)    (TRC, de) 
  Akiu  beat  DE tiger bleed   PRT 
    ‘Akiu beat the tiger so that it bled.’ 
(38)  a.  Akiu ku shi le     shoujuan.        (IRC, V-V) 
  Akiu  cry  wet  PRF handkerchief 
    ‘Akiu cried and as a result the handkerchief was wet.’ 
  b.  Akiu ku de shoujuan ye shi le.      (IRC, de) 
  Akiu  cry  DE handkerchief also wet PRF 
    ‘Akiu cried and as a result the handkerchief was wet.’ 
 
It is possible that the subject of a resultative predicate is a null form, as in (39). 
(39)  a.  Akiu ku  lei    le.        (= 3a) 
  Akiu  cry  tired  PRF 
    ‘Akiu cried and as a result he felt tired.’ 
  b.  Akiu wanr de wang le    zuoye.    (= 4a) 
  Akiu  play    DE forget PRF homework 
    ‘Akiu played so much that he forgot the homework.’ 
 
Similar data have been presented in (9b), (10b), and (11). In these data, the null subject of the 
resultative predicate is co-referential with the subject of Vpri, rather than the implicit patient 
of Vpri, if there is one. This type of data should be given the same treatment as that of other 
IRCs. 
3.4.1  Against the unitary approaches to TRC and IRC 
In the current literature, the approach represented by Hoekstra (1988) and Sybesma (1999) 
treats the affected argument in both TRC and IRC as subject of the resultative predicate. In 
contrast, the approach suggested by Rothstein (2000a: 259) tends to treat the affected 
argument in both TRC and IRC as an object of the Vpri. The following discussion will argue 
against these two unitary approaches. 
  In Korean, the affected argument has accusative case in TRC, whereas a nominative 
case in IRC (Kim & Maling 1997: 191). In English, the differences between TRC and IRC are 
noted by Wilder (1991, 1994), Carrier & Randall (1992), and Rothstein (1992), among others. 
They found that the two constructions contrast in selectional restrictions, middle formation, 
nominalization, subjacency violation, and semantic entailment. They claim that the contrasts 
indicate that the affected argument is the object of the Vpri in TRC, whereas it is the subject 
of the resultative predicate in IRC. In Chinese, the same claim is argued for by Li (1998: 287). 
I provide two more arguments for this non-unitary approach: a contrast in the adjacency 
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between the Vpri and the affected argument, and a contrast in extraction of the affected 
argument.  
  A focussed object can be preposed to either the left or the right of the subject in 
Chinese: 
(40) (lian  mingzii) Akiu (lian mingzii) dou wang-le   ti 
   even name   Akiu  even name     also   forget-PRF 
  ‘Akiu forgot even the name.’ 
 
In a TRC, the object of the resultative predicate can only be preposed to the right of the 
affected argument, as shown in (41a). In an IRC, however, the object of the resultative 
predicate can be preposed to either the left or the right of the affected argument, as shown in 
(41b): 
(41)  a.  Daiyu kua     de (*lian  mingzii) Baoyu (lian  mingzii) dou wang-le   ti.   (TRC) 
  Daiyu  praise  DE    even name     Baoyu   even name     also forget-PRF 
    ‘Daiyu praised Baoyu and as a result Baoyu forgot even the name.’  
  b.  Daiyu ku  de (lian mingzii) Baoyu (lian  mingzii) dou wang-le    ti.          (IRC) 
  Daiyu  cry  DE  even name    Baoyu  even name     also forget-PRF 
    ‘Daiyu cried and as a result Baoyu forgot even the name.’  
 
The contrast is expected if Baoyu is the object of the Vpri in (41a), but the subject of the 
resultative predicate in (41b), because the pre-Baoyu nominal lian mingzi ‘even name’ is in 
the permitted clause-initial position in (41b), but illegitimately intervenes between the Vpri 
and its object in (41a), making the sentence unacceptable. 
  Another relevant contrast is the extraction contrast between TRC and IRC presented in 
(19) and (20). Specifically, extraction of an affected argument is possible in TRC, but not in 
IRC. We will discuss this contrast in section 3.4.3. 
  The above two contrasts between TRC and IRC strongly suggest that the two 
constructions have different structures. Following Rothstein (1992) and Levin & Rappaport 
Hovav (1995), among others, I will analyze the affected argument as a subject of the 
resultative predicate in IRC and as an object of the Vpri in TRC. 
3.4.2  A control analysis of TRC 
Chinese TRCs have both object-control and subject-control structures. For an object-control 
structure, consider (42): 
(42)  a.  Akiu kan  de zhe ben shu   dou   lan       le. 
  Akiu  read  DE this CL    book even broken PRF 
    ‘Akiu read this book and  as a result the book even got broken.’ 
  b.  *Akiu kan de  zhe ben shu   dou   bunaifan  le. 
      Akiu read DE this CL    book even impatient PRF 
 
In (42), the affected argument zhe ben shu ‘this CL book’ is thematically selected by and is an 
object of the Vpri kan ‘read’. The null subject of the resultative dou lan le ‘even broken PRF’ 
is co-referential with the object. This co-reference relation obeys the Minimal Distance 
Principle (MDP, Rosenbaum 1970) on control, which roughly states that a PRO selects as its 
controller the nearest c-commanding nominal. The nearest c-commanding overt nominal to 
the resultative predicate must be the controller of the PRO subject of the predicate. In (42a) 
the nominal is zhe ben shu ‘this book’ rather than Akiu. In (42b), however, MDP requires zhe 
ben shu ‘this book’ to be the controller of the PRO subject, but semantically this overt 
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nominal cannot be predicated of by the resultative predicate bunaifan ‘impatient’. 
Consequently the predication fails. 
  One argument for the object-control construction of (42a) is that it obeys Bach’s 
generalization (Bach 1979, Larson 1991b), which states that detransitivization is available 
with subject-control verbs but proscribed with object-control verbs.  
(43)  a.  John promised (Mary) to leave.      (subject-control) 
  b.  John {persuaded/forced} *(Mary) to leave.    (object-control) 
 
As in (43b), if we remove the object from (42a), the sentence becomes unacceptable: 
(44)    *Akiu kan  de dou   lan       le. 
      Akiu read DE even broken PRF 
 
  Bach’s generalization captures the constraint that in obligatory control, PRO must 
have an overt antecedent (H&L 1987: 36).  Returning to data like (11), repeated here as (45), 
we now can see why the subject of the resultative here cannot be co-referential with the 
implicit patient of the Vpri. 
(45) a.  Taotaoi zhui  de hen lei. 
  Taotao  chase  DE very tired 
  ‘ T a o t a o i chased Xj and as a result {hei/*Xj}got tired.’ 
 b.  Taotaoi zhui   lei    le. 
  Taotao  chase  tired  PRF  
  ‘ T a o t a o i chased Xj and as a result {hei/*Xj}got tired.’ 
 
  In this respect, an obligatorily controlled PRO is like reciprocals and reflexives 
((46a,b), Chomsky 1986), and unlike pronouns (46c) and a non-obligatorily controlled PRO 
(46d), which do not require an overt antecedent (H&L: 36, Hornstein 2001):  
(46) a.  Theyi decided to hit {each other/themselves}i. 
  b.  *Damaging testimony was given about {each other/themselves}. 
  c.  The boat was sunk in order [that he could collect the insurance]. 
  d.  The boat was sunk [PRO to collect the insurance]. 
 
  We have shown that data like (42) have object-control structures. The following data 
(adapted from Y. Li 1999: 448) exhibit properties of subject-control structures, i.e., the PRO 
subject of the resultative predicate is controlled by the nearest subject Daiyu. 
(47)  a.  (Akiu zhidao) Daiyu deng de Baoyu PRODaiyu zuolibu’an. 
     Akiu  know   Daiyu  wait DE Baoyu                 restless 
    ‘(A. knew that) D. waited for B. and as a result D. became restless.’ 
 b.  (Akiu  tingshuo) Daiyu xiang de Baoyu PRODaiyu shuibuzhaojiao. 
     Akiu  hear         Daiyu miss  DE  Baoyu                unable.sleep 
    ‘(A. heard that) D. missed B. so much that D. could not sleep.’ 
 
  Like other resultative constructions, data like (47) describe a resultative state which is 
caused by the action denoted by the primary predication. According to Larson (1991b: 115, 
adopted in Bowers 2000: 321) and Hornstein (2001) the object of subject-control verbs does 
not c-command the PRO, since it is hosted by an adjunct of the verb. Thus MDP is not 
violated in the controlling of the PRO by John in John promised Mary to leave and Akiu in 
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(47).
6 Hornstein (2001: 64 fn 19) suggests that the object of promise is the object of a null 
preposition corresponding to the to in the nominal form in (48a), as shown in (48b): 
(48)  a.  John’s promise to Mary to leave 
  b.  John promised [PP P Mary] [PRO to leave] 
 
As in the object-control cases, MDP is obeyed in (47). The PRO is controlled by the nearest 
c-commanding nominal Daiyu, rather than Akiu, which is not a nearest c-commanding 
nominal.  
  In addition, Bach’s Generalization is also observed. (49) shows that as in (43a), 
detransitivization of the Vpri in (47a) does not change the control pattern. 
(49)   Daiyui deng de zuolibu’an. 
  Daiyu    wait  DE restless 
  ‘ D a i y u i waited and as a result shei became restless.’ 
 
  The following data show that the subject-control property of deng ‘wait’ and xiang 
‘miss’ is kept in the V-V construction: 
(50) a.  Akiui deng ji             le   Daiyuj PROi (pro da     dianhua wen zenme-huishi). 
    Akiu  wait impatient PRF Daiyu                  make call       ask   what-thing 
  ‘Akiui waited for Daiyuj so much that hei became impatient  
    (and then he made a phone call asking what happened)’ 
 b.  Akiui xiang feng le  Daiyuj PROi. 
    Akiu  miss  mad PRF Daiyu 
  ‘Akiui missed Daiyuj so much that hei became insane.’ 
 
Subject-control verbs are less common than object-control verbs.
7 If the Vpris in (47) are 
replaced by other transitive verbs such as kua ‘praise’, ma ‘scold’, or piping ‘criticize’, the 
PRO subject of the resultative predicate will be controlled by the object Baoyu rather than the 
subject Daiyu (I will discuss the issue of subject-orientation of the V-V TRC in section 5.1). 
3.4.3  A ECM analysis of IRC 
Bowers (1993: 622, 1997: 45, 2000: 325) argues that in the English IRCs, the subject of the 
secondary predicate raises to the higher clause, as shown in (51): 
(51)  a.  The joggers ran their Nikesi [PRP ti threadbare]. 
  b.  John ate himselfi [PRP ti sick]. 
 
  Based on the arguments presented in Lasnik & Saito (1991), Chomsky (1995) claims 
that an ECM structure is derived by movement of the embedded subject to a specifier position 
in the higher clause. The essence of Bowers’ ECM analysis of IRCs is that the subject of the 
resultative predicate has a theta relation locally, whereas it has a Case relation with the 
primary predication, and thus behaves like an object of Vpri.  
                                                 
6 Larson (1991b) claims that subject-control verbs are ditransitive verbs. However, it has been pointed out to me 
that dative shift verbs other than promise still take object-control. For example, tell permits dative shift, as in I 
told Mary the answer, but tell  is nevertheless an object-control verb, as in John told Mary PRO to kill 
herself/*himself. Thus in my present work I do not link the subject-control property of verbs such as promise to 
the dative shift property. In addition, Chinese verbs like deng ‘wait’ and xiang ‘miss’ have no dative shift 
property anyway: 
(i)  a.  *Akiu deng le  Baoyu yi   feng xin.    b.  *Akiu xiang le   Baoyu yi  feng xin. 
     Akiu  wait PRF Baoyu one CL    letter      Akiu miss  PRF Baoyu one CL    letter 
7 Acquisition evidence shows that subject-control verbs are marked in English (see Hornstein 2001: 35).  
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  Bowers’ analysis can be supported by the fact that the affected argument in IRC shows 
object properties. Rothstein (2000a: 256) uses the following evidence to show that the 
affected argument in IRC has properties of a direct object. As is well known, 
accomplishments can have an atelic reading if their direct object is a bare plural or a mass 
noun. She notes that the event denoted by IRC can be atelic if the affected argument is a bare 
plural or a mass noun. The data in (52) have atelic counterparts in (53): 
(52)  a.  John sang the baby asleep. 
  b.  The audience laughed the clown off the stage. 
(53)  a.  John sang babies asleep for hours last night. 
  b.  The audience was very cruel and laughed performers off the stage as fast as 
    they could come on. 
 
  Since objects in Chinese do not raise overtly for Case reasons, I assume that if there is 
a Case relation between a verb and the subject of its complement clause (an ECM structure), 
the relevant Case checking is accomplished either by covert raising of the embedded subject 
or without any movement (Chomsky’s (1998, 1999) Agree). I have three arguments for the 
ECM structure of IRC in Chinese. First, the affected argument in IRC has properties of a 
typical object. This is shown by the fact that such an argument can occur to the left of the 
Vpri in the BA construction, as in (54a). The affected argument in this sense is similar to an 
affected object of a transitive verb, as in (54b). Generally, nominals construed with an 
intransitive verb cannot occur in the BA construction, as shown in (55), where shi ‘wet’ and 
qu ‘go’ are intransitive verbs:
8 
(54)  a.  Akiu ba shoujuan       ku  de quan        shi-le. 
  A k i u   BA handkerchief cry DE complete wet-PRF 
    ‘Akiu cried and as a result the handkerchief was completely wet.’ 
  b.  Akiu ba mianbao chi-le. 
  A k i u   BA bread     eat-PRF 
    ‘Akiu ate the bread.’ 
(55)  a.  *Akiu ba shoujuan       shi-le. 
      Akiu  BA handkerchief wet-PRF 
  b.  *Akiu ba Xizang qu-le. 
      Akiu  BA Tibet    go-PRF 
 
  Second, unlike in the de-TRC, the affected argument in the de-IRC can be nonspecific, 
and the available nonspecific reading is found in objects rather than subjects in Chinese (I will 
discuss the specificity issue of the V-V construction in section 5.2). The subject of a primary 
predicate, regardless of whether the predicate is individual-level or stage-level, cannot be 
nonspecific in Chinese generally (Li & Thompson 1981, Tsai 2001, among others), as shown 
in (56a). The same constraint is observed in the PRO subject of the resultative predicate in the 
de-TRC, as shown in (56b). 
                                                 
8 It has been mentioned to me that (ib) is not acceptable (contra Huang 1992: 111).  
(i)  a.  Akiu ba Baoyu ku  de hen   gan’ga. 
 Akiu  BA Baoyu cry DE very embarrassed 
  ‘Akiu cried and as a result Baoyu got very embarrassed.’ 
b.  ??Akiu ba Baoyu ku  de hen  shangxin. 
     Akiu BA Baoyu cry DE very sad 
  ‘Akiu cried and as a result Baoyu got sad.’ 
I have no account for the unnaturalness of (ib), compared to the grammatical (ia), as well as (54a). 
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(56)  a.  liang ge haizi haotaodaku. 
  two    CL   child cry.loudly 
    ‘The two children cried loudly.’ 
    Not: ‘There are two children, who cried loudly.’ 
  b.  Akiu da   de liang ge haizii PROi haotaodaku. 
  Akiu  beat  DE two  CL child            cry.loudly 
    ‘Akiu beat the two children and as a result they cried loudly.’ 
    Not: ‘There are two children, whom Akiu beat and as a result they cried  
  loudly.’ 
 
The affected argument in the de-IRC, however, can be nonspecific, as shown below. Thus the 
argument has a property of objects rather than subjects in this respect. 
(57)  a.  Akiu xiao   de liang hang yanlei gua  zai le  lian-shang. 
  Akiu  laugh  DE two   line   tear    hang at PRF face-on 
    ‘Akiu laughed and as a result two lines of tears appeared on his face.’ 
  b.  Akiu han    de xuduo ren      fenfen                  likai   le  hui-chang. 
  Akiu  shout  DE many  people one.after.another leave PRF meeting-hall 
    ‘Akiu shouted and as a result many people left the meeting hall.’ 
 
  Third, unlike in an TRC, extraction out of an IRC is difficult, and the contrast patterns 
with the contrast between a control and an ECM structure in general. In the de-construction 
data in (58) and the V-V construction data in (59), topicalization and relativization of the 
internal argument of Vpri of TRC are possible; however, topicalization and relativization of 
the affected argument in IRC are not allowed.  
(58)  a.  na   shuang xiei Akiu chuan de ti dou  po       le.     (de-TRC)  (similar to 19) 
    that pair     shoe Akiu wear DE    even broken PRF 
    ‘That pair of shoes, Akiu wore and as a result they were broken.’ 
  b.   *na   tiao shoujuani      Akiu ku  de ti hen  shi.  (de-IRC) 
      that  CL    handkerchief Akiu cry DE   very wet 
  c.  Akiu chuan de ti dou  po        le  de    na   shuang xiei   (de-TRC) 
    Akiu wear   DE   even broken PRF MOD that pair    shoe  
    ‘that pair of shoes that Akiu wore and as a result became broken.’ 
  d.   *Akiu ku  DE ti hen  shi  de    na   tiao shoujuan ( de-IRC) 
      Akiu cry DE   very wet MOD that CL   handkerchief  
(59)  a.  Na shuang xiei, Akiu chuan po       le   ti.    (V-V TRC)  (similar to 20) 
    that pair    shoe  Akiu wear  broken PRF 
    ‘That pair of shoes, Akiu wore and as a result they were broken.’ 
  b.  *na   tiao shoujuani,     Akiu ku   shi  le   ti.   (V-V  IRC) 
      that  CL    handkerchief Akiu cry wet PRF  
  c.  Akiu chuan po        le    ti de    na   shuang xie (V-V  TRC) 
    Akiu wear   broken PRF     MOD that pair     shoe 
    ‘that pair of shoes that Akiu wore and as a result became broken’ 
  d.  *Akiu ku  shi  le   ti de    na   tiao shoujuan   (V-V  IRC) 
      Akiu cry wet PRF    MOD that CL   handkerchief 
 
  In English, no such contrast is seen in a short-distance extraction: 
(60)  a.   The joggers ran their Nikes threadbare. 
  b.  Those Nikes, the joggers ran threadbare.     (topicalization) 
  c.  the Nikes that the joggers ran threadbare    (relativization) 
(61)  a.   John drank those people under the table. 
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  b.  Those people, John drank under the table.    (topicalization) 
  c.  the people whom John drank under the table   (relativization) 
 
However, the contrast is revealed in a long-distance extraction (Rothstein 1992, 2000b): 
(62)  a.  Which table did you ask whether John wiped clean? 
  b.  ??Which baby did you ask whether John sang asleep? 
 
In (62a), the wh-nominal which table in the TRC moves out of the weak wh-island (the 
complement whether-clause), whereas in (62b), it is hard for the wh-nominal which baby in 
the IRC to undergo the similar movement. 
  The data in (63) show that in tough-constructions, extraction of an embedded object 
out of a control structure is easier than extraction of an embedded object out of an ECM 
structure (Chung 2001).  
(63)  a.  ?Which book was John hard for us to persuade to read? 
  b.  *Which book was John hard for us to expect to read? 
 
  The extraction data above indicate that it is easier to extract a nominal from a control 
structure than from an ECM structure. The extraction contrast introduced above between TRC 
and IRC may reflect the contrast between a control structure and ECM structure in general. 
  The two analyses, control and ECM, presented in Bowers (1993, 1997, 2000) and 
adopted in this paper, can capture the properties of the TRC and IRC. Specifically, in TRC the 
patient argument is the controller of the PRO subject of the resultative predicate. In IRC, 
however, there is no PRO, and the subject of the resultative predicate has a Case relation with 
the Vpri. The Case relation is similar to that between a transitive verb and its object. Thus the 
subject of the resultative in IRCs shows some, but not all, properties of objects. In Chinese, on 
the one hand, the subject of a resultative predicate in IRC can occur in the BA construction 
and can be nonspecific, as shown in (54a) and (57), respectively, exhibiting object properties. 
On the other hand, as shown in (41b), the subject of the resultative predicate can be preceded 
by some element in IRC, whereas a typical object cannot. This can be explained if the subject 
does not move overtly to the object position of the Vpri. 
  I conclude this subsection by claiming that in TRC, the subject of the resultative is a 
PRO, which can be viewed as a trace of a theta-to-theta movement (Hornstein 1999), whereas 
in IRC, the subject of the resultative is a regular overt nominal, not a PRO. However, the 
properties of both a control structure and an ECM-like structure indicate that the vP which 
hosts resultatives is a complement of Vpri, in both types of resultative constructions. 
  Based on the above four aspects, i.e., the position with respect to Vpri, the co-
occurrence restriction, the hierarchy of depictives, and the control/ECM properties of 
resultative constructions, we conclude that the vP hosting secondary predicates are integrated 
into the structure of primary predication in two ways: as a complement of Vpri, or as an 
adjunct. The former case is found in resultative constructions, and the latter case is found in 
depictive constructions. 
3.5  The locality of integration of a vP into the structure of primary 
predication 
In both Chinese and English, the subject of a secondary predicate cannot be co-referential 
with the object of a preposition (Williams 1980: 204). For instance, the subject of the 
resultative predicate full is co-referential with the object of the Vpri, wagon,  in (64a); 
however, the subject of full cannot be co-referential with wagon, which is the object of the 
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preposition into, in (64b). Similarly, the subject of the depictive predicate green cannot be co-
referential with hay, which is the object of the preposition with, in (64d).  
(64)  a.  John loaded the wagon full [with hay]. 
  b.  *John loaded the hay [into the wagon] full. 
  c.  John loaded the hay [into the wagon] green. 
  d.  *John loaded the wagon [with hay] green. 
 
  The same constraint is found in Chinese. In the reading of (65a), it is Akiu rather than 
Baoyu who was excited. In other words, the subject of the depictive predicate xingfen 
‘excited’ is co-referential with the subject of Vpri, Akiu, rather than Baoyu, which is the 
object of the preposition dui ‘to’. Similarly, the subject of the depictive predicate rere ‘hot’ is 
co-referential with the object of Vpri, yi wan tang ‘one bowl of soup’, rather than chufang 
‘kitchen’, which is the object of the preposition zai ‘at’, in (65b). In (65c), the subject of the 
depictive predicate ruanruan ‘soft’ cannot be co-referential with na tiao maojin ‘that towel’, 
which is the object of the preposition wei ‘for’. It can only be co-referential with the subject 
of Vpri, i.e., Akiu; however, semantically, a person cannot be predicated of by ruanruan, and 
thus the sentence is unacceptable. In the V-V construction (65d), the subject of the depictive 
predicate nu ‘angry’ is co-referential with Akiu, which is the subject of the Vpri ma ‘scold’, 
rather than Baoyu, which is the object of the preposition miandui ‘toward’. The parralel 
resultative data are presented in (66). The subject of the resultative predicate mei xinsi kan shu 
‘have no mood to read books’ cannot be co-referential with Baoyu, which is the object of the 
preposition miandui ‘towards’, in (66b). In the V-V construction (66c), the subject of the 
resultative predicate ku ‘cry’ is co-referential with Daiyu, which is the object of the Vpri da 
‘beat’, rather than Baoyu, which is the object of the preposition miandui ‘toward’.  
(65)  a.  Akiu [dui Baoyu] xingfen de shuo le    xuduo hua.  
    Akiu  to   Baoyu  excited  DE speak PRF many  words 
    ‘Akiu said many words to Baoyu excited.’ 
  b.  Akiu [zai chufang li] rere de he le yi wan tang. 
    Akiu   at  kitchen in  hot   DE drink PRF one bowl soup 
    ‘Akiu drank a bowl of soup in the kitchen hot.’ 
  c.  *Akiu [wei na tiao maojin] ruanruan de zou-jin      le   yu-shi. 
      Akiu  for  that CL  towel     soft         DE walk-enter PRF bath-room 
  d.  Akiu [miandui Baoyu] nu     ma     Daiyu. 
    Akiu  toward   Baoyu  angry scold Daiyu 
    ‘Akiu scolded Daiyu angry in front of Baoyu.’ 
(66)  a.  Akiu ku de  mei        xinsi   kan  shu    le. 
  Akiu  cry  DE not.have mood read book PRT 
    ‘Akiu cried so that he had no mood to read books.’  
  b.  Akiu [miandui Baoyu] ku de mei         xinsi  kan  shu    le. 
    Akiu  towards  Baoyu  cry DE not.have mood read book PRT 
  ‘Akiui cried in front of Baoyuj so that hei/*j had no mood to read books.’ 
  c.  Akiu [maindui Baoyu] da    ku le    Daiyu. 
    Akiu  toward    Baoyu  beat cry PRF Daiyu 
    ‘Akiu beat Daiyu in front of Baoyu so that Daiyu cried.’ 
 
  None of the subject-oriented depictive in (67a), the object-oriented depictive in (67b), 
and the resultative in (67c) can be co-referential with the possessor in the constructions.  
(67)  a.  Akiu de    erzi shangxin de jiang le   yi   ge gushi. 
  A k i u   MOD son sad          DE tell    PRF one CL story 
    ‘Akiu’s son told a story sad.’     (It is not Akiu who was sad.) 
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  b.  Akiu huo  zhuo  le   na  zhi laohu de    zaizi. 
  Akiu  alive  catch  PRF that CL  tiger  MOD baby  
    ‘Akiu caught the baby of that tiger alive.  (It is not the parent who was  
        a l i v e . )  
  c.  Akiu da    de na  zhi laohu de   zaizi  liuxue le. 
  Akiu  beat  DE that CL  tiger  MOD baby bleed PRT 
    ‘Akiu beat the baby of that tiger so that it bled.’ (It is not the parent who bled.) 
 
  Williams accounts for the English data like (64) by the C-command condition on his 
co-indexing operation of predication in general. The above data show that if the subject of a 
secondary predication is co-referential with a nominal of a primary predication, the nominal 
must be an argument of Vpri rather than any other nominal. The constraint indicates that the 
integration of a secondary predication into a primary one must be syntactically local. This 
locality constraint should follow the general principles of syntactic computations. In 
resultative constructions, we have argued that they have control (for TRCs) or ECM-like (for 
IRCs) structures. In the control structure, the general C-Command condition prohibits a PRO 
from being controlled by the object of a preposition, thus the impossibility for the subject of a 
resultative predicate to be co-referential with the object of a preposition is accounted for. 
Similarly, the general C-Command condition also prohibits a PRO from being controlled by a 
nominal internal to an argument nominal, thus the impossibility for the subject of a resultative 
predicate to be co-referential with the possessor of a nominal is also accounted for. In the 
ECM-like structure, the embedded subject has a Case relation with the verb, rather than a 
preposition or other nominal in the upper clause. Thus the impossibility for the subject of a 
resultative predicate to be co-referential with the object of a preposition or a possessor is also 
captured. 
  As for depictive constructions, we have assumed that they have control-to-adjunct 
structures. I then simply assume that whatever principle which rules out the impossible 
control in (68), rules out the impossible control in the depictive constructions in (65) and 
(67).
9  
(68)  a.  John arrested Billi behind Timj [for PROi/*j driving his car too fast] 
  b.  John arrested Bill’js brotheri [for PROi/*j driving his car too fast]  
 
  Depictive constructions thus differ from parasitic gap (pg) constructions. On the one 
hand, pgs, by definition, require real gaps to “license” them, whereas the null subject of 
depictives does not. In other words, the controller of the PRO subject of a depictive does not 
need to undergo any movement. On the other hand, pgs can be related to a real gap which is 
                                                 
9 One might assume that the null subject of a depictive predicate is the trace of a sideward theta-to-theta 
movement from an adjunct vP to an argument position of the primary predication, adopting Nunes & Uriagereka 
(2000) and Hornstein (2001). In the depictive constructions in (65), if the null subject of the depictive predicate 
were co-referential with the object of the preposition, the assumed sideward movement would land at a position 
internal to a PP. Nunes and Uriagereka (2000: 38) claim that “sideward movement from a derivational 
workspace W1 to a derivational workspace W2 yields licit result just in case W1 will be embedded in W2 at some 
derivational step.” In the licit derivations of depictive constructions, the sideward movement of a nominal lands 
at an argument position of the verbal projection of the primary predication, and the vP where the sideward 
movement starts is finally embedded to the verbal projection. In data like (65), the adjunct PP itself is an 
independent derivational workspace. If a sideward movement lands at a position internal to the PP, obviously, 
the vP where the sideward movement starts is never embedded to the PP. Thus such a derivation is not licit. 
Consequently, co-reference of the subject of a depictive predicate with an object of a preposition is impossible. 
However, this embedded-to-embedding-account has both empirical and theoretical problems. 
Empirically, it cannot cover the parasitic data like (69), where an assumed sideward movement lands internal to 
a PP. Theoretically, this embedded-to-embedding-account is not a local consideration. To judge the possibility of 
a certain step derivation one needs to check the future steps of the derivation. 
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an object of a preposition, as shown in (69) (Hornstein 2001: 114) and (70a) (Hornstein 2001: 
79, 123), whereas the null subject of a depictive cannot co-referential with an object of a 
preposition, as shown above. 
(69)  a.  Who did you show the book [to t] before Fred introduced pg. 
  b.  Who did you talk to me [about t] right after Fred introduced pg. 
(70)  a.  This is a topic that you should think about t before talking about pg. 
  b.  *This is a topic about which you should think t before talking pg. 
 
In this section, I have studied the syntactic properties of depictive and resultative predicates, 
arguing that the former are hosted by an adjunct vP, while the latter are hosted by a 
complement vP. The ways in which they are integrated into the structure of primary 
predication follow the general principles governing computations of complements and 
adjuncts. 
4  The surface position of the element realizing of v in secondary 
predication 
In this section we discuss the surface position of an overt element at v, i.e., de  or the 
secondary predicate in the V-V construction. I will make the following claims. The surface 
position of de is decided at PF. In the V-V construction, the lexical head of a depictive 
predicate first raises to v (8b) and then left-adjoins to Vpri at PF, while the lexical head of a 
resultative predicate undergoes successive head raising in syntax. 
4.1  The V-V Constructions 
In the depictive V-V construction, the depictive predicate is left-adjacent to Vpri, while in the 
resultative V-V construction, the resultative predicate is right-adjacent to Vpri. This is shown 
in the possible positions of adverbs such as like ‘immediately’ and yijing ‘already’ in (71): 
(71)  a.  Akiu (like)            sheng (*like)           chi le   na   tiao yu. 
    Akiu immediately raw     immediately eat PRF that CL    fish 
    ‘Akiu (immediately) ate that fish raw.’  
  b.  Akiu (yijing)  da   (*yijing)  ku  le  Baoyu. 
    Akiu  already beat   already cry PRF Baoyu  
    ‘Akiu (already) beat Baoyu so that Baoyu cried.’ 
 
In (71a), the depictive predicate sheng ‘raw’ is immediately left-adjacent to the Vpri chi ‘eat’. 
In (71b), the resultative predicate verb ku ‘cry’ is immediately right-adjacent to the Vpri da 
‘beat’. In neither case can the adverb occur between the Vpri and the secondary predicate.  
  Although both types of secondary predicates are adjacent to Vpri, the depictive 
sequence of [V-Vpri-Asp] is opaque to syntactic operations, while the resultative sequence of 
[Vpri-V-Asp] is not. This can be shown by the so-called A-not-A formation, a yes-no 
question formation in Chinese. In this operation, a yes-no [Q] feature is integrated into a verb, 
deriving a form where the verb is reduplicated, and an appropriate form of the negation word 
occurs between the two copies of the verb, as shown in (72b). 
(72)  a.  Akiu chi le   na   tiao yu. 
  Akiu  eat  PRF that CL   fish 
    ‘Akiu ate that fish.’ 
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  b.  Akiu chi mei chi na  tiao yu? 
    Akiu eat not  eat that CL   fish 
    ‘Did Akiu eat that fish?’ 
 
  This A-not-A formation can be applied to the resultative sequence [Vpri-V-Asp], but 
not the depictive sequence [V-Vpri-Asp], as shown in the contrast between the depictive 
constructions in (73) and the resultative constructions in (74): 
(73)  a.  Akiu sheng chi le  na   tiao yu. 
    Akiu raw    eat PRF that CL   fish 
    ‘Akiu ate that fish raw.’ 
  b.  *Akiu sheng (chi) mei sheng chi na   tiao yu? 
      Akiu raw     eat   not   raw    eat that CL   fish 
  b’.  *Akiu sheng chi-mei-chi na  tiao yu? 
      Akiu raw    eat-not-eat  that CL   fish 
  c.  *Akiu huo  (zhuo) mei huo  zhuo  na   tiao yu? 
      Akiu alive catch  not alive catch that CL   fish 
  d.  *Akiu nu      (ma)    mei nu      ma    Baoyu? 
      Akiu angry scold not angry scold Baoyu 
(74)  a.  Akiu da    po        le  na   ge huaping. 
  Akiu  beat  broken  PRF that CL vase 
    ‘Akiu beat that vase broken.’ 
  b.  Akiu da   (po)      mei da    po       na   ge huaping? 
    Akiu beat broken not  beat broken that CL vase 
    ‘Did Akiu break that vase?’ 
 
  One account for this contrast is that the depictive sequence [V-Vpri-Asp] is derived at 
PF, and thus there is no way to go back to syntax to integrate a [Q] feature into this sequence. 
The theoretical presupposition here is that any element which has been targeted by a 
phonological operation cannot undergo a subsequent syntactic operation. It is generally 
assumed that Chinese verbs overtly adjoin to the head of AspP in syntax to derive the verb-
asp sequence. I propose that depictive predicate verbs PF-adjoin to the left of the Vpri after 
the Vpri has moved to Asp. By the proposed PF movement, the depictive predicate verb left-
adjoins to the sequence [Vpri-Asp], and thus a new sequence of [V-Vpri-Asp] is derived. In 
(73a), for instance, the lexical head sheng ‘raw’ of the depictive predicate moves from a VP to 
the head of a vP in syntax (8b) (step c in (75)), and the vP merges with the primary predicate 
as an adjunct (I use ⇒ to show this adjunction integration in step d in (75)). The exact 
adjunction place is irrelevant here. On the other hand, in the structure of the primary 
predicate, chi ‘eat’ adjoins to the perfect aspect le in syntax, deriving [chi-le] at Asp (step e 
in (75)). Then at PF sheng moves from v to [chi-le], deriving [sheng-chi-le] (step f in (75)). 
 
(75) step  c  head-raising in vP   Akiu sheng chi le  na   tiao yu   (73a) 
    vP         Akiu raw    eat PRF that CL fish 
      3     ‘Akiu ate that fish raw.’ 
 PROi             v’ 
      3 
    sheng       VP 
   6 
          tsheng  
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 step  d  adjunction 
            vP   ⇒        vP 
   3   3 
        PROi       v’          Akiu        v’ 
             3   6 
       sheng          VP           VP 
          6   6 
                tsheng     chi   [na tiao yu]i 
 
 step  e head-raising to Asp 
        AspP 
  3 
            Asp’ 
   3 
        chi-le        XP 
    3 
            vP           XP 
   3     3 
          PROi       v’             X’ 
             3  6 
   sheng   VP   vP 
          6      3 
                  tsheng Akiu    v’ 
           6 
                      VP 
       6 
       t chi   [na tiao yu]i 
 
step f PF-raising 
        AspP 
  3 
            Asp’ 
   3 
      sheng [chi-le]        XP 
    3 
            vP         XP 
   3   3 
           PROi       v’           X’ 
             3     6 
            tsheng   VP    vP 
          6       3 
     t sheng     tAkiu   v’ 
             6 
       t chi   [na tiao yu]i 
 
  In this derivation, after sheng is combined with [chi-le] at PF, the derived form sheng-
chi-le is opaque to any syntactic operation such as the integration of [Q] to derive an A-not-A 
form. Thus data like (73b-d) are underivable, as desired. In addition, being a PF operation, the 
raising of sheng from an adjunct in step f is not ruled out by CED. 
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  The resultative V-V construction, in contrast, does not involve any such PF operation. 
I illustrate the derivation of (74a) in (76). I assume that in this construction, after the 
resultative predicate verb po ‘broken’ raises to v (8b) (step c), the verb moves further to the 
right of the Vpri da ‘beat’, which selects the vP (step d).
10  Then the newly formed [da-po] 
raises to Asp, deriving the sequence of [da-po-le] (step e).  
(76)        AspP      Akiu da   po        le    na  ge huaping.   (74a) 
  3    Akiu  beat  broken  PRF that CL vase 
            Asp’    ‘Akiu beat that vase broken.’ 
   3 
    [da-po]-le      .... 
              vP 
    3 
    t Akiu            v’ 
        e     6 
                         VP 
     3 
        na ge huaping        V’ 
      3 
       tda-po        vP 
       3 
              PRO           v’ 
                d   3 
        t po        VP 
         6 
                        c        tpo 
 
 
  Since these three instances of head raising all occur in syntax, a further syntactic 
operation such as the integration of [Q] is possible. Thus this analysis captures the 
grammaticality of (74b). 
4.2  The DE Constructions 
In the depictive de construction, de is right-adjacent to the depictive predicate. This is shown 
in (77a), where the possible positions of the adverb like ‘immediately’ illustrate the 
adjacency. 
(77)  a.  Akiu (like)          gaoxing (*like)        de  (like)           na    le   yi   zhang tanzi. 
    A.    immediately happy immediately DE immediately take PRF one CL    carpet 
    ‘Akiu (immediately) took a carpet happy.’ 
  b.  Akiu hen  gaoxing de ruanruan de zai di-shang pu        le   yi   zhang tanzi. 
    Akiu very happy    DE soft         DE at   floor-on  spread PRF one CL     carpet 
    ‘Akiu spread a carpet on the floor soft happy.’ 
 
 In  (77a),  de occurs to the immediate right of the depictive predicate gaoxing ‘happy’.  
In (77b), there are two depictive predicates. Each occurrence of de surfaces to the right of 
each depictive predicate, hen gaoxing ‘very happy’ and ruanruan ‘soft’. Data like (77) tell us 
that de, which is base-generated at v, surfaces to the immediate right of a depictive predicate. 
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10 Kayne’s (1994) constraint that heads can only left-adjoin to other heads is violated in this case. Other cases of 
similar violation can be found in the literature (cf. Roberts 2000). I leave this issue for future research. Depictive and Resultative Constructions in Chinese 
  We have assumed that depictive predicates are complement of v (8a). In addition, we 
also assume that a complement is to the right of its selecting head (Kayne 1994). Thus the 
base-order of a depictive predicate in the de construction should be [de-X], where X is the 
depictive predicate. The surface order in (77), however, is [X-de]. 
  In the resultative de construction, de is right-adjacent to Vpri. This is shown in (78), 
where the possible positions of the adverb yijing ‘already’ illustrate the adjacency. 
(78)    Akiu (yijing) ku  (*yijing) de liang tiao shoujuan       dou  shi  le.  
    Akiu already cry   already DE two   CL    handkerchief even wet PRT 
    ‘A. (already) cried so much that two handkerchieves were wet.’ 
 
In (78), de  is immediately right-adjacent to the Vpri ku ‘cry’, and no adverb can occur 
between the Vpri and de.  
 The  de-cluster in both the depictive and the resultative construction fails to form an A-
not-A form:
11 
(79)  a.  Akiu rere de he      le  na   bei  cha. 
  Akiu  hot    DE drink PRF that cup tea 
    ‘Akiu drank that cup of tea hot.’ 
  b.  *Akiu rere de {mei/bu} rere de he    (le)  na   bei  cha? 
     Akiu  hot  DE  not/not   hot   DE drink PRF that cup tea 
  c.  *Akiu rere de he {mei/bu} he na bei cha? 
(80)  a.  Akiu da    de Baoyu haotaodaku. 
  Akiu  beat  DE Baoyu cry.loudly 
    ‘Akiu beat Baoyu and as a result Baoyu cried loudly.’ 
  b.  *Akiu da   de {mei/bu} da   de Baoyu haotaodaku? 
      Akiu beat DE not/not   beat DE Baoyu cry.loudly 
  c.  *Akiu da {mei/bu} da de Baoyu haotaodaku? 
 
The impossibility of the de-clusters to have an A-not-A form suggests that they have 
undergone some PF operation and thus are opaque to the syntactic integration of [Q].  
  In addition, the Vpri in the depictive de construction can have an aspect suffix, as 
shown by the presence of le in (79a), whereas the Vpri in the resultative de construction 
cannot have an aspect suffix: 
(81)  Akiu da    (*le) de (*le) Baoyu haotaodaku. 
  Akiu beat   PRF  DE   PRF  Baoyu cry.loudly 
  ‘Akiu beat Baoyu and as a result Baoyu cried loudly.’ 
 
 If  the  de-clusters are formed in PF, this aspect contrast can be accounted for. 
Specifically, I propose that de surfaces to the immediate right of the leftmost verbal lexical 
element of the construction, by a PF movement. The leftmost verbal lexical element is the 
Vpri in resultative constructions, whereas it is the depictive in depictive constructions. In 
(79a), for instance, the leftmost verbal element is rere ‘hot’, and thus de attaches to the right 
of rere. If so, after the PF movement, the opaqueness of the de-clusters to any syntactic 
                                                 
11 One might argue that (79b) is not acceptable because rere ‘hot’ is not a typical verb and thus cannot have an 
A-not-A form. However, elements which do not look like typical verbs can have an A-not-A form. The 
preposition cong ‘from’ in (i) and the adjective-like word piaoliang ‘pretty’ in (ii) are both in A-not-A form: 
(i)  ta   cong-mei-cong Shanghai lai?    (ii)  ta    zhang de piaoliang-bu-piaoliang? 
  s/he from-not-from Shanghai come     s/he grow  DE beautiful-not-beautiful 
  ‘Did s/he come from Shanghai?’      ‘Is s/he beautiful?’ 
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operations such as the integration with [Q] to form an A-not-A form in (79) and (80) and 
raising of Vpri to Asp (81) is expected.  
  On the other hand, in the depictive construction, de attaches to the depictive predicate, 
rather than the Vpri, thus Vpri is free to undergo the syntactic movement to Asp. In contrast, 
in the resultative construction, de attaches to Vpri, making the latter unable to undergo the 
syntactic movement to Asp.
12  
  In this research I adopt Chomsky’s (1998, 1999) proposal that structure is sent to PF at 
discrete junctures in the derivation, called “phases.” Chomsky argues that CP and vP are such 
phases. In resultative constructions, the vP which hosts the resultative is firstly merged with 
Vpri. Then in a certain step of the syntactic computations, Vpri moves to the left of its object, 
deriving the VO order, before a higher vP is built. After the derivation reaches to the level of 
the higher vP, a phase is completed. Then the vP is sent to PF. In PF, de moves from the 
lower v to the right of the leftmost verbal element, i.e., Vpri. Assume that AspP is projected 
higher than vP. After the Vpri is targeted by the PF operation, there cannot be any aspect 
licensing relation between the Vpri and Asp in syntax any more (81). Nor can the Vpri merge 
with [Q] (80). The derivations of (80a) are illustrated in (82): 
(82)        AspP    Akiu da   de Baoyu haotaodaku.    (80a) 
  3   Akiu beat DE Baoyu cry.loudly 
            Asp’  ‘Akiu beat Baoyu and as a result Baoyu cried loudly.’ 
   3 
        Asp                  .... 
              vP 
    3 
     t Akiu            v’ 
  licensing    6 
        da-de            VP 
         3 
          Baoyu        V’ 
      3 
       tda        vP 
       3 
              PRO          v’ 
         P F     3 
                        tde        VP 
         6 
         haotaodaku 
 
  In contrast to the derivations in (82), if there is no PF-operation, the element in v is at 
the “edge” of the vP phase, so it may raise to Asp in the CP-phase. This is exactly what we 
see in the V-V resultative construction, where the sequence of V-V-asp occurs. 
                                                 
12 It has been suggested to me that a verb cannot have two suffixes in Chinese, and thus the constraint that Vpri 
does not have an aspect suffix in the de resultative construction should be covered. However, data like (i) show 
that a verb can have two suffixes, and thus the number of suffixes cannot account for the constraint: 
(i)  Akiu chi guo le  fan    jiu   shuijiao le. 
 Akiu  eat  EXP PRF meal then sleep     PRF 
  ‘After Akiu had eaten the meal, he slept.’ 
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  In this section, I have argued that de attaches to the right of the leftmost verbal lexical 
element at PF. I have also argued that in the V-V construction, a depictive predicate PF-
adjoins to Vpri, whereas a resultative predicate undergoes a successive head-raising in syntax. 
5  The effect of head movement in resultative constructions 
The assumed successive head raising of the resultative predicate in the V-V resultative 
construction, and the absence of the raising in the de resultative construction, explain the 
contrasts in the orientation of the resultative predicates and the specificity of the subject of the 
resultative predicates of the two constructions. 
5.1  The orientation of resultative predicates 
One contrast between the V-V and the de construction is that if the Vpri is not a subject-
control verb (see section 3.4.2), in the presence of an overt object of the Vpri, the V-V 
construction allows a subject-orientation reading, as noted by Li (1990), while the de-
construction does not, as shown in (83) and (84):
13 
(83)  a.  Baoyu zhui   lei    le   Daiyu. 
  Baoyu  chase  tired  PRF Daiyu 
    ‘Baoyu chased Daiyu and as a result Daiyu got tired.’ 
    ‘Baoyu chased Daiyu and as a result Baoyu got tired.’ 
  b.  Baoyu zhui   de Daiyu qichuanxuxu. 
  Baoyu  chase  DE Daiyu gasp 
    ‘Baoyu chased Daiyu and as a result Daiyu gasped.’ 
(84)  a.  Baoyu kan     ni        le   na   pan luxiang. 
  Baoyu  watch  fed.up  PRF that CL   video 
    ‘Baoyu watched that video and as a result he got fed up with it.’ 
  b.  *Baoyu kan     de na   pan luxiang dou  ni        le. 
      Baoyu watch DE that CL    video    even fed.up PRF  
 
In the V-V construction (83a), the subject of the resultative predicate is co-referential with 
either the subject or the object of Vpri, i.e., either Baoyu or Daiyu got tired. However, in the 
de construction (83b), the subject of the resultative predicate can only be co-referential with 
the object of Vpri, i.e., only Daiyu gasped, not Baoyu. In the V-V construction (84a), the 
subject of the resultative predicate is co-referential with the subject of Vpri, i.e., Baoyu got 
fed up. It cannot be co-referential with the object of Vpri, since semantically, na pan luxiang 
'that video' cannot the subject of the predicate ni ‘get fed up’. In the de construction (84b), the 
subject of the resultative predicate cannot co-referential with the subject of Vpri. It can only 
be co-referential with the object of Vpri. However, since the semantic clash mentioned above 
rules out the co-indexing, the secondary predication fails and the sentence is unacceptable. 
  We have argued in section 3.4.2 that TRCs have a control structure. The control of the 
PRO subject of the resultative predicate by the subject of Vpri seems to violate MDP, since 
the nearest overt c-commanding nominal is the object of Vpri, rather than the subject of Vpri. 
Why is this violation allowed in the V-V construction, but not in the de construction?
14 
                                                 
13 The subject of the primary predicate of (83) can also be a theme causer. In that case, it patterns with ( ), and 
the reading of the sentence is ‘Chasing Baoyu, Daiyu got tired.’ See the discussion of (15) in section 2.1. 
15
14 It has been mentioned to me that Igbo also has the V-V resultative construction, however, we have not seen 
any subject-oriented reading in the language. It is unclear to me whether Igbo really does not allow a subject-
orientated reading or simply we do not have such data available. In all the Igbo data in Dechaine (1993), such a 
reading is semantically or pragmatically ruled out. In any case, I leave this issue for future research.  
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  In Huang’s (1992: 130) approach, the V-V construction is derived by a reanalysis of 
the complex predicate V’ into V
0, and the raising of the entire compound. He claims that the 
essential difference between the V-V construction and the de-construction is that “whereas the 
former is a lexical category, the latter is a phrase” (p. 126). Consequently, the reading contrast 
like that between the a-sentences and the b-sentences in (83) and (84) is simply acknowledged 
by the claim that “the internal structures of compounds are not accessible to rules or 
principles that apply in syntax, in particular the MDP” (p. 127). Since in my approach, the 
V-V construction is derived in syntax, an alternative account for the contrast is called for. 
  I have argued that a successive head-raising occurs in the V-V TRC, but not in the de-
TRC. Consider the structure (85), where t is the trace of Y, which is adjoined to X to form 
[Y-X]. 
(85)          XP 
  3 
     Spec2         X’ 
   3 
       [Y-X]      YP 
    3 
          Spec1         Y’ 
     3 
     t         Z P  
 
Chomsky (1993, 1995: 298) claims that in this structure Spec1 and Spec2 are both in the 
minimal domain of the chain Y-t and are therefore equidistant from α, which is either ZP or a 
nominal within ZP. Move can therefore raise α to target either Spec1 or Spec2, which are 
equally close to α. It is reasonable to extend the application of this notion of equidistance 
from movement to control (in Hornstein 1999, 2001 control is analyzed as an operation of 
theta-to-theta movement). Accordingly, let us assume that in the V-V TRC, the successive 
head raising makes the subject of the Vpri and the object of the Vpri equidistant from the 
PRO subject of the resultative. In contrast, in the de-TRC, no corresponding successive head 
raising occurs in syntax, and thus compared to the subject of the Vpri, the object of the Vpri is 
always closer to the PRO subject of the resultative. Although some technical details need to 
be worked out, it is reasonable to claim that head raising in syntax may allow some control 
cases to escape from the constraint of MDP. 
5.2  The specificity of the subject of resultative predicates 
Another contrast between the de  and the V-V TRC is that the subject of the resultative 
predicate in the former cannot be nonspecific, like a regular subject in Chinese generally, 
whereas the subject of the resultative predicate in the latter can. The contrast is shown in (86): 
(86)  a.  Akiu da   de {na/*yi}  ge xiaohair haotaodaku. 
  Akiu  beat  DE  that/one CL  child      cry.loudly 
    ‘Akiu beat that child and as a result the child cried loudly.’ 
  b.  Akiu da    ku  le   yi   ge xiaohair. 
  Akiu  beat  cry  PRF one CL child 
    ‘Akiu beat a child and as a result the child cried loudly.’ 
 
  Tsai (2001) argues that head-raising out of the projection where a subject is base-
generated can license a non-specific reading of the subject. In the above discussion we have 
claimed that in the V-V resultative construction, the resultative predicate first raises from VP 
to the lower v, it then raises from the lower vP to Vpri, and finally the derived [Vpri-V] raises 
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to Asp (passing the higher v). In the second step of the head chain, the resultative predicate 
moves out of the vP where the subject of the predicate, a PRO, is base-generated. If Tsai’s 
basic thesis is right, a nonspecific reading of the subject of the resultative predicate in this 
case is licensed. In contrast, in the de resultative construction, the resultative predicate never 
moves out of the lower vP, where its subject, a PRO, is base-generated, and thus no 
nonspecific reading of the subject is licensed in TRC (however the Case relation of the 
subject of a resultative with the Vpri makes possible the nonspecific reading of the subject in 
IRC. See section 3.4.3). 
  In this section I have argued that in the V-V TRC, the successive head-raising may 
account for the possible subject-oriented reading of the resultative predicate, and the head 
raising out of the lower vP can account for the possible non-specific reading of the subject of 
the secondary predicate. 
6  Conclusions and remaining issues 
I have argued for the projection of vP in secondary predication. In secondary predication, v is 
overtly realized in Chinese by Merge (insertion of the functional word de) or Move (attraction 
of the lexical head of a secondary predicate). The former option derives the de-construction, 
whereas the latter option derives the V-V construction. I have also presented the asymmetry 
between vP as a complement of Vpri and vP as an adjunct of the structure of the primary 
predication. Specifically, resultatives are hosted by complement vPs, whereas depictives are 
hosted by adjunct vPs. This complement-adjunct asymmetry accounts for a series of syntactic 
properties of secondary predication in Chinese: the position of a secondary predicate with 
respect to Vpri, the co-occurrence patterns of secondary predicates, the hierarchy of 
depictives, the control and ECM properties of resultative constructions, and the locality 
constraint on the integration of secondary predicates into the structure of primary predication.  
  In addition, I also argued that the surface position of de is derived by a PF operation 
which attaches de to the right of the leftmost verbal lexical head of the construction, and that 
in the V-V TRC, the successive head-raising may account for the possible subject-oriented 
reading of the resultative predicate, and that the head raising out of the lower vP accounts for 
the possible non-specific reading of the subject of the resultative predicate. 
  In this paper we have analyzed two properties of Chinese secondary predicate 
constructions which are not found in English: the alternation of the de  and the V-V 
constructions, and the possible subject-oriented reading of resultatives under a certain 
syntactic condition, i.e. in the V-V construction. There is a third difference between the two 
languages which has not been noted in the literature: the occurrence of an overt subject of a 
secondary predicate in the presence of both subject and object of Vpri:  
(87)  a.  na zhi laohu xue   linlin de chi le   yi   kuai    rou.    (depictive) 
  t h a t   CL tiger  blood drip  DE eat PRF one chunk meat 
    ‘That tiger ate a chunk of meat with dripping blood.’ 
 b.  Baoyui [ti da    de Daiyu [shou dou teng      le]].       (resultative)
15 
    Baoyu      beat DE Daiyu  hand also painful PRT 
    'Baoyu beat Daiyu so that hisBaoyu own hand was painful.' 
 
                                                 
15 I thank Zo Xiu-Zhi Wu for helping me with the Chinese example (87b). Korean data similar to (87) can be 
found in Kim & Maling (1997). 
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 In  (87a),  xue ‘blood’ is the subject of the depictive linlin ‘drip’, and it has a theta 
relation with the depictive, rather than with the Vpri chi ‘eat’, which has both the overt 
subject Akiu and the overt object yi kuai rou ‘one chunk meat’. Similarly in (87b) there is no 
argument sharing between the overt two arguments of the Vpri and the overt subject of the 
resultative predicate. In this sentence, shou ‘hand’ is the subject of the resultative teng 
‘painful’, and it is co-referential with neither of the two overt arguments of the Vpri da ‘beat’, 
Baoyu and Daiyu. Unlike the English sentence in (88), there is no intonation break between 
the part which denotes the secondary predication and the rest of the sentence. Thus data like 
(87) look like regular secondary predication constructions. 
(88)    John left, his ears red. 
 
  Data like (87), however, have two constraints. First, the overt subject of the secondary 
predicate must have a part-whole relation with an argument of the Vpri. In (87a), xue ‘blood’ 
is the subject of the depictive linlin ‘drip’, and it has a part-whole relation with the object of 
the Vpri, yi kuai rou ‘one chunk meat’. (89a) is not acceptable, because there is no part-whole 
relation between the overt subject of the depictive, tian ‘sky’, and any argument of the Vpri. 
In (87b), the subject of Vpri, Baoyu, is an inalienable possessor of shou ‘hand’, which is the 
subject of the secondary predicate teng ‘painful’. (89b) is unacceptable because no such 
relation occurs between the subject of the secondary predicate, caidao ‘knife’, and any 
argument of the Vpri. 
(89)  a.  *na   zhi laohu tian hei  de chi le   yi   kuai rou. 
      that  CL   tiger  sky dark DE eat PRF one CL    meat 
  b.  *Akiu qie de rou   caidao dou dun   le. 
      Akiu cut DE meat knife  even blunt PRF 
 
  The second constraint is that between the two nominals which have a part-whole 
relation, the overt argument of Vpri and the overt subject of a secondary predicate, it is 
always the case that the former is an inalienable possessor of the latter. This relation cannot 
be reversed. These two constraints suggest that a kind of possessor-raising may occur in such 
data from the vP which hosts the secondary predicate to the structure of primary predication, 
or that a kind of possessee-possessor dependency construal occurs between an argument of vP 
which hosts the secondary predicate and an argument of Vpri. Such data may reveal the extent 
of grammatical argument-sharing, which has been claimed to be a defining property of 
depictive (Rothstein 2000a). I leave this for future research. 
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